From 08b8a0440eeec83f8330349f829908858fd52d31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 15:47:18 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 01/53] libceph: add spinlock around osd->o_requests MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In a later patch, we're going to need to search for a request in the rbtree, but taking the o_mutex is inconvenient as we already hold the con mutex at the point where we need it. Add a new spinlock that we take when inserting and erasing entries from the o_requests tree. Search of the rbtree can be done with either the mutex or the spinlock, but insertion and removal requires both. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h | 8 +++++++- net/ceph/osd_client.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h b/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h index fb6be72104df..92addef18738 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h @@ -29,7 +29,12 @@ typedef void (*ceph_osdc_callback_t)(struct ceph_osd_request *); #define CEPH_HOMELESS_OSD -1 -/* a given osd we're communicating with */ +/* + * A given osd we're communicating with. + * + * Note that the o_requests tree can be searched while holding the "lock" mutex + * or the "o_requests_lock" spinlock. Insertion or removal requires both! + */ struct ceph_osd { refcount_t o_ref; struct ceph_osd_client *o_osdc; @@ -37,6 +42,7 @@ struct ceph_osd { int o_incarnation; struct rb_node o_node; struct ceph_connection o_con; + spinlock_t o_requests_lock; struct rb_root o_requests; struct rb_root o_linger_requests; struct rb_root o_backoff_mappings; diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c index 658a6f2320cf..6d7a430bfed8 100644 --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c @@ -1177,6 +1177,7 @@ static void osd_init(struct ceph_osd *osd) { refcount_set(&osd->o_ref, 1); RB_CLEAR_NODE(&osd->o_node); + spin_lock_init(&osd->o_requests_lock); osd->o_requests = RB_ROOT; osd->o_linger_requests = RB_ROOT; osd->o_backoff_mappings = RB_ROOT; @@ -1406,7 +1407,9 @@ static void link_request(struct ceph_osd *osd, struct ceph_osd_request *req) atomic_inc(&osd->o_osdc->num_homeless); get_osd(osd); + spin_lock(&osd->o_requests_lock); insert_request(&osd->o_requests, req); + spin_unlock(&osd->o_requests_lock); req->r_osd = osd; } @@ -1418,7 +1421,9 @@ static void unlink_request(struct ceph_osd *osd, struct ceph_osd_request *req) req, req->r_tid); req->r_osd = NULL; + spin_lock(&osd->o_requests_lock); erase_request(&osd->o_requests, req); + spin_unlock(&osd->o_requests_lock); put_osd(osd); if (!osd_homeless(osd)) From a679e50f728648f7b2f3b349e082448abd388038 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2022 15:23:00 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 02/53] libceph: define struct ceph_sparse_extent and add some helpers MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When the OSD sends back a sparse read reply, it contains an array of these structures. Define the structure and add a couple of helpers for dealing with them. Also add a place in struct ceph_osd_req_op to store the extent buffer, and code to free it if it's populated when the req is torn down. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- net/ceph/osd_client.c | 13 ++++++++++ 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h b/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h index 92addef18738..05da1e755b7b 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h @@ -29,6 +29,17 @@ typedef void (*ceph_osdc_callback_t)(struct ceph_osd_request *); #define CEPH_HOMELESS_OSD -1 +/* + * A single extent in a SPARSE_READ reply. + * + * Note that these come from the OSD as little-endian values. On BE arches, + * we convert them in-place after receipt. + */ +struct ceph_sparse_extent { + u64 off; + u64 len; +} __packed; + /* * A given osd we're communicating with. * @@ -104,6 +115,8 @@ struct ceph_osd_req_op { u64 offset, length; u64 truncate_size; u32 truncate_seq; + int sparse_ext_cnt; + struct ceph_sparse_extent *sparse_ext; struct ceph_osd_data osd_data; } extent; struct { @@ -510,6 +523,20 @@ extern struct ceph_osd_request *ceph_osdc_new_request(struct ceph_osd_client *, u32 truncate_seq, u64 truncate_size, bool use_mempool); +int __ceph_alloc_sparse_ext_map(struct ceph_osd_req_op *op, int cnt); + +/* + * How big an extent array should we preallocate for a sparse read? This is + * just a starting value. If we get more than this back from the OSD, the + * receiver will reallocate. + */ +#define CEPH_SPARSE_EXT_ARRAY_INITIAL 16 + +static inline int ceph_alloc_sparse_ext_map(struct ceph_osd_req_op *op) +{ + return __ceph_alloc_sparse_ext_map(op, CEPH_SPARSE_EXT_ARRAY_INITIAL); +} + extern void ceph_osdc_get_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req); extern void ceph_osdc_put_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req); @@ -564,5 +591,19 @@ int ceph_osdc_list_watchers(struct ceph_osd_client *osdc, struct ceph_object_locator *oloc, struct ceph_watch_item **watchers, u32 *num_watchers); -#endif +/* Find offset into the buffer of the end of the extent map */ +static inline u64 ceph_sparse_ext_map_end(struct ceph_osd_req_op *op) +{ + struct ceph_sparse_extent *ext; + + /* No extents? No data */ + if (op->extent.sparse_ext_cnt == 0) + return 0; + + ext = &op->extent.sparse_ext[op->extent.sparse_ext_cnt - 1]; + + return ext->off + ext->len - op->extent.offset; +} + +#endif diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c index 6d7a430bfed8..3e03ae68722c 100644 --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c @@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ static void osd_req_op_data_release(struct ceph_osd_request *osd_req, case CEPH_OSD_OP_READ: case CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITE: case CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITEFULL: + kfree(op->extent.sparse_ext); ceph_osd_data_release(&op->extent.osd_data); break; case CEPH_OSD_OP_CALL: @@ -1120,6 +1121,18 @@ struct ceph_osd_request *ceph_osdc_new_request(struct ceph_osd_client *osdc, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_osdc_new_request); +int __ceph_alloc_sparse_ext_map(struct ceph_osd_req_op *op, int cnt) +{ + op->extent.sparse_ext_cnt = cnt; + op->extent.sparse_ext = kmalloc_array(cnt, + sizeof(*op->extent.sparse_ext), + GFP_NOFS); + if (!op->extent.sparse_ext) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ceph_alloc_sparse_ext_map); + /* * We keep osd requests in an rbtree, sorted by ->r_tid. */ From ec3bc567eac12c557a2b99bd0b34b5dff12cab23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 08:26:31 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 03/53] libceph: new sparse_read op, support sparse reads on msgr2 crc codepath MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add support for a new sparse_read ceph_connection operation. The idea is that the client driver can define this operation use it to do special handling for incoming reads. The alloc_msg routine will look at the request and determine whether the reply is expected to be sparse. If it is, then we'll dispatch to a different set of state machine states that will repeatedly call the driver's sparse_read op to get length and placement info for reading the extent map, and the extents themselves. This necessitates adding some new field to some other structs: - The msg gets a new bool to track whether it's a sparse_read request. - A new field is added to the cursor to track the amount remaining in the current extent. This is used to cap the read from the socket into the msg_data - Handing a revoke with all of this is particularly difficult, so I've added a new data_len_remain field to the v2 connection info, and then use that to skip that much on a revoke. We may want to expand the use of that to the normal read path as well, just for consistency's sake. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- include/linux/ceph/messenger.h | 28 ++++++ net/ceph/messenger.c | 1 + net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 167 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h index 99c1726be6ee..8a6938fa324e 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ struct ceph_msg; struct ceph_connection; +struct ceph_msg_data_cursor; /* * Ceph defines these callbacks for handling connection events. @@ -70,6 +71,30 @@ struct ceph_connection_operations { int used_proto, int result, const int *allowed_protos, int proto_cnt, const int *allowed_modes, int mode_cnt); + + /** + * sparse_read: read sparse data + * @con: connection we're reading from + * @cursor: data cursor for reading extents + * @buf: optional buffer to read into + * + * This should be called more than once, each time setting up to + * receive an extent into the current cursor position, and zeroing + * the holes between them. + * + * Returns amount of data to be read (in bytes), 0 if reading is + * complete, or -errno if there was an error. + * + * If @buf is set on a >0 return, then the data should be read into + * the provided buffer. Otherwise, it should be read into the cursor. + * + * The sparse read operation is expected to initialize the cursor + * with a length covering up to the end of the last extent. + */ + int (*sparse_read)(struct ceph_connection *con, + struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor, + char **buf); + }; /* use format string %s%lld */ @@ -207,6 +232,7 @@ struct ceph_msg_data_cursor { struct ceph_msg_data *data; /* current data item */ size_t resid; /* bytes not yet consumed */ + int sr_resid; /* residual sparse_read len */ bool need_crc; /* crc update needed */ union { #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK @@ -251,6 +277,7 @@ struct ceph_msg { struct kref kref; bool more_to_follow; bool needs_out_seq; + bool sparse_read; int front_alloc_len; struct ceph_msgpool *pool; @@ -395,6 +422,7 @@ struct ceph_connection_v2_info { void *conn_bufs[16]; int conn_buf_cnt; + int data_len_remain; struct kvec in_sign_kvecs[8]; struct kvec out_sign_kvecs[8]; diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger.c b/net/ceph/messenger.c index 5eb4898cccd4..2eb10d7518e8 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c @@ -1013,6 +1013,7 @@ void ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor, cursor->total_resid = length; cursor->data = msg->data; + cursor->sr_resid = 0; __ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(cursor); } diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c index 1df1d29dee92..17c9a858bfbd 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c @@ -52,14 +52,16 @@ #define FRAME_LATE_STATUS_COMPLETE 0xe #define FRAME_LATE_STATUS_ABORTED_MASK 0xf -#define IN_S_HANDLE_PREAMBLE 1 -#define IN_S_HANDLE_CONTROL 2 -#define IN_S_HANDLE_CONTROL_REMAINDER 3 -#define IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA 4 -#define IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA_CONT 5 -#define IN_S_PREPARE_READ_ENC_PAGE 6 -#define IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE 7 -#define IN_S_FINISH_SKIP 8 +#define IN_S_HANDLE_PREAMBLE 1 +#define IN_S_HANDLE_CONTROL 2 +#define IN_S_HANDLE_CONTROL_REMAINDER 3 +#define IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA 4 +#define IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA_CONT 5 +#define IN_S_PREPARE_READ_ENC_PAGE 6 +#define IN_S_PREPARE_SPARSE_DATA 7 +#define IN_S_PREPARE_SPARSE_DATA_CONT 8 +#define IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE 9 +#define IN_S_FINISH_SKIP 10 #define OUT_S_QUEUE_DATA 1 #define OUT_S_QUEUE_DATA_CONT 2 @@ -1825,6 +1827,123 @@ static void prepare_read_data_cont(struct ceph_connection *con) con->v2.in_state = IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE; } +static int prepare_sparse_read_cont(struct ceph_connection *con) +{ + int ret; + struct bio_vec bv; + char *buf = NULL; + struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor = &con->v2.in_cursor; + + WARN_ON(con->v2.in_state != IN_S_PREPARE_SPARSE_DATA_CONT); + + if (iov_iter_is_bvec(&con->v2.in_iter)) { + if (ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), RXBOUNCE)) { + con->in_data_crc = crc32c(con->in_data_crc, + page_address(con->bounce_page), + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len); + get_bvec_at(cursor, &bv); + memcpy_to_page(bv.bv_page, bv.bv_offset, + page_address(con->bounce_page), + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len); + } else { + con->in_data_crc = ceph_crc32c_page(con->in_data_crc, + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_page, + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_offset, + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len); + } + + ceph_msg_data_advance(cursor, con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len); + cursor->sr_resid -= con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len; + dout("%s: advance by 0x%x sr_resid 0x%x\n", __func__, + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len, cursor->sr_resid); + WARN_ON_ONCE(cursor->sr_resid > cursor->total_resid); + if (cursor->sr_resid) { + get_bvec_at(cursor, &bv); + if (bv.bv_len > cursor->sr_resid) + bv.bv_len = cursor->sr_resid; + if (ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), RXBOUNCE)) { + bv.bv_page = con->bounce_page; + bv.bv_offset = 0; + } + set_in_bvec(con, &bv); + con->v2.data_len_remain -= bv.bv_len; + return 0; + } + } else if (iov_iter_is_kvec(&con->v2.in_iter)) { + /* On first call, we have no kvec so don't compute crc */ + if (con->v2.in_kvec_cnt) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(con->v2.in_kvec_cnt > 1); + con->in_data_crc = crc32c(con->in_data_crc, + con->v2.in_kvecs[0].iov_base, + con->v2.in_kvecs[0].iov_len); + } + } else { + return -EIO; + } + + /* get next extent */ + ret = con->ops->sparse_read(con, cursor, &buf); + if (ret <= 0) { + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + reset_in_kvecs(con); + add_in_kvec(con, con->v2.in_buf, CEPH_EPILOGUE_PLAIN_LEN); + con->v2.in_state = IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE; + return 0; + } + + if (buf) { + /* receive into buffer */ + reset_in_kvecs(con); + add_in_kvec(con, buf, ret); + con->v2.data_len_remain -= ret; + return 0; + } + + if (ret > cursor->total_resid) { + pr_warn("%s: ret 0x%x total_resid 0x%zx resid 0x%zx\n", + __func__, ret, cursor->total_resid, cursor->resid); + return -EIO; + } + get_bvec_at(cursor, &bv); + if (bv.bv_len > cursor->sr_resid) + bv.bv_len = cursor->sr_resid; + if (ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), RXBOUNCE)) { + if (unlikely(!con->bounce_page)) { + con->bounce_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOIO); + if (!con->bounce_page) { + pr_err("failed to allocate bounce page\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } + + bv.bv_page = con->bounce_page; + bv.bv_offset = 0; + } + set_in_bvec(con, &bv); + con->v2.data_len_remain -= ret; + return ret; +} + +static int prepare_sparse_read_data(struct ceph_connection *con) +{ + struct ceph_msg *msg = con->in_msg; + + dout("%s: starting sparse read\n", __func__); + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!con->ops->sparse_read)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (!con_secure(con)) + con->in_data_crc = -1; + + reset_in_kvecs(con); + con->v2.in_state = IN_S_PREPARE_SPARSE_DATA_CONT; + con->v2.data_len_remain = data_len(msg); + return prepare_sparse_read_cont(con); +} + static int prepare_read_tail_plain(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct ceph_msg *msg = con->in_msg; @@ -1845,7 +1964,10 @@ static int prepare_read_tail_plain(struct ceph_connection *con) } if (data_len(msg)) { - con->v2.in_state = IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA; + if (msg->sparse_read) + con->v2.in_state = IN_S_PREPARE_SPARSE_DATA; + else + con->v2.in_state = IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA; } else { add_in_kvec(con, con->v2.in_buf, CEPH_EPILOGUE_PLAIN_LEN); con->v2.in_state = IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE; @@ -2898,6 +3020,12 @@ static int populate_in_iter(struct ceph_connection *con) prepare_read_enc_page(con); ret = 0; break; + case IN_S_PREPARE_SPARSE_DATA: + ret = prepare_sparse_read_data(con); + break; + case IN_S_PREPARE_SPARSE_DATA_CONT: + ret = prepare_sparse_read_cont(con); + break; case IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE: ret = handle_epilogue(con); break; @@ -3489,6 +3617,23 @@ static void revoke_at_prepare_read_enc_page(struct ceph_connection *con) con->v2.in_state = IN_S_FINISH_SKIP; } +static void revoke_at_prepare_sparse_data(struct ceph_connection *con) +{ + int resid; /* current piece of data */ + int remaining; + + WARN_ON(con_secure(con)); + WARN_ON(!data_len(con->in_msg)); + WARN_ON(!iov_iter_is_bvec(&con->v2.in_iter)); + resid = iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter); + dout("%s con %p resid %d\n", __func__, con, resid); + + remaining = CEPH_EPILOGUE_PLAIN_LEN + con->v2.data_len_remain; + con->v2.in_iter.count -= resid; + set_in_skip(con, resid + remaining); + con->v2.in_state = IN_S_FINISH_SKIP; +} + static void revoke_at_handle_epilogue(struct ceph_connection *con) { int resid; @@ -3505,6 +3650,7 @@ static void revoke_at_handle_epilogue(struct ceph_connection *con) void ceph_con_v2_revoke_incoming(struct ceph_connection *con) { switch (con->v2.in_state) { + case IN_S_PREPARE_SPARSE_DATA: case IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA: revoke_at_prepare_read_data(con); break; @@ -3514,6 +3660,9 @@ void ceph_con_v2_revoke_incoming(struct ceph_connection *con) case IN_S_PREPARE_READ_ENC_PAGE: revoke_at_prepare_read_enc_page(con); break; + case IN_S_PREPARE_SPARSE_DATA_CONT: + revoke_at_prepare_sparse_data(con); + break; case IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE: revoke_at_handle_epilogue(con); break; From f36217e35ce13fe284fe9481711614200badebb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 12:17:15 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 04/53] libceph: support sparse reads on msgr2 secure codepath MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add a new init_sgs_pages helper that populates the scatterlist from an arbitrary point in an array of pages. Change setup_message_sgs to take an optional pointer to an array of pages. If that's set, then the scatterlist will be set using that array instead of the cursor. When given a sparse read on a secure connection, decrypt the data in-place rather than into the final destination, by passing it the in_enc_pages array. After decrypting, run the sparse_read state machine in a loop, copying data from the decrypted pages until it's complete. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 110 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c index 17c9a858bfbd..d0a1fb422617 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c @@ -969,12 +969,48 @@ static void init_sgs_cursor(struct scatterlist **sg, } } +/** + * init_sgs_pages: set up scatterlist on an array of page pointers + * @sg: scatterlist to populate + * @pages: pointer to page array + * @dpos: position in the array to start (bytes) + * @dlen: len to add to sg (bytes) + * @pad: pointer to pad destination (if any) + * + * Populate the scatterlist from the page array, starting at an arbitrary + * byte in the array and running for a specified length. + */ +static void init_sgs_pages(struct scatterlist **sg, struct page **pages, + int dpos, int dlen, u8 *pad) +{ + int idx = dpos >> PAGE_SHIFT; + int off = offset_in_page(dpos); + int resid = dlen; + + do { + int len = min(resid, (int)PAGE_SIZE - off); + + sg_set_page(*sg, pages[idx], len, off); + *sg = sg_next(*sg); + off = 0; + ++idx; + resid -= len; + } while (resid); + + if (need_padding(dlen)) { + sg_set_buf(*sg, pad, padding_len(dlen)); + *sg = sg_next(*sg); + } +} + static int setup_message_sgs(struct sg_table *sgt, struct ceph_msg *msg, u8 *front_pad, u8 *middle_pad, u8 *data_pad, - void *epilogue, bool add_tag) + void *epilogue, struct page **pages, int dpos, + bool add_tag) { struct ceph_msg_data_cursor cursor; struct scatterlist *cur_sg; + int dlen = data_len(msg); int sg_cnt; int ret; @@ -988,9 +1024,15 @@ static int setup_message_sgs(struct sg_table *sgt, struct ceph_msg *msg, if (middle_len(msg)) sg_cnt += calc_sg_cnt(msg->middle->vec.iov_base, middle_len(msg)); - if (data_len(msg)) { - ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(&cursor, msg, data_len(msg)); - sg_cnt += calc_sg_cnt_cursor(&cursor); + if (dlen) { + if (pages) { + sg_cnt += calc_pages_for(dpos, dlen); + if (need_padding(dlen)) + sg_cnt++; + } else { + ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(&cursor, msg, dlen); + sg_cnt += calc_sg_cnt_cursor(&cursor); + } } ret = sg_alloc_table(sgt, sg_cnt, GFP_NOIO); @@ -1004,9 +1046,13 @@ static int setup_message_sgs(struct sg_table *sgt, struct ceph_msg *msg, if (middle_len(msg)) init_sgs(&cur_sg, msg->middle->vec.iov_base, middle_len(msg), middle_pad); - if (data_len(msg)) { - ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(&cursor, msg, data_len(msg)); - init_sgs_cursor(&cur_sg, &cursor, data_pad); + if (dlen) { + if (pages) { + init_sgs_pages(&cur_sg, pages, dpos, dlen, data_pad); + } else { + ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(&cursor, msg, dlen); + init_sgs_cursor(&cur_sg, &cursor, data_pad); + } } WARN_ON(!sg_is_last(cur_sg)); @@ -1041,10 +1087,53 @@ static int decrypt_control_remainder(struct ceph_connection *con) padded_len(rem_len) + CEPH_GCM_TAG_LEN); } +/* Process sparse read data that lives in a buffer */ +static int process_v2_sparse_read(struct ceph_connection *con, + struct page **pages, int spos) +{ + struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor = &con->v2.in_cursor; + int ret; + + for (;;) { + char *buf = NULL; + + ret = con->ops->sparse_read(con, cursor, &buf); + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + + dout("%s: sparse_read return %x buf %p\n", __func__, ret, buf); + + do { + int idx = spos >> PAGE_SHIFT; + int soff = offset_in_page(spos); + struct page *spage = con->v2.in_enc_pages[idx]; + int len = min_t(int, ret, PAGE_SIZE - soff); + + if (buf) { + memcpy_from_page(buf, spage, soff, len); + buf += len; + } else { + struct bio_vec bv; + + get_bvec_at(cursor, &bv); + len = min_t(int, len, bv.bv_len); + memcpy_page(bv.bv_page, bv.bv_offset, + spage, soff, len); + ceph_msg_data_advance(cursor, len); + } + spos += len; + ret -= len; + } while (ret); + } +} + static int decrypt_tail(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct sg_table enc_sgt = {}; struct sg_table sgt = {}; + struct page **pages = NULL; + bool sparse = con->in_msg->sparse_read; + int dpos = 0; int tail_len; int ret; @@ -1055,9 +1144,14 @@ static int decrypt_tail(struct ceph_connection *con) if (ret) goto out; + if (sparse) { + dpos = padded_len(front_len(con->in_msg) + padded_len(middle_len(con->in_msg))); + pages = con->v2.in_enc_pages; + } + ret = setup_message_sgs(&sgt, con->in_msg, FRONT_PAD(con->v2.in_buf), - MIDDLE_PAD(con->v2.in_buf), DATA_PAD(con->v2.in_buf), - con->v2.in_buf, true); + MIDDLE_PAD(con->v2.in_buf), DATA_PAD(con->v2.in_buf), + con->v2.in_buf, pages, dpos, true); if (ret) goto out; @@ -1067,6 +1161,12 @@ static int decrypt_tail(struct ceph_connection *con) if (ret) goto out; + if (sparse && data_len(con->in_msg)) { + ret = process_v2_sparse_read(con, con->v2.in_enc_pages, dpos); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + WARN_ON(!con->v2.in_enc_page_cnt); ceph_release_page_vector(con->v2.in_enc_pages, con->v2.in_enc_page_cnt); @@ -1590,7 +1690,7 @@ static int prepare_message_secure(struct ceph_connection *con) encode_epilogue_secure(con, false); ret = setup_message_sgs(&sgt, con->out_msg, zerop, zerop, zerop, - &con->v2.out_epil, false); + &con->v2.out_epil, NULL, 0, false); if (ret) goto out; From d396f89db39a2f259e2125ca43b4c31bb65afcad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2022 13:33:06 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 05/53] libceph: add sparse read support to msgr1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add 2 new fields to ceph_connection_v1_info to track the necessary info in sparse reads. Skip initializing the cursor for a sparse read. Break out read_partial_message_section into a wrapper around a new read_partial_message_chunk function that doesn't zero out the crc first. Add new helper functions to drive receiving into the destinations provided by the sparse_read state machine. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- include/linux/ceph/messenger.h | 4 ++ net/ceph/messenger_v1.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h index 8a6938fa324e..9fd7255172ad 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h @@ -336,6 +336,10 @@ struct ceph_connection_v1_info { int in_base_pos; /* bytes read */ + /* sparse reads */ + struct kvec in_sr_kvec; /* current location to receive into */ + u64 in_sr_len; /* amount of data in this extent */ + /* message in temps */ u8 in_tag; /* protocol control byte */ struct ceph_msg_header in_hdr; diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c index 3d57bb48a2b4..f9a50d7f0d20 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c @@ -159,9 +159,9 @@ static size_t sizeof_footer(struct ceph_connection *con) static void prepare_message_data(struct ceph_msg *msg, u32 data_len) { - /* Initialize data cursor */ - - ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(&msg->cursor, msg, data_len); + /* Initialize data cursor if it's not a sparse read */ + if (!msg->sparse_read) + ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(&msg->cursor, msg, data_len); } /* @@ -960,9 +960,9 @@ static void process_ack(struct ceph_connection *con) prepare_read_tag(con); } -static int read_partial_message_section(struct ceph_connection *con, - struct kvec *section, - unsigned int sec_len, u32 *crc) +static int read_partial_message_chunk(struct ceph_connection *con, + struct kvec *section, + unsigned int sec_len, u32 *crc) { int ret, left; @@ -978,11 +978,91 @@ static int read_partial_message_section(struct ceph_connection *con, section->iov_len += ret; } if (section->iov_len == sec_len) - *crc = crc32c(0, section->iov_base, section->iov_len); + *crc = crc32c(*crc, section->iov_base, section->iov_len); return 1; } +static inline int read_partial_message_section(struct ceph_connection *con, + struct kvec *section, + unsigned int sec_len, u32 *crc) +{ + *crc = 0; + return read_partial_message_chunk(con, section, sec_len, crc); +} + +static int read_sparse_msg_extent(struct ceph_connection *con, u32 *crc) +{ + struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor = &con->in_msg->cursor; + bool do_bounce = ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), RXBOUNCE); + + if (do_bounce && unlikely(!con->bounce_page)) { + con->bounce_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOIO); + if (!con->bounce_page) { + pr_err("failed to allocate bounce page\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } + + while (cursor->sr_resid > 0) { + struct page *page, *rpage; + size_t off, len; + int ret; + + page = ceph_msg_data_next(cursor, &off, &len); + rpage = do_bounce ? con->bounce_page : page; + + /* clamp to what remains in extent */ + len = min_t(int, len, cursor->sr_resid); + ret = ceph_tcp_recvpage(con->sock, rpage, (int)off, len); + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + *crc = ceph_crc32c_page(*crc, rpage, off, ret); + ceph_msg_data_advance(cursor, (size_t)ret); + cursor->sr_resid -= ret; + if (do_bounce) + memcpy_page(page, off, rpage, off, ret); + } + return 1; +} + +static int read_sparse_msg_data(struct ceph_connection *con) +{ + struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor = &con->in_msg->cursor; + bool do_datacrc = !ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), NOCRC); + u32 crc = 0; + int ret = 1; + + if (do_datacrc) + crc = con->in_data_crc; + + do { + if (con->v1.in_sr_kvec.iov_base) + ret = read_partial_message_chunk(con, + &con->v1.in_sr_kvec, + con->v1.in_sr_len, + &crc); + else if (cursor->sr_resid > 0) + ret = read_sparse_msg_extent(con, &crc); + + if (ret <= 0) { + if (do_datacrc) + con->in_data_crc = crc; + return ret; + } + + memset(&con->v1.in_sr_kvec, 0, sizeof(con->v1.in_sr_kvec)); + ret = con->ops->sparse_read(con, cursor, + (char **)&con->v1.in_sr_kvec.iov_base); + con->v1.in_sr_len = ret; + } while (ret > 0); + + if (do_datacrc) + con->in_data_crc = crc; + + return ret < 0 ? ret : 1; /* must return > 0 to indicate success */ +} + static int read_partial_msg_data(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor = &con->in_msg->cursor; @@ -1173,7 +1253,9 @@ static int read_partial_message(struct ceph_connection *con) if (!m->num_data_items) return -EIO; - if (ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), RXBOUNCE)) + if (m->sparse_read) + ret = read_sparse_msg_data(con); + else if (ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), RXBOUNCE)) ret = read_partial_msg_data_bounce(con); else ret = read_partial_msg_data(con); From f628d799972799023d32c2542bb2639eb8c4f84e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 11:38:02 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 06/53] libceph: add sparse read support to OSD client MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Have get_reply check for the presence of sparse read ops in the request and set the sparse_read boolean in the msg. That will queue the messenger layer to use the sparse read codepath instead of the normal data receive. Add a new sparse_read operation for the OSD client, driven by its own state machine. The messenger will repeatedly call the sparse_read operation, and it will pass back the necessary info to set up to read the next extent of data, while zero-filling the sparse regions. The state machine will stop at the end of the last extent, and will attach the extent map buffer to the ceph_osd_req_op so that the caller can use it. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h | 32 ++++ net/ceph/osd_client.c | 257 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 285 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h b/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h index 05da1e755b7b..bfa4813590da 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h @@ -40,6 +40,36 @@ struct ceph_sparse_extent { u64 len; } __packed; +/* Sparse read state machine state values */ +enum ceph_sparse_read_state { + CEPH_SPARSE_READ_HDR = 0, + CEPH_SPARSE_READ_EXTENTS, + CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA_LEN, + CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA, +}; + +/* + * A SPARSE_READ reply is a 32-bit count of extents, followed by an array of + * 64-bit offset/length pairs, and then all of the actual file data + * concatenated after it (sans holes). + * + * Unfortunately, we don't know how long the extent array is until we've + * started reading the data section of the reply. The caller should send down + * a destination buffer for the array, but we'll alloc one if it's too small + * or if the caller doesn't. + */ +struct ceph_sparse_read { + enum ceph_sparse_read_state sr_state; /* state machine state */ + u64 sr_req_off; /* orig request offset */ + u64 sr_req_len; /* orig request length */ + u64 sr_pos; /* current pos in buffer */ + int sr_index; /* current extent index */ + __le32 sr_datalen; /* length of actual data */ + u32 sr_count; /* extent count in reply */ + int sr_ext_len; /* length of extent array */ + struct ceph_sparse_extent *sr_extent; /* extent array */ +}; + /* * A given osd we're communicating with. * @@ -48,6 +78,7 @@ struct ceph_sparse_extent { */ struct ceph_osd { refcount_t o_ref; + int o_sparse_op_idx; struct ceph_osd_client *o_osdc; int o_osd; int o_incarnation; @@ -63,6 +94,7 @@ struct ceph_osd { unsigned long lru_ttl; struct list_head o_keepalive_item; struct mutex lock; + struct ceph_sparse_read o_sparse_read; }; #define CEPH_OSD_SLAB_OPS 2 diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c index 3e03ae68722c..0aacbadcab06 100644 --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c @@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ static void osd_req_op_data_release(struct ceph_osd_request *osd_req, switch (op->op) { case CEPH_OSD_OP_READ: + case CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ: case CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITE: case CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITEFULL: kfree(op->extent.sparse_ext); @@ -670,6 +671,7 @@ static void get_num_data_items(struct ceph_osd_request *req, /* reply */ case CEPH_OSD_OP_STAT: case CEPH_OSD_OP_READ: + case CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ: case CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS: *num_reply_data_items += 1; break; @@ -739,7 +741,7 @@ void osd_req_op_extent_init(struct ceph_osd_request *osd_req, BUG_ON(opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_READ && opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITE && opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITEFULL && opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_ZERO && - opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_TRUNCATE); + opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_TRUNCATE && opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ); op->extent.offset = offset; op->extent.length = length; @@ -964,6 +966,7 @@ static u32 osd_req_encode_op(struct ceph_osd_op *dst, case CEPH_OSD_OP_STAT: break; case CEPH_OSD_OP_READ: + case CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ: case CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITE: case CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITEFULL: case CEPH_OSD_OP_ZERO: @@ -1060,7 +1063,8 @@ struct ceph_osd_request *ceph_osdc_new_request(struct ceph_osd_client *osdc, BUG_ON(opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_READ && opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITE && opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_ZERO && opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_TRUNCATE && - opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_CREATE && opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_DELETE); + opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_CREATE && opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_DELETE && + opcode != CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ); req = ceph_osdc_alloc_request(osdc, snapc, num_ops, use_mempool, GFP_NOFS); @@ -1201,6 +1205,13 @@ static void osd_init(struct ceph_osd *osd) mutex_init(&osd->lock); } +static void ceph_init_sparse_read(struct ceph_sparse_read *sr) +{ + kfree(sr->sr_extent); + memset(sr, '\0', sizeof(*sr)); + sr->sr_state = CEPH_SPARSE_READ_HDR; +} + static void osd_cleanup(struct ceph_osd *osd) { WARN_ON(!RB_EMPTY_NODE(&osd->o_node)); @@ -1211,6 +1222,8 @@ static void osd_cleanup(struct ceph_osd *osd) WARN_ON(!list_empty(&osd->o_osd_lru)); WARN_ON(!list_empty(&osd->o_keepalive_item)); + ceph_init_sparse_read(&osd->o_sparse_read); + if (osd->o_auth.authorizer) { WARN_ON(osd_homeless(osd)); ceph_auth_destroy_authorizer(osd->o_auth.authorizer); @@ -1230,6 +1243,9 @@ static struct ceph_osd *create_osd(struct ceph_osd_client *osdc, int onum) osd_init(osd); osd->o_osdc = osdc; osd->o_osd = onum; + osd->o_sparse_op_idx = -1; + + ceph_init_sparse_read(&osd->o_sparse_read); ceph_con_init(&osd->o_con, osd, &osd_con_ops, &osdc->client->msgr); @@ -2034,6 +2050,7 @@ static void setup_request_data(struct ceph_osd_request *req) &op->raw_data_in); break; case CEPH_OSD_OP_READ: + case CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ: ceph_osdc_msg_data_add(reply_msg, &op->extent.osd_data); break; @@ -2453,8 +2470,10 @@ static void finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) req->r_end_latency = ktime_get(); - if (req->r_osd) + if (req->r_osd) { + ceph_init_sparse_read(&req->r_osd->o_sparse_read); unlink_request(req->r_osd, req); + } atomic_dec(&osdc->num_requests); /* @@ -5366,6 +5385,24 @@ static void osd_dispatch(struct ceph_connection *con, struct ceph_msg *msg) ceph_msg_put(msg); } +/* How much sparse data was requested? */ +static u64 sparse_data_requested(struct ceph_osd_request *req) +{ + u64 len = 0; + + if (req->r_flags & CEPH_OSD_FLAG_READ) { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < req->r_num_ops; ++i) { + struct ceph_osd_req_op *op = &req->r_ops[i]; + + if (op->op == CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ) + len += op->extent.length; + } + } + return len; +} + /* * Lookup and return message for incoming reply. Don't try to do * anything about a larger than preallocated data portion of the @@ -5382,6 +5419,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_reply(struct ceph_connection *con, int front_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->front_len); int data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len); u64 tid = le64_to_cpu(hdr->tid); + u64 srlen; down_read(&osdc->lock); if (!osd_registered(osd)) { @@ -5414,7 +5452,8 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_reply(struct ceph_connection *con, req->r_reply = m; } - if (data_len > req->r_reply->data_length) { + srlen = sparse_data_requested(req); + if (!srlen && data_len > req->r_reply->data_length) { pr_warn("%s osd%d tid %llu data %d > preallocated %zu, skipping\n", __func__, osd->o_osd, req->r_tid, data_len, req->r_reply->data_length); @@ -5424,6 +5463,8 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_reply(struct ceph_connection *con, } m = ceph_msg_get(req->r_reply); + m->sparse_read = (bool)srlen; + dout("get_reply tid %lld %p\n", tid, m); out_unlock_session: @@ -5656,9 +5697,217 @@ static int osd_check_message_signature(struct ceph_msg *msg) return ceph_auth_check_message_signature(auth, msg); } +static void advance_cursor(struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor, size_t len, + bool zero) +{ + while (len) { + struct page *page; + size_t poff, plen; + + page = ceph_msg_data_next(cursor, &poff, &plen); + if (plen > len) + plen = len; + if (zero) + zero_user_segment(page, poff, poff + plen); + len -= plen; + ceph_msg_data_advance(cursor, plen); + } +} + +static int prep_next_sparse_read(struct ceph_connection *con, + struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor) +{ + struct ceph_osd *o = con->private; + struct ceph_sparse_read *sr = &o->o_sparse_read; + struct ceph_osd_request *req; + struct ceph_osd_req_op *op; + + spin_lock(&o->o_requests_lock); + req = lookup_request(&o->o_requests, le64_to_cpu(con->in_msg->hdr.tid)); + if (!req) { + spin_unlock(&o->o_requests_lock); + return -EBADR; + } + + if (o->o_sparse_op_idx < 0) { + u64 srlen = sparse_data_requested(req); + + dout("%s: [%d] starting new sparse read req. srlen=0x%llx\n", + __func__, o->o_osd, srlen); + ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(cursor, con->in_msg, srlen); + } else { + u64 end; + + op = &req->r_ops[o->o_sparse_op_idx]; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(op->extent.sparse_ext); + + /* hand back buffer we took earlier */ + op->extent.sparse_ext = sr->sr_extent; + sr->sr_extent = NULL; + op->extent.sparse_ext_cnt = sr->sr_count; + sr->sr_ext_len = 0; + dout("%s: [%d] completed extent array len %d cursor->resid %zd\n", + __func__, o->o_osd, op->extent.sparse_ext_cnt, cursor->resid); + /* Advance to end of data for this operation */ + end = ceph_sparse_ext_map_end(op); + if (end < sr->sr_req_len) + advance_cursor(cursor, sr->sr_req_len - end, false); + } + + ceph_init_sparse_read(sr); + + /* find next op in this request (if any) */ + while (++o->o_sparse_op_idx < req->r_num_ops) { + op = &req->r_ops[o->o_sparse_op_idx]; + if (op->op == CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ) + goto found; + } + + /* reset for next sparse read request */ + spin_unlock(&o->o_requests_lock); + o->o_sparse_op_idx = -1; + return 0; +found: + sr->sr_req_off = op->extent.offset; + sr->sr_req_len = op->extent.length; + sr->sr_pos = sr->sr_req_off; + dout("%s: [%d] new sparse read op at idx %d 0x%llx~0x%llx\n", __func__, + o->o_osd, o->o_sparse_op_idx, sr->sr_req_off, sr->sr_req_len); + + /* hand off request's sparse extent map buffer */ + sr->sr_ext_len = op->extent.sparse_ext_cnt; + op->extent.sparse_ext_cnt = 0; + sr->sr_extent = op->extent.sparse_ext; + op->extent.sparse_ext = NULL; + + spin_unlock(&o->o_requests_lock); + return 1; +} + +#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN +static inline void convert_extent_map(struct ceph_sparse_read *sr) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sr->sr_count; i++) { + struct ceph_sparse_extent *ext = &sr->sr_extent[i]; + + ext->off = le64_to_cpu((__force __le64)ext->off); + ext->len = le64_to_cpu((__force __le64)ext->len); + } +} +#else +static inline void convert_extent_map(struct ceph_sparse_read *sr) +{ +} +#endif + +#define MAX_EXTENTS 4096 + +static int osd_sparse_read(struct ceph_connection *con, + struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor, + char **pbuf) +{ + struct ceph_osd *o = con->private; + struct ceph_sparse_read *sr = &o->o_sparse_read; + u32 count = sr->sr_count; + u64 eoff, elen; + int ret; + + switch (sr->sr_state) { + case CEPH_SPARSE_READ_HDR: +next_op: + ret = prep_next_sparse_read(con, cursor); + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + + /* number of extents */ + ret = sizeof(sr->sr_count); + *pbuf = (char *)&sr->sr_count; + sr->sr_state = CEPH_SPARSE_READ_EXTENTS; + break; + case CEPH_SPARSE_READ_EXTENTS: + /* Convert sr_count to host-endian */ + count = le32_to_cpu((__force __le32)sr->sr_count); + sr->sr_count = count; + dout("[%d] got %u extents\n", o->o_osd, count); + + if (count > 0) { + if (!sr->sr_extent || count > sr->sr_ext_len) { + /* + * Apply a hard cap to the number of extents. + * If we have more, assume something is wrong. + */ + if (count > MAX_EXTENTS) { + dout("%s: OSD returned 0x%x extents in a single reply!