License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
|
2019-08-28 14:19:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/pagewalk.h>
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/highmem.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched.h>
|
2009-12-15 01:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/mmu_context.h>
|
2024-08-02 15:55:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/swap.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/swapops.h>
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "internal.h"
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-04 01:36:03 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We want to know the real level where a entry is located ignoring any
|
|
|
|
* folding of levels which may be happening. For example if p4d is folded then
|
|
|
|
* a missing entry found at level 1 (p4d) is actually at level 0 (pgd).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int real_depth(int depth)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (depth == 3 && PTRS_PER_PMD == 1)
|
|
|
|
depth = 2;
|
|
|
|
if (depth == 2 && PTRS_PER_PUD == 1)
|
|
|
|
depth = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (depth == 1 && PTRS_PER_P4D == 1)
|
|
|
|
depth = 0;
|
|
|
|
return depth;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-04 01:35:54 +00:00
|
|
|
static int walk_pte_range_inner(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long end, struct mm_walk *walk)
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct mm_walk_ops *ops = walk->ops;
|
2020-02-04 01:35:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-28 09:11:47 +00:00
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ops->install_pte && pte_none(ptep_get(pte))) {
|
|
|
|
pte_t new_pte;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = ops->install_pte(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE, &new_pte,
|
|
|
|
walk);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_pte_at(walk->mm, addr, pte, new_pte);
|
|
|
|
/* Non-present before, so for arches that need it. */
|
|
|
|
if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(walk->no_vma))
|
|
|
|
update_mmu_cache(walk->vma, addr, pte);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
err = ops->pte_entry(pte, addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE, walk);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-02-04 01:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (addr >= end - PAGE_SIZE)
|
2008-04-28 09:11:47 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2020-02-04 01:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
addr += PAGE_SIZE;
|
2008-04-28 09:11:47 +00:00
|
|
|
pte++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-02-04 01:35:54 +00:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int walk_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
|
|
|
|
struct mm_walk *walk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pte_t *pte;
|
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
spinlock_t *ptl;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (walk->no_vma) {
|
2023-06-09 01:18:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* pte_offset_map() might apply user-specific validation.
|
2023-07-23 21:17:55 +00:00
|
|
|
* Indeed, on x86_64 the pmd entries set up by init_espfix_ap()
|
|
|
|
* fit its pmd_bad() check (_PAGE_NX set and _PAGE_RW clear),
|
|
|
|
* and CONFIG_EFI_PGT_DUMP efi_mm goes so far as to walk them.
|
2023-06-09 01:18:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-07-23 21:17:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (walk->mm == &init_mm || addr >= TASK_SIZE)
|
2023-06-09 01:18:49 +00:00
|
|
|
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
|
|
|
|
if (pte) {
|
|
|
|
err = walk_pte_range_inner(pte, addr, end, walk);
|
2023-09-02 15:29:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (walk->mm != &init_mm && addr < TASK_SIZE)
|
2023-06-09 01:18:49 +00:00
|
|
|
pte_unmap(pte);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-02-04 01:35:54 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(walk->mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
|
2023-06-09 01:18:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pte) {
|
|
|
|
err = walk_pte_range_inner(pte, addr, end, walk);
|
|
|
|
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-02-04 01:35:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2023-06-09 01:18:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pte)
|
|
|
|
walk->action = ACTION_AGAIN;
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int walk_pmd_range(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
|
2008-06-12 22:21:47 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mm_walk *walk)
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pmd_t *pmd;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long next;
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct mm_walk_ops *ops = walk->ops;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
bool has_handler = ops->pte_entry;
|
|
|
|
bool has_install = ops->install_pte;
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
2020-02-04 01:36:03 +00:00
|
|
|
int depth = real_depth(3);
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
|
|
|
|
do {
|
2011-03-22 23:32:56 +00:00
|
|
|
again:
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
|
2022-09-02 11:26:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (has_install)
|
|
|
|
err = __pte_alloc(walk->mm, pmd);
|
|
|
|
else if (ops->pte_hole)
|
2020-02-04 01:36:03 +00:00
|
|
|
err = ops->pte_hole(addr, next, depth, walk);
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!has_install)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-02-04 01:35:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
walk->action = ACTION_SUBTREE;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-22 23:32:56 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This implies that each ->pmd_entry() handler
|
|
|
|
* needs to know about pmd_trans_huge() pmds
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ops->pmd_entry)
|
|
|
|
err = ops->pmd_entry(pmd, addr, next, walk);
|
2011-03-22 23:32:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-04 01:35:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (walk->action == ACTION_AGAIN)
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (walk->action == ACTION_CONTINUE)
|
2011-03-22 23:32:56 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!has_handler) { /* No handlers for lower page tables. */
|
|
|
|
if (!has_install)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* Nothing to do. */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We are ONLY installing, so avoid unnecessarily
|
|
|
|
* splitting a present huge page.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (pmd_present(*pmd) &&
|
|
|
|
(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd) || pmd_devmap(*pmd)))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-06-09 01:18:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (walk->vma)
|
2020-02-04 01:35:50 +00:00
|
|
|
split_huge_pmd(walk->vma, pmd, addr);
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
else if (pmd_leaf(*pmd) || !pmd_present(*pmd))
|
|
|
|
continue; /* Nothing to do. */
|
2020-02-04 01:35:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2024-07-02 13:51:35 +00:00
|
|
|
err = walk_pte_range(pmd, addr, next, walk);
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2023-06-09 01:18:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (walk->action == ACTION_AGAIN)
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-09 14:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
static int walk_pud_range(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
|
2008-06-12 22:21:47 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mm_walk *walk)
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pud_t *pud;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long next;
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct mm_walk_ops *ops = walk->ops;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
bool has_handler = ops->pmd_entry || ops->pte_entry;
|
|
|
|
bool has_install = ops->install_pte;
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
2020-02-04 01:36:03 +00:00
|
|
|
int depth = real_depth(2);
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-09 14:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
do {
|
2017-02-24 22:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
again:
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
next = pud_addr_end(addr, end);
|
2022-09-02 11:26:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pud_none(*pud)) {
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (has_install)
|
|
|
|
err = __pmd_alloc(walk->mm, pud, addr);
|
|
|
|
else if (ops->pte_hole)
|
2020-02-04 01:36:03 +00:00
|
|
|
err = ops->pte_hole(addr, next, depth, walk);
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!has_install)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-24 22:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-02-04 01:35:45 +00:00
|
|
|
walk->action = ACTION_SUBTREE;
|
2017-02-24 22:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-02-04 01:35:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ops->pud_entry)
|
|
|
|
err = ops->pud_entry(pud, addr, next, walk);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (walk->action == ACTION_AGAIN)
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (walk->action == ACTION_CONTINUE)
|
2020-02-04 01:35:45 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2017-02-24 22:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!has_handler) { /* No handlers for lower page tables. */
|
|
|
|
if (!has_install)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* Nothing to do. */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We are ONLY installing, so avoid unnecessarily
|
|
|
|
* splitting a present huge page.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (pud_present(*pud) &&
|
|
|
|
(pud_trans_huge(*pud) || pud_devmap(*pud)))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-04 01:35:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if (walk->vma)
|
|
|
|
split_huge_pud(walk->vma, pud, addr);
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
else if (pud_leaf(*pud) || !pud_present(*pud))
|
|
|
|
continue; /* Nothing to do. */
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-24 22:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pud_none(*pud))
