linux-next/mm/maccess.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Access kernel or user memory without faulting.
*/
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/tlb.h>
bool __weak copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(const void *unsafe_src,
size_t size)
{
return true;
}
mm, kasan, kmsan: instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault Instrument copy_from_kernel_nofault() with KMSAN for uninitialized kernel memory check and copy_to_kernel_nofault() with KASAN, KCSAN to detect the memory corruption. syzbot reported that bpf_probe_read_kernel() kernel helper triggered KASAN report via kasan_check_range() which is not the expected behaviour as copy_from_kernel_nofault() is meant to be a non-faulting helper. Solution is, suggested by Marco Elver, to replace KASAN, KCSAN check in copy_from_kernel_nofault() with KMSAN detection of copying uninitilaized kernel memory. In copy_to_kernel_nofault() we can retain instrument_write() explicitly for the memory corruption instrumentation. copy_to_kernel_nofault() is tested on x86_64 and arm64 with CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS. On arm64 with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS, kunit test currently fails. Need more clarification on it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment layout, per checkpatch Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CANpmjNMAVFzqnCZhEity9cjiqQ9CVN1X7qeeeAp_6yKjwKo8iw@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241011035310.2982017-1-snovitoll@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot+61123a5daeb9f7454599@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=61123a5daeb9f7454599 Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210505 Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> [KASAN] Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> [KASAN] Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-11 03:53:10 +00:00
/*
* The below only uses kmsan_check_memory() to ensure uninitialized kernel
* memory isn't leaked.
*/
#define copy_from_kernel_nofault_loop(dst, src, len, type, err_label) \
while (len >= sizeof(type)) { \
mm, kasan, kmsan: instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault Instrument copy_from_kernel_nofault() with KMSAN for uninitialized kernel memory check and copy_to_kernel_nofault() with KASAN, KCSAN to detect the memory corruption. syzbot reported that bpf_probe_read_kernel() kernel helper triggered KASAN report via kasan_check_range() which is not the expected behaviour as copy_from_kernel_nofault() is meant to be a non-faulting helper. Solution is, suggested by Marco Elver, to replace KASAN, KCSAN check in copy_from_kernel_nofault() with KMSAN detection of copying uninitilaized kernel memory. In copy_to_kernel_nofault() we can retain instrument_write() explicitly for the memory corruption instrumentation. copy_to_kernel_nofault() is tested on x86_64 and arm64 with CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS. On arm64 with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS, kunit test currently fails. Need more clarification on it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment layout, per checkpatch Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CANpmjNMAVFzqnCZhEity9cjiqQ9CVN1X7qeeeAp_6yKjwKo8iw@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241011035310.2982017-1-snovitoll@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot+61123a5daeb9f7454599@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=61123a5daeb9f7454599 Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210505 Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> [KASAN] Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> [KASAN] Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-11 03:53:10 +00:00
__get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label); \
kmsan_check_memory(src, sizeof(type)); \
dst += sizeof(type); \
src += sizeof(type); \
len -= sizeof(type); \
}
long copy_from_kernel_nofault(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
{
unsigned long align = 0;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
align = (unsigned long)dst | (unsigned long)src;
if (!copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(src, size))
return -ERANGE;
pagefault_disable();
if (!(align & 7))
copy_from_kernel_nofault_loop(dst, src, size, u64, Efault);
if (!(align & 3))
copy_from_kernel_nofault_loop(dst, src, size, u32, Efault);
if (!(align & 1))
copy_from_kernel_nofault_loop(dst, src, size, u16, Efault);
copy_from_kernel_nofault_loop(dst, src, size, u8, Efault);
pagefault_enable();
return 0;
Efault:
pagefault_enable();
return -EFAULT;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_from_kernel_nofault);
#define copy_to_kernel_nofault_loop(dst, src, len, type, err_label) \
while (len >= sizeof(type)) { \
mm, kasan, kmsan: instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault Instrument copy_from_kernel_nofault() with KMSAN for uninitialized kernel memory check and copy_to_kernel_nofault() with KASAN, KCSAN to detect the memory corruption. syzbot reported that bpf_probe_read_kernel() kernel helper triggered KASAN report via kasan_check_range() which is not the expected behaviour as copy_from_kernel_nofault() is meant to be a non-faulting helper. Solution is, suggested by Marco Elver, to replace KASAN, KCSAN check in copy_from_kernel_nofault() with KMSAN detection of copying uninitilaized kernel memory. In copy_to_kernel_nofault() we can retain instrument_write() explicitly for the memory corruption instrumentation. copy_to_kernel_nofault() is tested on x86_64 and arm64 with CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS. On arm64 with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS, kunit test currently fails. Need more clarification on it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment layout, per checkpatch Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CANpmjNMAVFzqnCZhEity9cjiqQ9CVN1X7qeeeAp_6yKjwKo8iw@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241011035310.2982017-1-snovitoll@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot+61123a5daeb9f7454599@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=61123a5daeb9f7454599 Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210505 Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> [KASAN] Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> [KASAN] Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-11 03:53:10 +00:00
__put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label); \
instrument_write(dst, sizeof(type)); \
dst += sizeof(type); \
src += sizeof(type); \
len -= sizeof(type); \
}
long copy_to_kernel_nofault(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
{
unsigned long align = 0;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
align = (unsigned long)dst | (unsigned long)src;
pagefault_disable();
if (!(align & 7))
copy_to_kernel_nofault_loop(dst, src, size, u64, Efault);
if (!(align & 3))
copy_to_kernel_nofault_loop(dst, src, size, u32, Efault);
if (!(align & 1))
copy_to_kernel_nofault_loop(dst, src, size, u16, Efault);
copy_to_kernel_nofault_loop(dst, src, size, u8, Efault);
pagefault_enable();
return 0;
Efault:
pagefault_enable();
return -EFAULT;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_to_kernel_nofault);
long strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count)
{
const void *src = unsafe_addr;
if (unlikely(count <= 0))
return 0;
if (!copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(unsafe_addr, count))
return -ERANGE;
pagefault_disable();
do {
__get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, u8, Efault);
dst++;
src++;
} while (dst[-1] && src - unsafe_addr < count);
pagefault_enable();
dst[-1] = '\0';
return src - unsafe_addr;
Efault:
pagefault_enable();
dst[0] = '\0';
return -EFAULT;
}
/**
* copy_from_user_nofault(): safely attempt to read from a user-space location
* @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data
* @src: address to read from. This must be a user address.