\n", + __func__, count); + return -EREMOTEIO; + } + + /* no extent array provided, or too short */ + kfree(sr->sr_extent); + sr->sr_extent = kmalloc_array(count, + sizeof(*sr->sr_extent), + GFP_NOIO); + if (!sr->sr_extent) + return -ENOMEM; + sr->sr_ext_len = count; + } + ret = count * sizeof(*sr->sr_extent); + *pbuf = (char *)sr->sr_extent; + sr->sr_state = CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA_LEN; + break; + } + /* No extents? Read data len */ + fallthrough; + case CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA_LEN: + convert_extent_map(sr); + ret = sizeof(sr->sr_datalen); + *pbuf = (char *)&sr->sr_datalen; + sr->sr_state = CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA; + break; + case CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA: + if (sr->sr_index >= count) { + sr->sr_state = CEPH_SPARSE_READ_HDR; + goto next_op; + } + + eoff = sr->sr_extent[sr->sr_index].off; + elen = sr->sr_extent[sr->sr_index].len; + + dout("[%d] ext %d off 0x%llx len 0x%llx\n", + o->o_osd, sr->sr_index, eoff, elen); + + if (elen > INT_MAX) { + dout("Sparse read extent length too long (0x%llx)\n", + elen); + return -EREMOTEIO; + } + + /* zero out anything from sr_pos to start of extent */ + if (sr->sr_pos < eoff) + advance_cursor(cursor, eoff - sr->sr_pos, true); + + /* Set position to end of extent */ + sr->sr_pos = eoff + elen; + + /* send back the new length and nullify the ptr */ + cursor->sr_resid = elen; + ret = elen; + *pbuf = NULL; + + /* Bump the array index */ + ++sr->sr_index; + break; + } + return ret; +} + static const struct ceph_connection_operations osd_con_ops = { .get = osd_get_con, .put = osd_put_con, + .sparse_read = osd_sparse_read, .alloc_msg = osd_alloc_msg, .dispatch = osd_dispatch, .fault = osd_fault, From 03bc06c7b0bd8d86b9f17f459acaeb1283ba2700 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Sat, 26 Feb 2022 06:33:03 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 07/53] ceph: add new mount option to enable sparse reads MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add a new mount option that has the client issue sparse reads instead of normal ones. The callers now preallocate an sparse extent buffer that the libceph receive code can populate and hand back after the operation completes. After a successful sparse read, we can't use the req->r_result value to determine the amount of data "read", so instead we set the received length to be from the end of the last extent in the buffer. Any interstitial holes will have been filled by the receive code. [ xiubli: fix a double free on req reported by Ilya ] Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/addr.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/file.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- fs/ceph/super.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- fs/ceph/super.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c index 59cbfb80edbd..f45ebe957bbe 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/addr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c @@ -245,8 +245,10 @@ static void finish_netfs_read(struct ceph_osd_request *req) struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_inode_to_client(req->r_inode); struct ceph_osd_data *osd_data = osd_req_op_extent_osd_data(req, 0); struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq = req->r_priv; + struct ceph_osd_req_op *op = &req->r_ops[0]; int num_pages; int err = req->r_result; + bool sparse = (op->op == CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ); ceph_update_read_metrics(&fsc->mdsc->metric, req->r_start_latency, req->r_end_latency, osd_data->length, err); @@ -255,7 +257,9 @@ static void finish_netfs_read(struct ceph_osd_request *req) subreq->len, i_size_read(req->r_inode)); /* no object means success but no data */ - if (err == -ENOENT) + if (sparse && err >= 0) + err = ceph_sparse_ext_map_end(op); + else if (err == -ENOENT) err = 0; else if (err == -EBLOCKLISTED) fsc->blocklisted = true; @@ -338,6 +342,7 @@ static void ceph_netfs_issue_read(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq) size_t page_off; int err = 0; u64 len = subreq->len; + bool sparse = ceph_test_mount_opt(fsc, SPARSEREAD); if (ceph_inode_is_shutdown(inode)) { err = -EIO; @@ -348,7 +353,7 @@ static void ceph_netfs_issue_read(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq) return; req = ceph_osdc_new_request(&fsc->client->osdc, &ci->i_layout, vino, subreq->start, &len, - 0, 1, CEPH_OSD_OP_READ, + 0, 1, sparse ? CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ : CEPH_OSD_OP_READ, CEPH_OSD_FLAG_READ | fsc->client->osdc.client->options->read_from_replica, NULL, ci->i_truncate_seq, ci->i_truncate_size, false); if (IS_ERR(req)) { @@ -357,6 +362,12 @@ static void ceph_netfs_issue_read(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq) goto out; } + if (sparse) { + err = ceph_alloc_sparse_ext_map(&req->r_ops[0]); + if (err) + goto out; + } + dout("%s: pos=%llu orig_len=%zu len=%llu\n", __func__, subreq->start, subreq->len, len); iov_iter_xarray(&iter, ITER_DEST, &rreq->mapping->i_pages, subreq->start, len); err = iov_iter_get_pages_alloc2(&iter, &pages, len, &page_off); diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index 63efe5389783..e3671678b233 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -936,6 +936,7 @@ static ssize_t ceph_sync_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to, u64 off = iocb->ki_pos; u64 len = iov_iter_count(to); u64 i_size = i_size_read(inode); + bool sparse = ceph_test_mount_opt(fsc, SPARSEREAD); dout("sync_read on file %p %llu~%u %s\n", file, off, (unsigned)len, (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) ? "O_DIRECT" : ""); @@ -962,10 +963,12 @@ static ssize_t ceph_sync_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to, bool more; int idx; size_t left; + struct ceph_osd_req_op *op; req = ceph_osdc_new_request(osdc, &ci->i_layout, ci->i_vino, off, &len, 0, 1, - CEPH_OSD_OP_READ, CEPH_OSD_FLAG_READ, + sparse ? CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ : CEPH_OSD_OP_READ, + CEPH_OSD_FLAG_READ, NULL, ci->i_truncate_seq, ci->i_truncate_size, false); if (IS_ERR(req)) { @@ -986,6 +989,16 @@ static ssize_t ceph_sync_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to, osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, 0, pages, len, page_off, false, false); + + op = &req->r_ops[0]; + if (sparse) { + ret = ceph_alloc_sparse_ext_map(op); + if (ret) { + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + break; + } + } + ceph_osdc_start_request(osdc, req); ret = ceph_osdc_wait_request(osdc, req); @@ -994,19 +1007,24 @@ static ssize_t ceph_sync_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to, req->r_end_latency, len, ret); - ceph_osdc_put_request(req); - i_size = i_size_read(inode); dout("sync_read %llu~%llu got %zd i_size %llu%s\n", off, len, ret, i_size, (more ? " MORE" : "")); - if (ret == -ENOENT) + /* Fix it to go to end of extent map */ + if (sparse && ret >= 0) + ret = ceph_sparse_ext_map_end(op); + else if (ret == -ENOENT) ret = 0; + + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + if (ret >= 0 && ret < len && (off + ret < i_size)) { int zlen = min(len - ret, i_size - off - ret); int zoff = page_off + ret; + dout("sync_read zero gap %llu~%llu\n", - off + ret, off + ret + zlen); + off + ret, off + ret + zlen); ceph_zero_page_vector_range(zoff, zlen, pages); ret += zlen; } @@ -1125,8 +1143,10 @@ static void ceph_aio_complete_req(struct ceph_osd_request *req) struct inode *inode = req->r_inode; struct ceph_aio_request *aio_req = req->r_priv; struct ceph_osd_data *osd_data = osd_req_op_extent_osd_data(req, 0); + struct ceph_osd_req_op *op = &req->r_ops[0]; struct ceph_client_metric *metric = &ceph_sb_to_mdsc(inode->i_sb)->metric; unsigned int len = osd_data->bvec_pos.iter.bi_size; + bool sparse = (op->op == CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ); BUG_ON(osd_data->type != CEPH_OSD_DATA_TYPE_BVECS); BUG_ON(!osd_data->num_bvecs); @@ -1147,6 +1167,8 @@ static void ceph_aio_complete_req(struct ceph_osd_request *req) } rc = -ENOMEM; } else if (!aio_req->write) { + if (sparse && rc >= 0) + rc = ceph_sparse_ext_map_end(op); if (rc == -ENOENT) rc = 0; if (rc >= 0 && len > rc) { @@ -1283,6 +1305,7 @@ ceph_direct_read_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter, loff_t pos = iocb->ki_pos; bool write = iov_iter_rw(iter) == WRITE; bool should_dirty = !write && user_backed_iter(iter); + bool sparse = ceph_test_mount_opt(fsc, SPARSEREAD); if (write && ceph_snap(file_inode(file)) != CEPH_NOSNAP) return -EROFS; @@ -1310,6 +1333,8 @@ ceph_direct_read_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter, while (iov_iter_count(iter) > 0) { u64 size = iov_iter_count(iter); ssize_t len; + struct ceph_osd_req_op *op; + int readop = sparse ? CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ : CEPH_OSD_OP_READ; if (write) size = min_t(u64, size, fsc->mount_options->wsize); @@ -1320,8 +1345,7 @@ ceph_direct_read_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter, req = ceph_osdc_new_request(&fsc->client->osdc, &ci->i_layout, vino, pos, &size, 0, 1, - write ? CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITE : - CEPH_OSD_OP_READ, + write ? CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITE : readop, flags, snapc, ci->i_truncate_seq, ci->i_truncate_size, @@ -1372,6 +1396,14 @@ ceph_direct_read_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter, } osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_bvecs(req, 0, bvecs, num_pages, len); + op = &req->r_ops[0]; + if (sparse) { + ret = ceph_alloc_sparse_ext_map(op); + if (ret) { + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + break; + } + } if (aio_req) { aio_req->total_len += len; @@ -1399,8 +1431,11 @@ ceph_direct_read_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter, size = i_size_read(inode); if (!write) { - if (ret == -ENOENT) + if (sparse && ret >= 0) + ret = ceph_sparse_ext_map_end(op); + else if (ret == -ENOENT) ret = 0; + if (ret >= 0 && ret < len && pos + ret < size) { struct iov_iter i; int zlen = min_t(size_t, len - ret, diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.c b/fs/ceph/super.c index a5f52013314d..d6a1790f6923 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.c +++ b/fs/ceph/super.c @@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ enum { Opt_copyfrom, Opt_wsync, Opt_pagecache, + Opt_sparseread, }; enum ceph_recover_session_mode { @@ -207,6 +208,7 @@ static const struct fs_parameter_spec ceph_mount_parameters[] = { fsparam_u32 ("wsize", Opt_wsize), fsparam_flag_no ("wsync", Opt_wsync), fsparam_flag_no ("pagecache", Opt_pagecache), + fsparam_flag_no ("sparseread", Opt_sparseread), {} }; @@ -576,6 +578,12 @@ static int ceph_parse_mount_param(struct fs_context *fc, else fsopt->flags &= ~CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_NOPAGECACHE; break; + case Opt_sparseread: + if (result.negated) + fsopt->flags &= ~CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_SPARSEREAD; + else + fsopt->flags |= CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_SPARSEREAD; + break; default: BUG(); } @@ -710,9 +718,10 @@ static int ceph_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root) if (!(fsopt->flags & CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_ASYNC_DIROPS)) seq_puts(m, ",wsync"); - if (fsopt->flags & CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_NOPAGECACHE) seq_puts(m, ",nopagecache"); + if (fsopt->flags & CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_SPARSEREAD) + seq_puts(m, ",sparseread"); if (fsopt->wsize != CEPH_MAX_WRITE_SIZE) seq_printf(m, ",wsize=%u", fsopt->wsize); @@ -1296,6 +1305,11 @@ static int ceph_reconfigure_fc(struct fs_context *fc) else ceph_clear_mount_opt(fsc, ASYNC_DIROPS); + if (fsopt->flags & CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_SPARSEREAD) + ceph_set_mount_opt(fsc, SPARSEREAD); + else + ceph_clear_mount_opt(fsc, SPARSEREAD); + if (strcmp_null(fsc->mount_options->mon_addr, fsopt->mon_addr)) { kfree(fsc->mount_options->mon_addr); fsc->mount_options->mon_addr = fsopt->mon_addr; diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h index 3bfddf34d488..b9cad57ce606 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.h +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #define CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_NOCOPYFROM (1<<14) /* don't use RADOS 'copy-from' op */ #define CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_ASYNC_DIROPS (1<<15) /* allow async directory ops */ #define CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_NOPAGECACHE (1<<16) /* bypass pagecache altogether */ +#define CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_SPARSEREAD (1<<17) /* always do sparse reads */ #define CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_DEFAULT \ (CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_DCACHE | \ From ec9595c080c6f0ba3ebcfc3013eac8f38b868b78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2020 13:11:00 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 08/53] ceph: preallocate inode for ops that may create one MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When creating a new inode, we need to determine the crypto context before we can transmit the RPC. The fscrypt API has a routine for getting a crypto context before a create occurs, but it requires an inode. Change the ceph code to preallocate an inode in advance of a create of any sort (open(), mknod(), symlink(), etc). Move the existing code that generates the ACL and SELinux blobs into this routine since that's mostly common across all the different codepaths. In most cases, we just want to allow ceph_fill_trace to use that inode after the reply comes in, so add a new field to the MDS request for it (r_new_inode). The async create codepath is a bit different though. In that case, we want to hash the inode in advance of the RPC so that it can be used before the reply comes in. If the call subsequently fails with -EJUKEBOX, then just put the references and clean up the as_ctx. Note that with this change, we now need to regenerate the as_ctx when this occurs, but it's quite rare for it to happen. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/dir.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++----------------- fs/ceph/file.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/ceph/inode.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 17 +++++++-- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 1 + fs/ceph/super.h | 9 ++++- 6 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index bdcffb04513f..31fac215a6a0 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -865,13 +865,6 @@ static int ceph_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, goto out; } - err = ceph_pre_init_acls(dir, &mode, &as_ctx); - if (err < 0) - goto out; - err = ceph_security_init_secctx(dentry, mode, &as_ctx); - if (err < 0) - goto out; - dout("mknod in dir %p dentry %p mode 0%ho rdev %d\n", dir, dentry, mode, rdev); req = ceph_mdsc_create_request(mdsc, CEPH_MDS_OP_MKNOD, USE_AUTH_MDS); @@ -879,6 +872,14 @@ static int ceph_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, err = PTR_ERR(req); goto out; } + + req->r_new_inode = ceph_new_inode(dir, dentry, &mode, &as_ctx); + if (IS_ERR(req->r_new_inode)) { + err = PTR_ERR(req->r_new_inode); + req->r_new_inode = NULL; + goto out_req; + } + req->r_dentry = dget(dentry); req->r_num_caps = 2; req->r_parent = dir; @@ -889,13 +890,13 @@ static int ceph_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, req->r_dentry_drop = CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED | CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL | CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL; req->r_dentry_unless = CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL; - if (as_ctx.pagelist) { - req->r_pagelist = as_ctx.pagelist; - as_ctx.pagelist = NULL; - } + + ceph_as_ctx_to_req(req, &as_ctx); + err = ceph_mdsc_do_request(mdsc, dir, req); if (!err && !req->r_reply_info.head->is_dentry) err = ceph_handle_notrace_create(dir, dentry); +out_req: ceph_mdsc_put_request(req); out: if (!err) @@ -918,6 +919,7 @@ static int ceph_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = ceph_sb_to_mdsc(dir->i_sb); struct ceph_mds_request *req; struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx as_ctx = {}; + umode_t mode = S_IFLNK | 0777; int err; if (ceph_snap(dir) != CEPH_NOSNAP) @@ -932,21 +934,24 @@ static int ceph_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, goto out; } - err = ceph_security_init_secctx(dentry, S_IFLNK | 0777, &as_ctx); - if (err < 0) - goto out; - dout("symlink in dir %p dentry %p to '%s'\n", dir, dentry, dest); req = ceph_mdsc_create_request(mdsc, CEPH_MDS_OP_SYMLINK, USE_AUTH_MDS); if (IS_ERR(req)) { err = PTR_ERR(req); goto out; } + + req->r_new_inode = ceph_new_inode(dir, dentry, &mode, &as_ctx); + if (IS_ERR(req->r_new_inode)) { + err = PTR_ERR(req->r_new_inode); + req->r_new_inode = NULL; + goto out_req; + } + req->r_path2 = kstrdup(dest, GFP_KERNEL); if (!req->r_path2) { err = -ENOMEM; - ceph_mdsc_put_request(req); - goto out; + goto out_req; } req->r_parent = dir; ihold(dir); @@ -957,13 +962,13 @@ static int ceph_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, req->r_dentry_drop = CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED | CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL | CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL; req->r_dentry_unless = CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL; - if (as_ctx.pagelist) { - req->r_pagelist = as_ctx.pagelist; - as_ctx.pagelist = NULL; - } + + ceph_as_ctx_to_req(req, &as_ctx); + err = ceph_mdsc_do_request(mdsc, dir, req); if (!err && !req->r_reply_info.head->is_dentry) err = ceph_handle_notrace_create(dir, dentry); +out_req: ceph_mdsc_put_request(req); out: if (err) @@ -1004,13 +1009,6 @@ static int ceph_mkdir(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, goto out; } - mode |= S_IFDIR; - err = ceph_pre_init_acls(dir, &mode, &as_ctx); - if (err < 0) - goto out; - err = ceph_security_init_secctx(dentry, mode, &as_ctx); - if (err < 0) - goto out; req = ceph_mdsc_create_request(mdsc, op, USE_AUTH_MDS); if (IS_ERR(req)) { @@ -1018,6 +1016,14 @@ static int ceph_mkdir(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, goto out; } + mode |= S_IFDIR; + req->r_new_inode = ceph_new_inode(dir, dentry, &mode, &as_ctx); + if (IS_ERR(req->r_new_inode)) { + err = PTR_ERR(req->r_new_inode); + req->r_new_inode = NULL; + goto out_req; + } + req->r_dentry = dget(dentry); req->r_num_caps = 2; req->r_parent = dir; @@ -1027,15 +1033,15 @@ static int ceph_mkdir(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, req->r_dentry_drop = CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED | CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL | CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL; req->r_dentry_unless = CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL; - if (as_ctx.pagelist) { - req->r_pagelist = as_ctx.pagelist; - as_ctx.pagelist = NULL; - } + + ceph_as_ctx_to_req(req, &as_ctx); + err = ceph_mdsc_do_request(mdsc, dir, req); if (!err && !req->r_reply_info.head->is_target && !req->r_reply_info.head->is_dentry) err = ceph_handle_notrace_create(dir, dentry); +out_req: ceph_mdsc_put_request(req); out: if (!err) diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index e3671678b233..dddced525b69 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -604,7 +604,8 @@ static void ceph_async_create_cb(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, ceph_mdsc_release_dir_caps(req); } -static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, +static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, + struct dentry *dentry, struct file *file, umode_t mode, struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx, @@ -616,7 +617,6 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in iinfo = { .in = &in }; struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(dir); struct ceph_dentry_info *di = ceph_dentry(dentry); - struct inode *inode; struct timespec64 now; struct ceph_string *pool_ns; struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = ceph_sb_to_mdsc(dir->i_sb); @@ -625,10 +625,6 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, ktime_get_real_ts64(&now); - inode = ceph_get_inode(dentry->d_sb, vino); - if (IS_ERR(inode)) - return PTR_ERR(inode); - iinfo.inline_version = CEPH_INLINE_NONE; iinfo.change_attr = 1; ceph_encode_timespec64(&iinfo.btime, &now); @@ -686,8 +682,7 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, ceph_dir_clear_complete(dir); if (!d_unhashed(dentry)) d_drop(dentry); - if (inode->i_state & I_NEW) - discard_new_inode(inode); + discard_new_inode(inode); } else { struct dentry *dn; @@ -733,6 +728,7 @@ int ceph_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_sb_to_client(dir->i_sb); struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = fsc->mdsc; struct ceph_mds_request *req; + struct inode *new_inode = NULL; struct dentry *dn; struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx as_ctx = {}; bool try_async = ceph_test_mount_opt(fsc, ASYNC_DIROPS); @@ -755,15 +751,16 @@ int ceph_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, */ flags &= ~O_TRUNC; +retry: if (flags & O_CREAT) { if (ceph_quota_is_max_files_exceeded(dir)) return -EDQUOT; - err = ceph_pre_init_acls(dir, &mode, &as_ctx); - if (err < 0) - return err; - err = ceph_security_init_secctx(dentry, mode, &as_ctx); - if (err < 0) + + new_inode = ceph_new_inode(dir, dentry, &mode, &as_ctx); + if (IS_ERR(new_inode)) { + err = PTR_ERR(new_inode); goto out_ctx; + } /* Async create can't handle more than a page of xattrs */ if (as_ctx.pagelist && !list_is_singular(&as_ctx.pagelist->head)) @@ -772,7 +769,7 @@ int ceph_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, /* If it's not being looked up, it's negative */ return -ENOENT; } -retry: + /* do the open */ req = prepare_open_request(dir->i_sb, flags, mode); if (IS_ERR(req)) { @@ -794,32 +791,47 @@ int ceph_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, req->r_dentry_drop = CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED | CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL | CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL; req->r_dentry_unless = CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL; - if (as_ctx.pagelist) { - req->r_pagelist = as_ctx.pagelist; - as_ctx.pagelist = NULL; - } - if (try_async && - (req->r_dir_caps = - try_prep_async_create(dir, dentry, &lo, - &req->r_deleg_ino))) { + + ceph_as_ctx_to_req(req, &as_ctx); + + if (try_async && (req->r_dir_caps = + try_prep_async_create(dir, dentry, &lo, + &req->r_deleg_ino))) { + struct ceph_vino vino = { .ino = req->r_deleg_ino, + .snap = CEPH_NOSNAP }; struct ceph_dentry_info *di = ceph_dentry(dentry); set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_ASYNC, &req->r_req_flags); req->r_args.open.flags |= cpu_to_le32(CEPH_O_EXCL); req->r_callback = ceph_async_create_cb; + /* Hash inode before RPC */ + new_inode = ceph_get_inode(dir->i_sb, vino, new_inode); + if (IS_ERR(new_inode)) { + err = PTR_ERR(new_inode); + new_inode = NULL; + goto out_req; + } + WARN_ON_ONCE(!(new_inode->i_state & I_NEW)); + spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock); di->flags |= CEPH_DENTRY_ASYNC_CREATE; spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); err = ceph_mdsc_submit_request(mdsc, dir, req); if (!err) { - err = ceph_finish_async_create(dir, dentry, - file, mode, req, - &as_ctx, &lo); + err = ceph_finish_async_create(dir, new_inode, + dentry, file, + mode, req, + &as_ctx, &lo); + new_inode = NULL; } else if (err == -EJUKEBOX) { restore_deleg_ino(dir, req->r_deleg_ino); ceph_mdsc_put_request(req); + discard_new_inode(new_inode); + ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx(&as_ctx); + memset(&as_ctx, 0, sizeof(as_ctx)); + new_inode = NULL; try_async = false; ceph_put_string(rcu_dereference_raw(lo.pool_ns)); goto retry; @@ -830,6 +842,8 @@ int ceph_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, } set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_PARENT_LOCKED, &req->r_req_flags); + req->r_new_inode = new_inode; + new_inode = NULL; err = ceph_mdsc_do_request(mdsc, (flags & O_CREAT) ? dir : NULL, req); if (err == -ENOENT) { dentry = ceph_handle_snapdir(req, dentry); @@ -870,6 +884,7 @@ int ceph_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, } out_req: ceph_mdsc_put_request(req); + iput(new_inode); out_ctx: ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx(&as_ctx); dout("atomic_open result=%d\n", err); diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index 8e5f41d45283..e23172024707 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -52,17 +52,87 @@ static int ceph_set_ino_cb(struct inode *inode, void *data) return 0; } -struct inode *ceph_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct ceph_vino vino) +/** + * ceph_new_inode - allocate a new inode in advance of an expected create + * @dir: parent directory for new inode + * @dentry: dentry that may eventually point to new inode + * @mode: mode of new inode + * @as_ctx: pointer to inherited security context + * + * Allocate a new inode in advance of an operation to create a new inode. + * This allocates the inode and sets up the acl_sec_ctx with appropriate + * info for the new inode. + * + * Returns a pointer to the new inode or an ERR_PTR. + */ +struct inode *ceph_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t *mode, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) +{ + int err; + struct inode *inode; + + inode = new_inode(dir->i_sb); + if (!inode) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + if (!S_ISLNK(*mode)) { + err = ceph_pre_init_acls(dir, mode, as_ctx); + if (err < 0) + goto out_err; + } + + err = ceph_security_init_secctx(dentry, *mode, as_ctx); + if (err < 0) + goto out_err; + + inode->i_state = 0; + inode->i_mode = *mode; + return inode; +out_err: + iput(inode); + return ERR_PTR(err); +} + +void ceph_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, + struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) +{ + if (as_ctx->pagelist) { + req->r_pagelist = as_ctx->pagelist; + as_ctx->pagelist = NULL; + } +} + +/** + * ceph_get_inode - find or create/hash a new inode + * @sb: superblock to search and allocate in + * @vino: vino to search for + * @newino: optional new inode to insert if one isn't found (may be NULL) + * + * Search for or insert a new inode into the hash for the given vino, and + * return a reference to it. If new is non-NULL, its reference is consumed. + */ +struct inode *ceph_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct ceph_vino vino, + struct inode *newino) { struct inode *inode; if (ceph_vino_is_reserved(vino)) return ERR_PTR(-EREMOTEIO); - inode = iget5_locked(sb, (unsigned long)vino.ino, ceph_ino_compare, - ceph_set_ino_cb, &vino); - if (!inode) + if (newino) { + inode = inode_insert5(newino, (unsigned long)vino.ino, + ceph_ino_compare, ceph_set_ino_cb, &vino); + if (inode != newino) + iput(newino); + } else { + inode = iget5_locked(sb, (unsigned long)vino.ino, + ceph_ino_compare, ceph_set_ino_cb, &vino); + } + + if (!inode) { + dout("No inode found for %llx.%llx\n", vino.ino, vino.snap); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } dout("get_inode on %llu=%llx.%llx got %p new %d\n", ceph_present_inode(inode), ceph_vinop(inode), inode, !!(inode->i_state & I_NEW)); @@ -78,7 +148,7 @@ struct inode *ceph_get_snapdir(struct inode *parent) .ino = ceph_ino(parent), .snap = CEPH_SNAPDIR, }; - struct inode *inode = ceph_get_inode(parent->i_sb, vino); + struct inode *inode = ceph_get_inode(parent->i_sb, vino, NULL); struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); if (IS_ERR(inode)) @@ -1551,7 +1621,7 @@ static int readdir_prepopulate_inodes_only(struct ceph_mds_request *req, vino.ino = le64_to_cpu(rde->inode.in->ino); vino.snap = le64_to_cpu(rde->inode.in->snapid); - in = ceph_get_inode(req->r_dentry->d_sb, vino); + in = ceph_get_inode(req->r_dentry->d_sb, vino, NULL); if (IS_ERR(in)) { err = PTR_ERR(in); dout("new_inode badness got %d\n", err); @@ -1753,7 +1823,7 @@ int ceph_readdir_prepopulate(struct ceph_mds_request *req, if (d_really_is_positive(dn)) { in = d_inode(dn); } else { - in = ceph_get_inode(parent->d_sb, tvino); + in = ceph_get_inode(parent->d_sb, tvino, NULL); if (IS_ERR(in)) { dout("new_inode badness\n"); d_drop(dn); diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 5fb367b1d4b0..73dfea88bb88 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -945,6 +945,7 @@ void ceph_mdsc_release_request(struct kref *kref) iput(req->r_parent); } iput(req->r_target_inode); + iput(req->r_new_inode); if (req->r_dentry) dput(req->r_dentry); if (req->r_old_dentry) @@ -3357,13 +3358,25 @@ static void handle_reply(struct ceph_mds_session *session, struct ceph_msg *msg) /* Must find target inode outside of mutexes to avoid deadlocks */ if ((err >= 0) && rinfo->head->is_target) { - struct inode *in; + struct inode *in = xchg(&req->r_new_inode, NULL); struct ceph_vino tvino = { .ino = le64_to_cpu(rinfo->targeti.in->ino), .snap = le64_to_cpu(rinfo->targeti.in->snapid) }; - in = ceph_get_inode(mdsc->fsc->sb, tvino); + /* + * If we ended up opening an existing inode, discard + * r_new_inode + */ + if (req->r_op == CEPH_MDS_OP_CREATE && + !req->r_reply_info.has_create_ino) { + /* This should never happen on an async create */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(req->r_deleg_ino); + iput(in); + in = NULL; + } + + in = ceph_get_inode(mdsc->fsc->sb, tvino, in); if (IS_ERR(in)) { err = PTR_ERR(in); mutex_lock(&session->s_mutex); diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h index 86d2965e68a1..3c1aa99c1876 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h @@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ struct ceph_mds_request { struct inode *r_parent; /* parent dir inode */ struct inode *r_target_inode; /* resulting inode */ + struct inode *r_new_inode; /* new inode (for creates) */ #define CEPH_MDS_R_DIRECT_IS_HASH (1) /* r_direct_hash is valid */ #define CEPH_MDS_R_ABORTED (2) /* call was aborted */ diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h index b9cad57ce606..eb621bb276bd 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.h +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h @@ -999,6 +999,7 @@ static inline bool __ceph_have_pending_cap_snap(struct ceph_inode_info *ci) /* inode.c */ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in; struct ceph_mds_reply_dirfrag; +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx; extern const struct inode_operations ceph_file_iops; @@ -1006,8 +1007,14 @@ extern struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb); extern void ceph_evict_inode(struct inode *inode); extern void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode); +struct inode *ceph_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t *mode, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx); +void ceph_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, + struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx); + extern struct inode *ceph_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, - struct ceph_vino vino); + struct ceph_vino vino, + struct inode *newino); extern struct inode *ceph_get_snapdir(struct inode *parent); extern int ceph_fill_file_size(struct inode *inode, int issued, u32 truncate_seq, u64 truncate_size, u64 size); From 4c793d4c58b7e57e1eb616e3d032df6b3789a4a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 14:50:48 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 09/53] ceph: make ceph_msdc_build_path use ref-walk MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Encryption potentially requires allocation, at which point we'll need to be in a non-atomic context. Convert ceph_msdc_build_path to take dentry spinlocks and references instead of using rcu_read_lock to walk the path. This is slightly less efficient, and we may want to eventually allow using RCU when the leaf dentry isn't encrypted. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 73dfea88bb88..77b5e7b2e5dd 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -2387,7 +2387,8 @@ static inline u64 __get_oldest_tid(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) char *ceph_mdsc_build_path(struct dentry *dentry, int *plen, u64 *pbase, int stop_on_nosnap) { - struct dentry *temp; + struct dentry *cur; + struct inode *inode; char *path; int pos; unsigned seq; @@ -2404,34 +2405,35 @@ char *ceph_mdsc_build_path(struct dentry *dentry, int *plen, u64 *pbase, path[pos] = '\0'; seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); - rcu_read_lock(); - temp = dentry; + cur = dget(dentry); for (;;) { - struct inode *inode; + struct dentry *temp; - spin_lock(&temp->d_lock); - inode = d_inode(temp); + spin_lock(&cur->d_lock); + inode = d_inode(cur); if (inode && ceph_snap(inode) == CEPH_SNAPDIR) { dout("build_path path+%d: %p SNAPDIR\n", - pos, temp); - } else if (stop_on_nosnap && inode && dentry != temp && + pos, cur); + } else if (stop_on_nosnap && inode && dentry != cur && ceph_snap(inode) == CEPH_NOSNAP) { - spin_unlock(&temp->d_lock); + spin_unlock(&cur->d_lock); pos++; /* get rid of any prepended '/' */ break; } else { - pos -= temp->d_name.len; + pos -= cur->d_name.len; if (pos < 0) { - spin_unlock(&temp->d_lock); + spin_unlock(&cur->d_lock); break; } - memcpy(path + pos, temp->d_name.name, temp->d_name.len); + memcpy(path + pos, cur->d_name.name, cur->d_name.len); } + temp = cur; spin_unlock(&temp->d_lock); - temp = READ_ONCE(temp->d_parent); + cur = dget_parent(temp); + dput(temp); /* Are we at the root? */ - if (IS_ROOT(temp)) + if (IS_ROOT(cur)) break; /* Are we out of buffer? */ @@ -2440,8 +2442,9 @@ char *ceph_mdsc_build_path(struct dentry *dentry, int *plen, u64 *pbase, path[pos] = '/'; } - base = ceph_ino(d_inode(temp)); - rcu_read_unlock(); + inode = d_inode(cur); + base = inode ? ceph_ino(inode) : 0; + dput(cur); if (read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq)) goto retry; From dee0c5f834605ce9b384ee8b9c7032ffd8db4eca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 06:30:12 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 10/53] libceph: add new iov_iter-based ceph_msg_data_type and ceph_osd_data_type MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add an iov_iter to the unions in ceph_msg_data and ceph_msg_data_cursor. Instead of requiring a list of pages or bvecs, we can just use an iov_iter directly, and avoid extra allocations. We assume that the pages represented by the iter are pinned such that they shouldn't incur page faults, which is the case for the iov_iters created by netfs. While working on this, Al Viro informed me that he was going to change iov_iter_get_pages to auto-advance the iterator as that pattern is more or less required for ITER_PIPE anyway. We emulate that here for now by advancing in the _next op and tracking that amount in the "lastlen" field. In the event that _next is called twice without an intervening _advance, we revert the iov_iter by the remaining lastlen before calling iov_iter_get_pages. Cc: Al Viro Cc: David Howells Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- include/linux/ceph/messenger.h | 8 ++++ include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h | 4 ++ net/ceph/messenger.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ceph/osd_client.c | 27 ++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 116 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h index 9fd7255172ad..2eaaabbe98cb 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h @@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ enum ceph_msg_data_type { CEPH_MSG_DATA_BIO, /* data source/destination is a bio list */ #endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */ CEPH_MSG_DATA_BVECS, /* data source/destination is a bio_vec array */ + CEPH_MSG_DATA_ITER, /* data source/destination is an iov_iter */ }; #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK @@ -224,6 +225,7 @@ struct ceph_msg_data { bool own_pages; }; struct ceph_pagelist *pagelist; + struct iov_iter iter; }; }; @@ -248,6 +250,10 @@ struct ceph_msg_data_cursor { struct page *page; /* page from list */ size_t offset; /* bytes from list */ }; + struct { + struct iov_iter iov_iter; + unsigned int lastlen; + }; }; }; @@ -605,6 +611,8 @@ void ceph_msg_data_add_bio(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct ceph_bio_iter *bio_pos, #endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */ void ceph_msg_data_add_bvecs(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct ceph_bvec_iter *bvec_pos); +void ceph_msg_data_add_iter(struct ceph_msg *msg, + struct iov_iter *iter); struct ceph_msg *ceph_msg_new2(int type, int front_len, int max_data_items, gfp_t flags, bool can_fail); diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h b/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h index bfa4813590da..8f5d2b5bbba2 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ enum ceph_osd_data_type { CEPH_OSD_DATA_TYPE_BIO, #endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */ CEPH_OSD_DATA_TYPE_BVECS, + CEPH_OSD_DATA_TYPE_ITER, }; struct ceph_osd_data { @@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ struct ceph_osd_data { struct ceph_bvec_iter bvec_pos; u32 num_bvecs; }; + struct iov_iter iter; }; }; @@ -501,6 +503,8 @@ void osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_bvecs(struct ceph_osd_request *osd_req, void osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_bvec_pos(struct ceph_osd_request *osd_req, unsigned int which, struct ceph_bvec_iter *bvec_pos); +void osd_req_op_extent_osd_iter(struct ceph_osd_request *osd_req, + unsigned int which, struct iov_iter *iter); extern void osd_req_op_cls_request_data_pagelist(struct ceph_osd_request *, unsigned int which, diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger.c b/net/ceph/messenger.c index 2eb10d7518e8..10a41cd9c523 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c @@ -969,6 +969,62 @@ static bool ceph_msg_data_pagelist_advance(struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor, return true; } +static void ceph_msg_data_iter_cursor_init(struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor, + size_t length) +{ + struct ceph_msg_data *data = cursor->data; + + cursor->iov_iter = data->iter; + cursor->lastlen = 0; + iov_iter_truncate(&cursor->iov_iter, length); + cursor->resid = iov_iter_count(&cursor->iov_iter); +} + +static struct page *ceph_msg_data_iter_next(struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor, + size_t *page_offset, size_t *length) +{ + struct page *page; + ssize_t len; + + if (cursor->lastlen) + iov_iter_revert(&cursor->iov_iter, cursor->lastlen); + + len = iov_iter_get_pages2(&cursor->iov_iter, &page, PAGE_SIZE, + 1, page_offset); + BUG_ON(len < 0); + + cursor->lastlen = len; + + /* + * FIXME: The assumption is that the pages represented by the iov_iter + * are pinned, with the references held by the upper-level + * callers, or by virtue of being under writeback. Eventually, + * we'll get an iov_iter_get_pages2 variant that doesn't take + * page refs. Until then, just put the page ref. + */ + VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageWriteback(page) && page_count(page) < 2, page); + put_page(page); + + *length = min_t(size_t, len, cursor->resid); + return page; +} + +static bool ceph_msg_data_iter_advance(struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor, + size_t bytes) +{ + BUG_ON(bytes > cursor->resid); + cursor->resid -= bytes; + + if (bytes < cursor->lastlen) { + cursor->lastlen -= bytes; + } else { + iov_iter_advance(&cursor->iov_iter, bytes - cursor->lastlen); + cursor->lastlen = 0; + } + + return cursor->resid; +} + /* * Message data is handled (sent or received) in pieces, where each * piece resides on a single page. The network layer might not @@ -996,6 +1052,9 @@ static void __ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor) case CEPH_MSG_DATA_BVECS: ceph_msg_data_bvecs_cursor_init(cursor, length); break; + case CEPH_MSG_DATA_ITER: + ceph_msg_data_iter_cursor_init(cursor, length); + break; case CEPH_MSG_DATA_NONE: default: /* BUG(); */ @@ -1043,6 +1102,9 @@ struct page *ceph_msg_data_next(struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor, case CEPH_MSG_DATA_BVECS: page = ceph_msg_data_bvecs_next(cursor, page_offset, length); break; + case CEPH_MSG_DATA_ITER: + page = ceph_msg_data_iter_next(cursor, page_offset, length); + break; case CEPH_MSG_DATA_NONE: default: page = NULL; @@ -1081,6 +1143,9 @@ void ceph_msg_data_advance(struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor, size_t bytes) case CEPH_MSG_DATA_BVECS: new_piece = ceph_msg_data_bvecs_advance(cursor, bytes); break; + case CEPH_MSG_DATA_ITER: + new_piece = ceph_msg_data_iter_advance(cursor, bytes); + break; case CEPH_MSG_DATA_NONE: default: BUG(); @@ -1880,6 +1945,18 @@ void ceph_msg_data_add_bvecs(struct ceph_msg *msg, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_msg_data_add_bvecs); +void ceph_msg_data_add_iter(struct ceph_msg *msg, + struct iov_iter *iter) +{ + struct ceph_msg_data *data; + + data = ceph_msg_data_add(msg); + data->type = CEPH_MSG_DATA_ITER; + data->iter = *iter; + + msg->data_length += iov_iter_count(&data->iter); +} + /* * construct a new message with given type, size * the new msg has a ref count of 1. diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c index 0aacbadcab06..684faf8553de 100644 --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c @@ -171,6 +171,13 @@ static void ceph_osd_data_bvecs_init(struct ceph_osd_data *osd_data, osd_data->num_bvecs = num_bvecs; } +static void ceph_osd_iter_init(struct ceph_osd_data *osd_data, + struct iov_iter *iter) +{ + osd_data->type = CEPH_OSD_DATA_TYPE_ITER; + osd_data->iter = *iter; +} + static struct ceph_osd_data * osd_req_op_raw_data_in(struct ceph_osd_request *osd_req, unsigned int which) { @@ -264,6 +271,22 @@ void osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_bvec_pos(struct ceph_osd_request *osd_req, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_bvec_pos); +/** + * osd_req_op_extent_osd_iter - Set up an operation with an iterator buffer + * @osd_req: The request to set up + * @which: Index of the operation in which to set the iter + * @iter: The buffer iterator + */ +void osd_req_op_extent_osd_iter(struct ceph_osd_request *osd_req, + unsigned int which, struct iov_iter *iter) +{ + struct ceph_osd_data *osd_data; + + osd_data = osd_req_op_data(osd_req, which, extent, osd_data); + ceph_osd_iter_init(osd_data, iter); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(osd_req_op_extent_osd_iter); + static void osd_req_op_cls_request_info_pagelist( struct ceph_osd_request *osd_req, unsigned int which, struct ceph_pagelist *pagelist) @@ -346,6 +369,8 @@ static u64 ceph_osd_data_length(struct ceph_osd_data *osd_data) #endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */ case CEPH_OSD_DATA_TYPE_BVECS: return osd_data->bvec_pos.iter.bi_size; + case CEPH_OSD_DATA_TYPE_ITER: + return iov_iter_count(&osd_data->iter); default: WARN(true, "unrecognized data type %d\n", (int)osd_data->type); return 0; @@ -954,6 +979,8 @@ static void ceph_osdc_msg_data_add(struct ceph_msg *msg, #endif } else if (osd_data->type == CEPH_OSD_DATA_TYPE_BVECS) { ceph_msg_data_add_bvecs(msg, &osd_data->bvec_pos); + } else if (osd_data->type == CEPH_OSD_DATA_TYPE_ITER) { + ceph_msg_data_add_iter(msg, &osd_data->iter); } else { BUG_ON(osd_data->type != CEPH_OSD_DATA_TYPE_NONE); } From 4de77f25fd857a9dd0614416025af51b45c1cb2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Mon, 2 Jan 2023 12:36:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 11/53] ceph: use osd_req_op_extent_osd_iter for netfs reads MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The netfs layer has already pinned the pages involved before calling issue_op, so we can just pass down the iter directly instead of calling iov_iter_get_pages_alloc. Instead of having to allocate a page array, use CEPH_MSG_DATA_ITER and pass it the iov_iter directly to clone. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/addr.c | 19 +------------------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c index f45ebe957bbe..611443d06330 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/addr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c @@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ static void finish_netfs_read(struct ceph_osd_request *req) struct ceph_osd_data *osd_data = osd_req_op_extent_osd_data(req, 0); struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq = req->r_priv; struct ceph_osd_req_op *op = &req->r_ops[0]; - int num_pages; int err = req->r_result; bool sparse = (op->op == CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ); @@ -268,9 +267,6 @@ static void finish_netfs_read(struct ceph_osd_request *req) __set_bit(NETFS_SREQ_CLEAR_TAIL, &subreq->flags); netfs_subreq_terminated(subreq, err, false); - - num_pages = calc_pages_for(osd_data->alignment, osd_data->length); - ceph_put_page_vector(osd_data->pages, num_pages, false); iput(req->r_inode); } @@ -338,8 +334,6 @@ static void ceph_netfs_issue_read(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq) struct ceph_osd_request *req = NULL; struct ceph_vino vino = ceph_vino(inode); struct iov_iter iter; - struct page **pages; - size_t page_off; int err = 0; u64 len = subreq->len; bool sparse = ceph_test_mount_opt(fsc, SPARSEREAD); @@ -370,18 +364,7 @@ static void ceph_netfs_issue_read(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq) dout("%s: pos=%llu orig_len=%zu len=%llu\n", __func__, subreq->start, subreq->len, len); iov_iter_xarray(&iter, ITER_DEST, &rreq->mapping->i_pages, subreq->start, len); - err = iov_iter_get_pages_alloc2(&iter, &pages, len, &page_off); - if (err < 0) { - dout("%s: iov_ter_get_pages_alloc returned %d\n", __func__, err); - goto out; - } - - /* should always give us a page-aligned read */ - WARN_ON_ONCE(page_off); - len = err; - err = 0; - - osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, 0, pages, len, 0, false, false); + osd_req_op_extent_osd_iter(req, 0, &iter); req->r_callback = finish_netfs_read; req->r_priv = subreq; req->r_inode = inode; From 2d332d5bc424404911540006a8bb450fbb96b178 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2020 10:16:09 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 12/53] ceph: fscrypt_auth handling for ceph MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Most fscrypt-enabled filesystems store the crypto context in an xattr, but that's problematic for ceph as xatts are governed by the XATTR cap, but we really want the crypto context as part of the AUTH cap. Because of this, the MDS has added two new inode metadata fields: fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file. The former is used to hold the crypto context, and the latter is used to track the real file size. Parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces. For now, we don't use fscrypt_file, but fscrypt_auth is used to hold the fscrypt context. Allow the client to use a setattr request for setting the fscrypt_auth field. Since this is not a standard setattr request from the VFS, we add a new field to __ceph_setattr that carries ceph-specific inode attrs. Have the set_context op do a setattr that sets the fscrypt_auth value, and get_context just return the contents of that field (since it should always be available). Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/Makefile | 1 + fs/ceph/acl.c | 4 +- fs/ceph/caps.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++---- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/crypto.h | 36 +++++++++++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 7 +++ fs/ceph/super.c | 3 + fs/ceph/super.h | 15 ++++- include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h | 21 ++++--- 11 files changed, 385 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) create mode 100644 fs/ceph/crypto.c create mode 100644 fs/ceph/crypto.h diff --git a/fs/ceph/Makefile b/fs/ceph/Makefile index 50c635dc7f71..1f77ca04c426 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/Makefile +++ b/fs/ceph/Makefile @@ -12,3 +12,4 @@ ceph-y := super.o inode.o dir.o file.o locks.o addr.o ioctl.o \ ceph-$(CONFIG_CEPH_FSCACHE) += cache.o ceph-$(CONFIG_CEPH_FS_POSIX_ACL) += acl.o +ceph-$(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) += crypto.o diff --git a/fs/ceph/acl.c b/fs/ceph/acl.c index 6945a938d396..8a56f979c7cb 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/acl.c +++ b/fs/ceph/acl.c @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int ceph_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, newattrs.ia_ctime = current_time(inode); newattrs.ia_mode = new_mode; newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME; - ret = __ceph_setattr(inode, &newattrs); + ret = __ceph_setattr(inode, &newattrs, NULL); if (ret) goto out_free; } @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ int ceph_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, newattrs.ia_ctime = old_ctime; newattrs.ia_mode = old_mode; newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME; - __ceph_setattr(inode, &newattrs); + __ceph_setattr(inode, &newattrs, NULL); } goto out_free; } diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c index e2bb0d0072da..1c62ef339bc6 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/caps.c +++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" #include "cache.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include #include @@ -1216,15 +1217,12 @@ struct cap_msg_args { umode_t mode; bool inline_data; bool wake; + u32 fscrypt_auth_len; + u32 fscrypt_file_len; + u8 fscrypt_auth[sizeof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth)]; // for context + u8 fscrypt_file[sizeof(u64)]; // for size }; -/* - * cap struct size + flock buffer size + inline version + inline data size + - * osd_epoch_barrier + oldest_flush_tid - */ -#define CAP_MSG_SIZE (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ - 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4) - /* Marshal up the cap msg to the MDS */ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg) { @@ -1240,7 +1238,7 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg) arg->size, arg->max_size, arg->xattr_version, arg->xattr_buf ? (int)arg->xattr_buf->vec.iov_len : 0); - msg->hdr.version = cpu_to_le16(10); + msg->hdr.version = cpu_to_le16(12); msg->hdr.tid = cpu_to_le64(arg->flush_tid); fc = msg->front.iov_base; @@ -1311,6 +1309,21 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg) /* Advisory flags (version 10) */ ceph_encode_32(&p, arg->flags); + + /* dirstats (version 11) - these are r/o on the client */ + ceph_encode_64(&p, 0); + ceph_encode_64(&p, 0); + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) + /* fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file (version 12) */ + ceph_encode_32(&p, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); + ceph_encode_copy(&p, arg->fscrypt_auth, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); + ceph_encode_32(&p, arg->fscrypt_file_len); + ceph_encode_copy(&p, arg->fscrypt_file, arg->fscrypt_file_len); +#else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ + ceph_encode_32(&p, 0); + ceph_encode_32(&p, 0); +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ } /* @@ -1432,8 +1445,38 @@ static void __prep_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_cap *cap, } } arg->flags = flags; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) + if (ci->fscrypt_auth_len && + WARN_ON_ONCE(ci->fscrypt_auth_len > sizeof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth))) { + /* Don't set this if it's too big */ + arg->fscrypt_auth_len = 0; + } else { + arg->fscrypt_auth_len = ci->fscrypt_auth_len; + memcpy(arg->fscrypt_auth, ci->fscrypt_auth, + min_t(size_t, ci->fscrypt_auth_len, + sizeof(arg->fscrypt_auth))); + } + /* FIXME: use this to track "real" size */ + arg->fscrypt_file_len = 0; +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ } +#define CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 4) + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) +static inline int cap_msg_size(struct cap_msg_args *arg) +{ + return CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS + arg->fscrypt_auth_len + + arg->fscrypt_file_len; +} +#else +static inline int cap_msg_size(struct cap_msg_args *arg) +{ + return CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ + /* * Send a cap msg on the given inode. * @@ -1444,7 +1487,8 @@ static void __send_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_inode_info *ci) struct ceph_msg *msg; struct inode *inode = &ci->netfs.inode; - msg = ceph_msg_new(CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS, CAP_MSG_SIZE, GFP_NOFS, false); + msg = ceph_msg_new(CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS, cap_msg_size(arg), GFP_NOFS, + false); if (!msg) { pr_err("error allocating cap msg: ino (%llx.%llx) flushing %s tid %llu, requeuing cap.\n", ceph_vinop(inode), ceph_cap_string(arg->dirty), @@ -1470,10 +1514,6 @@ static inline int __send_flush_snap(struct inode *inode, struct cap_msg_args arg; struct ceph_msg *msg; - msg = ceph_msg_new(CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS, CAP_MSG_SIZE, GFP_NOFS, false); - if (!msg) - return -ENOMEM; - arg.session = session; arg.ino = ceph_vino(inode).ino; arg.cid = 0; @@ -1511,6 +1551,18 @@ static inline int __send_flush_snap(struct inode *inode, arg.flags = 0; arg.wake = false; + /* + * No fscrypt_auth changes from a capsnap. It will need + * to update fscrypt_file on size changes (TODO). + */ + arg.fscrypt_auth_len = 0; + arg.fscrypt_file_len = 0; + + msg = ceph_msg_new(CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS, cap_msg_size(&arg), + GFP_NOFS, false); + if (!msg) + return -ENOMEM; + encode_cap_msg(msg, &arg); ceph_con_send(&arg.session->s_con, msg); return 0; diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b17a6ee16cf0 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include +#include +#include + +#include "super.h" +#include "crypto.h" + +static int ceph_crypt_get_context(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, size_t len) +{ + struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); + struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *cfa = (struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *)ci->fscrypt_auth; + u32 ctxlen; + + /* Non existent or too short? */ + if (!cfa || (ci->fscrypt_auth_len < (offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth, cfa_blob) + 1))) + return -ENOBUFS; + + /* Some format we don't recognize? */ + if (le32_to_cpu(cfa->cfa_version) != CEPH_FSCRYPT_AUTH_VERSION) + return -ENOBUFS; + + ctxlen = le32_to_cpu(cfa->cfa_blob_len); + if (len < ctxlen) + return -ERANGE; + + memcpy(ctx, cfa->cfa_blob, ctxlen); + return ctxlen; +} + +static int ceph_crypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, + size_t len, void *fs_data) +{ + int ret; + struct iattr attr = { }; + struct ceph_iattr cia = { }; + struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *cfa; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(fs_data); + + if (len > FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + cfa = kzalloc(sizeof(*cfa), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!cfa) + return -ENOMEM; + + cfa->cfa_version = cpu_to_le32(CEPH_FSCRYPT_AUTH_VERSION); + cfa->cfa_blob_len = cpu_to_le32(len); + memcpy(cfa->cfa_blob, ctx, len); + + cia.fscrypt_auth = cfa; + + ret = __ceph_setattr(inode, &attr, &cia); + if (ret == 0) + inode_set_flags(inode, S_ENCRYPTED, S_ENCRYPTED); + kfree(cia.fscrypt_auth); + return ret; +} + +static bool ceph_crypt_empty_dir(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); + + return ci->i_rsubdirs + ci->i_rfiles == 1; +} + +static struct fscrypt_operations ceph_fscrypt_ops = { + .get_context = ceph_crypt_get_context, + .set_context = ceph_crypt_set_context, + .empty_dir = ceph_crypt_empty_dir, +}; + +void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) +{ + fscrypt_set_ops(sb, &ceph_fscrypt_ops); +} diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6dca674f79b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Ceph fscrypt functionality + */ + +#ifndef _CEPH_CRYPTO_H +#define _CEPH_CRYPTO_H + +#include + +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth { + __le32 cfa_version; + __le32 cfa_blob_len; + u8 cfa_blob[FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE]; +} __packed; + +#define CEPH_FSCRYPT_AUTH_VERSION 1 +static inline u32 ceph_fscrypt_auth_len(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fa) +{ + u32 ctxsize = le32_to_cpu(fa->cfa_blob_len); + + return offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth, cfa_blob) + ctxsize; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb); + +#else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ + +static inline void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) +{ +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ + +#endif diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index e23172024707..a3aa7870a6a2 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -14,10 +14,12 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" #include "cache.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include /* @@ -617,6 +619,10 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) INIT_WORK(&ci->i_work, ceph_inode_work); ci->i_work_mask = 0; memset(&ci->i_btime, '\0', sizeof(ci->i_btime)); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + ci->fscrypt_auth = NULL; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = 0; +#endif return &ci->netfs.inode; } @@ -625,6 +631,9 @@ void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode) struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); kfree(ci->i_symlink); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + kfree(ci->fscrypt_auth); +#endif kmem_cache_free(ceph_inode_cachep, ci); } @@ -645,6 +654,7 @@ void ceph_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) clear_inode(inode); ceph_fscache_unregister_inode_cookie(ci); + fscrypt_put_encryption_info(inode); __ceph_remove_caps(ci); @@ -935,6 +945,17 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, __ceph_update_quota(ci, iinfo->max_bytes, iinfo->max_files); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && (inode->i_state & I_NEW)) { + kfree(ci->fscrypt_auth); + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len; + ci->fscrypt_auth = iinfo->fscrypt_auth; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth = NULL; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len = 0; + inode_set_flags(inode, S_ENCRYPTED, S_ENCRYPTED); + } +#endif + if ((new_version || (new_issued & CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED)) && (issued & CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL) == 0) { inode->i_mode = mode; @@ -2079,7 +2100,8 @@ static const struct inode_operations ceph_symlink_iops = { .listxattr = ceph_listxattr, }; -int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) +int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, + struct ceph_iattr *cia) { struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; @@ -2119,6 +2141,43 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) } dout("setattr %p issued %s\n", inode, ceph_cap_string(issued)); +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) + if (cia && cia->fscrypt_auth) { + u32 len = ceph_fscrypt_auth_len(cia->fscrypt_auth); + + if (len > sizeof(*cia->fscrypt_auth)) { + err = -EINVAL; + spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); + goto out; + } + + dout("setattr %llx:%llx fscrypt_auth len %u to %u)\n", + ceph_vinop(inode), ci->fscrypt_auth_len, len); + + /* It should never be re-set once set */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(ci->fscrypt_auth); + + if (issued & CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL) { + dirtied |= CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL; + kfree(ci->fscrypt_auth); + ci->fscrypt_auth = (u8 *)cia->fscrypt_auth; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = len; + } else if ((issued & CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED) == 0 || + ci->fscrypt_auth_len != len || + memcmp(ci->fscrypt_auth, cia->fscrypt_auth, len)) { + req->r_fscrypt_auth = cia->fscrypt_auth; + mask |= CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_AUTH; + release |= CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED; + } + cia->fscrypt_auth = NULL; + } +#else + if (cia && cia->fscrypt_auth) { + err = -EINVAL; + spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); + goto out; + } +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID) { dout("setattr %p uid %d -> %d\n", inode, @@ -2282,6 +2341,7 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) req->r_stamp = attr->ia_ctime; err = ceph_mdsc_do_request(mdsc, NULL, req); } +out: dout("setattr %p result=%d (%s locally, %d remote)\n", inode, err, ceph_cap_string(dirtied), mask); @@ -2322,7 +2382,7 @@ int ceph_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, ceph_quota_is_max_bytes_exceeded(inode, attr->ia_size)) return -EDQUOT; - err = __ceph_setattr(inode, attr); + err = __ceph_setattr(inode, attr, NULL); if (err >= 0 && (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) err = posix_acl_chmod(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, attr->ia_mode); diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 77b5e7b2e5dd..c3927dab5a3b 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include #include @@ -184,8 +185,54 @@ static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, info->rsnaps = 0; } + if (struct_v >= 5) { + u32 alen; + + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, alen, bad); + + while (alen--) { + u32 len; + + /* key */ + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, bad); + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, bad); + /* value */ + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, bad); + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, bad); + } + } + + /* fscrypt flag -- ignore */ + if (struct_v >= 6) + ceph_decode_skip_8(p, end, bad); + + info->fscrypt_auth = NULL; + info->fscrypt_auth_len = 0; + info->fscrypt_file = NULL; + info->fscrypt_file_len = 0; + if (struct_v >= 7) { + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + if (info->fscrypt_auth_len) { + info->fscrypt_auth = kmalloc(info->fscrypt_auth_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!info->fscrypt_auth) + return -ENOMEM; + ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, info->fscrypt_auth, + info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + } + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); + if (info->fscrypt_file_len) { + info->fscrypt_file = kmalloc(info->fscrypt_file_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!info->fscrypt_file) + return -ENOMEM; + ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, info->fscrypt_file, + info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); + } + } *p = end; } else { + /* legacy (unversioned) struct */ if (features & CEPH_FEATURE_MDS_INLINE_DATA) { ceph_decode_64_safe(p, end, info->inline_version, bad); ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, info->inline_len, bad); @@ -651,8 +698,21 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg, static void destroy_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info) { + int i; + + kfree(info->diri.fscrypt_auth); + kfree(info->diri.fscrypt_file); + kfree(info->targeti.fscrypt_auth); + kfree(info->targeti.fscrypt_file); if (!info->dir_entries) return; + + for (i = 0; i < info->dir_nr; i++) { + struct ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry *rde = info->dir_entries + i; + + kfree(rde->inode.fscrypt_auth); + kfree(rde->inode.fscrypt_file); + } free_pages((unsigned long)info->dir_entries, get_order(info->dir_buf_size)); } @@ -966,6 +1026,7 @@ void ceph_mdsc_release_request(struct kref *kref) put_cred(req->r_cred); if (req->r_pagelist) ceph_pagelist_release(req->r_pagelist); + kfree(req->r_fscrypt_auth); put_request_session(req); ceph_unreserve_caps(req->r_mdsc, &req->r_caps_reservation); WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&req->r_wait)); @@ -2543,8 +2604,8 @@ static int set_request_path_attr(struct inode *rinode, struct dentry *rdentry, return r; } -static void encode_timestamp_and_gids(void **p, - const struct ceph_mds_request *req) +static void encode_mclientrequest_tail(void **p, + const struct ceph_mds_request *req) { struct ceph_timespec ts; int i; @@ -2557,6 +2618,20 @@ static void encode_timestamp_and_gids(void **p, for (i = 0; i < req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups; i++) ceph_encode_64(p, from_kgid(&init_user_ns, req->r_cred->group_info->gid[i])); + + /* v5: altname (TODO: skip for now) */ + ceph_encode_32(p, 0); + + /* v6: fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ + if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) { + u32 authlen = ceph_fscrypt_auth_len(req->r_fscrypt_auth); + + ceph_encode_32(p, authlen); + ceph_encode_copy(p, req->r_fscrypt_auth, authlen); + } else { + ceph_encode_32(p, 0); + } + ceph_encode_32(p, 0); // fscrypt_file for now } /* @@ -2605,12 +2680,14 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, goto out_free1; } + /* head */ len = legacy ? sizeof(*head) : sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_head); - len += pathlen1 + pathlen2 + 2*(1 + sizeof(u32) + sizeof(u64)) + - sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); - len += sizeof(u32) + (sizeof(u64) * req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); - /* calculate (max) length for cap releases */ + /* filepaths */ + len += 2 * (1 + sizeof(u32) + sizeof(u64)); + len += pathlen1 + pathlen2; + + /* cap releases */ len += sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_release) * (!!req->r_inode_drop + !!req->r_dentry_drop + !!req->r_old_inode_drop + !!req->r_old_dentry_drop); @@ -2620,6 +2697,25 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, if (req->r_old_dentry_drop) len += pathlen2; + /* MClientRequest tail */ + + /* req->r_stamp */ + len += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); + + /* gid list */ + len += sizeof(u32) + (sizeof(u64) * req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); + + /* alternate name */ + len += sizeof(u32); // TODO + + /* fscrypt_auth */ + len += sizeof(u32); // fscrypt_auth + if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) + len += ceph_fscrypt_auth_len(req->r_fscrypt_auth); + + /* fscrypt_file */ + len += sizeof(u32); + msg = ceph_msg_new2(CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_REQUEST, len, 1, GFP_NOFS, false); if (!msg) { msg = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); @@ -2639,7 +2735,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, } else { struct ceph_mds_request_head *new_head = msg->front.iov_base; - msg->hdr.version = cpu_to_le16(4); + msg->hdr.version = cpu_to_le16(6); new_head->version = cpu_to_le16(CEPH_MDS_REQUEST_HEAD_VERSION); head = (struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *)&new_head->oldest_client_tid; p = msg->front.iov_base + sizeof(*new_head); @@ -2690,7 +2786,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, head->num_releases = cpu_to_le16(releases); - encode_timestamp_and_gids(&p, req); + encode_mclientrequest_tail(&p, req); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(p > end)) { ceph_msg_put(msg); @@ -2820,7 +2916,7 @@ static int __prepare_send_request(struct ceph_mds_session *session, rhead->num_releases = 0; p = msg->front.iov_base + req->r_request_release_offset; - encode_timestamp_and_gids(&p, req); + encode_mclientrequest_tail(&p, req); msg->front.iov_len = p - msg->front.iov_base; msg->hdr.front_len = cpu_to_le32(msg->front.iov_len); diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h index 3c1aa99c1876..a2e85fb5aab1 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h @@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in { s32 dir_pin; struct ceph_timespec btime; struct ceph_timespec snap_btime; + u8 *fscrypt_auth; + u8 *fscrypt_file; + u32 fscrypt_auth_len; + u32 fscrypt_file_len; u64 rsnaps; u64 change_attr; }; @@ -278,6 +282,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_request { struct mutex r_fill_mutex; union ceph_mds_request_args r_args; + + struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *r_fscrypt_auth; + int r_fmode; /* file mode, if expecting cap */ int r_request_release_offset; const struct cred *r_cred; diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.c b/fs/ceph/super.c index d6a1790f6923..c4ab2db85ef0 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.c +++ b/fs/ceph/super.