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
|
2024-07-02 13:51:35 +00:00
|
|
|
err = walk_pmd_range(pud, addr, next, walk);
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} while (pud++, addr = next, addr != end);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-09 14:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
static int walk_p4d_range(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
|
|
|
|
struct mm_walk *walk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
p4d_t *p4d;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long next;
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct mm_walk_ops *ops = walk->ops;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
bool has_handler = ops->pud_entry || ops->pmd_entry || ops->pte_entry;
|
|
|
|
bool has_install = ops->install_pte;
|
2017-03-09 14:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
2020-02-04 01:36:03 +00:00
|
|
|
int depth = real_depth(1);
|
2017-03-09 14:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
next = p4d_addr_end(addr, end);
|
|
|
|
if (p4d_none_or_clear_bad(p4d)) {
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (has_install)
|
|
|
|
err = __pud_alloc(walk->mm, p4d, addr);
|
|
|
|
else if (ops->pte_hole)
|
2020-02-04 01:36:03 +00:00
|
|
|
err = ops->pte_hole(addr, next, depth, walk);
|
2017-03-09 14:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!has_install)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2017-03-09 14:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-02-04 01:35:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ops->p4d_entry) {
|
|
|
|
err = ops->p4d_entry(p4d, addr, next, walk);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (has_handler || has_install)
|
2017-03-09 14:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
err = walk_pud_range(p4d, addr, next, walk);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} while (p4d++, addr = next, addr != end);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
static int walk_pgd_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
|
|
|
|
struct mm_walk *walk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pgd_t *pgd;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long next;
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct mm_walk_ops *ops = walk->ops;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
bool has_handler = ops->p4d_entry || ops->pud_entry || ops->pmd_entry ||
|
|
|
|
ops->pte_entry;
|
|
|
|
bool has_install = ops->install_pte;
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-04 01:36:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if (walk->pgd)
|
|
|
|
pgd = walk->pgd + pgd_index(addr);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
pgd = pgd_offset(walk->mm, addr);
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
next = pgd_addr_end(addr, end);
|
|
|
|
if (pgd_none_or_clear_bad(pgd)) {
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (has_install)
|
|
|
|
err = __p4d_alloc(walk->mm, pgd, addr);
|
|
|
|
else if (ops->pte_hole)
|
2020-02-04 01:36:03 +00:00
|
|
|
err = ops->pte_hole(addr, next, 0, walk);
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!has_install)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-02-04 01:35:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ops->pgd_entry) {
|
|
|
|
err = ops->pgd_entry(pgd, addr, next, walk);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (has_handler || has_install)
|
2017-03-09 14:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
err = walk_p4d_range(pgd, addr, next, walk);
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} while (pgd++, addr = next, addr != end);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-04-06 21:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
|
|
|
|
static unsigned long hugetlb_entry_end(struct hstate *h, unsigned long addr,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long end)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long boundary = (addr & huge_page_mask(h)) + huge_page_size(h);
|
|
|
|
return boundary < end ? boundary : end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
static int walk_hugetlb_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
|
2010-04-06 21:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mm_walk *walk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->vma;
|
2010-04-06 21:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
|
|
|
|
unsigned long next;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long hmask = huge_page_mask(h);
|
2017-07-06 22:39:42 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long sz = huge_page_size(h);
|
2010-04-06 21:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
pte_t *pte;
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct mm_walk_ops *ops = walk->ops;
|
2010-04-06 21:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-12-16 15:52:26 +00:00
|
|
|
hugetlb_vma_lock_read(vma);
|
2010-04-06 21:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
next = hugetlb_entry_end(h, addr, end);
|
2022-12-16 15:52:29 +00:00
|
|
|
pte = hugetlb_walk(vma, addr & hmask, sz);
|
2017-11-14 00:03:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pte)
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
err = ops->hugetlb_entry(pte, hmask, addr, next, walk);
|
|
|
|
else if (ops->pte_hole)
|
2020-02-04 01:36:03 +00:00
|
|
|
err = ops->pte_hole(addr, next, -1, walk);
|
2010-04-06 21:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-04-06 21:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
} while (addr = next, addr != end);
|
2022-12-16 15:52:26 +00:00
|
|
|
hugetlb_vma_unlock_read(vma);
|
2010-04-06 21:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2010-04-06 21:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-07-26 00:12:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE */
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
static int walk_hugetlb_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
|
2011-07-26 00:12:09 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mm_walk *walk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE */
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Decide whether we really walk over the current vma on [@start, @end)
|
|
|
|
* or skip it via the returned value. Return 0 if we do walk over the
|
|
|
|
* current vma, and return 1 if we skip the vma. Negative values means
|
|
|
|
* error, where we abort the current walk.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int walk_page_test(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
|
|
|
|
struct mm_walk *walk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->vma;
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct mm_walk_ops *ops = walk->ops;
|
2011-07-26 00:12:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ops->test_walk)
|
|
|
|
return ops->test_walk(start, end, walk);
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-02-11 23:28:06 +00:00
|
|
|
* vma(VM_PFNMAP) doesn't have any valid struct pages behind VM_PFNMAP
|
|
|
|
* range, so we don't walk over it as we do for normal vmas. However,
|
|
|
|
* Some callers are interested in handling hole range and they don't
|
|
|
|
* want to just ignore any single address range. Such users certainly
|
|
|
|
* define their ->pte_hole() callbacks, so let's delegate them to handle
|
|
|
|
* vma(VM_PFNMAP).
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-02-11 23:28:06 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_PFNMAP) {
|
|
|
|
int err = 1;
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ops->pte_hole)
|
2020-02-04 01:36:03 +00:00
|
|
|
err = ops->pte_hole(start, end, -1, walk);
|
2015-02-11 23:28:06 +00:00
|
|
|
return err ? err : 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __walk_page_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
|
|
|
|
struct mm_walk *walk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->vma;
|
2019-10-01 09:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct mm_walk_ops *ops = walk->ops;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
bool is_hugetlb = is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We do not support hugetlb PTE installation. */
|
|
|
|
if (ops->install_pte && is_hugetlb)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2019-10-01 09:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-02 11:26:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ops->pre_vma) {
|
2019-10-01 09:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
err = ops->pre_vma(start, end, walk);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (is_hugetlb) {
|
2019-10-01 09:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ops->hugetlb_entry)
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
err = walk_hugetlb_range(start, end, walk);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
err = walk_pgd_range(start, end, walk);
|
|
|
|
|
2022-09-02 11:26:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ops->post_vma)
|
2019-10-01 09:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
ops->post_vma(walk);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-04-06 21:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-08-04 15:27:19 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline void process_mm_walk_lock(struct mm_struct *mm,
|
|
|
|
enum page_walk_lock walk_lock)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (walk_lock == PGWALK_RDLOCK)
|
|
|
|
mmap_assert_locked(mm);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
mmap_assert_write_locked(mm);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void process_vma_walk_lock(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
|
|
|
|
enum page_walk_lock walk_lock)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK
|
|
|
|
switch (walk_lock) {
|
|
|
|
case PGWALK_WRLOCK:
|
|
|
|
vma_start_write(vma);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PGWALK_WRLOCK_VERIFY:
|
|
|
|
vma_assert_write_locked(vma);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PGWALK_RDLOCK:
|
|
|
|
/* PGWALK_RDLOCK is handled by process_mm_walk_lock */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* See the comment for walk_page_range(), this performs the heavy lifting of the
|
|
|
|
* operation, only sets no restrictions on how the walk proceeds.
|
2011-07-26 00:12:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
* We usually restrict the ability to install PTEs, but this functionality is
|
|
|
|
* available to internal memory management code and provided in mm/internal.h.