* @size: size of the data chunk
*
* Safely read from user address @src to the buffer at @dst. If a kernel fault
* happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
*/
long copy_from_user_nofault(void *dst, const void __user *src, size_t size)
{
long ret = -EFAULT;
if (!__access_ok(src, size))
return ret;
if (!nmi_uaccess_okay())
return ret;
pagefault_disable();
ret = __copy_from_user_inatomic(dst, src, size);
pagefault_enable();
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_from_user_nofault);
/**
* copy_to_user_nofault(): safely attempt to write to a user-space location
* @dst: address to write to
* @src: pointer to the data that shall be written
* @size: size of the data chunk
*
* Safely write to address @dst from the buffer at @src. If a kernel fault
* happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
*/
long copy_to_user_nofault(void __user *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
{
long ret = -EFAULT;
if (access_ok(dst, size)) {
pagefault_disable();
ret = __copy_to_user_inatomic(dst, src, size);
pagefault_enable();
}
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_to_user_nofault);
/**
* strncpy_from_user_nofault: - Copy a NUL terminated string from unsafe user
* address.
* @dst: Destination address, in kernel space. This buffer must be at
* least @count bytes long.
* @unsafe_addr: Unsafe user address.
* @count: Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
*
* Copies a NUL-terminated string from unsafe user address to kernel buffer.
*
* On success, returns the length of the string INCLUDING the trailing NUL.
*
* If access fails, returns -EFAULT (some data may have been copied
* and the trailing NUL added).
*
* If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count-1 bytes,
* sets the last byte of @dst buffer to NUL and returns @count.
*/
long strncpy_from_user_nofault(char *dst, const void __user *unsafe_addr,
long count)
{
long ret;
if (unlikely(count <= 0))
return 0;
pagefault_disable();
ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_addr, count);
pagefault_enable();
if (ret >= count) {
ret = count;
dst[ret - 1] = '\0';
} else if (ret > 0) {
ret++;
}
return ret;
}
/**
* strnlen_user_nofault: - Get the size of a user string INCLUDING final NUL.
* @unsafe_addr: The string to measure.
* @count: Maximum count (including NUL)
*
* Get the size of a NUL-terminated string in user space without pagefault.
*
* Returns the size of the string INCLUDING the terminating NUL.
*
* If the string is too long, returns a number larger than @count. User
* has to check the return value against "> count".
* On exception (or invalid count), returns 0.
*
* Unlike strnlen_user, this can be used from IRQ handler etc. because
* it disables pagefaults.
*/
long strnlen_user_nofault(const void __user *unsafe_addr, long count)
{
int ret;
pagefault_disable();
ret = strnlen_user(unsafe_addr, count);
pagefault_enable();
return ret;
}
mm: uninline copy_overflow() While building a small config with CONFIG_CC_OPTIMISE_FOR_SIZE, I ended up with more than 50 times the following function in vmlinux because GCC doesn't honor the 'inline' keyword: c00243bc <copy_overflow>: c00243bc: 94 21 ff f0 stwu r1,-16(r1) c00243c0: 7c 85 23 78 mr r5,r4 c00243c4: 7c 64 1b 78 mr r4,r3 c00243c8: 3c 60 c0 62 lis r3,-16286 c00243cc: 7c 08 02 a6 mflr r0 c00243d0: 38 63 5e e5 addi r3,r3,24293 c00243d4: 90 01 00 14 stw r0,20(r1) c00243d8: 4b ff 82 45 bl c001c61c <__warn_printk> c00243dc: 0f e0 00 00 twui r0,0 c00243e0: 80 01 00 14 lwz r0,20(r1) c00243e4: 38 21 00 10 addi r1,r1,16 c00243e8: 7c 08 03 a6 mtlr r0 c00243ec: 4e 80 00 20 blr With -Winline, GCC tells: /include/linux/thread_info.h:212:20: warning: inlining failed in call to 'copy_overflow': call is unlikely and code size would grow [-Winline] copy_overflow() is a non conditional warning called by check_copy_size() on an error path. check_copy_size() have to remain inlined in order to benefit from constant folding, but copy_overflow() is not worth inlining. Uninline the warning when CONFIG_BUG is selected. When CONFIG_BUG is not selected, WARN() does nothing so skip it. This reduces the size of vmlinux by almost 4kbytes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e1723b9cfa924bcefcd41f69d0025b38e4c9364e.1644819985.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-22 21:47:49 +00:00
void __copy_overflow(int size, unsigned long count)
{
WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected (%d < %lu)!\n", size, count);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_overflow);