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" #include "cache.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include #include @@ -1135,6 +1136,8 @@ static int ceph_set_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc) s->s_time_max = U32_MAX; s->s_flags |= SB_NODIRATIME | SB_NOATIME; + ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(s); + ret = set_anon_super_fc(s, fc); if (ret != 0) fsc->sb = NULL; diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h index eb621bb276bd..3a39a9b3bc33 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.h +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h @@ -450,6 +450,13 @@ struct ceph_inode_info { struct work_struct i_work; unsigned long i_work_mask; + +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + u32 fscrypt_auth_len; + u32 fscrypt_file_len; + u8 *fscrypt_auth; + u8 *fscrypt_file; +#endif }; struct ceph_netfs_request_data { @@ -1073,7 +1080,13 @@ static inline int ceph_do_getattr(struct inode *inode, int mask, bool force) } extern int ceph_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, int mask); -extern int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr); + +struct ceph_iattr { + struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fscrypt_auth; +}; + +extern int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, + struct ceph_iattr *cia); extern int ceph_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); extern int ceph_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h b/include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h index 49586ff26152..45f8ce61e103 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h @@ -359,14 +359,19 @@ enum { extern const char *ceph_mds_op_name(int op); - -#define CEPH_SETATTR_MODE 1 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_UID 2 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_GID 4 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME 8 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME 16 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE 32 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_CTIME 64 +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MODE (1 << 0) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_UID (1 << 1) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_GID (1 << 2) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME (1 << 3) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME (1 << 4) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE (1 << 5) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_CTIME (1 << 6) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME_NOW (1 << 7) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME_NOW (1 << 8) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_BTIME (1 << 9) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_KILL_SGUID (1 << 10) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_AUTH (1 << 11) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_FILE (1 << 12) /* * Ceph setxattr request flags. From 6b5717bd30ab7f35792d20b71211055bdb43e6de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 09:47:40 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 13/53] ceph: implement -o test_dummy_encryption mount option MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add support for the test_dummy_encryption mount option. This allows us to test the encrypted codepaths in ceph without having to manually set keys, etc. [ lhenriques: fix potential fsc->fsc_dummy_enc_policy memory leak in ceph_real_mount() ] Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/crypto.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 10 ++++-- fs/ceph/super.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/super.h | 9 ++++- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 3 ++ 6 files changed, 186 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c index b17a6ee16cf0..b65e31c5c503 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include #include "super.h" +#include "mds_client.h" #include "crypto.h" static int ceph_crypt_get_context(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, size_t len) @@ -65,9 +66,15 @@ static bool ceph_crypt_empty_dir(struct inode *inode) return ci->i_rsubdirs + ci->i_rfiles == 1; } +static const union fscrypt_policy *ceph_get_dummy_policy(struct super_block *sb) +{ + return ceph_sb_to_client(sb)->fsc_dummy_enc_policy.policy; +} + static struct fscrypt_operations ceph_fscrypt_ops = { .get_context = ceph_crypt_get_context, .set_context = ceph_crypt_set_context, + .get_dummy_policy = ceph_get_dummy_policy, .empty_dir = ceph_crypt_empty_dir, }; @@ -75,3 +82,52 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) { fscrypt_set_ops(sb, &ceph_fscrypt_ops); } + +void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(struct ceph_fs_client *fsc) +{ + fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(&fsc->fsc_dummy_enc_policy); +} + +int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, + struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as) +{ + int ret, ctxsize; + bool encrypted = false; + struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); + + ret = fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(dir, inode, &encrypted); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (!encrypted) + return 0; + + as->fscrypt_auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*as->fscrypt_auth), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!as->fscrypt_auth) + return -ENOMEM; + + ctxsize = fscrypt_context_for_new_inode(as->fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob, + inode); + if (ctxsize < 0) + return ctxsize; + + as->fscrypt_auth->cfa_version = cpu_to_le32(CEPH_FSCRYPT_AUTH_VERSION); + as->fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len = cpu_to_le32(ctxsize); + + WARN_ON_ONCE(ci->fscrypt_auth); + kfree(ci->fscrypt_auth); + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = ceph_fscrypt_auth_len(as->fscrypt_auth); + ci->fscrypt_auth = kmemdup(as->fscrypt_auth, ci->fscrypt_auth_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ci->fscrypt_auth) + return -ENOMEM; + + inode->i_flags |= S_ENCRYPTED; + + return 0; +} + +void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, + struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as) +{ + swap(req->r_fscrypt_auth, as->fscrypt_auth); +} diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h index 6dca674f79b8..642963f5442e 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h @@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ #include +struct ceph_fs_client; +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx; +struct ceph_mds_request; + struct ceph_fscrypt_auth { __le32 cfa_version; __le32 cfa_blob_len; @@ -25,12 +29,36 @@ static inline u32 ceph_fscrypt_auth_len(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fa) #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb); +void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(struct ceph_fs_client *fsc); + +int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, + struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); +void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, + struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); + #else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) { } +static inline void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(struct ceph_fs_client *fsc) +{ +} + +static inline int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(struct inode *dir, + struct inode *inode, + struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as) +{ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return 0; +} + +static inline void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, + struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) +{ +} #endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ #endif diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index a3aa7870a6a2..50ff641865e0 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -83,12 +83,17 @@ struct inode *ceph_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, goto out_err; } + inode->i_state = 0; + inode->i_mode = *mode; + err = ceph_security_init_secctx(dentry, *mode, as_ctx); if (err < 0) goto out_err; - inode->i_state = 0; - inode->i_mode = *mode; + err = ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(dir, inode, as_ctx); + if (err) + goto out_err; + return inode; out_err: iput(inode); @@ -102,6 +107,7 @@ void ceph_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, req->r_pagelist = as_ctx->pagelist; as_ctx->pagelist = NULL; } + ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(req, as_ctx); } /** diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.c b/fs/ceph/super.c index c4ab2db85ef0..75dd1b6b3d01 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.c +++ b/fs/ceph/super.c @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static void ceph_put_super(struct super_block *s) struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_sb_to_client(s); dout("put_super\n"); + ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(fsc); ceph_mdsc_close_sessions(fsc->mdsc); } @@ -152,6 +153,7 @@ enum { Opt_recover_session, Opt_source, Opt_mon_addr, + Opt_test_dummy_encryption, /* string args above */ Opt_dirstat, Opt_rbytes, @@ -194,6 +196,7 @@ static const struct fs_parameter_spec ceph_mount_parameters[] = { fsparam_string ("fsc", Opt_fscache), // fsc=... fsparam_flag_no ("ino32", Opt_ino32), fsparam_string ("mds_namespace", Opt_mds_namespace), + fsparam_string ("mon_addr", Opt_mon_addr), fsparam_flag_no ("poolperm", Opt_poolperm), fsparam_flag_no ("quotadf", Opt_quotadf), fsparam_u32 ("rasize", Opt_rasize), @@ -205,7 +208,8 @@ static const struct fs_parameter_spec ceph_mount_parameters[] = { fsparam_u32 ("rsize", Opt_rsize), fsparam_string ("snapdirname", Opt_snapdirname), fsparam_string ("source", Opt_source), - fsparam_string ("mon_addr", Opt_mon_addr), + fsparam_flag ("test_dummy_encryption", Opt_test_dummy_encryption), + fsparam_string ("test_dummy_encryption", Opt_test_dummy_encryption), fsparam_u32 ("wsize", Opt_wsize), fsparam_flag_no ("wsync", Opt_wsync), fsparam_flag_no ("pagecache", Opt_pagecache), @@ -585,6 +589,23 @@ static int ceph_parse_mount_param(struct fs_context *fc, else fsopt->flags |= CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_SPARSEREAD; break; + case Opt_test_dummy_encryption: +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(&fsopt->dummy_enc_policy); + ret = fscrypt_parse_test_dummy_encryption(param, + &fsopt->dummy_enc_policy); + if (ret == -EINVAL) { + warnfc(fc, "Value of option \"%s\" is unrecognized", + param->key); + } else if (ret == -EEXIST) { + warnfc(fc, "Conflicting test_dummy_encryption options"); + ret = -EINVAL; + } +#else + warnfc(fc, + "FS encryption not supported: test_dummy_encryption mount option ignored"); +#endif + break; default: BUG(); } @@ -605,6 +626,7 @@ static void destroy_mount_options(struct ceph_mount_options *args) kfree(args->server_path); kfree(args->fscache_uniq); kfree(args->mon_addr); + fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(&args->dummy_enc_policy); kfree(args); } @@ -724,6 +746,8 @@ static int ceph_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root) if (fsopt->flags & CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_SPARSEREAD) seq_puts(m, ",sparseread"); + fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption(m, ',', root->d_sb); + if (fsopt->wsize != CEPH_MAX_WRITE_SIZE) seq_printf(m, ",wsize=%u", fsopt->wsize); if (fsopt->rsize != CEPH_MAX_READ_SIZE) @@ -1062,6 +1086,50 @@ static struct dentry *open_root_dentry(struct ceph_fs_client *fsc, return root; } +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +static int ceph_apply_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, + struct fs_context *fc, + struct ceph_mount_options *fsopt) +{ + struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = sb->s_fs_info; + + if (!fscrypt_is_dummy_policy_set(&fsopt->dummy_enc_policy)) + return 0; + + /* No changing encryption context on remount. */ + if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE && + !fscrypt_is_dummy_policy_set(&fsc->fsc_dummy_enc_policy)) { + if (fscrypt_dummy_policies_equal(&fsopt->dummy_enc_policy, + &fsc->fsc_dummy_enc_policy)) + return 0; + errorfc(fc, "Can't set test_dummy_encryption on remount"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Also make sure fsopt doesn't contain a conflicting value. */ + if (fscrypt_is_dummy_policy_set(&fsc->fsc_dummy_enc_policy)) { + if (fscrypt_dummy_policies_equal(&fsopt->dummy_enc_policy, + &fsc->fsc_dummy_enc_policy)) + return 0; + errorfc(fc, "Conflicting test_dummy_encryption options"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + fsc->fsc_dummy_enc_policy = fsopt->dummy_enc_policy; + memset(&fsopt->dummy_enc_policy, 0, sizeof(fsopt->dummy_enc_policy)); + + warnfc(fc, "test_dummy_encryption mode enabled"); + return 0; +} +#else +static int ceph_apply_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, + struct fs_context *fc, + struct ceph_mount_options *fsopt) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + /* * mount: join the ceph cluster, and open root directory. */ @@ -1090,6 +1158,11 @@ static struct dentry *ceph_real_mount(struct ceph_fs_client *fsc, goto out; } + err = ceph_apply_test_dummy_encryption(fsc->sb, fc, + fsc->mount_options); + if (err) + goto out; + dout("mount opening path '%s'\n", path); ceph_fs_debugfs_init(fsc); @@ -1111,6 +1184,7 @@ static struct dentry *ceph_real_mount(struct ceph_fs_client *fsc, out: mutex_unlock(&fsc->client->mount_mutex); + ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(fsc); return ERR_PTR(err); } @@ -1299,9 +1373,15 @@ static void ceph_free_fc(struct fs_context *fc) static int ceph_reconfigure_fc(struct fs_context *fc) { + int err; struct ceph_parse_opts_ctx *pctx = fc->fs_private; struct ceph_mount_options *fsopt = pctx->opts; - struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_sb_to_client(fc->root->d_sb); + struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb; + struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_sb_to_client(sb); + + err = ceph_apply_test_dummy_encryption(sb, fc, fsopt); + if (err) + return err; if (fsopt->flags & CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_ASYNC_DIROPS) ceph_set_mount_opt(fsc, ASYNC_DIROPS); @@ -1320,7 +1400,7 @@ static int ceph_reconfigure_fc(struct fs_context *fc) pr_notice("ceph: monitor addresses recorded, but not used for reconnection"); } - sync_filesystem(fc->root->d_sb); + sync_filesystem(sb); return 0; } diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h index 3a39a9b3bc33..11483855897e 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.h +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include +#include "crypto.h" /* large granularity for statfs utilization stats to facilitate * large volume sizes on 32-bit machines. */ @@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ struct ceph_mount_options { char *server_path; /* default NULL (means "/") */ char *fscache_uniq; /* default NULL */ char *mon_addr; + struct fscrypt_dummy_policy dummy_enc_policy; }; /* mount state */ @@ -155,9 +157,11 @@ struct ceph_fs_client { #ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FSCACHE struct fscache_volume *fscache; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + struct fscrypt_dummy_policy fsc_dummy_enc_policy; +#endif }; - /* * File i/o capability. This tracks shared state with the metadata * server that allows us to cache or writeback attributes or to read @@ -1120,6 +1124,9 @@ struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx { #ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL void *sec_ctx; u32 sec_ctxlen; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fscrypt_auth; #endif struct ceph_pagelist *pagelist; }; diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c index 806183959c47..ddc9090a1465 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c @@ -1407,6 +1407,9 @@ void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx(struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL security_release_secctx(as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + kfree(as_ctx->fscrypt_auth); #endif if (as_ctx->pagelist) ceph_pagelist_release(as_ctx->pagelist); From f061feda6c54ccb02b0f2c09926fb8edd4882fbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 09:58:43 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 14/53] ceph: add fscrypt ioctls and ceph.fscrypt.auth vxattr MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit We gate most of the ioctls on MDS feature support. The exception is the key removal and status functions that we still want to work if the MDS's were to (inexplicably) lose the feature. For the set_policy ioctl, we take Fs caps to ensure that nothing can create files in the directory while the ioctl is running. That should be enough to ensure that the "empty_dir" check is reliable. The vxattr is read-only, added mostly for future debugging purposes. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/ioctl.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/xattr.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/ioctl.c b/fs/ceph/ioctl.c index deac817647eb..9bb37bcab05a 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/ceph/ioctl.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include "mds_client.h" #include "ioctl.h" #include +#include /* * ioctls @@ -268,8 +269,54 @@ static long ceph_ioctl_syncio(struct file *file) return 0; } +static int vet_mds_for_fscrypt(struct file *file) +{ + int i, ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = ceph_sb_to_mdsc(file_inode(file)->i_sb); + + mutex_lock(&mdsc->mutex); + for (i = 0; i < mdsc->max_sessions; i++) { + struct ceph_mds_session *s = mdsc->sessions[i]; + + if (!s) + continue; + if (test_bit(CEPHFS_FEATURE_ALTERNATE_NAME, &s->s_features)) + ret = 0; + break; + } + mutex_unlock(&mdsc->mutex); + return ret; +} + +static long ceph_set_encryption_policy(struct file *file, unsigned long arg) +{ + int ret, got = 0; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); + + ret = vet_mds_for_fscrypt(file); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* + * Ensure we hold these caps so that we _know_ that the rstats check + * in the empty_dir check is reliable. + */ + ret = ceph_get_caps(file, CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED, 0, -1, &got); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(file, (const void __user *)arg); + if (got) + ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, got); + + return ret; +} + long ceph_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { + int ret; + dout("ioctl file %p cmd %u arg %lu\n", file, cmd, arg); switch (cmd) { case CEPH_IOC_GET_LAYOUT: @@ -289,6 +336,43 @@ long ceph_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) case CEPH_IOC_SYNCIO: return ceph_ioctl_syncio(file); + + case FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY: + return ceph_set_encryption_policy(file, arg); + + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY: + ret = vet_mds_for_fscrypt(file); + if (ret) + return ret; + return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(file, (void __user *)arg); + + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX: + ret = vet_mds_for_fscrypt(file); + if (ret) + return ret; + return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex(file, (void __user *)arg); + + case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY: + ret = vet_mds_for_fscrypt(file); + if (ret) + return ret; + return fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(file, (void __user *)arg); + + case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY: + return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(file, (void __user *)arg); + + case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS: + return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key_all_users(file, + (void __user *)arg); + + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS: + return fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(file, (void __user *)arg); + + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_NONCE: + ret = vet_mds_for_fscrypt(file); + if (ret) + return ret; + return fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce(file, (void __user *)arg); } return -ENOTTY; diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c index ddc9090a1465..6cd82404202a 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c @@ -352,6 +352,24 @@ static ssize_t ceph_vxattrcb_auth_mds(struct ceph_inode_info *ci, return ret; } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) +static bool ceph_vxattrcb_fscrypt_auth_exists(struct ceph_inode_info *ci) +{ + return ci->fscrypt_auth_len; +} + +static ssize_t ceph_vxattrcb_fscrypt_auth(struct ceph_inode_info *ci, + char *val, size_t size) +{ + if (size) { + if (size < ci->fscrypt_auth_len) + return -ERANGE; + memcpy(val, ci->fscrypt_auth, ci->fscrypt_auth_len); + } + return ci->fscrypt_auth_len; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ + #define CEPH_XATTR_NAME(_type, _name) XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX #_type "." #_name #define CEPH_XATTR_NAME2(_type, _name, _name2) \ XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX #_type "." #_name "." #_name2 @@ -500,6 +518,15 @@ static struct ceph_vxattr ceph_common_vxattrs[] = { .exists_cb = NULL, .flags = VXATTR_FLAG_READONLY, }, +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) + { + .name = "ceph.fscrypt.auth", + .name_size = sizeof("ceph.fscrypt.auth"), + .getxattr_cb = ceph_vxattrcb_fscrypt_auth, + .exists_cb = ceph_vxattrcb_fscrypt_auth_exists, + .flags = VXATTR_FLAG_READONLY, + }, +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ { .name = NULL, 0 } /* Required table terminator */ }; From b7b53361c80b16ad461dbcb8a93e6e37578bac9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiubo Li Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2022 14:49:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 15/53] ceph: make ioctl cmds more readable in debug log MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit ioctl file 0000000004e6b054 cmd 2148296211 arg 824635143532 The numerical cmd value in the ioctl debug log message is too hard to understand even when you look at it in the code. Make it more readable. [ idryomov: add missing _ in ceph_ioctl_cmd_name() ] Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/ioctl.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/ioctl.c b/fs/ceph/ioctl.c index 9bb37bcab05a..11d37d307382 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/ceph/ioctl.c @@ -313,11 +313,48 @@ static long ceph_set_encryption_policy(struct file *file, unsigned long arg) return ret; } +static const char *ceph_ioctl_cmd_name(const unsigned int cmd) +{ + switch (cmd) { + case CEPH_IOC_GET_LAYOUT: + return "get_layout"; + case CEPH_IOC_SET_LAYOUT: + return "set_layout"; + case CEPH_IOC_SET_LAYOUT_POLICY: + return "set_layout_policy"; + case CEPH_IOC_GET_DATALOC: + return "get_dataloc"; + case CEPH_IOC_LAZYIO: + return "lazyio"; + case CEPH_IOC_SYNCIO: + return "syncio"; + case FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY: + return "set_encryption_policy"; + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY: + return "get_encryption_policy"; + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX: + return "get_encryption_policy_ex"; + case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY: + return "add_encryption_key"; + case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY: + return "remove_encryption_key"; + case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS: + return "remove_encryption_key_all_users"; + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS: + return "get_encryption_key_status"; + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_NONCE: + return "get_encryption_nonce"; + default: + return "unknown"; + } +} + long ceph_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { int ret; - dout("ioctl file %p cmd %u arg %lu\n", file, cmd, arg); + dout("ioctl file %p cmd %s arg %lu\n", file, + ceph_ioctl_cmd_name(cmd), arg); switch (cmd) { case CEPH_IOC_GET_LAYOUT: return ceph_ioctl_get_layout(file, (void __user *)arg); From 64e86f632bf148d007946c52781781eb8380d416 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Lu=C3=ADs=20Henriques?= Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2022 14:59:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 16/53] ceph: add base64 endcoding routines for encrypted names MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The base64url encoding used by fscrypt includes the '_' character, which may cause problems in snapshot names (if the name starts with '_'). Thus, use the base64 encoding defined for IMAP mailbox names (RFC 3501), which uses '+' and ',' instead of '-' and '_'. Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/crypto.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c index b65e31c5c503..0bb4d8e9f3b0 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c @@ -1,4 +1,11 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * The base64 encode/decode code was copied from fscrypt: + * Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility + * Written by Uday Savagaonkar, 2014. + * Modified by Jaegeuk Kim, 2015. + */ #include #include #include @@ -7,6 +14,59 @@ #include "mds_client.h" #include "crypto.h" +/* + * The base64url encoding used by fscrypt includes the '_' character, which may + * cause problems in snapshot names (which can not start with '_'). Thus, we + * used the base64 encoding defined for IMAP mailbox names (RFC 3501) instead, + * which replaces '-' and '_' by '+' and ','. + */ +static const char base64_table[65] = + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+,"; + +int ceph_base64_encode(const u8 *src, int srclen, char *dst) +{ + u32 ac = 0; + int bits = 0; + int i; + char *cp = dst; + + for (i = 0; i < srclen; i++) { + ac = (ac << 8) | src[i]; + bits += 8; + do { + bits -= 6; + *cp++ = base64_table[(ac >> bits) & 0x3f]; + } while (bits >= 6); + } + if (bits) + *cp++ = base64_table[(ac << (6 - bits)) & 0x3f]; + return cp - dst; +} + +int ceph_base64_decode(const char *src, int srclen, u8 *dst) +{ + u32 ac = 0; + int bits = 0; + int i; + u8 *bp = dst; + + for (i = 0; i < srclen; i++) { + const char *p = strchr(base64_table, src[i]); + + if (p == NULL || src[i] == 0) + return -1; + ac = (ac << 6) | (p - base64_table); + bits += 6; + if (bits >= 8) { + bits -= 8; + *bp++ = (u8)(ac >> bits); + } + } + if (ac & ((1 << bits) - 1)) + return -1; + return bp - dst; +} + static int ceph_crypt_get_context(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, size_t len) { struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h index 642963f5442e..44eb3f9f8287 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h @@ -27,6 +27,38 @@ static inline u32 ceph_fscrypt_auth_len(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fa) } #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +/* + * We want to encrypt filenames when creating them, but the encrypted + * versions of those names may have illegal characters in them. To mitigate + * that, we base64 encode them, but that gives us a result that can exceed + * NAME_MAX. + * + * Follow a similar scheme to fscrypt itself, and cap the filename to a + * smaller size. If the ciphertext name is longer than the value below, then + * sha256 hash the remaining bytes. + * + * For the fscrypt_nokey_name struct the dirhash[2] member is useless in ceph + * so the corresponding struct will be: + * + * struct fscrypt_ceph_nokey_name { + * u8 bytes[157]; + * u8 sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + * }; // 180 bytes => 240 bytes base64-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255) + * + * (240 bytes is the maximum size allowed for snapshot names to take into + * account the format: '__'.) + * + * Note that for long names that end up having their tail portion hashed, we + * must also store the full encrypted name (in the dentry's alternate_name + * field). + */ +#define CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX (180 - SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) + +#define CEPH_BASE64_CHARS(nbytes) DIV_ROUND_UP((nbytes) * 4, 3) + +int ceph_base64_encode(const u8 *src, int srclen, char *dst); +int ceph_base64_decode(const char *src, int srclen, u8 *dst); + void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb); void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(struct ceph_fs_client *fsc); From 3fd945a79e147ee10f84213976889b29049c3519 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2020 09:28:31 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 17/53] ceph: encode encrypted name in ceph_mdsc_build_path and dentry release MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Allow ceph_mdsc_build_path to encrypt and base64 encode the filename when the parent is encrypted and we're sending the path to the MDS. In a similar fashion, encode encrypted dentry names if including a dentry release in a request. In most cases, we just encrypt the filenames and base64 encode them, but when the name is longer than CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX, we use a similar scheme to fscrypt proper, and hash the remaning bits with sha256. When doing this, we then send along the full crypttext of the name in the new alternate_name field of the MClientRequest. The MDS can then send that along in readdir responses and traces. [ idryomov: drop duplicate include reported by Abaci Robot ] Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/caps.c | 32 ++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/crypto.h | 9 ++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 2 +- 5 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c index 1c62ef339bc6..4738be54dc73 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/caps.c +++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c @@ -4663,6 +4663,18 @@ int ceph_encode_inode_release(void **p, struct inode *inode, return ret; } +/** + * ceph_encode_dentry_release - encode a dentry release into an outgoing request + * @p: outgoing request buffer + * @dentry: dentry to release + * @dir: dir to release it from + * @mds: mds that we're speaking to + * @drop: caps being dropped + * @unless: unless we have these caps + * + * Encode a dentry release into an outgoing request buffer. Returns 1 if the + * thing was released, or a negative error code otherwise. + */ int ceph_encode_dentry_release(void **p, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *dir, int mds, int drop, int unless) @@ -4695,13 +4707,25 @@ int ceph_encode_dentry_release(void **p, struct dentry *dentry, if (ret && di->lease_session && di->lease_session->s_mds == mds) { dout("encode_dentry_release %p mds%d seq %d\n", dentry, mds, (int)di->lease_seq); - rel->dname_len = cpu_to_le32(dentry->d_name.len); - memcpy(*p, dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.len); - *p += dentry->d_name.len; rel->dname_seq = cpu_to_le32(di->lease_seq); __ceph_mdsc_drop_dentry_lease(dentry); + spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { + int ret2 = ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(dir, dentry, *p); + + if (ret2 < 0) + return ret2; + + rel->dname_len = cpu_to_le32(ret2); + *p += ret2; + } else { + rel->dname_len = cpu_to_le32(dentry->d_name.len); + memcpy(*p, dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.len); + *p += dentry->d_name.len; + } + } else { + spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); } - spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); return ret; } diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c index 0bb4d8e9f3b0..6dc723e8d395 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c @@ -191,3 +191,56 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, { swap(req->r_fscrypt_auth, as->fscrypt_auth); } + +int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, + struct dentry *dentry, char *buf) +{ + u32 len; + int elen; + int ret; + u8 *cryptbuf; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent)); + + /* + * Convert cleartext d_name to ciphertext. If result is longer than + * CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX, sha256 the remaining bytes + * + * See: fscrypt_setup_filename + */ + if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(parent, dentry->d_name.len, NAME_MAX, + &len)) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + + /* Allocate a buffer appropriate to hold the result */ + cryptbuf = kmalloc(len > CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX ? NAME_MAX : len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!cryptbuf) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(parent, &dentry->d_name, cryptbuf, len); + if (ret) { + kfree(cryptbuf); + return ret; + } + + /* hash the end if the name is long enough */ + if (len > CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX) { + u8 hash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 *extra = cryptbuf + CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX; + + /* + * hash the extra bytes and overwrite crypttext beyond that + * point with it + */ + sha256(extra, len - CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX, hash); + memcpy(extra, hash, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + len = CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + } + + /* base64 encode the encrypted name */ + elen = ceph_base64_encode(cryptbuf, len, buf); + kfree(cryptbuf); + dout("base64-encoded ciphertext name = %.