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
int walk_page_range_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long end, const struct mm_walk_ops *ops,
|
|
|
|
void *private)
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long next;
|
|
|
|
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mm_walk walk = {
|
|
|
|
.ops = ops,
|
|
|
|
.mm = mm,
|
|
|
|
.private = private,
|
|
|
|
};
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (start >= end)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!walk.mm)
|
2008-06-12 22:21:47 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2023-08-04 15:27:19 +00:00
|
|
|
process_mm_walk_lock(walk.mm, ops->walk_lock);
|
2013-05-24 22:55:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
vma = find_vma(walk.mm, start);
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
do {
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!vma) { /* after the last vma */
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
walk.vma = NULL;
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
next = end;
|
2022-09-02 11:26:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ops->pte_hole)
|
|
|
|
err = ops->pte_hole(start, next, -1, &walk);
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (start < vma->vm_start) { /* outside vma */
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
walk.vma = NULL;
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
next = min(end, vma->vm_start);
|
2022-09-02 11:26:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ops->pte_hole)
|
|
|
|
err = ops->pte_hole(start, next, -1, &walk);
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
} else { /* inside vma */
|
2023-08-04 15:27:19 +00:00
|
|
|
process_vma_walk_lock(vma, ops->walk_lock);
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
walk.vma = vma;
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
next = min(end, vma->vm_end);
|
2022-09-06 19:49:04 +00:00
|
|
|
vma = find_vma(mm, vma->vm_end);
|
2010-11-24 20:57:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
err = walk_page_test(start, next, &walk);
|
2015-03-25 22:55:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err > 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* positive return values are purely for
|
|
|
|
* controlling the pagewalk, so should never
|
|
|
|
* be passed to the callers.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
err = 0;
|
2013-05-24 22:55:36 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2015-03-25 22:55:14 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err < 0)
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
err = __walk_page_range(start, next, &walk);
|
2022-09-02 11:26:12 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2015-02-11 23:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
} while (start = next, start < end);
|
2008-02-05 06:29:01 +00:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-11 23:27:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Determine if the walk operations specified are permitted to be used for a
|
|
|
|
* page table walk.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This check is performed on all functions which are parameterised by walk
|
|
|
|
* operations and exposed in include/linux/pagewalk.h.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Internal memory management code can use the walk_page_range_mm() function to
|
|
|
|
* be able to use all page walking operations.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static bool check_ops_valid(const struct mm_walk_ops *ops)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The installation of PTEs is solely under the control of memory
|
|
|
|
* management logic and subject to many subtle locking, security and
|
|
|
|
* cache considerations so we cannot permit other users to do so, and
|
|
|
|
* certainly not for exported symbols.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ops->install_pte)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* walk_page_range - walk page table with caller specific callbacks
|
|
|
|
* @mm: mm_struct representing the target process of page table walk
|
|
|
|
* @start: start address of the virtual address range
|
|
|
|
* @end: end address of the virtual address range
|
|
|
|
* @ops: operation to call during the walk
|
|
|
|
* @private: private data for callbacks' usage
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Recursively walk the page table tree of the process represented by @mm
|
|
|
|
* within the virtual address range [@start, @end). During walking, we can do
|
|
|
|
* some caller-specific works for each entry, by setting up pmd_entry(),
|
|
|
|
* pte_entry(), and/or hugetlb_entry(). If you don't set up for some of these
|
|
|
|
* callbacks, the associated entries/pages are just ignored.
|
|
|
|
* The return values of these callbacks are commonly defined like below:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - 0 : succeeded to handle the current entry, and if you don't reach the
|
|
|
|
* end address yet, continue to walk.
|
|
|
|
* - >0 : succeeded to handle the current entry, and return to the caller
|
|
|
|
* with caller specific value.
|
|
|
|
* - <0 : failed to handle the current entry, and return to the caller
|
|
|
|
* with error code.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Before starting to walk page table, some callers want to check whether
|
|
|
|
* they really want to walk over the current vma, typically by checking
|
|
|
|
* its vm_flags. walk_page_test() and @ops->test_walk() are used for this
|
|
|
|
* purpose.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If operations need to be staged before and committed after a vma is walked,
|
|
|
|
* there are two callbacks, pre_vma() and post_vma(). Note that post_vma(),
|
|
|
|
* since it is intended to handle commit-type operations, can't return any
|
|
|
|
* errors.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* struct mm_walk keeps current values of some common data like vma and pmd,
|
|
|
|
* which are useful for the access from callbacks. If you want to pass some
|
|
|
|
* caller-specific data to callbacks, @private should be helpful.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Locking:
|
|
|
|
* Callers of walk_page_range() and walk_page_vma() should hold @mm->mmap_lock,
|
|
|
|
* because these function traverse vma list and/or access to vma's data.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int walk_page_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long end, const struct mm_walk_ops *ops,
|
|
|
|
void *private)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!check_ops_valid(ops))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return walk_page_range_mm(mm, start, end, ops, private);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-08-22 13:02:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* walk_page_range_novma - walk a range of pagetables not backed by a vma
|
|
|
|
* @mm: mm_struct representing the target process of page table walk
|
|
|
|
* @start: start address of the virtual address range
|
|
|
|
* @end: end address of the virtual address range
|
|
|
|
* @ops: operation to call during the walk
|
|
|
|
* @pgd: pgd to walk if different from mm->pgd
|
|
|
|
* @private: private data for callbacks' usage
|
|
|
|
*
|
2020-02-04 01:35:54 +00:00
|
|
|
* Similar to walk_page_range() but can walk any page tables even if they are
|
|
|
|
* not backed by VMAs. Because 'unusual' entries may be walked this function
|
|
|
|
* will also not lock the PTEs for the pte_entry() callback. This is useful for
|
|
|
|
* walking the kernel pages tables or page tables for firmware.
|
2023-11-27 08:46:42 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: Be careful to walk the kernel pages tables, the caller may be need to
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
* take other effective approaches (mmap lock may be insufficient) to prevent
|
2023-11-27 08:46:42 +00:00
|
|
|
* the intermediate kernel page tables belonging to the specified address range
|
|
|
|
* from being freed (e.g. memory hot-remove).
|
2020-02-04 01:35:54 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-02-04 01:35:50 +00:00
|
|
|
int walk_page_range_novma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long end, const struct mm_walk_ops *ops,
|
2020-02-04 01:36:42 +00:00
|
|
|
pgd_t *pgd,
|
2020-02-04 01:35:50 +00:00
|
|
|
void *private)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct mm_walk walk = {
|
|
|
|
.ops = ops,
|
|
|
|
.mm = mm,
|
2020-02-04 01:36:42 +00:00
|
|
|
.pgd = pgd,
|
2020-02-04 01:35:50 +00:00
|
|
|
.private = private,
|
|
|
|
.no_vma = true
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (start >= end || !walk.mm)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!check_ops_valid(ops))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2020-02-04 01:35:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-27 08:46:42 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* 1) For walking the user virtual address space:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The mmap lock protects the page walker from changes to the page
|
|
|
|
* tables during the walk. However a read lock is insufficient to
|
|
|
|
* protect those areas which don't have a VMA as munmap() detaches
|
|
|
|
* the VMAs before downgrading to a read lock and actually tearing
|
|
|
|
* down PTEs/page tables. In which case, the mmap write lock should
|
|
|
|
* be hold.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 2) For walking the kernel virtual address space:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The kernel intermediate page tables usually do not be freed, so
|
|
|
|
* the mmap map read lock is sufficient. But there are some exceptions.
|
|
|
|
* E.g. memory hot-remove. In which case, the mmap lock is insufficient
|
|
|
|
* to prevent the intermediate kernel pages tables belonging to the
|
|
|
|
* specified address range from being freed. The caller should take
|
|
|
|
* other actions to prevent this race.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (mm == &init_mm)
|
|
|
|
mmap_assert_locked(walk.mm);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
mmap_assert_write_locked(walk.mm);
|
2020-02-04 01:35:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-02 11:26:12 +00:00
|
|
|
return walk_pgd_range(start, end, &walk);
|
2020-02-04 01:35:50 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-21 10:11:39 +00:00
|
|
|
int walk_page_range_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long end, const struct mm_walk_ops *ops,
|
|
|
|
void *private)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct mm_walk walk = {
|
|
|
|
.ops = ops,
|
|
|
|
.mm = vma->vm_mm,
|
|
|
|
.vma = vma,
|
|
|
|
.private = private,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (start >= end || !walk.mm)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (start < vma->vm_start || end > vma->vm_end)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!check_ops_valid(ops))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2022-10-21 10:11:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-08-04 15:27:19 +00:00
|
|
|
process_mm_walk_lock(walk.mm, ops->walk_lock);
|
|
|
|
process_vma_walk_lock(vma, ops->walk_lock);
|
2022-10-21 10:11:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return __walk_page_range(start, end, &walk);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int walk_page_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, const struct mm_walk_ops *ops,
|
|
|
|
void *private)
|
2015-02-11 23:27:40 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mm_walk walk = {
|
|
|
|
.ops = ops,
|
|
|
|
.mm = vma->vm_mm,
|
|
|
|
.vma = vma,
|
|
|
|
.private = private,
|
|
|
|
};
|
2015-02-11 23:27:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!walk.mm)
|
2015-02-11 23:27:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!check_ops_valid(ops))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2015-02-11 23:27:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-08-04 15:27:19 +00:00
|
|
|
process_mm_walk_lock(walk.mm, ops->walk_lock);
|
|
|
|
process_vma_walk_lock(vma, ops->walk_lock);
|
2019-08-28 14:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
return __walk_page_range(vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, &walk);
|
2015-02-11 23:27:40 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-10-01 09:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* walk_page_mapping - walk all memory areas mapped into a struct address_space.
