mirror of
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
synced 2025-01-04 04:06:26 +00:00
bpf: Improve verifier error messages for users
commit a6aaece00a
upstream
Consolidate all error handling and provide more user-friendly error messages
from sanitize_ptr_alu() and sanitize_val_alu().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
8ab6572e20
commit
656b3f9ef4
@ -2729,6 +2729,14 @@ static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
|
||||
return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
enum {
|
||||
REASON_BOUNDS = -1,
|
||||
REASON_TYPE = -2,
|
||||
REASON_PATHS = -3,
|
||||
REASON_LIMIT = -4,
|
||||
REASON_STACK = -5,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
|
||||
const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
|
||||
u32 *alu_limit, u8 opcode)
|
||||
@ -2740,7 +2748,7 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
|
||||
|
||||
if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
|
||||
(off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
|
||||
return -EACCES;
|
||||
return REASON_BOUNDS;
|
||||
|
||||
switch (ptr_reg->type) {
|
||||
case PTR_TO_STACK:
|
||||
@ -2764,11 +2772,11 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
return REASON_TYPE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (ptr_limit >= max)
|
||||
return -ERANGE;
|
||||
return REASON_LIMIT;
|
||||
*alu_limit = ptr_limit;
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -2788,7 +2796,7 @@ static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
|
||||
if (aux->alu_state &&
|
||||
(aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
|
||||
aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
|
||||
return -EACCES;
|
||||
return REASON_PATHS;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Corresponding fixup done in fixup_bpf_calls(). */
|
||||
aux->alu_state = alu_state;
|
||||
@ -2861,7 +2869,46 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
|
||||
ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true);
|
||||
if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret)
|
||||
*dst_reg = tmp;
|
||||
return !ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
||||
return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
|
||||
const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
|
||||
const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
|
||||
const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root";
|
||||
const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub";
|
||||
u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
|
||||
|
||||
switch (reason) {
|
||||
case REASON_BOUNDS:
|
||||
verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n",
|
||||
off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case REASON_TYPE:
|
||||
verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n",
|
||||
off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case REASON_PATHS:
|
||||
verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n",
|
||||
dst, op, err);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case REASON_LIMIT:
|
||||
verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n",
|
||||
dst, op, err);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case REASON_STACK:
|
||||
verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n",
|
||||
dst, err);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n",
|
||||
reason);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return -EACCES;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
|
||||
@ -2934,10 +2981,9 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
|
||||
switch (opcode) {
|
||||
case BPF_ADD:
|
||||
ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
|
||||
if (ret < 0) {
|
||||
verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types\n", dst);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ret < 0)
|
||||
return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
|
||||
|
||||
/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
|
||||
* the s32 'off' field
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -2989,10 +3035,9 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case BPF_SUB:
|
||||
ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg);
|
||||
if (ret < 0) {
|
||||
verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types\n", dst);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ret < 0)
|
||||
return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
|
||||
/* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */
|
||||
verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
|
||||
@ -3109,7 +3154,6 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
|
||||
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
|
||||
u64 umin_val, umax_val;
|
||||
u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;
|
||||
u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
if (insn_bitness == 32) {
|
||||
@ -3146,10 +3190,8 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
|
||||
switch (opcode) {
|
||||
case BPF_ADD:
|
||||
ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
|
||||
if (ret < 0) {
|
||||
verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different pointers or scalars\n", dst);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ret < 0)
|
||||
return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
|
||||
signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
|
||||
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
|
||||
@ -3170,10 +3212,8 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case BPF_SUB:
|
||||
ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
|
||||
if (ret < 0) {
|
||||
verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different pointers or scalars\n", dst);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ret < 0)
|
||||
return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
|
||||
signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
|
||||
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user