*s\n", elen, buf); + return elen; +} diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h index 44eb3f9f8287..176731f64997 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #ifndef _CEPH_CRYPTO_H #define _CEPH_CRYPTO_H +#include #include struct ceph_fs_client; @@ -67,6 +68,8 @@ int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); +int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, + struct dentry *dentry, char *buf); #else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ @@ -91,6 +94,12 @@ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) { } + +static inline int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, + struct dentry *dentry, char *buf) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} #endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ #endif diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index c3927dab5a3b..882c01a64498 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -2435,18 +2435,29 @@ static inline u64 __get_oldest_tid(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) return mdsc->oldest_tid; } -/* - * Build a dentry's path. Allocate on heap; caller must kfree. Based - * on build_path_from_dentry in fs/cifs/dir.c. +/** + * ceph_mdsc_build_path - build a path string to a given dentry + * @dentry: dentry to which path should be built + * @plen: returned length of string + * @pbase: returned base inode number + * @for_wire: is this path going to be sent to the MDS? * - * If @stop_on_nosnap, generate path relative to the first non-snapped - * inode. + * Build a string that represents the path to the dentry. This is mostly called + * for two different purposes: + * + * 1) we need to build a path string to send to the MDS (for_wire == true) + * 2) we need a path string for local presentation (e.g. debugfs) + * (for_wire == false) + * + * The path is built in reverse, starting with the dentry. Walk back up toward + * the root, building the path until the first non-snapped inode is reached + * (for_wire) or the root inode is reached (!for_wire). * * Encode hidden .snap dirs as a double /, i.e. * foo/.snap/bar -> foo//bar */ char *ceph_mdsc_build_path(struct dentry *dentry, int *plen, u64 *pbase, - int stop_on_nosnap) + int for_wire) { struct dentry *cur; struct inode *inode; @@ -2468,30 +2479,67 @@ char *ceph_mdsc_build_path(struct dentry *dentry, int *plen, u64 *pbase, seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); cur = dget(dentry); for (;;) { - struct dentry *temp; + struct dentry *parent; spin_lock(&cur->d_lock); inode = d_inode(cur); if (inode && ceph_snap(inode) == CEPH_SNAPDIR) { dout("build_path path+%d: %p SNAPDIR\n", pos, cur); - } else if (stop_on_nosnap && inode && dentry != cur && + spin_unlock(&cur->d_lock); + parent = dget_parent(cur); + } else if (for_wire && inode && dentry != cur && ceph_snap(inode) == CEPH_NOSNAP) { spin_unlock(&cur->d_lock); pos++; /* get rid of any prepended '/' */ break; - } else { + } else if (!for_wire || !IS_ENCRYPTED(d_inode(cur->d_parent))) { pos -= cur->d_name.len; if (pos < 0) { spin_unlock(&cur->d_lock); break; } memcpy(path + pos, cur->d_name.name, cur->d_name.len); + spin_unlock(&cur->d_lock); + parent = dget_parent(cur); + } else { + int len, ret; + char buf[NAME_MAX]; + + /* + * Proactively copy name into buf, in case we need to + * present it as-is. + */ + memcpy(buf, cur->d_name.name, cur->d_name.len); + len = cur->d_name.len; + spin_unlock(&cur->d_lock); + parent = dget_parent(cur); + + ret = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(d_inode(parent)); + if (ret < 0) { + dput(parent); + dput(cur); + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } + + if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key(d_inode(parent))) { + len = ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(d_inode(parent), + cur, buf); + if (len < 0) { + dput(parent); + dput(cur); + return ERR_PTR(len); + } + } + pos -= len; + if (pos < 0) { + dput(parent); + break; + } + memcpy(path + pos, buf, len); } - temp = cur; - spin_unlock(&temp->d_lock); - cur = dget_parent(temp); - dput(temp); + dput(cur); + cur = parent; /* Are we at the root? */ if (IS_ROOT(cur)) @@ -2515,8 +2563,8 @@ char *ceph_mdsc_build_path(struct dentry *dentry, int *plen, u64 *pbase, * A rename didn't occur, but somehow we didn't end up where * we thought we would. Throw a warning and try again. */ - pr_warn("build_path did not end path lookup where " - "expected, pos is %d\n", pos); + pr_warn("build_path did not end path lookup where expected (pos = %d)\n", + pos); goto retry; } @@ -2536,7 +2584,8 @@ static int build_dentry_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *dir, rcu_read_lock(); if (!dir) dir = d_inode_rcu(dentry->d_parent); - if (dir && parent_locked && ceph_snap(dir) == CEPH_NOSNAP) { + if (dir && parent_locked && ceph_snap(dir) == CEPH_NOSNAP && + !IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { *pino = ceph_ino(dir); rcu_read_unlock(); *ppath = dentry->d_name.name; @@ -2765,15 +2814,23 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, req->r_inode ? req->r_inode : d_inode(req->r_dentry), mds, req->r_inode_drop, req->r_inode_unless, req->r_op == CEPH_MDS_OP_READDIR); - if (req->r_dentry_drop) - releases += ceph_encode_dentry_release(&p, req->r_dentry, + if (req->r_dentry_drop) { + ret = ceph_encode_dentry_release(&p, req->r_dentry, req->r_parent, mds, req->r_dentry_drop, req->r_dentry_unless); - if (req->r_old_dentry_drop) - releases += ceph_encode_dentry_release(&p, req->r_old_dentry, + if (ret < 0) + goto out_err; + releases += ret; + } + if (req->r_old_dentry_drop) { + ret = ceph_encode_dentry_release(&p, req->r_old_dentry, req->r_old_dentry_dir, mds, req->r_old_dentry_drop, req->r_old_dentry_unless); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_err; + releases += ret; + } if (req->r_old_inode_drop) releases += ceph_encode_inode_release(&p, d_inode(req->r_old_dentry), @@ -2815,6 +2872,10 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, ceph_mdsc_free_path((char *)path1, pathlen1); out: return msg; +out_err: + ceph_msg_put(msg); + msg = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto out_free2; } /* diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h index a2e85fb5aab1..1105baa97d49 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h @@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static inline void ceph_mdsc_free_path(char *path, int len) } extern char *ceph_mdsc_build_path(struct dentry *dentry, int *plen, u64 *base, - int stop_on_nosnap); + int for_wire); extern void __ceph_mdsc_drop_dentry_lease(struct dentry *dentry); extern void ceph_mdsc_lease_send_msg(struct ceph_mds_session *session, From 24865e75c1a4e70ac9e8328dae8b5e03712a6e8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 10:39:22 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 18/53] ceph: send alternate_name in MClientRequest MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In the event that we have a filename longer than CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX, we'll need to hash the tail of the filename. The client however will still need to know the full name of the file if it has a key. To support this, the MClientRequest field has grown a new alternate_name field that we populate with the full (binary) crypttext of the filename. This is then transmitted to the clients in readdir or traces as part of the dentry lease. Add support for populating this field when the filenames are very long. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 3 ++ 2 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 882c01a64498..126529ec7ca9 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -1027,6 +1027,7 @@ void ceph_mdsc_release_request(struct kref *kref) if (req->r_pagelist) ceph_pagelist_release(req->r_pagelist); kfree(req->r_fscrypt_auth); + kfree(req->r_altname); put_request_session(req); ceph_unreserve_caps(req->r_mdsc, &req->r_caps_reservation); WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&req->r_wait)); @@ -2435,6 +2436,64 @@ static inline u64 __get_oldest_tid(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) return mdsc->oldest_tid; } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) +static u8 *get_fscrypt_altname(const struct ceph_mds_request *req, u32 *plen) +{ + struct inode *dir = req->r_parent; + struct dentry *dentry = req->r_dentry; + u8 *cryptbuf = NULL; + u32 len = 0; + int ret = 0; + + /* only encode if we have parent and dentry */ + if (!dir || !dentry) + goto success; + + /* No-op unless this is encrypted */ + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) + goto success; + + ret = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(dir); + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + /* No key? Just ignore it. */ + if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) + goto success; + + if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(dir, dentry->d_name.len, NAME_MAX, + &len)) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); + } + + /* No need to append altname if name is short enough */ + if (len <= CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX) { + len = 0; + goto success; + } + + cryptbuf = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!cryptbuf) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + ret = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(dir, &dentry->d_name, cryptbuf, len); + if (ret) { + kfree(cryptbuf); + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } +success: + *plen = len; + return cryptbuf; +} +#else +static u8 *get_fscrypt_altname(const struct ceph_mds_request *req, u32 *plen) +{ + *plen = 0; + return NULL; +} +#endif + /** * ceph_mdsc_build_path - build a path string to a given dentry * @dentry: dentry to which path should be built @@ -2662,14 +2721,15 @@ static void encode_mclientrequest_tail(void **p, ceph_encode_timespec64(&ts, &req->r_stamp); ceph_encode_copy(p, &ts, sizeof(ts)); - /* gid_list */ + /* v4: gid_list */ ceph_encode_32(p, req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); for (i = 0; i < req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups; i++) ceph_encode_64(p, from_kgid(&init_user_ns, req->r_cred->group_info->gid[i])); - /* v5: altname (TODO: skip for now) */ - ceph_encode_32(p, 0); + /* v5: altname */ + ceph_encode_32(p, req->r_altname_len); + ceph_encode_copy(p, req->r_altname, req->r_altname_len); /* v6: fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) { @@ -2729,7 +2789,13 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, goto out_free1; } - /* head */ + req->r_altname = get_fscrypt_altname(req, &req->r_altname_len); + if (IS_ERR(req->r_altname)) { + msg = ERR_CAST(req->r_altname); + req->r_altname = NULL; + goto out_free2; + } + len = legacy ? sizeof(*head) : sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_head); /* filepaths */ @@ -2755,7 +2821,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, len += sizeof(u32) + (sizeof(u64) * req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); /* alternate name */ - len += sizeof(u32); // TODO + len += sizeof(u32) + req->r_altname_len; /* fscrypt_auth */ len += sizeof(u32); // fscrypt_auth diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h index 1105baa97d49..3cf874925519 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h @@ -285,6 +285,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_request { struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *r_fscrypt_auth; + u8 *r_altname; /* fscrypt binary crypttext for long filenames */ + u32 r_altname_len; /* length of r_altname */ + int r_fmode; /* file mode, if expecting cap */ int r_request_release_offset; const struct cred *r_cred; From 4ac4c23eaa389859f746a6ef31e1c71d880312f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 12:35:48 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 19/53] ceph: decode alternate_name in lease info MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Ceph is a bit different from local filesystems, in that we don't want to store filenames as raw binary data, since we may also be dealing with clients that don't support fscrypt. We could just base64-encode the encrypted filenames, but that could leave us with filenames longer than NAME_MAX. It turns out that the MDS doesn't care much about filename length, but the clients do. To manage this, we've added a new "alternate name" field that can be optionally added to any dentry that we'll use to store the binary crypttext of the filename if its base64-encoded value will be longer than NAME_MAX. When a dentry has one of these names attached, the MDS will send it along in the lease info, which we can then store for later usage. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 126529ec7ca9..34b8c0273427 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -310,27 +310,47 @@ static int parse_reply_info_dir(void **p, void *end, static int parse_reply_info_lease(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_mds_reply_lease **lease, - u64 features) + u64 features, u32 *altname_len, u8 **altname) { + u8 struct_v; + u32 struct_len; + void *lend; + if (features == (u64)-1) { - u8 struct_v, struct_compat; - u32 struct_len; + u8 struct_compat; + ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, struct_v, bad); ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, struct_compat, bad); + /* struct_v is expected to be >= 1. we only understand * encoding whose struct_compat == 1. */ if (!struct_v || struct_compat != 1) goto bad; + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, struct_len, bad); - ceph_decode_need(p, end, struct_len, bad); - end = *p + struct_len; + } else { + struct_len = sizeof(**lease); + *altname_len = 0; + *altname = NULL; } - ceph_decode_need(p, end, sizeof(**lease), bad); + lend = *p + struct_len; + ceph_decode_need(p, end, struct_len, bad); *lease = *p; *p += sizeof(**lease); - if (features == (u64)-1) - *p = end; + + if (features == (u64)-1) { + if (struct_v >= 2) { + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *altname_len, bad); + ceph_decode_need(p, end, *altname_len, bad); + *altname = *p; + *p += *altname_len; + } else { + *altname = NULL; + *altname_len = 0; + } + } + *p = lend; return 0; bad: return -EIO; @@ -360,7 +380,8 @@ static int parse_reply_info_trace(void **p, void *end, info->dname = *p; *p += info->dname_len; - err = parse_reply_info_lease(p, end, &info->dlease, features); + err = parse_reply_info_lease(p, end, &info->dlease, features, + &info->altname_len, &info->altname); if (err < 0) goto out_bad; } @@ -427,9 +448,11 @@ static int parse_reply_info_readdir(void **p, void *end, dout("parsed dir dname '%.*s'\n", rde->name_len, rde->name); /* dentry lease */ - err = parse_reply_info_lease(p, end, &rde->lease, features); + err = parse_reply_info_lease(p, end, &rde->lease, features, + &rde->altname_len, &rde->altname); if (err) goto out_bad; + /* inode */ err = parse_reply_info_in(p, end, &rde->inode, features); if (err < 0) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h index 3cf874925519..a4a6f7893b9e 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ enum ceph_feature_type { CEPHFS_FEATURE_MULTI_RECONNECT, \ CEPHFS_FEATURE_DELEG_INO, \ CEPHFS_FEATURE_METRIC_COLLECT, \ + CEPHFS_FEATURE_ALTERNATE_NAME, \ CEPHFS_FEATURE_NOTIFY_SESSION_STATE, \ CEPHFS_FEATURE_OP_GETVXATTR, \ } @@ -96,7 +97,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in { struct ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry { char *name; + u8 *altname; u32 name_len; + u32 altname_len; struct ceph_mds_reply_lease *lease; struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in inode; loff_t offset; @@ -120,7 +123,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed { struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in diri, targeti; struct ceph_mds_reply_dirfrag *dirfrag; char *dname; + u8 *altname; u32 dname_len; + u32 altname_len; struct ceph_mds_reply_lease *dlease; struct ceph_mds_reply_xattr xattr_info; From cb3524a8bd96fbc614e0f9295866c28dc17cafe6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 14:12:24 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 20/53] ceph: set DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME flag in ceph_lookup/atomic_open() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit This is required so that we know to invalidate these dentries when the directory is unlocked. Atomic open can act as a lookup if handed a dentry that is negative on the MDS. Ensure that we set DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME on the dentry in atomic_open, if we don't have the key for the parent. Otherwise, we can end up validating the dentry inappropriately if someone later adds a key. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/dir.c | 11 +++++++++++ fs/ceph/file.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index 31fac215a6a0..cd2ca26e3159 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -760,6 +760,17 @@ static struct dentry *ceph_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, if (dentry->d_name.len > NAME_MAX) return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { + err = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(dir); + if (err) + return ERR_PTR(err); + if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { + spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock); + dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME; + spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); + } + } + /* can we conclude ENOENT locally? */ if (d_really_is_negative(dentry)) { struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(dir); diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index dddced525b69..9383ec312a04 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -784,6 +784,13 @@ int ceph_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, req->r_args.open.mask = cpu_to_le32(mask); req->r_parent = dir; ihold(dir); + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { + if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { + spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock); + dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME; + spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); + } + } if (flags & O_CREAT) { struct ceph_file_layout lo; From c526760181ca083dbd607d2e694b43080a8b1585 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2020 15:47:17 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 21/53] ceph: make d_revalidate call fscrypt revalidator for encrypted dentries MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit If we have a dentry which represents a no-key name, then we need to test whether the parent directory's encryption key has since been added. Do that before we test anything else about the dentry. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/dir.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index cd2ca26e3159..9a0342697595 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -1782,6 +1782,10 @@ static int ceph_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) struct inode *dir, *inode; struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc; + valid = fscrypt_d_revalidate(dentry, flags); + if (valid <= 0) + return valid; + if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) { parent = READ_ONCE(dentry->d_parent); dir = d_inode_rcu(parent); @@ -1794,8 +1798,9 @@ static int ceph_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) inode = d_inode(dentry); } - dout("d_revalidate %p '%pd' inode %p offset 0x%llx\n", dentry, - dentry, inode, ceph_dentry(dentry)->offset); + dout("d_revalidate %p '%pd' inode %p offset 0x%llx nokey %d\n", dentry, + dentry, inode, ceph_dentry(dentry)->offset, + !!(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME)); mdsc = ceph_sb_to_client(dir->i_sb)->mdsc; From 457117f077c6749d1e28469eae91fb69c9806768 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2021 12:26:18 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 22/53] ceph: add helpers for converting names for userland presentation MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Define a new ceph_fname struct that we can use to carry information about encrypted dentry names. Add helpers for working with these objects, including ceph_fname_to_usr which formats an encrypted filename for userland presentation. [ xiubli: fix resulting name length check -- neither name_len nor ctext_len should exceed NAME_MAX ] Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/crypto.h | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 123 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c index 6dc723e8d395..e2a461960955 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c @@ -244,3 +244,80 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, dout("base64-encoded ciphertext name = %.*s\n", elen, buf); return elen; } + +/** + * ceph_fname_to_usr - convert a filename for userland presentation + * @fname: ceph_fname to be converted + * @tname: temporary name buffer to use for conversion (may be NULL) + * @oname: where converted name should be placed + * @is_nokey: set to true if key wasn't available during conversion (may be NULL) + * + * Given a filename (usually from the MDS), format it for presentation to + * userland. If @parent is not encrypted, just pass it back as-is. + * + * Otherwise, base64 decode the string, and then ask fscrypt to format it + * for userland presentation. + * + * Returns 0 on success or negative error code on error. + */ +int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, + struct fscrypt_str *oname, bool *is_nokey) +{ + int ret; + struct fscrypt_str _tname = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0); + struct fscrypt_str iname; + + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(fname->dir)) { + oname->name = fname->name; + oname->len = fname->name_len; + return 0; + } + + /* Sanity check that the resulting name will fit in the buffer */ + if (fname->name_len > NAME_MAX || fname->ctext_len > NAME_MAX) + return -EIO; + + ret = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(fname->dir); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* + * Use the raw dentry name as sent by the MDS instead of + * generating a nokey name via fscrypt. + */ + if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(fname->dir)) { + memcpy(oname->name, fname->name, fname->name_len); + oname->len = fname->name_len; + if (is_nokey) + *is_nokey = true; + return 0; + } + + if (fname->ctext_len == 0) { + int declen; + + if (!tname) { + ret = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(NAME_MAX, &_tname); + if (ret) + return ret; + tname = &_tname; + } + + declen = ceph_base64_decode(fname->name, fname->name_len, + tname->name); + if (declen <= 0) { + ret = -EIO; + goto out; + } + iname.name = tname->name; + iname.len = declen; + } else { + iname.name = fname->ctext; + iname.len = fname->ctext_len; + } + + ret = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(fname->dir, 0, 0, &iname, oname); +out: + fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(&_tname); + return ret; +} diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h index 176731f64997..a53645123248 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h @@ -13,6 +13,14 @@ struct ceph_fs_client; struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx; struct ceph_mds_request; +struct ceph_fname { + struct inode *dir; + char *name; // b64 encoded, possibly hashed + unsigned char *ctext; // binary crypttext (if any) + u32 name_len; // length of name buffer + u32 ctext_len; // length of crypttext +}; + struct ceph_fscrypt_auth { __le32 cfa_version; __le32 cfa_blob_len; @@ -71,6 +79,24 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf); +static inline int ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(struct inode *parent, + struct fscrypt_str *fname) +{ + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) + return 0; + return fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(NAME_MAX, fname); +} + +static inline void ceph_fname_free_buffer(struct inode *parent, + struct fscrypt_str *fname) +{ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) + fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(fname); +} + +int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, + struct fscrypt_str *oname, bool *is_nokey); + #else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) @@ -100,6 +126,26 @@ static inline int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } + +static inline int ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(struct inode *parent, + struct fscrypt_str *fname) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void ceph_fname_free_buffer(struct inode *parent, + struct fscrypt_str *fname) +{ +} + +static inline int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, + struct fscrypt_str *tname, + struct fscrypt_str *oname, bool *is_nokey) +{ + oname->name = fname->name; + oname->len = fname->name_len; + return 0; +} #endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ #endif From 855290962c5581289dcf5365894a87b911e4c4d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2020 15:13:29 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 23/53] ceph: make ceph_fill_trace and ceph_get_name decrypt names MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When we get a dentry in a trace, decrypt the name so we can properly instantiate the dentry or fill out ceph_get_name() buffer. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/export.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ fs/ceph/inode.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/export.c b/fs/ceph/export.c index f780e4e0d062..8559990a59a5 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/export.c +++ b/fs/ceph/export.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" +#include "crypto.h" /* * Basic fh @@ -535,7 +536,9 @@ static int ceph_get_name(struct dentry *parent, char *name, { struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc; struct ceph_mds_request *req; + struct inode *dir = d_inode(parent); struct inode *inode = d_inode(child); + struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *rinfo; int err; if (ceph_snap(inode) != CEPH_NOSNAP) @@ -547,30 +550,47 @@ static int ceph_get_name(struct dentry *parent, char *name, if (IS_ERR(req)) return PTR_ERR(req); - inode_lock(d_inode(parent)); - + inode_lock(dir); req->r_inode = inode; ihold(inode); req->r_ino2 = ceph_vino(d_inode(parent)); - req->r_parent = d_inode(parent); - ihold(req->r_parent); + req->r_parent = dir; + ihold(dir); set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_PARENT_LOCKED, &req->r_req_flags); req->r_num_caps = 2; err = ceph_mdsc_do_request(mdsc, NULL, req); + inode_unlock(dir); - inode_unlock(d_inode(parent)); + if (err) + goto out; - if (!err) { - struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *rinfo = &req->r_reply_info; + rinfo = &req->r_reply_info; + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { memcpy(name, rinfo->dname, rinfo->dname_len); name[rinfo->dname_len] = 0; - dout("get_name %p ino %llx.%llx name %s\n", - child, ceph_vinop(inode), name); } else { - dout("get_name %p ino %llx.%llx err %d\n", - child, ceph_vinop(inode), err); - } + struct fscrypt_str oname = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0); + struct ceph_fname fname = { .dir = dir, + .name = rinfo->dname, + .ctext = rinfo->altname, + .name_len = rinfo->dname_len, + .ctext_len = rinfo->altname_len }; + err = ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(dir, &oname); + if (err < 0) + goto out; + + err = ceph_fname_to_usr(&fname, NULL, &oname, NULL); + if (!err) { + memcpy(name, oname.name, oname.len); + name[oname.len] = 0; + } + ceph_fname_free_buffer(dir, &oname); + } +out: + dout("get_name %p ino %llx.%llx err %d %s%s\n", + child, ceph_vinop(inode), err, + err ? "" : "name ", err ? "" : name); ceph_mdsc_put_request(req); return err; } diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index 50ff641865e0..a6e9a41020d5 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -1406,8 +1406,15 @@ int ceph_fill_trace(struct super_block *sb, struct ceph_mds_request *req) if (dir && req->r_op == CEPH_MDS_OP_LOOKUPNAME && test_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_PARENT_LOCKED, &req->r_req_flags) && !test_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_ABORTED, &req->r_req_flags)) { + bool is_nokey = false; struct qstr dname; struct dentry *dn, *parent; + struct fscrypt_str oname = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0); + struct ceph_fname fname = { .dir = dir, + .name = rinfo->dname, + .ctext = rinfo->altname, + .name_len = rinfo->dname_len, + .ctext_len = rinfo->altname_len }; BUG_ON(!rinfo->head->is_target); BUG_ON(req->r_dentry); @@ -1415,8 +1422,20 @@ int ceph_fill_trace(struct super_block *sb, struct ceph_mds_request *req) parent = d_find_any_alias(dir); BUG_ON(!parent); - dname.name = rinfo->dname; - dname.len = rinfo->dname_len; + err = ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(dir, &oname); + if (err < 0) { + dput(parent); + goto done; + } + + err = ceph_fname_to_usr(&fname, NULL, &oname, &is_nokey); + if (err < 0) { + dput(parent); + ceph_fname_free_buffer(dir, &oname); + goto done; + } + dname.name = oname.name; + dname.len = oname.len; dname.hash = full_name_hash(parent, dname.name, dname.len); tvino.ino = le64_to_cpu(rinfo->targeti.in->ino); tvino.snap = le64_to_cpu(rinfo->targeti.in->snapid); @@ -1431,9 +1450,15 @@ int ceph_fill_trace(struct super_block *sb, struct ceph_mds_request *req) dname.len, dname.name, dn); if (!dn) { dput(parent); + ceph_fname_free_buffer(dir, &oname); err = -ENOMEM; goto done; } + if (is_nokey) { + spin_lock(&dn->d_lock); + dn->d_flags |= DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME; + spin_unlock(&dn->d_lock); + } err = 0; } else if (d_really_is_positive(dn) && (ceph_ino(d_inode(dn)) != tvino.ino || @@ -1445,6 +1470,7 @@ int ceph_fill_trace(struct super_block *sb, struct ceph_mds_request *req) dput(dn); goto retry_lookup; } + ceph_fname_free_buffer(dir, &oname); req->r_dentry = dn; dput(parent); From 3859af9eba958cec91e4908f64787f190254f565 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiubo Li Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 10:28:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 24/53] ceph: pass the request to parse_reply_info_readdir() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Instead of passing just the r_reply_info to the readdir reply parser, pass the request pointer directly instead. This will facilitate implementing readdir on fscrypted directories. Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 23 +++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 34b8c0273427..8709fc1b2523 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -407,9 +407,10 @@ static int parse_reply_info_trace(void **p, void *end, * parse readdir results */ static int parse_reply_info_readdir(void **p, void *end, - struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info, - u64 features) + struct ceph_mds_request *req, + u64 features) { + struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info = &req->r_reply_info; u32 num, i = 0; int err; @@ -651,15 +652,16 @@ static int parse_reply_info_getvxattr(void **p, void *end, * parse extra results */ static int parse_reply_info_extra(void **p, void *end, - struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info, + struct ceph_mds_request *req, u64 features, struct ceph_mds_session *s) { + struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info = &req->r_reply_info; u32 op = le32_to_cpu(info->head->op); if (op == CEPH_MDS_OP_GETFILELOCK) return parse_reply_info_filelock(p, end, info, features); else if (op == CEPH_MDS_OP_READDIR || op == CEPH_MDS_OP_LSSNAP) - return parse_reply_info_readdir(p, end, info, features); + return parse_reply_info_readdir(p, end, req, features); else if (op == CEPH_MDS_OP_CREATE) return parse_reply_info_create(p, end, info, features, s); else if (op == CEPH_MDS_OP_GETVXATTR) @@ -672,9 +674,9 @@ static int parse_reply_info_extra(void **p, void *end, * parse entire mds reply */ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg, - struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info, - u64 features) + struct ceph_mds_request *req, u64 features) { + struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info = &req->r_reply_info; void *p, *end; u32 len; int err; @@ -696,7 +698,7 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg, ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, len, bad); if (len > 0) { ceph_decode_need(&p, end, len, bad); - err = parse_reply_info_extra(&p, p+len, info, features, s); + err = parse_reply_info_extra(&p, p+len, req, features, s); if (err < 0) goto out_bad; } @@ -3598,14 +3600,15 @@ static void handle_reply(struct ceph_mds_session *session, struct ceph_msg *msg) } dout("handle_reply tid %lld result %d\n", tid, result); - rinfo = &req->r_reply_info; if (test_bit(CEPHFS_FEATURE_REPLY_ENCODING, &session->s_features)) - err = parse_reply_info(session, msg, rinfo, (u64)-1); + err = parse_reply_info(session, msg, req, (u64)-1); else - err = parse_reply_info(session, msg, rinfo, session->s_con.peer_features); + err = parse_reply_info(session, msg, req, + session->s_con.peer_features); mutex_unlock(&mdsc->mutex); /* Must find target inode outside of mutexes to avoid deadlocks */ + rinfo = &req->r_reply_info; if ((err >= 0) && rinfo->head->is_target) { struct inode *in = xchg(&req->r_new_inode, NULL); struct ceph_vino tvino = { From af9ffa6df7e337599ce41165d9e6166a330c7b96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiubo Li Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 10:28:35 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 25/53] ceph: add support to readdir for encrypted names MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit To make it simpler to decrypt names in a readdir reply (i.e. before we have a dentry), add a new ceph_encode_encrypted_fname()-like helper that takes a qstr pointer instead of a dentry pointer. Once we've decrypted the names in a readdir reply, we no longer need the crypttext, so overwrite them in ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry with the unencrypted names. Then in both ceph_readdir_prepopulate() and ceph_readdir() we will use the dencrypted name directly. [ jlayton: convert some BUG_ONs into error returns ] Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 27 +++++++++++---- fs/ceph/crypto.h | 10 ++++++ fs/ceph/dir.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++---- fs/ceph/inode.c | 12 ++++--- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 4 +-- 6 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c index e2a461960955..a08978a0ed4d 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c @@ -192,15 +192,18 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, swap(req->r_fscrypt_auth, as->fscrypt_auth); } -int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, - struct dentry *dentry, char *buf) +int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, + struct qstr *d_name, char *buf) { u32 len; int elen; int ret; u8 *cryptbuf; - WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent)); + if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent)) { + memcpy(buf, d_name->name, d_name->len); + return d_name->len; + } /* * Convert cleartext d_name to ciphertext. If result is longer than @@ -208,8 +211,7 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, * * See: fscrypt_setup_filename */ - if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(parent, dentry->d_name.len, NAME_MAX, - &len)) + if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(parent, d_name->len, NAME_MAX, &len)) return -ENAMETOOLONG; /* Allocate a buffer appropriate to hold the result */ @@ -218,7 +220,7 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, if (!cryptbuf) return -ENOMEM; - ret = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(parent, &dentry->d_name, cryptbuf, len); + ret = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(parent, d_name, cryptbuf, len); if (ret) { kfree(cryptbuf); return ret; @@ -245,6 +247,14 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, return elen; } +int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, + struct dentry *dentry, char *buf) +{ + WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent)); + + return ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(parent, &dentry->d_name, buf); +} + /** * ceph_fname_to_usr - convert a filename for userland presentation * @fname: ceph_fname to be converted @@ -286,7 +296,10 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, * generating a nokey name via fscrypt. */ if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(fname->dir)) { - memcpy(oname->name, fname->name, fname->name_len); + if (fname->no_copy) + oname->name = fname->name; + else + memcpy(oname->name, fname->name, fname->name_len); oname->len = fname->name_len; if (is_nokey) *is_nokey = true; diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h index a53645123248..3269fc8f8cf3 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ struct ceph_fname { unsigned char *ctext; // binary crypttext (if any) u32 name_len; // length of name buffer u32 ctext_len; // length of crypttext + bool no_copy; }; struct ceph_fscrypt_auth { @@ -76,6 +77,8 @@ int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); +int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, + struct qstr *d_name, char *buf); int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf); @@ -121,6 +124,13 @@ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, { } +static inline int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, + struct qstr *d_name, char *buf) +{ + memcpy(buf, d_name->name, d_name->len); + return d_name->len; +} + static inline int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf) { diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index 9a0342697595..ee5c8b9c8630 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" +#include "crypto.h" /* * Directory operations: readdir, lookup, create, link, unlink, @@ -241,7 +242,9 @@ static int __dcache_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx, di = ceph_dentry(dentry); if (d_unhashed(dentry) || d_really_is_negative(dentry) || - di->lease_shared_gen != shared_gen) { + di->lease_shared_gen != shared_gen || + ((dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME) && + fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir))) { spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); dput(dentry); err = -EAGAIN; @@ -340,6 +343,10 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) ctx->pos = 2; } + err = fscrypt_prepare_readdir(inode); + if (err) + return err; + spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); /* request Fx cap. if have Fx, we don't need to release Fs cap * for later create/unlink. */ @@ -389,6 +396,7 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) req = ceph_mdsc_create_request(mdsc, op, USE_AUTH_MDS); if (IS_ERR(req)) return PTR_ERR(req); + err = ceph_alloc_readdir_reply_buffer(req, inode); if (err) { ceph_mdsc_put_request(req); @@ -402,11 +410,21 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) req->r_inode_drop = CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL; } if (dfi->last_name) { - req->r_path2 = kstrdup(dfi->last_name, GFP_KERNEL); + struct qstr d_name = { .name = dfi->last_name, + .len = strlen(dfi->last_name) }; + + req->r_path2 = kzalloc(NAME_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!req->r_path2) { ceph_mdsc_put_request(req); return -ENOMEM; } + + err = ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(inode, &d_name, + req->r_path2); + if (err < 0) { + ceph_mdsc_put_request(req); + return err; + } } else if (is_hash_order(ctx->pos)) { req->r_args.readdir.offset_hash = cpu_to_le32(fpos_hash(ctx->pos)); @@ -511,15 +529,20 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) for (; i < rinfo->dir_nr; i++) { struct ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry *rde = rinfo->dir_entries + i; - BUG_ON(rde->offset < ctx->pos); + if (rde->offset < ctx->pos) { + pr_warn("%s: rde->offset 0x%llx ctx->pos 0x%llx\n", + __func__, rde->offset, ctx->pos); + return -EIO; + } + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!rde->inode.in)) + return -EIO; ctx->pos = rde->offset; dout("readdir (%d/%d) -> %llx '%.