|
|
|
|
* @mapping: Pointer to the struct address_space
|
|
|
|
* @first_index: First page offset in the address_space
|
|
|
|
* @nr: Number of incremental page offsets to cover
|
|
|
|
* @ops: operation to call during the walk
|
|
|
|
* @private: private data for callbacks' usage
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This function walks all memory areas mapped into a struct address_space.
|
|
|
|
* The walk is limited to only the given page-size index range, but if
|
|
|
|
* the index boundaries cross a huge page-table entry, that entry will be
|
|
|
|
* included.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Also see walk_page_range() for additional information.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Locking:
|
2020-06-09 04:33:54 +00:00
|
|
|
* This function can't require that the struct mm_struct::mmap_lock is held,
|
2019-10-01 09:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
* since @mapping may be mapped by multiple processes. Instead
|
|
|
|
* @mapping->i_mmap_rwsem must be held. This might have implications in the
|
|
|
|
* callbacks, and it's up tho the caller to ensure that the
|
2020-06-09 04:33:54 +00:00
|
|
|
* struct mm_struct::mmap_lock is not needed.
|
2019-10-01 09:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Also this means that a caller can't rely on the struct
|
|
|
|
* vm_area_struct::vm_flags to be constant across a call,
|
|
|
|
* except for immutable flags. Callers requiring this shouldn't use
|
|
|
|
* this function.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: 0 on success, negative error code on failure, positive number on
|
|
|
|
* caller defined premature termination.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int walk_page_mapping(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t first_index,
|
|
|
|
pgoff_t nr, const struct mm_walk_ops *ops,
|
|
|
|
void *private)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct mm_walk walk = {
|
|
|
|
.ops = ops,
|
|
|
|
.private = private,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
|
|
|
|
pgoff_t vba, vea, cba, cea;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long start_addr, end_addr;
|
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
mm: pagewalk: add the ability to install PTEs
Patch series "implement lightweight guard pages", v4.
Userland library functions such as allocators and threading
implementations often require regions of memory to act as 'guard pages' -
mappings which, when accessed, result in a fatal signal being sent to the
accessing process.
The current means by which these are implemented is via a PROT_NONE mmap()
mapping, which provides the required semantics however incur an overhead
of a VMA for each such region.
With a great many processes and threads, this can rapidly add up and incur
a significant memory penalty. It also has the added problem of preventing
merges that might otherwise be permitted.
This series takes a different approach - an idea suggested by Vlastimil
Babka (and before him David Hildenbrand and Jann Horn - perhaps more - the
provenance becomes a little tricky to ascertain after this - please
forgive any omissions!) - rather than locating the guard pages at the VMA
layer, instead placing them in page tables mapping the required ranges.
Early testing of the prototype version of this code suggests a 5 times
speed up in memory mapping invocations (in conjunction with use of
process_madvise()) and a 13% reduction in VMAs on an entirely idle android
system and unoptimised code.
We expect with optimisation and a loaded system with a larger number of
guard pages this could significantly increase, but in any case these
numbers are encouraging.
This way, rather than having separate VMAs specifying which parts of a
range are guard pages, instead we have a VMA spanning the entire range of
memory a user is permitted to access and including ranges which are to be
'guarded'.
After mapping this, a user can specify which parts of the range should
result in a fatal signal when accessed.
By restricting the ability to specify guard pages to memory mapped by
existing VMAs, we can rely on the mappings being torn down when the
mappings are ultimately unmapped and everything works simply as if the
memory were not faulted in, from the point of view of the containing VMAs.
This mechanism in effect poisons memory ranges similar to hardware memory
poisoning, only it is an entirely software-controlled form of poisoning.
The mechanism is implemented via madvise() behaviour - MADV_GUARD_INSTALL
which installs page table-level guard page markers - and MADV_GUARD_REMOVE
- which clears them.
Guard markers can be installed across multiple VMAs and any existing
mappings will be cleared, that is zapped, before installing the guard page
markers in the page tables.
There is no concept of 'nested' guard markers, multiple attempts to
install guard markers in a range will, after the first attempt, have no
effect.
Importantly, removing guard markers over a range that contains both guard
markers and ordinary backed memory has no effect on anything but the guard
markers (including leaving huge pages un-split), so a user can safely
remove guard markers over a range of memory leaving the rest intact.
The actual mechanism by which the page table entries are specified makes
use of existing logic - PTE markers, which are used for the userfaultfd
UFFDIO_POISON mechanism.
Unfortunately PTE_MARKER_POISONED is not suited for the guard page
mechanism as it results in VM_FAULT_HWPOISON semantics in the fault
handler, so we add our own specific PTE_MARKER_GUARD and adapt existing
logic to handle it.
We also extend the generic page walk mechanism to allow for installation
of PTEs (carefully restricted to memory management logic only to prevent
unwanted abuse).
We ensure that zapping performed by MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE do not
remove guard markers, nor does forking (except when VM_WIPEONFORK is
specified for a VMA which implies a total removal of memory
characteristics).
It's important to note that the guard page implementation is emphatically
NOT a security feature, so a user can remove the markers if they wish. We
simply implement it in such a way as to provide the least surprising
behaviour.
An extensive set of self-tests are provided which ensure behaviour is as
expected and additionally self-documents expected behaviour of guard
ranges.
This patch (of 5):
The existing generic pagewalk logic permits the walking of page tables,
invoking callbacks at individual page table levels via user-provided
mm_walk_ops callbacks.
This is useful for traversing existing page table entries, but precludes
the ability to establish new ones.
Existing mechanism for performing a walk which also installs page table
entries if necessary are heavily duplicated throughout the kernel, each
with semantic differences from one another and largely unavailable for use
elsewhere.
Rather than add yet another implementation, we extend the generic pagewalk
logic to enable the installation of page table entries by adding a new
install_pte() callback in mm_walk_ops. If this is specified, then upon
encountering a missing page table entry, we allocate and install a new one
and continue the traversal.
If a THP huge page is encountered at either the PMD or PUD level we split
it only if there are ops->pte_entry() (or ops->pmd_entry at PUD level),
otherwise if there is only an ops->install_pte(), we avoid the unnecessary
split.
We do not support hugetlb at this stage.
If this function returns an error, or an allocation fails during the
operation, we abort the operation altogether. It is up to the caller to
deal appropriately with partially populated page table ranges.
If install_pte() is defined, the semantics of pte_entry() change - this
callback is then only invoked if the entry already exists. This is a
useful property, as it allows a caller to handle existing PTEs while
installing new ones where necessary in the specified range.
If install_pte() is not defined, then there is no functional difference to
this patch, so all existing logic will work precisely as it did before.
As we only permit the installation of PTEs where a mapping does not
already exist there is no need for TLB management, however we do invoke
update_mmu_cache() for architectures which require manual maintenance of
mappings for other CPUs.
We explicitly do not allow the existing page walk API to expose this
feature as it is dangerous and intended for internal mm use only.
