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exec: Avoid pathological argc, envc, and bprm->p values
Make sure nothing goes wrong with the string counters or the bprm's belief about the stack pointer. Add checks and matching self-tests. Take special care for !CONFIG_MMU, since argmin is not exposed there. For 32-bit validation, 32-bit UML was used: $ tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run \ --make_options CROSS_COMPILE=i686-linux-gnu- \ --make_options SUBARCH=i386 \ exec For !MMU validation, m68k was used: $ tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run \ --arch m68k --make_option CROSS_COMPILE=m68k-linux-gnu- \ exec Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240520021615.741800-2-keescook@chromium.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240621205046.4001362-2-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
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084ebf7ca8
commit
21f9310830
10
fs/exec.c
10
fs/exec.c
@ -490,6 +490,9 @@ static inline int bprm_set_stack_limit(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
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unsigned long limit)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
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/* Avoid a pathological bprm->p. */
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if (bprm->p < limit)
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return -E2BIG;
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bprm->argmin = bprm->p - limit;
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#endif
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return 0;
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@ -531,6 +534,9 @@ static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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* of argument strings even with small stacks
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*/
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limit = max_t(unsigned long, limit, ARG_MAX);
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/* Reject totally pathological counts. */
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if (bprm->argc < 0 || bprm->envc < 0)
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return -E2BIG;
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/*
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* We must account for the size of all the argv and envp pointers to
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* the argv and envp strings, since they will also take up space in
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@ -544,7 +550,9 @@ static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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* argc can never be 0, to keep them from walking envp by accident.
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* See do_execveat_common().
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*/
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ptr_size = (max(bprm->argc, 1) + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
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if (check_add_overflow(max(bprm->argc, 1), bprm->envc, &ptr_size) ||
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check_mul_overflow(ptr_size, sizeof(void *), &ptr_size))
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return -E2BIG;
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if (limit <= ptr_size)
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return -E2BIG;
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limit -= ptr_size;
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@ -8,9 +8,34 @@ struct bprm_stack_limits_result {
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};
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static const struct bprm_stack_limits_result bprm_stack_limits_results[] = {
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/* Giant values produce -E2BIG */
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/* Negative argc/envc counts produce -E2BIG */
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{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
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.argc = INT_MIN, .envc = INT_MIN }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
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{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
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.argc = 5, .envc = -1 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
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{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
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.argc = -1, .envc = 10 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
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/* The max value of argc or envc is MAX_ARG_STRINGS. */
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{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
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.argc = INT_MAX, .envc = INT_MAX }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
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{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
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.argc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS, .envc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
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{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
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.argc = 0, .envc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
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{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
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.argc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS, .envc = 0 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
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/*
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* On 32-bit system these argc and envc counts, while likely impossible
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* to represent within the associated TASK_SIZE, could overflow the
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* limit calculation, and bypass the ptr_size <= limit check.
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*/
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{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
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.argc = 0x20000001, .envc = 0x20000001 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
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#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
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/* Make sure a pathological bprm->p doesn't cause an overflow. */
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{ { .p = sizeof(void *), .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
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.argc = 10, .envc = 10 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
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#endif
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/*
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* 0 rlim_stack will get raised to ARG_MAX. With 1 string pointer,
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* we should see p - ARG_MAX + sizeof(void *).
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@ -88,6 +113,7 @@ static void exec_test_bprm_stack_limits(struct kunit *test)
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/* Double-check the constants. */
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KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, _STK_LIM, SZ_8M);
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KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ARG_MAX, 32 * SZ_4K);
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KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, MAX_ARG_STRINGS, 0x7FFFFFFF);
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for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bprm_stack_limits_results); i++) {
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const struct bprm_stack_limits_result *result = &bprm_stack_limits_results[i];
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