*s' %p\n", i, rinfo->dir_nr, ctx->pos, rde->name_len, rde->name, &rde->inode.in); - BUG_ON(!rde->inode.in); - if (!dir_emit(ctx, rde->name, rde->name_len, ceph_present_ino(inode->i_sb, le64_to_cpu(rde->inode.in->ino)), le32_to_cpu(rde->inode.in->mode) >> 12)) { @@ -532,6 +555,8 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) dout("filldir stopping us...\n"); return 0; } + + /* Reset the lengths to their original allocated vals */ ctx->pos++; } @@ -586,7 +611,6 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) dfi->dir_ordered_count); spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); } - dout("readdir %p file %p done.\n", inode, file); return 0; } diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index a6e9a41020d5..0c33809f8e22 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -1752,7 +1752,8 @@ int ceph_readdir_prepopulate(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_mds_session *session) { struct dentry *parent = req->r_dentry; - struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(d_inode(parent)); + struct inode *inode = d_inode(parent); + struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *rinfo = &req->r_reply_info; struct qstr dname; struct dentry *dn; @@ -1826,9 +1827,7 @@ int ceph_readdir_prepopulate(struct ceph_mds_request *req, tvino.snap = le64_to_cpu(rde->inode.in->snapid); if (rinfo->hash_order) { - u32 hash = ceph_str_hash(ci->i_dir_layout.dl_dir_hash, - rde->name, rde->name_len); - hash = ceph_frag_value(hash); + u32 hash = ceph_frag_value(rde->raw_hash); if (hash != last_hash) fpos_offset = 2; last_hash = hash; @@ -1851,6 +1850,11 @@ int ceph_readdir_prepopulate(struct ceph_mds_request *req, err = -ENOMEM; goto out; } + if (rde->is_nokey) { + spin_lock(&dn->d_lock); + dn->d_flags |= DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME; + spin_unlock(&dn->d_lock); + } } else if (d_really_is_positive(dn) && (ceph_ino(d_inode(dn)) != tvino.ino || ceph_snap(d_inode(dn)) != tvino.snap)) { diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 8709fc1b2523..447acc4a0fbd 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -440,20 +440,87 @@ static int parse_reply_info_readdir(void **p, void *end, info->dir_nr = num; while (num) { + struct inode *inode = d_inode(req->r_dentry); + struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); struct ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry *rde = info->dir_entries + i; + struct fscrypt_str tname = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0); + struct fscrypt_str oname = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0); + struct ceph_fname fname; + u32 altname_len, _name_len; + u8 *altname, *_name; + /* dentry */ - ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, rde->name_len, bad); - ceph_decode_need(p, end, rde->name_len, bad); - rde->name = *p; - *p += rde->name_len; - dout("parsed dir dname '%.*s'\n", rde->name_len, rde->name); + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, _name_len, bad); + ceph_decode_need(p, end, _name_len, bad); + _name = *p; + *p += _name_len; + dout("parsed dir dname '%.*s'\n", _name_len, _name); + + if (info->hash_order) + rde->raw_hash = ceph_str_hash(ci->i_dir_layout.dl_dir_hash, + _name, _name_len); /* dentry lease */ err = parse_reply_info_lease(p, end, &rde->lease, features, - &rde->altname_len, &rde->altname); + &altname_len, &altname); if (err) goto out_bad; + /* + * Try to dencrypt the dentry names and update them + * in the ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry struct. + */ + fname.dir = inode; + fname.name = _name; + fname.name_len = _name_len; + fname.ctext = altname; + fname.ctext_len = altname_len; + /* + * The _name_len maybe larger than altname_len, such as + * when the human readable name length is in range of + * (CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX, CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE), + * then the copy in ceph_fname_to_usr will corrupt the + * data if there has no encryption key. + * + * Just set the no_copy flag and then if there has no + * encryption key the oname.name will be assigned to + * _name always. + */ + fname.no_copy = true; + if (altname_len == 0) { + /* + * Set tname to _name, and this will be used + * to do the base64_decode in-place. It's + * safe because the decoded string should + * always be shorter, which is 3/4 of origin + * string. + */ + tname.name = _name; + + /* + * Set oname to _name too, and this will be + * used to do the dencryption in-place. + */ + oname.name = _name; + oname.len = _name_len; + } else { + /* + * This will do the decryption only in-place + * from altname cryptext directly. + */ + oname.name = altname; + oname.len = altname_len; + } + rde->is_nokey = false; + err = ceph_fname_to_usr(&fname, &tname, &oname, &rde->is_nokey); + if (err) { + pr_err("%s unable to decode %.*s, got %d\n", __func__, + _name_len, _name, err); + goto out_bad; + } + rde->name = oname.name; + rde->name_len = oname.len; + /* inode */ err = parse_reply_info_in(p, end, &rde->inode, features); if (err < 0) @@ -3671,7 +3738,7 @@ static void handle_reply(struct ceph_mds_session *session, struct ceph_msg *msg) if (err == 0) { if (result == 0 && (req->r_op == CEPH_MDS_OP_READDIR || req->r_op == CEPH_MDS_OP_LSSNAP)) - ceph_readdir_prepopulate(req, req->r_session); + err = ceph_readdir_prepopulate(req, req->r_session); } current->journal_info = NULL; mutex_unlock(&req->r_fill_mutex); diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h index a4a6f7893b9e..a8f622439f38 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h @@ -96,10 +96,10 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in { }; struct ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry { + bool is_nokey; char *name; - u8 *altname; u32 name_len; - u32 altname_len; + u32 raw_hash; struct ceph_mds_reply_lease *lease; struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in inode; loff_t offset; From 79f2f6ad878c1f2cb9edc674c6a263ff2ef6d1fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2020 13:31:10 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 26/53] ceph: create symlinks with encrypted and base64-encoded targets MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When creating symlinks in encrypted directories, encrypt and base64-encode the target with the new inode's key before sending to the MDS. When filling a symlinked inode, base64-decode it into a buffer that we'll keep in ci->i_symlink. When get_link is called, decrypt the buffer into a new one that will hang off i_link. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/dir.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++--- fs/ceph/inode.c | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index ee5c8b9c8630..7e064c024d2a 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -948,6 +948,43 @@ static int ceph_create(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, return ceph_mknod(idmap, dir, dentry, mode, 0); } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) +static int prep_encrypted_symlink_target(struct ceph_mds_request *req, + const char *dest) +{ + int err; + int len = strlen(dest); + struct fscrypt_str osd_link = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0); + + err = fscrypt_prepare_symlink(req->r_parent, dest, len, PATH_MAX, + &osd_link); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(req->r_new_inode, dest, len, &osd_link); + if (err) + goto out; + + req->r_path2 = kmalloc(CEPH_BASE64_CHARS(osd_link.len) + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req->r_path2) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + len = ceph_base64_encode(osd_link.name, osd_link.len, req->r_path2); + req->r_path2[len] = '\0'; +out: + fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(&osd_link); + return err; +} +#else +static int prep_encrypted_symlink_target(struct ceph_mds_request *req, + const char *dest) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +#endif + static int ceph_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *dest) { @@ -983,14 +1020,21 @@ static int ceph_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, goto out_req; } - req->r_path2 = kstrdup(dest, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!req->r_path2) { - err = -ENOMEM; - goto out_req; - } req->r_parent = dir; ihold(dir); + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(req->r_new_inode)) { + err = prep_encrypted_symlink_target(req, dest); + if (err) + goto out_req; + } else { + req->r_path2 = kstrdup(dest, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req->r_path2) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out_req; + } + } + set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_PARENT_LOCKED, &req->r_req_flags); req->r_dentry = dget(dentry); req->r_num_caps = 2; diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index 0c33809f8e22..5423c69ac434 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ */ static const struct inode_operations ceph_symlink_iops; +static const struct inode_operations ceph_encrypted_symlink_iops; static void ceph_inode_work(struct work_struct *work); @@ -640,6 +641,7 @@ void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode) #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION kfree(ci->fscrypt_auth); #endif + fscrypt_free_inode(inode); kmem_cache_free(ceph_inode_cachep, ci); } @@ -837,6 +839,34 @@ void ceph_fill_file_time(struct inode *inode, int issued, inode, time_warp_seq, ci->i_time_warp_seq); } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) +static int decode_encrypted_symlink(const char *encsym, int enclen, u8 **decsym) +{ + int declen; + u8 *sym; + + sym = kmalloc(enclen + 1, GFP_NOFS); + if (!sym) + return -ENOMEM; + + declen = ceph_base64_decode(encsym, enclen, sym); + if (declen < 0) { + pr_err("%s: can't decode symlink (%d). Content: %.*s\n", + __func__, declen, enclen, encsym); + kfree(sym); + return -EIO; + } + sym[declen + 1] = '\0'; + *decsym = sym; + return declen; +} +#else +static int decode_encrypted_symlink(const char *encsym, int symlen, u8 **decsym) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +#endif + /* * Populate an inode based on info from mds. May be called on new or * existing inodes. @@ -1071,26 +1101,42 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, inode->i_fop = &ceph_file_fops; break; case S_IFLNK: - inode->i_op = &ceph_symlink_iops; if (!ci->i_symlink) { u32 symlen = iinfo->symlink_len; char *sym; spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); - if (symlen != i_size_read(inode)) { - pr_err("%s %llx.%llx BAD symlink " - "size %lld\n", __func__, - ceph_vinop(inode), - i_size_read(inode)); + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { + if (symlen != i_size_read(inode)) + pr_err("%s %llx.%llx BAD symlink size %lld\n", + __func__, ceph_vinop(inode), + i_size_read(inode)); + + err = decode_encrypted_symlink(iinfo->symlink, + symlen, (u8 **)&sym); + if (err < 0) { + pr_err("%s decoding encrypted symlink failed: %d\n", + __func__, err); + goto out; + } + symlen = err; i_size_write(inode, symlen); inode->i_blocks = calc_inode_blocks(symlen); - } + } else { + if (symlen != i_size_read(inode)) { + pr_err("%s %llx.%llx BAD symlink size %lld\n", + __func__, ceph_vinop(inode), + i_size_read(inode)); + i_size_write(inode, symlen); + inode->i_blocks = calc_inode_blocks(symlen); + } - err = -ENOMEM; - sym = kstrndup(iinfo->symlink, symlen, GFP_NOFS); - if (!sym) - goto out; + err = -ENOMEM; + sym = kstrndup(iinfo->symlink, symlen, GFP_NOFS); + if (!sym) + goto out; + } spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); if (!ci->i_symlink) @@ -1098,7 +1144,17 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, else kfree(sym); /* lost a race */ } - inode->i_link = ci->i_symlink; + + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { + /* + * Encrypted symlinks need to be decrypted before we can + * cache their targets in i_link. Don't touch it here. + */ + inode->i_op = &ceph_encrypted_symlink_iops; + } else { + inode->i_link = ci->i_symlink; + inode->i_op = &ceph_symlink_iops; + } break; case S_IFDIR: inode->i_op = &ceph_dir_iops; @@ -2126,6 +2182,32 @@ static void ceph_inode_work(struct work_struct *work) iput(inode); } +static const char *ceph_encrypted_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, + struct inode *inode, + struct delayed_call *done) +{ + struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); + + if (!dentry) + return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); + + return fscrypt_get_symlink(inode, ci->i_symlink, i_size_read(inode), + done); +} + +static int ceph_encrypted_symlink_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + const struct path *path, + struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, + unsigned int query_flags) +{ + int ret; + + ret = ceph_getattr(idmap, path, stat, request_mask, query_flags); + if (ret) + return ret; + return fscrypt_symlink_getattr(path, stat); +} + /* * symlinks */ @@ -2136,6 +2218,13 @@ static const struct inode_operations ceph_symlink_iops = { .listxattr = ceph_listxattr, }; +static const struct inode_operations ceph_encrypted_symlink_iops = { + .get_link = ceph_encrypted_get_link, + .setattr = ceph_setattr, + .getattr = ceph_encrypted_symlink_getattr, + .listxattr = ceph_listxattr, +}; + int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *cia) { From 94af0470924c6368b07f9125fde29d6698ed1558 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 14:40:51 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 27/53] ceph: add some fscrypt guardrails MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add the appropriate calls into fscrypt for various actions, including link, rename, setattr, and the open codepaths. Disable fallocate for encrypted inodes -- hopefully, just for now. If we have an encrypted inode, then the client will need to re-encrypt the contents of the new object. Disable copy offload to or from encrypted inodes. Set i_blkbits to crypto block size for encrypted inodes -- some of the underlying infrastructure for fscrypt relies on i_blkbits being aligned to crypto blocksize. Report STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED on encrypted inodes. [ lhenriques: forbid encryption with striped layouts ] Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/crypto.h | 4 ++++ fs/ceph/dir.c | 9 +++++++++ fs/ceph/file.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- fs/ceph/inode.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++-------- fs/ceph/ioctl.c | 4 ++++ 5 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h index 3269fc8f8cf3..21694df7dfbf 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h @@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ #include #include +#define CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT 12 +#define CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE (_AC(1, UL) << CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT) +#define CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_MASK (~(CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE-1)) + struct ceph_fs_client; struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx; struct ceph_mds_request; diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index 7e064c024d2a..99fdc777dccd 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -1148,6 +1148,10 @@ static int ceph_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, if (ceph_snap(dir) != CEPH_NOSNAP) return -EROFS; + err = fscrypt_prepare_link(old_dentry, dir, dentry); + if (err) + return err; + dout("link in dir %p %llx.%llx old_dentry %p:'%pd' dentry %p:'%pd'\n", dir, ceph_vinop(dir), old_dentry, old_dentry, dentry, dentry); req = ceph_mdsc_create_request(mdsc, CEPH_MDS_OP_LINK, USE_AUTH_MDS); @@ -1395,6 +1399,11 @@ static int ceph_rename(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *old_dir, if (err) return err; + err = fscrypt_prepare_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry, + flags); + if (err) + return err; + dout("rename dir %p dentry %p to dir %p dentry %p\n", old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); req = ceph_mdsc_create_request(mdsc, op, USE_AUTH_MDS); diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index 9383ec312a04..6e9ae398ef2c 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -366,8 +366,13 @@ int ceph_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) /* filter out O_CREAT|O_EXCL; vfs did that already. yuck. */ flags = file->f_flags & ~(O_CREAT|O_EXCL); - if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) + if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) { flags = O_DIRECTORY; /* mds likes to know */ + } else if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) { + err = fscrypt_file_open(inode, file); + if (err) + return err; + } dout("open inode %p ino %llx.%llx file %p flags %d (%d)\n", inode, ceph_vinop(inode), file, flags, file->f_flags); @@ -879,6 +884,13 @@ int ceph_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, dout("atomic_open finish_no_open on dn %p\n", dn); err = finish_no_open(file, dn); } else { + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && + !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(dir, d_inode(dentry))) { + pr_warn("Inconsistent encryption context (parent %llx:%llx child %llx:%llx)\n", + ceph_vinop(dir), ceph_vinop(d_inode(dentry))); + goto out_req; + } + dout("atomic_open finish_open on dn %p\n", dn); if (req->r_op == CEPH_MDS_OP_CREATE && req->r_reply_info.has_create_ino) { struct inode *newino = d_inode(dentry); @@ -2222,6 +2234,9 @@ static long ceph_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + prealloc_cf = ceph_alloc_cap_flush(); if (!prealloc_cf) return -ENOMEM; @@ -2543,6 +2558,10 @@ static ssize_t __ceph_copy_file_range(struct file *src_file, loff_t src_off, return -EOPNOTSUPP; } + /* Every encrypted inode gets its own key, so we can't offload them */ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(src_inode) || IS_ENCRYPTED(dst_inode)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (len < src_ci->i_layout.object_size) return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* no remote copy will be done */ diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index 5423c69ac434..828badfe62a8 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -972,13 +972,6 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, issued |= __ceph_caps_dirty(ci); new_issued = ~issued & info_caps; - /* directories have fl_stripe_unit set to zero */ - if (le32_to_cpu(info->layout.fl_stripe_unit)) - inode->i_blkbits = - fls(le32_to_cpu(info->layout.fl_stripe_unit)) - 1; - else - inode->i_blkbits = CEPH_BLOCK_SHIFT; - __ceph_update_quota(ci, iinfo->max_bytes, iinfo->max_files); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION @@ -1004,6 +997,15 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, ceph_decode_timespec64(&ci->i_snap_btime, &iinfo->snap_btime); } + /* directories have fl_stripe_unit set to zero */ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) + inode->i_blkbits = CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT; + else if (le32_to_cpu(info->layout.fl_stripe_unit)) + inode->i_blkbits = + fls(le32_to_cpu(info->layout.fl_stripe_unit)) - 1; + else + inode->i_blkbits = CEPH_BLOCK_SHIFT; + if ((new_version || (new_issued & CEPH_CAP_LINK_SHARED)) && (issued & CEPH_CAP_LINK_EXCL) == 0) set_nlink(inode, le32_to_cpu(info->nlink)); @@ -2495,6 +2497,10 @@ int ceph_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (ceph_inode_is_shutdown(inode)) return -ESTALE; + err = fscrypt_prepare_setattr(dentry, attr); + if (err) + return err; + err = setattr_prepare(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, attr); if (err != 0) return err; @@ -2778,8 +2784,12 @@ int ceph_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path, stat->nlink = 1 + 1 + ci->i_subdirs; } - stat->attributes_mask |= STATX_ATTR_CHANGE_MONOTONIC; stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_CHANGE_MONOTONIC; + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) + stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED; + stat->attributes_mask |= (STATX_ATTR_CHANGE_MONOTONIC | + STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED); + stat->result_mask = request_mask & valid_mask; return err; } diff --git a/fs/ceph/ioctl.c b/fs/ceph/ioctl.c index 11d37d307382..91a84917d203 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/ceph/ioctl.c @@ -294,6 +294,10 @@ static long ceph_set_encryption_policy(struct file *file, unsigned long arg) struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); + /* encrypted directories can't have striped layout */ + if (ci->i_layout.stripe_count > 1) + return -EINVAL; + ret = vet_mds_for_fscrypt(file); if (ret) return ret; From e127e03009a3a3c26f00d0b2703c6e0e47927aec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Lu=C3=ADs=20Henriques?= Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2022 14:06:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 28/53] ceph: allow encrypting a directory while not having Ax caps MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit If a client doesn't have Fx caps on a directory, it will get errors while trying encrypt it: ceph: handle_cap_grant: cap grant attempt to change fscrypt_auth on non-I_NEW inode (old len 0 new len 48) fscrypt (ceph, inode 1099511627812): Error -105 getting encryption context A simple way to reproduce this is to use two clients: client1 # mkdir /mnt/mydir client2 # ls /mnt/mydir client1 # fscrypt encrypt /mnt/mydir client1 # echo hello > /mnt/mydir/world This happens because, in __ceph_setattr(), we only initialize ci->fscrypt_auth if we have Ax and ceph_fill_inode() won't use the fscrypt_auth received if the inode state isn't I_NEW. Fix it by allowing ceph_fill_inode() to also set ci->fscrypt_auth if the inode doesn't have it set already. Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/inode.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index 828badfe62a8..9ec4ebe5ccaf 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -975,7 +975,8 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, __ceph_update_quota(ci, iinfo->max_bytes, iinfo->max_files); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION - if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && (inode->i_state & I_NEW)) { + if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && + ((inode->i_state & I_NEW) || (ci->fscrypt_auth_len == 0))) { kfree(ci->fscrypt_auth); ci->fscrypt_auth_len = iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len; ci->fscrypt_auth = iinfo->fscrypt_auth; From 14e034a61c908d4479be1a7ee9fe5b8d3d1f09b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Lu=C3=ADs=20Henriques?= Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 10:39:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 29/53] ceph: mark directory as non-complete after loading key MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When setting a directory's crypt context, ceph_dir_clear_complete() needs to be called otherwise if it was complete before, any existing (old) dentry will still be valid. This patch adds a wrapper around __fscrypt_prepare_readdir() which will ensure a directory is marked as non-complete if key status changes. [ xiubli: revise commit title per Milind ] Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/crypto.h | 6 ++++++ fs/ceph/dir.c | 8 ++++---- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c index a08978a0ed4d..5df2c52b384f 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c @@ -287,8 +287,8 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, if (fname->name_len > NAME_MAX || fname->ctext_len > NAME_MAX) return -EIO; - ret = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(fname->dir); - if (ret) + ret = ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(fname->dir); + if (ret < 0) return ret; /* @@ -334,3 +334,34 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(&_tname); return ret; } + +/** + * ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir - simple __fscrypt_prepare_readdir() wrapper + * @dir: directory inode for readdir prep + * + * Simple wrapper around __fscrypt_prepare_readdir() that will mark directory as + * non-complete if this call results in having the directory unlocked. + * + * Returns: + * 1 - if directory was locked and key is now loaded (i.e. dir is unlocked) + * 0 - if directory is still locked + * < 0 - if __fscrypt_prepare_readdir() fails + */ +int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(struct inode *dir) +{ + bool had_key = fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir); + int err; + + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) + return 0; + + err = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(dir); + if (err) + return err; + if (!had_key && fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { + /* directory just got unlocked, mark it as not complete */ + ceph_dir_clear_complete(dir); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h index 21694df7dfbf..b5413ec95b1a 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ static inline void ceph_fname_free_buffer(struct inode *parent, int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, struct fscrypt_str *oname, bool *is_nokey); +int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(struct inode *dir); #else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ @@ -160,6 +161,11 @@ static inline int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, oname->len = fname->name_len; return 0; } + +static inline int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(struct inode *dir) +{ + return 0; +} #endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ #endif diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index 99fdc777dccd..08504afbe242 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -343,8 +343,8 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) ctx->pos = 2; } - err = fscrypt_prepare_readdir(inode); - if (err) + err = ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(inode); + if (err < 0) return err; spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); @@ -785,8 +785,8 @@ static struct dentry *ceph_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { - err = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(dir); - if (err) + err = ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(dir); + if (err < 0) return ERR_PTR(err); if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock); diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 447acc4a0fbd..7de22052ee22 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -2545,8 +2545,8 @@ static u8 *get_fscrypt_altname(const struct ceph_mds_request *req, u32 *plen) if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) goto success; - ret = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(dir); - if (ret) + ret = ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(dir); + if (ret < 0) return ERR_PTR(ret); /* No key? Just ignore it. */ @@ -2666,7 +2666,7 @@ char *ceph_mdsc_build_path(struct dentry *dentry, int *plen, u64 *pbase, spin_unlock(&cur->d_lock); parent = dget_parent(cur); - ret = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(d_inode(parent)); + ret = ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(d_inode(parent)); if (ret < 0) { dput(parent); dput(cur); From 16be62fc8a53482529201b4be6bbcd0de3a058cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:06 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 30/53] ceph: size handling in MClientRequest, cap updates and inode traces MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit For encrypted inodes, transmit a rounded-up size to the MDS as the normal file size and send the real inode size in fscrypt_file field. Also, fix up creates and truncates to also transmit fscrypt_file. When we get an inode trace from the MDS, grab the fscrypt_file field if the inode is encrypted, and use it to populate the i_size field instead of the regular inode size field. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/caps.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- fs/ceph/dir.c | 3 +++ fs/ceph/file.c | 1 + fs/ceph/inode.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 9 +++++++- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 2 ++ 6 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c index 4738be54dc73..aff256274415 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/caps.c +++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c @@ -1217,10 +1217,9 @@ struct cap_msg_args { umode_t mode; bool inline_data; bool wake; + bool encrypted; u32 fscrypt_auth_len; - u32 fscrypt_file_len; u8 fscrypt_auth[sizeof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth)]; // for context - u8 fscrypt_file[sizeof(u64)]; // for size }; /* Marshal up the cap msg to the MDS */ @@ -1255,7 +1254,13 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg) fc->ino = cpu_to_le64(arg->ino); fc->snap_follows = cpu_to_le64(arg->follows); - fc->size = cpu_to_le64(arg->size); +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) + if (arg->encrypted) + fc->size = cpu_to_le64(round_up(arg->size, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)); + else +#endif + fc->size = cpu_to_le64(arg->size); fc->max_size = cpu_to_le64(arg->max_size); ceph_encode_timespec64(&fc->mtime, &arg->mtime); ceph_encode_timespec64(&fc->atime, &arg->atime); @@ -1315,11 +1320,17 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg) ceph_encode_64(&p, 0); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) - /* fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file (version 12) */ + /* + * fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file (version 12) + * + * fscrypt_auth holds the crypto context (if any). fscrypt_file + * tracks the real i_size as an __le64 field (and we use a rounded-up + * i_size in the traditional size field). + */ ceph_encode_32(&p, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); ceph_encode_copy(&p, arg->fscrypt_auth, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); - ceph_encode_32(&p, arg->fscrypt_file_len); - ceph_encode_copy(&p, arg->fscrypt_file, arg->fscrypt_file_len); + ceph_encode_32(&p, sizeof(__le64)); + ceph_encode_64(&p, arg->size); #else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ ceph_encode_32(&p, 0); ceph_encode_32(&p, 0); @@ -1391,7 +1402,6 @@ static void __prep_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_cap *cap, arg->follows = flushing ? ci->i_head_snapc->seq : 0; arg->flush_tid = flush_tid; arg->oldest_flush_tid = oldest_flush_tid; - arg->size = i_size_read(inode); ci->i_reported_size = arg->size; arg->max_size = ci->i_wanted_max_size; @@ -1445,6 +1455,7 @@ static void __prep_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_cap *cap, } } arg->flags = flags; + arg->encrypted = IS_ENCRYPTED(inode); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) if (ci->fscrypt_auth_len && WARN_ON_ONCE(ci->fscrypt_auth_len > sizeof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth))) { @@ -1456,21 +1467,21 @@ static void __prep_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_cap *cap, min_t(size_t, ci->fscrypt_auth_len, sizeof(arg->fscrypt_auth))); } - /* FIXME: use this to track "real" size */ - arg->fscrypt_file_len = 0; #endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) +#define CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8) + +static inline int cap_msg_size(struct cap_msg_args *arg) +{ + return CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS + arg->fscrypt_auth_len; +} +#else #define CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 4) -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) -static inline int cap_msg_size(struct cap_msg_args *arg) -{ - return CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS + arg->fscrypt_auth_len + - arg->fscrypt_file_len; -} -#else static inline int cap_msg_size(struct cap_msg_args *arg) { return CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS; @@ -1550,13 +1561,10 @@ static inline int __send_flush_snap(struct inode *inode, arg.inline_data = capsnap->inline_data; arg.flags = 0; arg.wake = false; + arg.encrypted = IS_ENCRYPTED(inode); - /* - * No fscrypt_auth changes from a capsnap. It will need - * to update fscrypt_file on size changes (TODO). - */ + /* No fscrypt_auth changes from a capsnap.*/ arg.fscrypt_auth_len = 0; - arg.fscrypt_file_len = 0; msg = ceph_msg_new(CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS, cap_msg_size(&arg), GFP_NOFS, false); diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index 08504afbe242..4990886a366c 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -915,6 +915,9 @@ static int ceph_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, goto out_req; } + if (S_ISREG(mode) && IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) + set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_FSCRYPT_FILE, &req->r_req_flags); + req->r_dentry = dget(dentry); req->r_num_caps = 2; req->r_parent = dir; diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index 6e9ae398ef2c..c3ce224db032 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -790,6 +790,7 @@ int ceph_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, req->r_parent = dir; ihold(dir); if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { + set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_FSCRYPT_FILE, &req->r_req_flags); if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock); dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME; diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index 9ec4ebe5ccaf..841f60e8de6a 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -1028,6 +1028,7 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, if (new_version || (new_issued & (CEPH_CAP_ANY_FILE_RD | CEPH_CAP_ANY_FILE_WR))) { + u64 size = le64_to_cpu(info->size); s64 old_pool = ci->i_layout.pool_id; struct ceph_string *old_ns; @@ -1041,10 +1042,22 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, pool_ns = old_ns; + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && size && + iinfo->fscrypt_file_len == sizeof(__le64)) { + u64 fsize = __le64_to_cpu(*(__le64 *)iinfo->fscrypt_file); + + if (size == round_up(fsize, CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)) { + size = fsize; + } else { + pr_warn("fscrypt size mismatch: size=%llu fscrypt_file=%llu, discarding fscrypt_file size.