Therefore we provide a new walk_page_range_mm() function exposed only to
mm/internal.h.
We take the opportunity to additionally clean up the page walker logic to
be a little easier to follow.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b432ebef013e3fdf9f92101533435de1bffadf.1730123433.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabkba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-28 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!check_ops_valid(ops))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-10-01 09:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
lockdep_assert_held(&mapping->i_mmap_rwsem);
|
|
|
|
vma_interval_tree_foreach(vma, &mapping->i_mmap, first_index,
|
|
|
|
first_index + nr - 1) {
|
|
|
|
/* Clip to the vma */
|
|
|
|
vba = vma->vm_pgoff;
|
|
|
|
vea = vba + vma_pages(vma);
|
|
|
|
cba = first_index;
|
|
|
|
cba = max(cba, vba);
|
|
|
|
cea = first_index + nr;
|
|
|
|
cea = min(cea, vea);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
start_addr = ((cba - vba) << PAGE_SHIFT) + vma->vm_start;
|
|
|
|
end_addr = ((cea - vba) << PAGE_SHIFT) + vma->vm_start;
|
|
|
|
if (start_addr >= end_addr)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
walk.vma = vma;
|
|
|
|
walk.mm = vma->vm_mm;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = walk_page_test(vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, &walk);
|
|
|
|
if (err > 0) {
|
|
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else if (err < 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = __walk_page_range(start_addr, end_addr, &walk);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2024-08-02 15:55:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* folio_walk_start - walk the page tables to a folio
|
|
|
|
* @fw: filled with information on success.
|
|
|
|
* @vma: the VMA.
|
|
|
|
* @addr: the virtual address to use for the page table walk.
|
|
|
|
* @flags: flags modifying which folios to walk to.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Walk the page tables using @addr in a given @vma to a mapped folio and
|
|
|
|
* return the folio, making sure that the page table entry referenced by
|
|
|
|
* @addr cannot change until folio_walk_end() was called.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* As default, this function returns only folios that are not special (e.g., not
|
|
|
|
* the zeropage) and never returns folios that are supposed to be ignored by the
|
|
|
|
* VM as documented by vm_normal_page(). If requested, zeropages will be
|
|
|
|
* returned as well.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* As default, this function only considers present page table entries.
|
|
|
|
* If requested, it will also consider migration entries.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If this function returns NULL it might either indicate "there is nothing" or
|
|
|
|
* "there is nothing suitable".
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* On success, @fw is filled and the function returns the folio while the PTL
|
|
|
|
* is still held and folio_walk_end() must be called to clean up,
|
|
|
|
* releasing any held locks. The returned folio must *not* be used after the
|
|
|
|
* call to folio_walk_end(), unless a short-term folio reference is taken before
|
|
|
|
* that call.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @fw->page will correspond to the page that is effectively referenced by
|
|
|
|
* @addr. However, for migration entries and shared zeropages @fw->page is
|
|
|
|
* set to NULL. Note that large folios might be mapped by multiple page table
|
|
|
|
* entries, and this function will always only lookup a single entry as
|
|
|
|
* specified by @addr, which might or might not cover more than a single page of
|
|
|
|
* the returned folio.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This function must *not* be used as a naive replacement for
|
|
|
|
* get_user_pages() / pin_user_pages(), especially not to perform DMA or
|
|
|
|
* to carelessly modify page content. This function may *only* be used to grab
|
|
|
|
* short-term folio references, never to grab long-term folio references.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Using the page table entry pointers in @fw for reading or modifying the
|
|
|
|
* entry should be avoided where possible: however, there might be valid
|
|
|
|
* use cases.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* WARNING: Modifying page table entries in hugetlb VMAs requires a lot of care.
|
|
|
|
* For example, PMD page table sharing might require prior unsharing. Also,
|
|
|
|
* logical hugetlb entries might span multiple physical page table entries,
|
|
|
|
* which *must* be modified in a single operation (set_huge_pte_at(),
|
|
|
|
* huge_ptep_set_*, ...). Note that the page table entry stored in @fw might
|
|
|
|
* not correspond to the first physical entry of a logical hugetlb entry.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The mmap lock must be held in read mode.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: folio pointer on success, otherwise NULL.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct folio *folio_walk_start(struct folio_walk *fw,
|
|
|
|
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
|
|
|
|
folio_walk_flags_t flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long entry_size;
|
|
|
|
bool expose_page = true;
|
|
|
|
struct page *page;
|
|
|
|
pud_t *pudp, pud;
|
|
|
|
pmd_t *pmdp, pmd;
|
|
|
|
pte_t *ptep, pte;
|
|
|
|
spinlock_t *ptl;
|
|
|
|
pgd_t *pgdp;
|
|
|
|
p4d_t *p4dp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mmap_assert_locked(vma->vm_mm);
|
|
|
|
vma_pgtable_walk_begin(vma);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(addr < vma->vm_start || addr >= vma->vm_end))
|
|
|
|
goto not_found;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pgdp = pgd_offset(vma->vm_mm, addr);
|
|
|
|
if (pgd_none_or_clear_bad(pgdp))
|
|
|
|
goto not_found;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p4dp = p4d_offset(pgdp, addr);
|
|
|
|
if (p4d_none_or_clear_bad(p4dp))
|
|
|
|
goto not_found;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pudp = pud_offset(p4dp, addr);
|
|
|
|
pud = pudp_get(pudp);
|
|
|
|
if (pud_none(pud))
|
|
|
|
goto not_found;
|
mm/pagewalk: fix usage of pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() without present check
pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() only implies a pmd_present()/pud_present() check on
some architectures. We really should check for
pmd_present()/pud_present() first.
This should explain the report we got on ppc64 (which has
CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES set in the config) that triggered:
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(pmd_leaf(pmdp_get_lockless(pmdp)));
Likely we had a PMD migration entry for which pmd_leaf() did not trigger.
We raced with restoring the PMD migration entry, and suddenly saw a
pmd_leaf(). In this case, pte_offset_map_lock() saved us from more
trouble, because it rechecks the PMD value, but we would not have
processed the migration entry -- which is not too bad because the only
user of FW_MIGRATION is KSM for unsharing, and KSM only applies to small
folios.
Further, we shouldn't re-read the PMD/PUD value for our warning, the
primary purpose of the VM_WARN_ON_ONCE() is to find spurious use of
pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() without CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES.
As a side note, we are currently not implementing FW_MIGRATION support for
PUD migration entries, which likely should exist due to hugetlb. Add a
TODO so this won't fall through the cracks if more FW_MIGRATION users get
added.
Was able to write a quick reproducer and verify that the issue no longer triggers with this fix.
https://gitlab.com/davidhildenbrand/scratchspace/-/blob/main/reproducers/move-pages-pmd-leaf.c
Without this fix after a couple of seconds in a VM with 2 NUMA nodes:
[ 54.333753] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 54.334901] WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 1704 at mm/pagewalk.c:815 folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.336455] Modules linked in: ...
[ 54.345009] CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 1704 Comm: move-pages-pmd- Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2+ #81
[ 54.346529] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
[ 54.348191] RIP: 0010:folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.349134] Code: b5 ad 48 8d 35 00 00 00 00 e8 6d 59 d7 ff e8 08 74 da ff e9 9c fe ff ff 4c 8b 7c 24 08 4c 89 ff e8 26 2b be 00 e9 8a fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 ec fe ff ff f7 c2 ff 0f 00 00 0f 85 81 fe ff ff 48 8b 02
[ 54.352660] RSP: 0018:ffffb7e4c430bc78 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 54.353679] RAX: 80000002a3e008e7 RBX: ffff9946039aa580 RCX: ffff994380000000
[ 54.355056] RDX: ffff994606aec000 RSI: 00007f004b000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 54.356440] RBP: 00007f004b000000 R08: 0000000000000591 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 54.357820] R10: 0000000000000200 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffb7e4c430bd10
[ 54.359198] R13: ffff994606aec2c0 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff994604a89b00
[ 54.360564] FS: 00007f004ae006c0(0000) GS:ffff9947f7400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 54.362111] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 54.363242] CR2: 00007f004adffe58 CR3: 0000000281e12005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 54.364615] PKRU: 55555554
[ 54.365153] Call Trace:
[ 54.365646] <TASK>
[ 54.366073] ? __warn.cold+0xb7/0x14d
[ 54.366796] ? folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.367628] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140
[ 54.368324] ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90
[ 54.369019] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[ 54.369771] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 54.370606] ? folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.371415] ? folio_walk_start+0x9e/0x6e0
[ 54.372227] do_pages_move+0x1c5/0x680
[ 54.372972] kernel_move_pages+0x1a1/0x2b0
[ 54.373804] __x64_sys_move_pages+0x25/0x30
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241015111236.1290921-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: aa39ca6940f1 ("mm/pagewalk: introduce folio_walk_start() + folio_walk_end()")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+7d917f67c05066cec295@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/670d3248.050a0220.3e960.0064.GAE@google.com
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-15 11:12:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES) &&
|
|
|
|
(!pud_present(pud) || pud_leaf(pud))) {
|
2024-08-02 15:55:15 +00:00
|
|
|
ptl = pud_lock(vma->vm_mm, pudp);
|
|
|
|
pud = pudp_get(pudp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
entry_size = PUD_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
fw->level = FW_LEVEL_PUD;
|
|
|
|
fw->pudp = pudp;
|
|
|
|
fw->pud = pud;
|
|
|
|
|
mm/pagewalk: fix usage of pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() without present check
pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() only implies a pmd_present()/pud_present() check on
some architectures. We really should check for
pmd_present()/pud_present() first.
This should explain the report we got on ppc64 (which has
CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES set in the config) that triggered:
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(pmd_leaf(pmdp_get_lockless(pmdp)));
Likely we had a PMD migration entry for which pmd_leaf() did not trigger.
We raced with restoring the PMD migration entry, and suddenly saw a
pmd_leaf(). In this case, pte_offset_map_lock() saved us from more
trouble, because it rechecks the PMD value, but we would not have
processed the migration entry -- which is not too bad because the only
user of FW_MIGRATION is KSM for unsharing, and KSM only applies to small
folios.
Further, we shouldn't re-read the PMD/PUD value for our warning, the
primary purpose of the VM_WARN_ON_ONCE() is to find spurious use of
pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() without CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES.
As a side note, we are currently not implementing FW_MIGRATION support for
PUD migration entries, which likely should exist due to hugetlb. Add a
TODO so this won't fall through the cracks if more FW_MIGRATION users get
added.
Was able to write a quick reproducer and verify that the issue no longer triggers with this fix.
https://gitlab.com/davidhildenbrand/scratchspace/-/blob/main/reproducers/move-pages-pmd-leaf.c
Without this fix after a couple of seconds in a VM with 2 NUMA nodes:
[ 54.333753] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 54.334901] WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 1704 at mm/pagewalk.c:815 folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.336455] Modules linked in: ...
[ 54.345009] CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 1704 Comm: move-pages-pmd- Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2+ #81
[ 54.346529] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
[ 54.348191] RIP: 0010:folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.349134] Code: b5 ad 48 8d 35 00 00 00 00 e8 6d 59 d7 ff e8 08 74 da ff e9 9c fe ff ff 4c 8b 7c 24 08 4c 89 ff e8 26 2b be 00 e9 8a fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 ec fe ff ff f7 c2 ff 0f 00 00 0f 85 81 fe ff ff 48 8b 02
[ 54.352660] RSP: 0018:ffffb7e4c430bc78 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 54.353679] RAX: 80000002a3e008e7 RBX: ffff9946039aa580 RCX: ffff994380000000
[ 54.355056] RDX: ffff994606aec000 RSI: 00007f004b000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 54.356440] RBP: 00007f004b000000 R08: 0000000000000591 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 54.357820] R10: 0000000000000200 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffb7e4c430bd10
[ 54.359198] R13: ffff994606aec2c0 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff994604a89b00
[ 54.360564] FS: 00007f004ae006c0(0000) GS:ffff9947f7400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 54.362111] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 54.363242] CR2: 00007f004adffe58 CR3: 0000000281e12005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 54.364615] PKRU: 55555554
[ 54.365153] Call Trace:
[ 54.365646] <TASK>
[ 54.366073] ? __warn.cold+0xb7/0x14d
[ 54.366796] ? folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.367628] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140
[ 54.368324] ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90
[ 54.369019] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[ 54.369771] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 54.370606] ? folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.371415] ? folio_walk_start+0x9e/0x6e0
[ 54.372227] do_pages_move+0x1c5/0x680
[ 54.372972] kernel_move_pages+0x1a1/0x2b0
[ 54.373804] __x64_sys_move_pages+0x25/0x30
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241015111236.1290921-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: aa39ca6940f1 ("mm/pagewalk: introduce folio_walk_start() + folio_walk_end()")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+7d917f67c05066cec295@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/670d3248.050a0220.3e960.0064.GAE@google.com
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-15 11:12:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* TODO: FW_MIGRATION support for PUD migration entries
|
|
|
|
* once there are relevant users.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2024-08-26 20:43:40 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pud_present(pud) || pud_devmap(pud) || pud_special(pud)) {
|
2024-08-02 15:55:15 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(ptl);
|
|
|
|
goto not_found;
|
|
|
|
} else if (!pud_leaf(pud)) {
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(ptl);
|
|
|
|
goto pmd_table;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* TODO: vm_normal_page_pud() will be handy once we want to
|
|
|
|
* support PUD mappings in VM_PFNMAP|VM_MIXEDMAP VMAs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
page = pud_page(pud);
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pmd_table:
|
mm/pagewalk: fix usage of pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() without present check
pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() only implies a pmd_present()/pud_present() check on
some architectures. We really should check for
pmd_present()/pud_present() first.
This should explain the report we got on ppc64 (which has
CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES set in the config) that triggered:
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(pmd_leaf(pmdp_get_lockless(pmdp)));
Likely we had a PMD migration entry for which pmd_leaf() did not trigger.
We raced with restoring the PMD migration entry, and suddenly saw a
pmd_leaf(). In this case, pte_offset_map_lock() saved us from more
trouble, because it rechecks the PMD value, but we would not have
processed the migration entry -- which is not too bad because the only
user of FW_MIGRATION is KSM for unsharing, and KSM only applies to small
folios.
Further, we shouldn't re-read the PMD/PUD value for our warning, the
primary purpose of the VM_WARN_ON_ONCE() is to find spurious use of
pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() without CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES.
As a side note, we are currently not implementing FW_MIGRATION support for
PUD migration entries, which likely should exist due to hugetlb. Add a
TODO so this won't fall through the cracks if more FW_MIGRATION users get
added.
Was able to write a quick reproducer and verify that the issue no longer triggers with this fix.
https://gitlab.com/davidhildenbrand/scratchspace/-/blob/main/reproducers/move-pages-pmd-leaf.c
Without this fix after a couple of seconds in a VM with 2 NUMA nodes:
[ 54.333753] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 54.334901] WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 1704 at mm/pagewalk.c:815 folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.336455] Modules linked in: ...