\n", + info->size, size); + } + } + queue_trunc = ceph_fill_file_size(inode, issued, le32_to_cpu(info->truncate_seq), le64_to_cpu(info->truncate_size), - le64_to_cpu(info->size)); + size); /* only update max_size on auth cap */ if ((info->cap.flags & CEPH_CAP_FLAG_AUTH) && ci->i_max_size != le64_to_cpu(info->max_size)) { @@ -2388,11 +2401,25 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, } } else if ((issued & CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED) == 0 || attr->ia_size != isize) { - req->r_args.setattr.size = cpu_to_le64(attr->ia_size); - req->r_args.setattr.old_size = cpu_to_le64(isize); mask |= CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE; release |= CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED | CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL | CEPH_CAP_FILE_RD | CEPH_CAP_FILE_WR; + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && attr->ia_size) { + set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_FSCRYPT_FILE, &req->r_req_flags); + mask |= CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_FILE; + req->r_args.setattr.size = + cpu_to_le64(round_up(attr->ia_size, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)); + req->r_args.setattr.old_size = + cpu_to_le64(round_up(isize, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)); + req->r_fscrypt_file = attr->ia_size; + /* FIXME: client must zero out any partial blocks! */ + } else { + req->r_args.setattr.size = cpu_to_le64(attr->ia_size); + req->r_args.setattr.old_size = cpu_to_le64(isize); + req->r_fscrypt_file = 0; + } } } if (ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME) { diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 7de22052ee22..c257d75c5757 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -2832,7 +2832,12 @@ static void encode_mclientrequest_tail(void **p, } else { ceph_encode_32(p, 0); } - ceph_encode_32(p, 0); // fscrypt_file for now + if (test_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_FSCRYPT_FILE, &req->r_req_flags)) { + ceph_encode_32(p, sizeof(__le64)); + ceph_encode_64(p, req->r_fscrypt_file); + } else { + ceph_encode_32(p, 0); + } } /* @@ -2922,6 +2927,8 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, /* fscrypt_file */ len += sizeof(u32); + if (test_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_FSCRYPT_FILE, &req->r_req_flags)) + len += sizeof(__le64); msg = ceph_msg_new2(CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_REQUEST, len, 1, GFP_NOFS, false); if (!msg) { diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h index a8f622439f38..0477388a0d1c 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h @@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ struct ceph_mds_request { #define CEPH_MDS_R_DID_PREPOPULATE (6) /* prepopulated readdir */ #define CEPH_MDS_R_PARENT_LOCKED (7) /* is r_parent->i_rwsem wlocked? */ #define CEPH_MDS_R_ASYNC (8) /* async request */ +#define CEPH_MDS_R_FSCRYPT_FILE (9) /* must marshal fscrypt_file field */ unsigned long r_req_flags; struct mutex r_fill_mutex; @@ -289,6 +290,7 @@ struct ceph_mds_request { union ceph_mds_request_args r_args; struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *r_fscrypt_auth; + u64 r_fscrypt_file; u8 *r_altname; /* fscrypt binary crypttext for long filenames */ u32 r_altname_len; /* length of r_altname */ From 0d91f0ad6a01c8c64a84c5255c5ab95133d0fed5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:09 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 31/53] ceph: handle fscrypt fields in cap messages from MDS MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Handle the new fscrypt_file and fscrypt_auth fields in cap messages. Use them to populate new fields in cap_extra_info and update the inode with those values. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/caps.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c index aff256274415..ee61b539a8ec 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/caps.c +++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c @@ -3383,6 +3383,9 @@ struct cap_extra_info { /* currently issued */ int issued; struct timespec64 btime; + u8 *fscrypt_auth; + u32 fscrypt_auth_len; + u64 fscrypt_file_size; }; /* @@ -3415,6 +3418,14 @@ static void handle_cap_grant(struct inode *inode, bool deleted_inode = false; bool fill_inline = false; + /* + * If there is at least one crypto block then we'll trust + * fscrypt_file_size. If the real length of the file is 0, then + * ignore it (it has probably been truncated down to 0 by the MDS). + */ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && size) + size = extra_info->fscrypt_file_size; + dout("handle_cap_grant inode %p cap %p mds%d seq %d %s\n", inode, cap, session->s_mds, seq, ceph_cap_string(newcaps)); dout(" size %llu max_size %llu, i_size %llu\n", size, max_size, @@ -3481,6 +3492,14 @@ static void handle_cap_grant(struct inode *inode, dout("%p mode 0%o uid.gid %d.%d\n", inode, inode->i_mode, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid), from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid)); +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) + if (ci->fscrypt_auth_len != extra_info->fscrypt_auth_len || + memcmp(ci->fscrypt_auth, extra_info->fscrypt_auth, + ci->fscrypt_auth_len)) + pr_warn_ratelimited("%s: cap grant attempt to change fscrypt_auth on non-I_NEW inode (old len %d new len %d)\n", + __func__, ci->fscrypt_auth_len, + extra_info->fscrypt_auth_len); +#endif } if ((newcaps & CEPH_CAP_LINK_SHARED) && @@ -3897,7 +3916,8 @@ static void handle_cap_flushsnap_ack(struct inode *inode, u64 flush_tid, */ static bool handle_cap_trunc(struct inode *inode, struct ceph_mds_caps *trunc, - struct ceph_mds_session *session) + struct ceph_mds_session *session, + struct cap_extra_info *extra_info) { struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); int mds = session->s_mds; @@ -3914,6 +3934,14 @@ static bool handle_cap_trunc(struct inode *inode, issued |= implemented | dirty; + /* + * If there is at least one crypto block then we'll trust + * fscrypt_file_size. If the real length of the file is 0, then + * ignore it (it has probably been truncated down to 0 by the MDS). + */ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && size) + size = extra_info->fscrypt_file_size; + dout("handle_cap_trunc inode %p mds%d seq %d to %lld seq %d\n", inode, mds, seq, truncate_size, truncate_seq); queue_trunc = ceph_fill_file_size(inode, issued, @@ -4135,6 +4163,52 @@ static void handle_cap_import(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, *target_cap = cap; } +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +static int parse_fscrypt_fields(void **p, void *end, + struct cap_extra_info *extra) +{ + u32 len; + + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, extra->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + if (extra->fscrypt_auth_len) { + ceph_decode_need(p, end, extra->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + extra->fscrypt_auth = kmalloc(extra->fscrypt_auth_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!extra->fscrypt_auth) + return -ENOMEM; + ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, extra->fscrypt_auth, + extra->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + } + + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, bad); + if (len >= sizeof(u64)) { + ceph_decode_64_safe(p, end, extra->fscrypt_file_size, bad); + len -= sizeof(u64); + } + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, bad); + return 0; +bad: + return -EIO; +} +#else +static int parse_fscrypt_fields(void **p, void *end, + struct cap_extra_info *extra) +{ + u32 len; + + /* Don't care about these fields unless we're encryption-capable */ + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, bad); + if (len) + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, bad); + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, bad); + if (len) + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, bad); + return 0; +bad: + return -EIO; +} +#endif + /* * Handle a caps message from the MDS. * @@ -4255,6 +4329,11 @@ void ceph_handle_caps(struct ceph_mds_session *session, ceph_decode_64_safe(&p, end, extra_info.nsubdirs, bad); } + if (msg_version >= 12) { + if (parse_fscrypt_fields(&p, end, &extra_info)) + goto bad; + } + /* lookup ino */ inode = ceph_find_inode(mdsc->fsc->sb, vino); dout(" op %s ino %llx.%llx inode %p\n", ceph_cap_op_name(op), vino.ino, @@ -4352,7 +4431,8 @@ void ceph_handle_caps(struct ceph_mds_session *session, break; case CEPH_CAP_OP_TRUNC: - queue_trunc = handle_cap_trunc(inode, h, session); + queue_trunc = handle_cap_trunc(inode, h, session, + &extra_info); spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); if (queue_trunc) ceph_queue_vmtruncate(inode); @@ -4375,6 +4455,7 @@ void ceph_handle_caps(struct ceph_mds_session *session, if (close_sessions) ceph_mdsc_close_sessions(mdsc); + kfree(extra_info.fscrypt_auth); return; flush_cap_releases: From 77cdb7e17e39ebb986f60bbd3c2b3507687bf475 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:14 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 32/53] ceph: add infrastructure for file encryption and decryption MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit ...and allow test_dummy_encryption to bypass content encryption if mounted with test_dummy_encryption=clear. [ xiubli: remove test_dummy_encryption=clear support per Ilya ] Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 171 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/crypto.h | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 251 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c index 5df2c52b384f..9494bf485f6a 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" @@ -365,3 +366,173 @@ int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(struct inode *dir) } return 0; } + +int ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode, + struct page *page, unsigned int len, + unsigned int offs, u64 lblk_num) +{ + dout("%s: len %u offs %u blk %llu\n", __func__, len, offs, lblk_num); + return fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace(inode, page, len, offs, lblk_num); +} + +int ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode, + struct page *page, unsigned int len, + unsigned int offs, u64 lblk_num, + gfp_t gfp_flags) +{ + dout("%s: len %u offs %u blk %llu\n", __func__, len, offs, lblk_num); + return fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(inode, page, len, offs, lblk_num, + gfp_flags); +} + +/** + * ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_pages - decrypt an array of pages + * @inode: pointer to inode associated with these pages + * @page: pointer to page array + * @off: offset into the file that the read data starts + * @len: max length to decrypt + * + * Decrypt an array of fscrypt'ed pages and return the amount of + * data decrypted. Any data in the page prior to the start of the + * first complete block in the read is ignored. Any incomplete + * crypto blocks at the end of the array are ignored (and should + * probably be zeroed by the caller). + * + * Returns the length of the decrypted data or a negative errno. + */ +int ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_pages(struct inode *inode, struct page **page, + u64 off, int len) +{ + int i, num_blocks; + u64 baseblk = off >> CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT; + int ret = 0; + + /* + * We can't deal with partial blocks on an encrypted file, so mask off + * the last bit. + */ + num_blocks = ceph_fscrypt_blocks(off, len & CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_MASK); + + /* Decrypt each block */ + for (i = 0; i < num_blocks; ++i) { + int blkoff = i << CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT; + int pgidx = blkoff >> PAGE_SHIFT; + unsigned int pgoffs = offset_in_page(blkoff); + int fret; + + fret = ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace(inode, page[pgidx], + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, pgoffs, + baseblk + i); + if (fret < 0) { + if (ret == 0) + ret = fret; + break; + } + ret += CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + return ret; +} + +/** + * ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_extents: decrypt received extents in given buffer + * @inode: inode associated with pages being decrypted + * @page: pointer to page array + * @off: offset into the file that the data in page[0] starts + * @map: pointer to extent array + * @ext_cnt: length of extent array + * + * Given an extent map and a page array, decrypt the received data in-place, + * skipping holes. Returns the offset into buffer of end of last decrypted + * block. + */ +int ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_extents(struct inode *inode, struct page **page, + u64 off, struct ceph_sparse_extent *map, + u32 ext_cnt) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); + u64 objno, objoff; + u32 xlen; + + /* Nothing to do for empty array */ + if (ext_cnt == 0) { + dout("%s: empty array, ret 0\n", __func__); + return 0; + } + + ceph_calc_file_object_mapping(&ci->i_layout, off, map[0].len, + &objno, &objoff, &xlen); + + for (i = 0; i < ext_cnt; ++i) { + struct ceph_sparse_extent *ext = &map[i]; + int pgsoff = ext->off - objoff; + int pgidx = pgsoff >> PAGE_SHIFT; + int fret; + + if ((ext->off | ext->len) & ~CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_MASK) { + pr_warn("%s: bad encrypted sparse extent idx %d off %llx len %llx\n", + __func__, i, ext->off, ext->len); + return -EIO; + } + fret = ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_pages(inode, &page[pgidx], + off + pgsoff, ext->len); + dout("%s: [%d] 0x%llx~0x%llx fret %d\n", __func__, i, + ext->off, ext->len, fret); + if (fret < 0) { + if (ret == 0) + ret = fret; + break; + } + ret = pgsoff + fret; + } + dout("%s: ret %d\n", __func__, ret); + return ret; +} + +/** + * ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_pages - encrypt an array of pages + * @inode: pointer to inode associated with these pages + * @page: pointer to page array + * @off: offset into the file that the data starts + * @len: max length to encrypt + * @gfp: gfp flags to use for allocation + * + * Decrypt an array of cleartext pages and return the amount of + * data encrypted. Any data in the page prior to the start of the + * first complete block in the read is ignored. Any incomplete + * crypto blocks at the end of the array are ignored. + * + * Returns the length of the encrypted data or a negative errno. + */ +int ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_pages(struct inode *inode, struct page **page, u64 off, + int len, gfp_t gfp) +{ + int i, num_blocks; + u64 baseblk = off >> CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT; + int ret = 0; + + /* + * We can't deal with partial blocks on an encrypted file, so mask off + * the last bit. + */ + num_blocks = ceph_fscrypt_blocks(off, len & CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_MASK); + + /* Encrypt each block */ + for (i = 0; i < num_blocks; ++i) { + int blkoff = i << CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT; + int pgidx = blkoff >> PAGE_SHIFT; + unsigned int pgoffs = offset_in_page(blkoff); + int fret; + + fret = ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(inode, page[pgidx], + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, pgoffs, + baseblk + i, gfp); + if (fret < 0) { + if (ret == 0) + ret = fret; + break; + } + ret += CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + return ret; +} diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h index b5413ec95b1a..7a03275f3ad5 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h @@ -105,6 +105,44 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, struct fscrypt_str *oname, bool *is_nokey); int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(struct inode *dir); +static inline unsigned int ceph_fscrypt_blocks(u64 off, u64 len) +{ + /* crypto blocks cannot span more than one page */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT > PAGE_SHIFT); + + return ((off+len+CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE-1) >> CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT) - + (off >> CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT); +} + +/* + * If we have an encrypted inode then we must adjust the offset and + * range of the on-the-wire read to cover an entire encryption block. + * The copy will be done using the original offset and length, after + * we've decrypted the result. + */ +static inline void ceph_fscrypt_adjust_off_and_len(struct inode *inode, + u64 *off, u64 *len) +{ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { + *len = ceph_fscrypt_blocks(*off, *len) * CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE; + *off &= CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_MASK; + } +} + +int ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode, + struct page *page, unsigned int len, + unsigned int offs, u64 lblk_num); +int ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode, + struct page *page, unsigned int len, + unsigned int offs, u64 lblk_num, + gfp_t gfp_flags); +int ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_pages(struct inode *inode, struct page **page, + u64 off, int len); +int ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_extents(struct inode *inode, struct page **page, + u64 off, struct ceph_sparse_extent *map, + u32 ext_cnt); +int ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_pages(struct inode *inode, struct page **page, u64 off, + int len, gfp_t gfp); #else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) @@ -166,6 +204,48 @@ static inline int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(struct inode *dir) { return 0; } + +static inline void ceph_fscrypt_adjust_off_and_len(struct inode *inode, + u64 *off, u64 *len) +{ +} + +static inline int ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode, + struct page *page, unsigned int len, + unsigned int offs, u64 lblk_num) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode, + struct page *page, unsigned int len, + unsigned int offs, u64 lblk_num, + gfp_t gfp_flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_pages(struct inode *inode, + struct page **page, u64 off, + int len) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_extents(struct inode *inode, + struct page **page, u64 off, + struct ceph_sparse_extent *map, + u32 ext_cnt) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_pages(struct inode *inode, + struct page **page, u64 off, + int len, gfp_t gfp) +{ + return 0; +} #endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ #endif From 69dd3b3930f96b624228000921f417fb0919a6ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:05 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 33/53] libceph: add CEPH_OSD_OP_ASSERT_VER support MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit ...and record the user_version in the reply in a new field in ceph_osd_request, so we can populate the assert_ver appropriately. Shuffle the fields a bit too so that the new field fits in an existing hole on x86_64. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h | 6 +++++- include/linux/ceph/rados.h | 4 ++++ net/ceph/osd_client.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h b/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h index 8f5d2b5bbba2..bf9823956758 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/osd_client.h @@ -198,6 +198,9 @@ struct ceph_osd_req_op { u32 src_fadvise_flags; struct ceph_osd_data osd_data; } copy_from; + struct { + u64 ver; + } assert_ver; }; }; @@ -252,6 +255,7 @@ struct ceph_osd_request { struct ceph_osd_client *r_osdc; struct kref r_kref; bool r_mempool; + bool r_linger; /* don't resend on failure */ struct completion r_completion; /* private to osd_client.c */ ceph_osdc_callback_t r_callback; @@ -264,9 +268,9 @@ struct ceph_osd_request { struct ceph_snap_context *r_snapc; /* for writes */ struct timespec64 r_mtime; /* ditto */ u64 r_data_offset; /* ditto */ - bool r_linger; /* don't resend on failure */ /* internal */ + u64 r_version; /* data version sent in reply */ unsigned long r_stamp; /* jiffies, send or check time */ unsigned long r_start_stamp; /* jiffies */ ktime_t r_start_latency; /* ktime_t */ diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/rados.h b/include/linux/ceph/rados.h index 43a7a1573b51..73c3efbec36c 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/rados.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/rados.h @@ -523,6 +523,10 @@ struct ceph_osd_op { struct { __le64 cookie; } __attribute__ ((packed)) notify; + struct { + __le64 unused; + __le64 ver; + } __attribute__ ((packed)) assert_ver; struct { __le64 offset, length; __le64 src_offset; diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c index 684faf8553de..7f159e40cf9c 100644 --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c @@ -1048,6 +1048,10 @@ static u32 osd_req_encode_op(struct ceph_osd_op *dst, dst->copy_from.src_fadvise_flags = cpu_to_le32(src->copy_from.src_fadvise_flags); break; + case CEPH_OSD_OP_ASSERT_VER: + dst->assert_ver.unused = cpu_to_le64(0); + dst->assert_ver.ver = cpu_to_le64(src->assert_ver.ver); + break; default: pr_err("unsupported osd opcode %s\n", ceph_osd_op_name(src->op)); @@ -3859,6 +3863,7 @@ static void handle_reply(struct ceph_osd *osd, struct ceph_msg *msg) * one (type of) reply back. */ WARN_ON(!(m.flags & CEPH_OSD_FLAG_ONDISK)); + req->r_version = m.user_version; req->r_result = m.result ?: data_len; finish_request(req); mutex_unlock(&osd->lock); From 4e8c4c235578b4d44bd6676df3a01dce98d0f7dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:16 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 34/53] libceph: allow ceph_osdc_new_request to accept a multi-op read MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Currently we have some special-casing for multi-op writes, but in the case of a read, we can't really handle it. All of the current multi-op callers call it with CEPH_OSD_FLAG_WRITE set. Have ceph_osdc_new_request check for CEPH_OSD_FLAG_READ and if it's set, allocate multiple reply ops instead of multiple request ops. If neither flag is set, return -EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- net/ceph/osd_client.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c index 7f159e40cf9c..d3a759e052c8 100644 --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c @@ -1136,15 +1136,30 @@ struct ceph_osd_request *ceph_osdc_new_request(struct ceph_osd_client *osdc, if (flags & CEPH_OSD_FLAG_WRITE) req->r_data_offset = off; - if (num_ops > 1) + if (num_ops > 1) { + int num_req_ops, num_rep_ops; + /* - * This is a special case for ceph_writepages_start(), but it - * also covers ceph_uninline_data(). If more multi-op request - * use cases emerge, we will need a separate helper. + * If this is a multi-op write request, assume that we'll need + * request ops. If it's a multi-op read then assume we'll need + * reply ops. Anything else and call it -EINVAL. */ - r = __ceph_osdc_alloc_messages(req, GFP_NOFS, num_ops, 0); - else + if (flags & CEPH_OSD_FLAG_WRITE) { + num_req_ops = num_ops; + num_rep_ops = 0; + } else if (flags & CEPH_OSD_FLAG_READ) { + num_req_ops = 0; + num_rep_ops = num_ops; + } else { + r = -EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + + r = __ceph_osdc_alloc_messages(req, GFP_NOFS, num_req_ops, + num_rep_ops); + } else { r = ceph_osdc_alloc_messages(req, GFP_NOFS); + } if (r) goto fail; From d4d518871574ebbd53f054c16c085caa0a77b83d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiubo Li Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:12 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 35/53] ceph: add object version support for sync read MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Turn the guts of ceph_sync_read into a new helper that takes an inode and an offset instead of a kiocb struct, and make ceph_sync_read call the helper as a wrapper. Make the new helper always return the last object's version. Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/file.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ fs/ceph/super.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index c3ce224db032..24ee84f257fb 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -959,22 +959,24 @@ enum { * If we get a short result from the OSD, check against i_size; we need to * only return a short read to the caller if we hit EOF. */ -static ssize_t ceph_sync_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to, - int *retry_op) +ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos, + struct iov_iter *to, int *retry_op, + u64 *last_objver) { - struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp; - struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_inode_to_client(inode); struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = &fsc->client->osdc; ssize_t ret; - u64 off = iocb->ki_pos; + u64 off = *ki_pos; u64 len = iov_iter_count(to); u64 i_size = i_size_read(inode); bool sparse = ceph_test_mount_opt(fsc, SPARSEREAD); + u64 objver = 0; - dout("sync_read on file %p %llu~%u %s\n", file, off, (unsigned)len, - (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) ? "O_DIRECT" : ""); + dout("sync_read on inode %p %llx~%llx\n", inode, *ki_pos, len); + + if (ceph_inode_is_shutdown(inode)) + return -EIO; if (!len) return 0; @@ -1042,6 +1044,9 @@ static ssize_t ceph_sync_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to, req->r_end_latency, len, ret); + if (ret > 0) + objver = req->r_version; + i_size = i_size_read(inode); dout("sync_read %llu~%llu got %zd i_size %llu%s\n", off, len, ret, i_size, (more ? " MORE" : "")); @@ -1092,21 +1097,36 @@ static ssize_t ceph_sync_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to, break; } - if (off > iocb->ki_pos) { + if (off > *ki_pos) { if (off >= i_size) { *retry_op = CHECK_EOF; - ret = i_size - iocb->ki_pos; - iocb->ki_pos = i_size; + ret = i_size - *ki_pos; + *ki_pos = i_size; } else { - ret = off - iocb->ki_pos; - iocb->ki_pos = off; + ret = off - *ki_pos; + *ki_pos = off; } } + if (last_objver && ret > 0) + *last_objver = objver; + dout("sync_read result %zd retry_op %d\n", ret, *retry_op); return ret; } +static ssize_t ceph_sync_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to, + int *retry_op) +{ + struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + + dout("sync_read on file %p %llx~%zx %s\n", file, iocb->ki_pos, + iov_iter_count(to), (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) ? "O_DIRECT" : ""); + + return __ceph_sync_read(inode, &iocb->ki_pos, to, retry_op, NULL); +} + struct ceph_aio_request { struct kiocb *iocb; size_t total_len; diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h index 11483855897e..d60342cc6f33 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.h +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h @@ -1300,6 +1300,9 @@ extern int ceph_renew_caps(struct inode *inode, int fmode); extern int ceph_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); extern int ceph_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct file *file, unsigned flags, umode_t mode); +extern ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos, + struct iov_iter *to, int *retry_op, + u64 *last_objver); extern int ceph_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp); extern void ceph_fill_inline_data(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, char *data, size_t len); From 5c64737d253683b7d138dde0da513a9ade16a170 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiubo Li Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:11 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 36/53] ceph: add truncate size handling support for fscrypt MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit This will transfer the encrypted last block contents to the MDS along with the truncate request only when the new size is smaller and not aligned to the fscrypt BLOCK size. When the last block is located in the file hole, the truncate request will only contain the header. The MDS could fail to do the truncate if there has another client or process has already updated the RADOS object which contains the last block, and will return -EAGAIN, then the kclient needs to retry it. The RMW will take around 50ms, and will let it retry 20 times for now. Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/caps.c | 18 +++-- fs/ceph/crypto.h | 21 +++++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 200 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/super.h | 7 ++ 4 files changed, 234 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c index ee61b539a8ec..5c2b28ac9410 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/caps.c +++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c @@ -2960,10 +2960,9 @@ int ceph_try_get_caps(struct inode *inode, int need, int want, * due to a small max_size, make sure we check_max_size (and possibly * ask the mds) so we don't get hung up indefinitely. */ -int ceph_get_caps(struct file *filp, int need, int want, loff_t endoff, int *got) +int __ceph_get_caps(struct inode *inode, struct ceph_file_info *fi, int need, + int want, loff_t endoff, int *got) { - struct ceph_file_info *fi = filp->private_data; - struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp); struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_inode_to_client(inode); int ret, _got, flags; @@ -2972,7 +2971,7 @@ int ceph_get_caps(struct file *filp, int need, int want, loff_t endoff, int *got if (ret < 0) return ret; - if ((fi->fmode & CEPH_FILE_MODE_WR) && + if (fi && (fi->fmode & CEPH_FILE_MODE_WR) && fi->filp_gen != READ_ONCE(fsc->filp_gen)) return -EBADF; @@ -3025,7 +3024,7 @@ int ceph_get_caps(struct file *filp, int need, int want, loff_t endoff, int *got continue; } - if ((fi->fmode & CEPH_FILE_MODE_WR) && + if (fi && (fi->fmode & CEPH_FILE_MODE_WR) && fi->filp_gen != READ_ONCE(fsc->filp_gen)) { if (ret >= 0 && _got) ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, _got); @@ -3088,6 +3087,15 @@ int ceph_get_caps(struct file *filp, int need, int want, loff_t endoff, int *got return 0; } +int ceph_get_caps(struct file *filp, int need, int want, loff_t endoff, + int *got) +{ + struct ceph_file_info *fi = filp->private_data; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp); + + return __ceph_get_caps(inode, fi, need, want, endoff, got); +} + /* * Take cap refs. Caller must already know we hold at least one ref * on the caps in question or we don't know this is safe. diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h index 7a03275f3ad5..b735b3f144a7 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h @@ -26,6 +26,27 @@ struct ceph_fname { bool no_copy; }; +/* + * Header for the crypted file when truncating the size, this + * will be sent to MDS, and the MDS will update the encrypted + * last block and then truncate the size. + */ +struct ceph_fscrypt_truncate_size_header { + __u8 ver; + __u8 compat; + + /* + * It will be sizeof(assert_ver + file_offset + block_size) + * if the last block is empty when it's located in a file + * hole. Or the data_len will plus CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE. + */ + __le32 data_len; + + __le64 change_attr; + __le64 file_offset; + __le32 block_size; +} __packed; + struct ceph_fscrypt_auth { __le32 cfa_version; __le32 cfa_blob_len; diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index 841f60e8de6a..054fd66609b7 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -596,6 +596,7 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) ci->i_truncate_seq = 0; ci->i_truncate_size = 0; ci->i_truncate_pending = 0; + ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size = 0; ci->i_max_size = 0; ci->i_reported_size = 0; @@ -767,6 +768,10 @@ int ceph_fill_file_size(struct inode *inode, int issued, dout("truncate_size %lld -> %llu\n", ci->i_truncate_size, truncate_size); ci->i_truncate_size = truncate_size; + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) + ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size = size; + else + ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size = truncate_size; } return queue_trunc; } @@ -2147,7 +2152,7 @@ void __ceph_do_pending_vmtruncate(struct inode *inode) /* there should be no reader or writer */ WARN_ON_ONCE(ci->i_rd_ref || ci->i_wr_ref); - to = ci->i_truncate_size; + to = ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size; wrbuffer_refs = ci->i_wrbuffer_ref; dout("__do_pending_vmtruncate %p (%d) to %lld\n", inode, ci->i_truncate_pending, to); @@ -2157,7 +2162,7 @@ void __ceph_do_pending_vmtruncate(struct inode *inode) truncate_pagecache(inode, to); spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); - if (to == ci->i_truncate_size) { + if (to == ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size) { ci->i_truncate_pending = 0; finish = 1; } @@ -2241,6 +2246,144 @@ static const struct inode_operations ceph_encrypted_symlink_iops = { .listxattr = ceph_listxattr, }; +/* + * Transfer the encrypted last block to the MDS and the MDS + * will help update it when truncating a smaller size. + * + * We don't support a PAGE_SIZE that is smaller than the + * CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE. + */ +static int fill_fscrypt_truncate(struct inode *inode, + struct ceph_mds_request *req, + struct iattr *attr) +{ + struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); + int boff = attr->ia_size % CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE; + loff_t pos, orig_pos = round_down(attr->ia_size, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE); + u64 block = orig_pos >> CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT; + struct ceph_pagelist *pagelist = NULL; + struct kvec iov = {0}; + struct iov_iter iter; + struct page *page = NULL; + struct ceph_fscrypt_truncate_size_header header; + int retry_op = 0; + int len = CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE; + loff_t i_size = i_size_read(inode); + int got, ret, issued; + u64 objver; + + ret = __ceph_get_caps(inode, NULL, CEPH_CAP_FILE_RD, 0, -1, &got); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + issued = __ceph_caps_issued(ci, NULL); + + dout("%s size %lld -> %lld got cap refs on %s, issued %s\n", __func__, + i_size, attr->ia_size, ceph_cap_string(got), + ceph_cap_string(issued)); + + /* Try to writeback the dirty pagecaches */ + if (issued & (CEPH_CAP_FILE_BUFFER)) { + loff_t lend = orig_pos + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT - 1; + + ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(inode->i_mapping, + orig_pos, lend); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + } + + page = __page_cache_alloc(GFP_KERNEL); + if (page == NULL) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + pagelist = ceph_pagelist_alloc(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pagelist) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + iov.iov_base = kmap_local_page(page); + iov.iov_len = len; + iov_iter_kvec(&iter, READ, &iov, 1, len); + + pos = orig_pos; + ret = __ceph_sync_read(inode, &pos, &iter, &retry_op, &objver); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + /* Insert the header first */ + header.ver = 1; + header.compat = 1; + header.change_attr = cpu_to_le64(inode_peek_iversion_raw(inode)); + + /* + * Always set the block_size to CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, + * because in MDS it may need this to do the truncate. + */ + header.block_size = cpu_to_le32(CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE); + + /* + * If we hit a hole here, we should just skip filling + * the fscrypt for the request, because once the fscrypt + * is enabled, the file will be split into many blocks + * with the size of CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, if there + * has a hole, the hole size should be multiple of block + * size. + * + * If the Rados object doesn't exist, it will be set to 0. + */ + if (!objver) { + dout("%s hit hole, ppos %lld < size %lld\n", __func__, + pos, i_size); + + header.data_len = cpu_to_le32(8 + 8 + 4); + header.file_offset = 0; + ret = 0; + } else { + header.data_len = cpu_to_le32(8 + 8 + 4 + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE); + header.file_offset = cpu_to_le64(orig_pos); + + /* truncate and zero out the extra contents for the last block */ + memset(iov.iov_base + boff, 0, PAGE_SIZE - boff); + + /* encrypt the last block */ + ret = ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(inode, page, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, + 0, block, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + + /* Insert the header */ + ret = ceph_pagelist_append(pagelist, &header, sizeof(header)); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (header.block_size) { + /* Append the last block contents to pagelist */ + ret = ceph_pagelist_append(pagelist, iov.iov_base, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + req->r_pagelist = pagelist; +out: + dout("%s %p size dropping cap refs on %s\n", __func__, + inode, ceph_cap_string(got)); + ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, got); + if (iov.iov_base) + kunmap_local(iov.iov_base); + if (page) + __free_pages(page, 0); + if (ret && pagelist) + ceph_pagelist_release(pagelist); + return ret; +} + int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *cia) { @@ -2249,13 +2392,17 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_mds_request *req; struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = ceph_sb_to_client(inode->i_sb)->mdsc; struct ceph_cap_flush *prealloc_cf; + loff_t isize = i_size_read(inode); int issued; int release = 0, dirtied = 0; int mask = 0; int err = 0; int inode_dirty_flags = 0; bool lock_snap_rwsem = false; + bool fill_fscrypt; + int truncate_retry = 20; /* The RMW will take around 50ms */ +retry: prealloc_cf = ceph_alloc_cap_flush(); if (!prealloc_cf) return -ENOMEM; @@ -2267,6 +2414,7 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, return PTR_ERR(req); } + fill_fscrypt = false; spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); issued = __ceph_caps_issued(ci, NULL); @@ -2388,10 +2536,27 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, } } if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) { - loff_t isize = i_size_read(inode); - dout("setattr %p size %lld -> %lld\n", inode, isize, attr->ia_size); - if ((issued & CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL) && attr->ia_size >= isize) { + /* + * Only when the new size is smaller and not aligned to + * CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE will the RMW is needed. + */ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && attr->ia_size < isize && + (attr->ia_size % CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)) { + mask |= CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE; + release |= CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED | CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL | + CEPH_CAP_FILE_RD | CEPH_CAP_FILE_WR; + set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_FSCRYPT_FILE, &req->r_req_flags); + mask |= CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_FILE; + req->r_args.setattr.size = + cpu_to_le64(round_up(attr->ia_size, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)); + req->r_args.setattr.old_size = + cpu_to_le64(round_up(isize, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)); + req->r_fscrypt_file = attr->ia_size; + fill_fscrypt = true; + } else if ((issued & CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL) && attr->ia_size >= isize) { if (attr->ia_size > isize) { i_size_write(inode, attr->ia_size); inode->i_blocks = calc_inode_blocks(attr->ia_size); @@ -2414,7 +2579,6 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, cpu_to_le64(round_up(isize, CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)); req->r_fscrypt_file = attr->ia_size; - /* FIXME: client must zero out any partial blocks! */ } else { req->r_args.setattr.size = cpu_to_le64(attr->ia_size); req->r_args.setattr.old_size = cpu_to_le64(isize); @@ -2481,8 +2645,10 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, release &= issued; spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); - if (lock_snap_rwsem) + if (lock_snap_rwsem) { up_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); + lock_snap_rwsem = false; + } if (inode_dirty_flags) __mark_inode_dirty(inode, inode_dirty_flags); @@ -2494,7 +2660,27 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, req->r_args.setattr.mask = cpu_to_le32(mask); req->r_num_caps = 1; req->r_stamp = attr->ia_ctime; + if (fill_fscrypt) { + err = fill_fscrypt_truncate(inode, req, attr); + if (err) + goto out; + } + + /* + * The truncate request will return -EAGAIN when the + * last block has been updated just before the MDS + * successfully gets the xlock for the FILE lock. To + * avoid corrupting the file contents we need to retry + * it. + */ err = ceph_mdsc_do_request(mdsc, NULL, req); + if (err == -EAGAIN && truncate_retry--) { + dout("setattr %p result=%d (%s locally, %d remote), retry it!