[ 54.345009] CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 1704 Comm: move-pages-pmd- Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2+ #81
[ 54.346529] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
[ 54.348191] RIP: 0010:folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.349134] Code: b5 ad 48 8d 35 00 00 00 00 e8 6d 59 d7 ff e8 08 74 da ff e9 9c fe ff ff 4c 8b 7c 24 08 4c 89 ff e8 26 2b be 00 e9 8a fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 ec fe ff ff f7 c2 ff 0f 00 00 0f 85 81 fe ff ff 48 8b 02
[ 54.352660] RSP: 0018:ffffb7e4c430bc78 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 54.353679] RAX: 80000002a3e008e7 RBX: ffff9946039aa580 RCX: ffff994380000000
[ 54.355056] RDX: ffff994606aec000 RSI: 00007f004b000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 54.356440] RBP: 00007f004b000000 R08: 0000000000000591 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 54.357820] R10: 0000000000000200 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffb7e4c430bd10
[ 54.359198] R13: ffff994606aec2c0 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff994604a89b00
[ 54.360564] FS: 00007f004ae006c0(0000) GS:ffff9947f7400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 54.362111] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 54.363242] CR2: 00007f004adffe58 CR3: 0000000281e12005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 54.364615] PKRU: 55555554
[ 54.365153] Call Trace:
[ 54.365646] <TASK>
[ 54.366073] ? __warn.cold+0xb7/0x14d
[ 54.366796] ? folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.367628] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140
[ 54.368324] ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90
[ 54.369019] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[ 54.369771] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 54.370606] ? folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.371415] ? folio_walk_start+0x9e/0x6e0
[ 54.372227] do_pages_move+0x1c5/0x680
[ 54.372972] kernel_move_pages+0x1a1/0x2b0
[ 54.373804] __x64_sys_move_pages+0x25/0x30
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241015111236.1290921-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: aa39ca6940f1 ("mm/pagewalk: introduce folio_walk_start() + folio_walk_end()")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+7d917f67c05066cec295@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/670d3248.050a0220.3e960.0064.GAE@google.com
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-15 11:12:36 +00:00
|
|
|
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!pud_present(pud) || pud_leaf(pud));
|
2024-08-02 15:55:15 +00:00
|
|
|
pmdp = pmd_offset(pudp, addr);
|
|
|
|
pmd = pmdp_get_lockless(pmdp);
|
|
|
|
if (pmd_none(pmd))
|
|
|
|
goto not_found;
|
mm/pagewalk: fix usage of pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() without present check
pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() only implies a pmd_present()/pud_present() check on
some architectures. We really should check for
pmd_present()/pud_present() first.
This should explain the report we got on ppc64 (which has
CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES set in the config) that triggered:
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(pmd_leaf(pmdp_get_lockless(pmdp)));
Likely we had a PMD migration entry for which pmd_leaf() did not trigger.
We raced with restoring the PMD migration entry, and suddenly saw a
pmd_leaf(). In this case, pte_offset_map_lock() saved us from more
trouble, because it rechecks the PMD value, but we would not have
processed the migration entry -- which is not too bad because the only
user of FW_MIGRATION is KSM for unsharing, and KSM only applies to small
folios.
Further, we shouldn't re-read the PMD/PUD value for our warning, the
primary purpose of the VM_WARN_ON_ONCE() is to find spurious use of
pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() without CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES.
As a side note, we are currently not implementing FW_MIGRATION support for
PUD migration entries, which likely should exist due to hugetlb. Add a
TODO so this won't fall through the cracks if more FW_MIGRATION users get
added.
Was able to write a quick reproducer and verify that the issue no longer triggers with this fix.
https://gitlab.com/davidhildenbrand/scratchspace/-/blob/main/reproducers/move-pages-pmd-leaf.c
Without this fix after a couple of seconds in a VM with 2 NUMA nodes:
[ 54.333753] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 54.334901] WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 1704 at mm/pagewalk.c:815 folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.336455] Modules linked in: ...
[ 54.345009] CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 1704 Comm: move-pages-pmd- Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2+ #81
[ 54.346529] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
[ 54.348191] RIP: 0010:folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.349134] Code: b5 ad 48 8d 35 00 00 00 00 e8 6d 59 d7 ff e8 08 74 da ff e9 9c fe ff ff 4c 8b 7c 24 08 4c 89 ff e8 26 2b be 00 e9 8a fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 ec fe ff ff f7 c2 ff 0f 00 00 0f 85 81 fe ff ff 48 8b 02
[ 54.352660] RSP: 0018:ffffb7e4c430bc78 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 54.353679] RAX: 80000002a3e008e7 RBX: ffff9946039aa580 RCX: ffff994380000000
[ 54.355056] RDX: ffff994606aec000 RSI: 00007f004b000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 54.356440] RBP: 00007f004b000000 R08: 0000000000000591 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 54.357820] R10: 0000000000000200 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffb7e4c430bd10
[ 54.359198] R13: ffff994606aec2c0 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff994604a89b00
[ 54.360564] FS: 00007f004ae006c0(0000) GS:ffff9947f7400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 54.362111] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 54.363242] CR2: 00007f004adffe58 CR3: 0000000281e12005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 54.364615] PKRU: 55555554
[ 54.365153] Call Trace:
[ 54.365646] <TASK>
[ 54.366073] ? __warn.cold+0xb7/0x14d
[ 54.366796] ? folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.367628] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140
[ 54.368324] ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90
[ 54.369019] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[ 54.369771] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 54.370606] ? folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.371415] ? folio_walk_start+0x9e/0x6e0
[ 54.372227] do_pages_move+0x1c5/0x680
[ 54.372972] kernel_move_pages+0x1a1/0x2b0
[ 54.373804] __x64_sys_move_pages+0x25/0x30
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241015111236.1290921-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: aa39ca6940f1 ("mm/pagewalk: introduce folio_walk_start() + folio_walk_end()")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+7d917f67c05066cec295@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/670d3248.050a0220.3e960.0064.GAE@google.com
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-15 11:12:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES) &&
|
|
|
|
(!pmd_present(pmd) || pmd_leaf(pmd))) {
|
2024-08-02 15:55:15 +00:00
|
|
|
ptl = pmd_lock(vma->vm_mm, pmdp);
|
|
|
|
pmd = pmdp_get(pmdp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
entry_size = PMD_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
fw->level = FW_LEVEL_PMD;
|
|
|
|
fw->pmdp = pmdp;
|
|
|
|
fw->pmd = pmd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pmd_none(pmd)) {
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(ptl);
|
|
|
|
goto not_found;
|
mm/pagewalk: fix usage of pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() without present check
pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() only implies a pmd_present()/pud_present() check on
some architectures. We really should check for
pmd_present()/pud_present() first.
This should explain the report we got on ppc64 (which has
CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES set in the config) that triggered:
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(pmd_leaf(pmdp_get_lockless(pmdp)));
Likely we had a PMD migration entry for which pmd_leaf() did not trigger.
We raced with restoring the PMD migration entry, and suddenly saw a
pmd_leaf(). In this case, pte_offset_map_lock() saved us from more
trouble, because it rechecks the PMD value, but we would not have
processed the migration entry -- which is not too bad because the only
user of FW_MIGRATION is KSM for unsharing, and KSM only applies to small
folios.
Further, we shouldn't re-read the PMD/PUD value for our warning, the
primary purpose of the VM_WARN_ON_ONCE() is to find spurious use of
pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() without CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES.
As a side note, we are currently not implementing FW_MIGRATION support for
PUD migration entries, which likely should exist due to hugetlb. Add a
TODO so this won't fall through the cracks if more FW_MIGRATION users get
added.
Was able to write a quick reproducer and verify that the issue no longer triggers with this fix.
https://gitlab.com/davidhildenbrand/scratchspace/-/blob/main/reproducers/move-pages-pmd-leaf.c
Without this fix after a couple of seconds in a VM with 2 NUMA nodes:
[ 54.333753] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 54.334901] WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 1704 at mm/pagewalk.c:815 folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.336455] Modules linked in: ...
[ 54.345009] CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 1704 Comm: move-pages-pmd- Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2+ #81
[ 54.346529] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
[ 54.348191] RIP: 0010:folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.349134] Code: b5 ad 48 8d 35 00 00 00 00 e8 6d 59 d7 ff e8 08 74 da ff e9 9c fe ff ff 4c 8b 7c 24 08 4c 89 ff e8 26 2b be 00 e9 8a fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 ec fe ff ff f7 c2 ff 0f 00 00 0f 85 81 fe ff ff 48 8b 02
[ 54.352660] RSP: 0018:ffffb7e4c430bc78 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 54.353679] RAX: 80000002a3e008e7 RBX: ffff9946039aa580 RCX: ffff994380000000
[ 54.355056] RDX: ffff994606aec000 RSI: 00007f004b000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 54.356440] RBP: 00007f004b000000 R08: 0000000000000591 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 54.357820] R10: 0000000000000200 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffb7e4c430bd10
[ 54.359198] R13: ffff994606aec2c0 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff994604a89b00
[ 54.360564] FS: 00007f004ae006c0(0000) GS:ffff9947f7400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 54.362111] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 54.363242] CR2: 00007f004adffe58 CR3: 0000000281e12005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 54.364615] PKRU: 55555554
[ 54.365153] Call Trace:
[ 54.365646] <TASK>
[ 54.366073] ? __warn.cold+0xb7/0x14d
[ 54.366796] ? folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.367628] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140
[ 54.368324] ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90
[ 54.369019] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[ 54.369771] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 54.370606] ? folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.371415] ? folio_walk_start+0x9e/0x6e0
[ 54.372227] do_pages_move+0x1c5/0x680
[ 54.372972] kernel_move_pages+0x1a1/0x2b0
[ 54.373804] __x64_sys_move_pages+0x25/0x30
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241015111236.1290921-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: aa39ca6940f1 ("mm/pagewalk: introduce folio_walk_start() + folio_walk_end()")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+7d917f67c05066cec295@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/670d3248.050a0220.3e960.0064.GAE@google.com
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-15 11:12:36 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (pmd_present(pmd) && !pmd_leaf(pmd)) {
|
2024-08-02 15:55:15 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(ptl);
|
|
|
|
goto pte_table;
|
|
|
|
} else if (pmd_present(pmd)) {
|
|
|
|
page = vm_normal_page_pmd(vma, addr, pmd);
|
|
|
|
if (page) {
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
} else if ((flags & FW_ZEROPAGE) &&
|
|
|
|
is_huge_zero_pmd(pmd)) {
|
|
|
|
page = pfn_to_page(pmd_pfn(pmd));
|
|
|
|
expose_page = false;
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if ((flags & FW_MIGRATION) &&
|
|
|
|
is_pmd_migration_entry(pmd)) {
|
|
|
|
swp_entry_t entry = pmd_to_swp_entry(pmd);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
page = pfn_swap_entry_to_page(entry);
|
|
|
|
expose_page = false;
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(ptl);
|
|
|
|
goto not_found;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pte_table:
|
mm/pagewalk: fix usage of pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() without present check
pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() only implies a pmd_present()/pud_present() check on
some architectures. We really should check for
pmd_present()/pud_present() first.
This should explain the report we got on ppc64 (which has
CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES set in the config) that triggered:
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(pmd_leaf(pmdp_get_lockless(pmdp)));
Likely we had a PMD migration entry for which pmd_leaf() did not trigger.
We raced with restoring the PMD migration entry, and suddenly saw a
pmd_leaf(). In this case, pte_offset_map_lock() saved us from more
trouble, because it rechecks the PMD value, but we would not have
processed the migration entry -- which is not too bad because the only
user of FW_MIGRATION is KSM for unsharing, and KSM only applies to small
folios.
Further, we shouldn't re-read the PMD/PUD value for our warning, the
primary purpose of the VM_WARN_ON_ONCE() is to find spurious use of
pmd_leaf()/pud_leaf() without CONFIG_PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES.
As a side note, we are currently not implementing FW_MIGRATION support for
PUD migration entries, which likely should exist due to hugetlb. Add a
TODO so this won't fall through the cracks if more FW_MIGRATION users get
added.
Was able to write a quick reproducer and verify that the issue no longer triggers with this fix.
https://gitlab.com/davidhildenbrand/scratchspace/-/blob/main/reproducers/move-pages-pmd-leaf.c
Without this fix after a couple of seconds in a VM with 2 NUMA nodes:
[ 54.333753] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 54.334901] WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 1704 at mm/pagewalk.c:815 folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.336455] Modules linked in: ...
[ 54.345009] CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 1704 Comm: move-pages-pmd- Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2+ #81
[ 54.346529] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
[ 54.348191] RIP: 0010:folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.349134] Code: b5 ad 48 8d 35 00 00 00 00 e8 6d 59 d7 ff e8 08 74 da ff e9 9c fe ff ff 4c 8b 7c 24 08 4c 89 ff e8 26 2b be 00 e9 8a fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 ec fe ff ff f7 c2 ff 0f 00 00 0f 85 81 fe ff ff 48 8b 02
[ 54.352660] RSP: 0018:ffffb7e4c430bc78 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 54.353679] RAX: 80000002a3e008e7 RBX: ffff9946039aa580 RCX: ffff994380000000
[ 54.355056] RDX: ffff994606aec000 RSI: 00007f004b000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 54.356440] RBP: 00007f004b000000 R08: 0000000000000591 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 54.357820] R10: 0000000000000200 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffb7e4c430bd10
[ 54.359198] R13: ffff994606aec2c0 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff994604a89b00
[ 54.360564] FS: 00007f004ae006c0(0000) GS:ffff9947f7400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 54.362111] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 54.363242] CR2: 00007f004adffe58 CR3: 0000000281e12005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 54.364615] PKRU: 55555554
[ 54.365153] Call Trace:
[ 54.365646] <TASK>
[ 54.366073] ? __warn.cold+0xb7/0x14d
[ 54.366796] ? folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.367628] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140
[ 54.368324] ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90
[ 54.369019] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[ 54.369771] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 54.370606] ? folio_walk_start+0x48f/0x6e0
[ 54.371415] ? folio_walk_start+0x9e/0x6e0
[ 54.372227] do_pages_move+0x1c5/0x680
[ 54.372972] kernel_move_pages+0x1a1/0x2b0
[ 54.373804] __x64_sys_move_pages+0x25/0x30
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241015111236.1290921-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: aa39ca6940f1 ("mm/pagewalk: introduce folio_walk_start() + folio_walk_end()")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+7d917f67c05066cec295@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/670d3248.050a0220.3e960.0064.GAE@google.com
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-15 11:12:36 +00:00
|
|
|
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!pmd_present(pmd) || pmd_leaf(pmd));
|
2024-08-02 15:55:15 +00:00
|
|
|
ptep = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, pmdp, addr, &ptl);
|
|
|
|
if (!ptep)
|
|
|
|
goto not_found;
|
|
|
|
pte = ptep_get(ptep);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
entry_size = PAGE_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
fw->level = FW_LEVEL_PTE;
|
|
|
|
fw->ptep = ptep;
|
|
|
|
fw->pte = pte;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pte_present(pte)) {
|
|
|
|
page = vm_normal_page(vma, addr, pte);
|
|
|
|
if (page)
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
if ((flags & FW_ZEROPAGE) &&
|
|
|
|
is_zero_pfn(pte_pfn(pte))) {
|
|
|
|
page = pfn_to_page(pte_pfn(pte));
|
|
|
|
expose_page = false;
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (!pte_none(pte)) {
|
|
|
|
swp_entry_t entry = pte_to_swp_entry(pte);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((flags & FW_MIGRATION) &&
|
|
|
|
is_migration_entry(entry)) {
|
|
|
|
page = pfn_swap_entry_to_page(entry);
|
|
|
|
expose_page = false;
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
|
|
|
|
not_found:
|
|
|
|
vma_pgtable_walk_end(vma);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
found:
|
|
|
|
if (expose_page)
|
|
|
|
/* Note: Offset from the mapped page, not the folio start. */
|
|
|
|
fw->page = nth_page(page, (addr & (entry_size - 1)) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
fw->page = NULL;
|
|
|
|
fw->ptl = ptl;
|
|
|
|
return page_folio(page);
|
|
|
|
}
|