\n", + inode, err, ceph_cap_string(dirtied), mask); + ceph_mdsc_put_request(req); + ceph_free_cap_flush(prealloc_cf); + goto retry; + } } out: dout("setattr %p result=%d (%s locally, %d remote)\n", inode, err, diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h index d60342cc6f33..b5e54c8f010b 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.h +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h @@ -424,6 +424,11 @@ struct ceph_inode_info { u32 i_truncate_seq; /* last truncate to smaller size */ u64 i_truncate_size; /* and the size we last truncated down to */ int i_truncate_pending; /* still need to call vmtruncate */ + /* + * For none fscrypt case it equals to i_truncate_size or it will + * equals to fscrypt_file_size + */ + u64 i_truncate_pagecache_size; u64 i_max_size; /* max file size authorized by mds */ u64 i_reported_size; /* (max_)size reported to or requested of mds */ @@ -1265,6 +1270,8 @@ extern int ceph_encode_dentry_release(void **p, struct dentry *dn, struct inode *dir, int mds, int drop, int unless); +extern int __ceph_get_caps(struct inode *inode, struct ceph_file_info *fi, + int need, int want, loff_t endoff, int *got); extern int ceph_get_caps(struct file *filp, int need, int want, loff_t endoff, int *got); extern int ceph_try_get_caps(struct inode *inode, From 8cff8f5374c7974ab9b9726c5b7c50f10466047e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:19 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 37/53] ceph: don't use special DIO path for encrypted inodes MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Eventually I want to merge the synchronous and direct read codepaths, possibly via new netfs infrastructure. For now, the direct path is not crypto-enabled, so use the sync read/write paths instead. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/file.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index 24ee84f257fb..f4c3da5b38fe 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -1738,7 +1738,9 @@ static ssize_t ceph_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to) ceph_cap_string(got)); if (!ceph_has_inline_data(ci)) { - if (!retry_op && (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_DIRECT)) { + if (!retry_op && + (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_DIRECT) && + !IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { ret = ceph_direct_read_write(iocb, to, NULL, NULL); if (ret >= 0 && ret < len) @@ -2024,7 +2026,7 @@ static ssize_t ceph_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from) /* we might need to revert back to that point */ data = *from; - if (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_DIRECT) + if ((iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_DIRECT) && !IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) written = ceph_direct_read_write(iocb, &data, snapc, &prealloc_cf); else From b294fa295ff47a1fdf4db5e8c9275cc7af328c5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:20 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 38/53] ceph: align data in pages in ceph_sync_write MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Encrypted files will need to be dealt with in block-sized chunks and once we do that, the way that ceph_sync_write aligns the data in the bounce buffer won't be acceptable. Change it to align the data the same way it would be aligned in the pagecache. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/file.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index f4c3da5b38fe..0abe36379fdf 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -1582,6 +1582,7 @@ ceph_sync_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from, loff_t pos, bool check_caps = false; struct timespec64 mtime = current_time(inode); size_t count = iov_iter_count(from); + size_t off; if (ceph_snap(file_inode(file)) != CEPH_NOSNAP) return -EROFS; @@ -1619,12 +1620,7 @@ ceph_sync_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from, loff_t pos, break; } - /* - * write from beginning of first page, - * regardless of io alignment - */ - num_pages = (len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; - + num_pages = calc_pages_for(pos, len); pages = ceph_alloc_page_vector(num_pages, GFP_KERNEL); if (IS_ERR(pages)) { ret = PTR_ERR(pages); @@ -1632,9 +1628,12 @@ ceph_sync_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from, loff_t pos, } left = len; + off = offset_in_page(pos); for (n = 0; n < num_pages; n++) { - size_t plen = min_t(size_t, left, PAGE_SIZE); - ret = copy_page_from_iter(pages[n], 0, plen, from); + size_t plen = min_t(size_t, left, PAGE_SIZE - off); + + ret = copy_page_from_iter(pages[n], off, plen, from); + off = 0; if (ret != plen) { ret = -EFAULT; break; @@ -1649,8 +1648,9 @@ ceph_sync_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from, loff_t pos, req->r_inode = inode; - osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, 0, pages, len, 0, - false, true); + osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, 0, pages, len, + offset_in_page(pos), + false, true); req->r_mtime = mtime; ceph_osdc_start_request(&fsc->client->osdc, req); From 33a5f1709a44efa7253b84832fe4a49fccf4924b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:21 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 39/53] ceph: add read/modify/write to ceph_sync_write MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When doing a synchronous write on an encrypted inode, we have no guarantee that the caller is writing crypto block-aligned data. When that happens, we must do a read/modify/write cycle. First, expand the range to cover complete blocks. If we had to change the original pos or length, issue a read to fill the first and/or last pages, and fetch the version of the object from the result. We then copy data into the pages as usual, encrypt the result and issue a write prefixed by an assertion that the version hasn't changed. If it has changed then we restart the whole thing again. If there is no object at that position in the file (-ENOENT), we prefix the write on an exclusive create of the object instead. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/file.c | 320 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 291 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index 0abe36379fdf..45e00e42960b 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -1571,18 +1571,16 @@ ceph_sync_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from, loff_t pos, struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_inode_to_client(inode); - struct ceph_vino vino; + struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = &fsc->client->osdc; struct ceph_osd_request *req; struct page **pages; u64 len; int num_pages; int written = 0; - int flags; int ret; bool check_caps = false; struct timespec64 mtime = current_time(inode); size_t count = iov_iter_count(from); - size_t off; if (ceph_snap(file_inode(file)) != CEPH_NOSNAP) return -EROFS; @@ -1602,29 +1600,235 @@ ceph_sync_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from, loff_t pos, if (ret < 0) dout("invalidate_inode_pages2_range returned %d\n", ret); - flags = /* CEPH_OSD_FLAG_ORDERSNAP | */ CEPH_OSD_FLAG_WRITE; - while ((len = iov_iter_count(from)) > 0) { size_t left; int n; + u64 write_pos = pos; + u64 write_len = len; + u64 objnum, objoff; + u32 xlen; + u64 assert_ver = 0; + bool rmw; + bool first, last; + struct iov_iter saved_iter = *from; + size_t off; - vino = ceph_vino(inode); - req = ceph_osdc_new_request(&fsc->client->osdc, &ci->i_layout, - vino, pos, &len, 0, 1, - CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITE, flags, snapc, - ci->i_truncate_seq, - ci->i_truncate_size, - false); - if (IS_ERR(req)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(req); - break; - } + ceph_fscrypt_adjust_off_and_len(inode, &write_pos, &write_len); - num_pages = calc_pages_for(pos, len); + /* clamp the length to the end of first object */ + ceph_calc_file_object_mapping(&ci->i_layout, write_pos, + write_len, &objnum, &objoff, + &xlen); + write_len = xlen; + + /* adjust len downward if it goes beyond current object */ + if (pos + len > write_pos + write_len) + len = write_pos + write_len - pos; + + /* + * If we had to adjust the length or position to align with a + * crypto block, then we must do a read/modify/write cycle. We + * use a version assertion to redrive the thing if something + * changes in between. + */ + first = pos != write_pos; + last = (pos + len) != (write_pos + write_len); + rmw = first || last; + + dout("sync_write ino %llx %lld~%llu adjusted %lld~%llu -- %srmw\n", + ci->i_vino.ino, pos, len, write_pos, write_len, + rmw ? "" : "no "); + + /* + * The data is emplaced into the page as it would be if it were + * in an array of pagecache pages. + */ + num_pages = calc_pages_for(write_pos, write_len); pages = ceph_alloc_page_vector(num_pages, GFP_KERNEL); if (IS_ERR(pages)) { ret = PTR_ERR(pages); - goto out; + break; + } + + /* Do we need to preload the pages? */ + if (rmw) { + u64 first_pos = write_pos; + u64 last_pos = (write_pos + write_len) - CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE; + u64 read_len = CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE; + struct ceph_osd_req_op *op; + + /* We should only need to do this for encrypted inodes */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)); + + /* No need to do two reads if first and last blocks are same */ + if (first && last_pos == first_pos) + last = false; + + /* + * Allocate a read request for one or two extents, + * depending on how the request was aligned. + */ + req = ceph_osdc_new_request(osdc, &ci->i_layout, + ci->i_vino, first ? first_pos : last_pos, + &read_len, 0, (first && last) ? 2 : 1, + CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ, CEPH_OSD_FLAG_READ, + NULL, ci->i_truncate_seq, + ci->i_truncate_size, false); + if (IS_ERR(req)) { + ceph_release_page_vector(pages, num_pages); + ret = PTR_ERR(req); + break; + } + + /* Something is misaligned! */ + if (read_len != CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE) { + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + ceph_release_page_vector(pages, num_pages); + ret = -EIO; + break; + } + + /* Add extent for first block? */ + op = &req->r_ops[0]; + + if (first) { + osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, 0, pages, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, + offset_in_page(first_pos), + false, false); + /* We only expect a single extent here */ + ret = __ceph_alloc_sparse_ext_map(op, 1); + if (ret) { + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + ceph_release_page_vector(pages, num_pages); + break; + } + } + + /* Add extent for last block */ + if (last) { + /* Init the other extent if first extent has been used */ + if (first) { + op = &req->r_ops[1]; + osd_req_op_extent_init(req, 1, + CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ, + last_pos, CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, + ci->i_truncate_size, + ci->i_truncate_seq); + } + + ret = __ceph_alloc_sparse_ext_map(op, 1); + if (ret) { + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + ceph_release_page_vector(pages, num_pages); + break; + } + + osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, first ? 1 : 0, + &pages[num_pages - 1], + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, + offset_in_page(last_pos), + false, false); + } + + ceph_osdc_start_request(osdc, req); + ret = ceph_osdc_wait_request(osdc, req); + + /* FIXME: length field is wrong if there are 2 extents */ + ceph_update_read_metrics(&fsc->mdsc->metric, + req->r_start_latency, + req->r_end_latency, + read_len, ret); + + /* Ok if object is not already present */ + if (ret == -ENOENT) { + /* + * If there is no object, then we can't assert + * on its version. Set it to 0, and we'll use an + * exclusive create instead. + */ + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + ret = 0; + + /* + * zero out the soon-to-be uncopied parts of the + * first and last pages. + */ + if (first) + zero_user_segment(pages[0], 0, + offset_in_page(first_pos)); + if (last) + zero_user_segment(pages[num_pages - 1], + offset_in_page(last_pos), + PAGE_SIZE); + } else { + if (ret < 0) { + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + ceph_release_page_vector(pages, num_pages); + break; + } + + op = &req->r_ops[0]; + if (op->extent.sparse_ext_cnt == 0) { + if (first) + zero_user_segment(pages[0], 0, + offset_in_page(first_pos)); + else + zero_user_segment(pages[num_pages - 1], + offset_in_page(last_pos), + PAGE_SIZE); + } else if (op->extent.sparse_ext_cnt != 1 || + ceph_sparse_ext_map_end(op) != + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE) { + ret = -EIO; + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + ceph_release_page_vector(pages, num_pages); + break; + } + + if (first && last) { + op = &req->r_ops[1]; + if (op->extent.sparse_ext_cnt == 0) { + zero_user_segment(pages[num_pages - 1], + offset_in_page(last_pos), + PAGE_SIZE); + } else if (op->extent.sparse_ext_cnt != 1 || + ceph_sparse_ext_map_end(op) != + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE) { + ret = -EIO; + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + ceph_release_page_vector(pages, num_pages); + break; + } + } + + /* Grab assert version. It must be non-zero. */ + assert_ver = req->r_version; + WARN_ON_ONCE(ret > 0 && assert_ver == 0); + + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + if (first) { + ret = ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace(inode, + pages[0], CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, + offset_in_page(first_pos), + first_pos >> CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT); + if (ret < 0) { + ceph_release_page_vector(pages, num_pages); + break; + } + } + if (last) { + ret = ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace(inode, + pages[num_pages - 1], + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, + offset_in_page(last_pos), + last_pos >> CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT); + if (ret < 0) { + ceph_release_page_vector(pages, num_pages); + break; + } + } + } } left = len; @@ -1632,35 +1836,91 @@ ceph_sync_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from, loff_t pos, for (n = 0; n < num_pages; n++) { size_t plen = min_t(size_t, left, PAGE_SIZE - off); + /* copy the data */ ret = copy_page_from_iter(pages[n], off, plen, from); - off = 0; if (ret != plen) { ret = -EFAULT; break; } + off = 0; left -= ret; } - if (ret < 0) { + dout("sync_write write failed with %d\n", ret); ceph_release_page_vector(pages, num_pages); - goto out; + break; } + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { + ret = ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_pages(inode, pages, + write_pos, write_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (ret < 0) { + dout("encryption failed with %d\n", ret); + ceph_release_page_vector(pages, num_pages); + break; + } + } + + req = ceph_osdc_new_request(osdc, &ci->i_layout, + ci->i_vino, write_pos, &write_len, + rmw ? 1 : 0, rmw ? 2 : 1, + CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITE, + CEPH_OSD_FLAG_WRITE, + snapc, ci->i_truncate_seq, + ci->i_truncate_size, false); + if (IS_ERR(req)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(req); + ceph_release_page_vector(pages, num_pages); + break; + } + + dout("sync_write write op %lld~%llu\n", write_pos, write_len); + osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, rmw ? 1 : 0, pages, write_len, + offset_in_page(write_pos), false, + true); req->r_inode = inode; - - osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, 0, pages, len, - offset_in_page(pos), - false, true); - req->r_mtime = mtime; - ceph_osdc_start_request(&fsc->client->osdc, req); - ret = ceph_osdc_wait_request(&fsc->client->osdc, req); + + /* Set up the assertion */ + if (rmw) { + /* + * Set up the assertion. If we don't have a version + * number, then the object doesn't exist yet. Use an + * exclusive create instead of a version assertion in + * that case. + */ + if (assert_ver) { + osd_req_op_init(req, 0, CEPH_OSD_OP_ASSERT_VER, 0); + req->r_ops[0].assert_ver.ver = assert_ver; + } else { + osd_req_op_init(req, 0, CEPH_OSD_OP_CREATE, + CEPH_OSD_OP_FLAG_EXCL); + } + } + + ceph_osdc_start_request(osdc, req); + ret = ceph_osdc_wait_request(osdc, req); ceph_update_write_metrics(&fsc->mdsc->metric, req->r_start_latency, req->r_end_latency, len, ret); -out: ceph_osdc_put_request(req); if (ret != 0) { + dout("sync_write osd write returned %d\n", ret); + /* Version changed! Must re-do the rmw cycle */ + if ((assert_ver && (ret == -ERANGE || ret == -EOVERFLOW)) || + (!assert_ver && ret == -EEXIST)) { + /* We should only ever see this on a rmw */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rmw); + + /* The version should never go backward */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == -EOVERFLOW); + + *from = saved_iter; + + /* FIXME: limit number of times we loop? */ + continue; + } ceph_set_error_write(ci); break; } @@ -1668,6 +1928,7 @@ ceph_sync_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from, loff_t pos, ceph_clear_error_write(ci); pos += len; written += len; + dout("sync_write written %d\n", written); if (pos > i_size_read(inode)) { check_caps = ceph_inode_set_size(inode, pos); if (check_caps) @@ -1681,6 +1942,7 @@ ceph_sync_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from, loff_t pos, ret = written; iocb->ki_pos = pos; } + dout("sync_write returning %d\n", ret); return ret; } From d55207717ded95c8f2760a30e93319fa313186e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:25 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 40/53] ceph: add encryption support to writepage and writepages MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Allow writepage to issue encrypted writes. Extend out the requested size and offset to cover complete blocks, and then encrypt and write them to the OSDs. Add the appropriate machinery to write back dirty data with encryption. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/addr.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- fs/ceph/crypto.h | 18 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c index 611443d06330..89ca27848325 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/addr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c @@ -565,10 +565,12 @@ static u64 get_writepages_data_length(struct inode *inode, struct page *page, u64 start) { struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); - struct ceph_snap_context *snapc = page_snap_context(page); + struct ceph_snap_context *snapc; struct ceph_cap_snap *capsnap = NULL; u64 end = i_size_read(inode); + u64 ret; + snapc = page_snap_context(ceph_fscrypt_pagecache_page(page)); if (snapc != ci->i_head_snapc) { bool found = false; spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); @@ -583,9 +585,12 @@ static u64 get_writepages_data_length(struct inode *inode, spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); WARN_ON(!found); } - if (end > page_offset(page) + thp_size(page)) - end = page_offset(page) + thp_size(page); - return end > start ? end - start : 0; + if (end > ceph_fscrypt_page_offset(page) + thp_size(page)) + end = ceph_fscrypt_page_offset(page) + thp_size(page); + ret = end > start ? end - start : 0; + if (ret && fscrypt_is_bounce_page(page)) + ret = round_up(ret, CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE); + return ret; } /* @@ -604,10 +609,12 @@ static int writepage_nounlock(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc) loff_t page_off = page_offset(page); int err; loff_t len = thp_size(page); + loff_t wlen; struct ceph_writeback_ctl ceph_wbc; struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = &fsc->client->osdc; struct ceph_osd_request *req; bool caching = ceph_is_cache_enabled(inode); + struct page *bounce_page = NULL; dout("writepage %p idx %lu\n", page, page->index); @@ -643,31 +650,51 @@ static int writepage_nounlock(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc) if (ceph_wbc.i_size < page_off + len) len = ceph_wbc.i_size - page_off; + wlen = IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) ? round_up(len, CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE) : len; dout("writepage %p page %p index %lu on %llu~%llu snapc %p seq %lld\n", - inode, page, page->index, page_off, len, snapc, snapc->seq); + inode, page, page->index, page_off, wlen, snapc, snapc->seq); if (atomic_long_inc_return(&fsc->writeback_count) > CONGESTION_ON_THRESH(fsc->mount_options->congestion_kb)) fsc->write_congested = true; - req = ceph_osdc_new_request(osdc, &ci->i_layout, ceph_vino(inode), page_off, &len, 0, 1, - CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITE, CEPH_OSD_FLAG_WRITE, snapc, - ceph_wbc.truncate_seq, ceph_wbc.truncate_size, - true); + req = ceph_osdc_new_request(osdc, &ci->i_layout, ceph_vino(inode), + page_off, &wlen, 0, 1, CEPH_OSD_OP_WRITE, + CEPH_OSD_FLAG_WRITE, snapc, + ceph_wbc.truncate_seq, + ceph_wbc.truncate_size, true); if (IS_ERR(req)) { redirty_page_for_writepage(wbc, page); return PTR_ERR(req); } + if (wlen < len) + len = wlen; + set_page_writeback(page); if (caching) ceph_set_page_fscache(page); ceph_fscache_write_to_cache(inode, page_off, len, caching); + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { + bounce_page = fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks(page, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, 0, + GFP_NOFS); + if (IS_ERR(bounce_page)) { + redirty_page_for_writepage(wbc, page); + end_page_writeback(page); + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + return PTR_ERR(bounce_page); + } + } + /* it may be a short write due to an object boundary */ WARN_ON_ONCE(len > thp_size(page)); - osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, 0, &page, len, 0, false, false); - dout("writepage %llu~%llu (%llu bytes)\n", page_off, len, len); + osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, 0, + bounce_page ? &bounce_page : &page, wlen, 0, + false, false); + dout("writepage %llu~%llu (%llu bytes, %sencrypted)\n", + page_off, len, wlen, IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) ? "" : "not "); req->r_mtime = inode->i_mtime; ceph_osdc_start_request(osdc, req); @@ -675,7 +702,7 @@ static int writepage_nounlock(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc) ceph_update_write_metrics(&fsc->mdsc->metric, req->r_start_latency, req->r_end_latency, len, err); - + fscrypt_free_bounce_page(bounce_page); ceph_osdc_put_request(req); if (err == 0) err = len; @@ -794,6 +821,11 @@ static void writepages_finish(struct ceph_osd_request *req) total_pages += num_pages; for (j = 0; j < num_pages; j++) { page = osd_data->pages[j]; + if (fscrypt_is_bounce_page(page)) { + page = fscrypt_pagecache_page(page); + fscrypt_free_bounce_page(osd_data->pages[j]); + osd_data->pages[j] = page; + } BUG_ON(!page); WARN_ON(!PageUptodate(page)); @@ -1064,9 +1096,28 @@ static int ceph_writepages_start(struct address_space *mapping, fsc->mount_options->congestion_kb)) fsc->write_congested = true; - pages[locked_pages++] = page; - fbatch.folios[i] = NULL; + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { + pages[locked_pages] = + fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks(page, + PAGE_SIZE, 0, + locked_pages ? GFP_NOWAIT : GFP_NOFS); + if (IS_ERR(pages[locked_pages])) { + if (PTR_ERR(pages[locked_pages]) == -EINVAL) + pr_err("%s: inode->i_blkbits=%hhu\n", + __func__, inode->i_blkbits); + /* better not fail on first page! */ + BUG_ON(locked_pages == 0); + pages[locked_pages] = NULL; + redirty_page_for_writepage(wbc, page); + unlock_page(page); + break; + } + ++locked_pages; + } else { + pages[locked_pages++] = page; + } + fbatch.folios[i] = NULL; len += thp_size(page); } @@ -1094,7 +1145,7 @@ static int ceph_writepages_start(struct address_space *mapping, } new_request: - offset = page_offset(pages[0]); + offset = ceph_fscrypt_page_offset(pages[0]); len = wsize; req = ceph_osdc_new_request(&fsc->client->osdc, @@ -1115,8 +1166,8 @@ static int ceph_writepages_start(struct address_space *mapping, ceph_wbc.truncate_size, true); BUG_ON(IS_ERR(req)); } - BUG_ON(len < page_offset(pages[locked_pages - 1]) + - thp_size(page) - offset); + BUG_ON(len < ceph_fscrypt_page_offset(pages[locked_pages - 1]) + + thp_size(pages[locked_pages - 1]) - offset); req->r_callback = writepages_finish; req->r_inode = inode; @@ -1126,7 +1177,9 @@ static int ceph_writepages_start(struct address_space *mapping, data_pages = pages; op_idx = 0; for (i = 0; i < locked_pages; i++) { - u64 cur_offset = page_offset(pages[i]); + struct page *page = ceph_fscrypt_pagecache_page(pages[i]); + + u64 cur_offset = page_offset(page); /* * Discontinuity in page range? Ceph can handle that by just passing * multiple extents in the write op. @@ -1155,9 +1208,9 @@ static int ceph_writepages_start(struct address_space *mapping, op_idx++; } - set_page_writeback(pages[i]); + set_page_writeback(page); if (caching) - ceph_set_page_fscache(pages[i]); + ceph_set_page_fscache(page); len += thp_size(page); } ceph_fscache_write_to_cache(inode, offset, len, caching); @@ -1173,8 +1226,16 @@ static int ceph_writepages_start(struct address_space *mapping, offset); len = max(len, min_len); } + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) + len = round_up(len, CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE); + dout("writepages got pages at %llu~%llu\n", offset, len); + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && + ((offset | len) & ~CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_MASK)) + pr_warn("%s: bad encrypted write offset=%lld len=%llu\n", + __func__, offset, len); + osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, op_idx, data_pages, len, 0, from_pool, false); osd_req_op_extent_update(req, op_idx, len); diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h index b735b3f144a7..6afa6d888fe0 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h @@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ int ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_extents(struct inode *inode, struct page **page, u32 ext_cnt); int ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_pages(struct inode *inode, struct page **page, u64 off, int len, gfp_t gfp); + +static inline struct page *ceph_fscrypt_pagecache_page(struct page *page) +{ + return fscrypt_is_bounce_page(page) ? fscrypt_pagecache_page(page) : page; +} + #else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) @@ -267,6 +273,16 @@ static inline int ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_pages(struct inode *inode, { return 0; } + +static inline struct page *ceph_fscrypt_pagecache_page(struct page *page) +{ + return page; +} #endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ -#endif +static inline loff_t ceph_fscrypt_page_offset(struct page *page) +{ + return page_offset(ceph_fscrypt_pagecache_page(page)); +} + +#endif /* _CEPH_CRYPTO_H */ From f0fe1e54cfcf5209a88d720671dc6637774b8757 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:22 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 41/53] ceph: plumb in decryption during reads MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Force the use of sparse reads when the inode is encrypted, and add the appropriate code to decrypt the extent map after receiving. Note that the crypto block may be smaller than a page, but the reverse cannot be true. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/addr.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ fs/ceph/file.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c index 89ca27848325..95ff84930dcf 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/addr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include "mds_client.h" #include "cache.h" #include "metric.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include #include @@ -242,7 +243,8 @@ static bool ceph_netfs_clamp_length(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq) static void finish_netfs_read(struct ceph_osd_request *req) { - struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_inode_to_client(req->r_inode); + struct inode *inode = req->r_inode; + struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_inode_to_client(inode); struct ceph_osd_data *osd_data = osd_req_op_extent_osd_data(req, 0); struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq = req->r_priv; struct ceph_osd_req_op *op = &req->r_ops[0]; @@ -256,16 +258,31 @@ static void finish_netfs_read(struct ceph_osd_request *req) subreq->len, i_size_read(req->r_inode)); /* no object means success but no data */ - if (sparse && err >= 0) - err = ceph_sparse_ext_map_end(op); - else if (err == -ENOENT) + if (err == -ENOENT) err = 0; else if (err == -EBLOCKLISTED) fsc->blocklisted = true; - if (err >= 0 && err < subreq->len) - __set_bit(NETFS_SREQ_CLEAR_TAIL, &subreq->flags); + if (err >= 0) { + if (sparse && err > 0) + err = ceph_sparse_ext_map_end(op); + if (err < subreq->len) + __set_bit(NETFS_SREQ_CLEAR_TAIL, &subreq->flags); + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && err > 0) { + err = ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_extents(inode, + osd_data->pages, subreq->start, + op->extent.sparse_ext, + op->extent.sparse_ext_cnt); + if (err > subreq->len) + err = subreq->len; + } + } + if (osd_data->type == CEPH_OSD_DATA_TYPE_PAGES) { + ceph_put_page_vector(osd_data->pages, + calc_pages_for(osd_data->alignment, + osd_data->length), false); + } netfs_subreq_terminated(subreq, err, false); iput(req->r_inode); } @@ -336,7 +353,8 @@ static void ceph_netfs_issue_read(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq) struct iov_iter iter; int err = 0; u64 len = subreq->len; - bool sparse = ceph_test_mount_opt(fsc, SPARSEREAD); + bool sparse = IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) || ceph_test_mount_opt(fsc, SPARSEREAD); + u64 off = subreq->start; if (ceph_inode_is_shutdown(inode)) { err = -EIO; @@ -346,8 +364,10 @@ static void ceph_netfs_issue_read(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq) if (ceph_has_inline_data(ci) && ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline(subreq)) return; - req = ceph_osdc_new_request(&fsc->client->osdc, &ci->i_layout, vino, subreq->start, &len, - 0, 1, sparse ? CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ : CEPH_OSD_OP_READ, + ceph_fscrypt_adjust_off_and_len(inode, &off, &len); + + req = ceph_osdc_new_request(&fsc->client->osdc, &ci->i_layout, vino, + off, &len, 0, 1, sparse ? CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ : CEPH_OSD_OP_READ, CEPH_OSD_FLAG_READ | fsc->client->osdc.client->options->read_from_replica, NULL, ci->i_truncate_seq, ci->i_truncate_size, false); if (IS_ERR(req)) { @@ -363,8 +383,37 @@ static void ceph_netfs_issue_read(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq) } dout("%s: pos=%llu orig_len=%zu len=%llu\n", __func__, subreq->start, subreq->len, len); + iov_iter_xarray(&iter, ITER_DEST, &rreq->mapping->i_pages, subreq->start, len); - osd_req_op_extent_osd_iter(req, 0, &iter); + + /* + * FIXME: For now, use CEPH_OSD_DATA_TYPE_PAGES instead of _ITER for + * encrypted inodes. We'd need infrastructure that handles an iov_iter + * instead of page arrays, and we don't have that as of yet. Once the + * dust settles on the write helpers and encrypt/decrypt routines for + * netfs, we should be able to rework this. + */ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { + struct page **pages; + size_t page_off; + + err = iov_iter_get_pages_alloc2(&iter, &pages, len, &page_off); + if (err < 0) { + dout("%s: iov_ter_get_pages_alloc returned %d\n", + __func__, err); + goto out; + } + + /* should always give us a page-aligned read */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(page_off); + len = err; + err = 0; + + osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, 0, pages, len, 0, false, + false); + } else { + osd_req_op_extent_osd_iter(req, 0, &iter); + } req->r_callback = finish_netfs_read; req->r_priv = subreq; req->r_inode = inode; diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index 45e00e42960b..9d1a77cdc494 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos, u64 off = *ki_pos; u64 len = iov_iter_count(to); u64 i_size = i_size_read(inode); - bool sparse = ceph_test_mount_opt(fsc, SPARSEREAD); + bool sparse = IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) || ceph_test_mount_opt(fsc, SPARSEREAD); u64 objver = 0; dout("sync_read on inode %p %llx~%llx\n", inode, *ki_pos, len); @@ -1001,10 +1001,19 @@ ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos, int idx; size_t left; struct ceph_osd_req_op *op; + u64 read_off = off; + u64 read_len = len; + + /* determine new offset/length if encrypted */ + ceph_fscrypt_adjust_off_and_len(inode, &read_off, &read_len); + + dout("sync_read orig %llu~%llu reading %llu~%llu", + off, len, read_off, read_len); req = ceph_osdc_new_request(osdc, &ci->i_layout, - ci->i_vino, off, &len, 0, 1, - sparse ? CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ : CEPH_OSD_OP_READ, + ci->i_vino, read_off, &read_len, 0, 1, + sparse ? CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ : + CEPH_OSD_OP_READ, CEPH_OSD_FLAG_READ, NULL, ci->i_truncate_seq, ci->i_truncate_size, false); @@ -1013,10 +1022,13 @@ ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos, break; } + /* adjust len downward if the request truncated the len */ + if (off + len > read_off + read_len) + len = read_off + read_len - off; more = len < iov_iter_count(to); - num_pages = calc_pages_for(off, len); - page_off = off & ~PAGE_MASK; + num_pages = calc_pages_for(read_off, read_len); + page_off = offset_in_page(off); pages = ceph_alloc_page_vector(num_pages, GFP_KERNEL); if (IS_ERR(pages)) { ceph_osdc_put_request(req); @@ -1024,7 +1036,8 @@ ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos, break; } - osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, 0, pages, len, page_off, + osd_req_op_extent_osd_data_pages(req, 0, pages, read_len, + offset_in_page(read_off), false, false); op = &req->r_ops[0]; @@ -1042,7 +1055,7 @@ ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos, ceph_update_read_metrics(&fsc->mdsc->metric, req->r_start_latency, req->r_end_latency, - len, ret); + read_len, ret); if (ret > 0) objver = req->r_version; @@ -1057,8 +1070,35 @@ ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos, else if (ret == -ENOENT) ret = 0; + if (ret > 0 && IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { + int fret; + + fret = ceph_fscrypt_decrypt_extents(inode, pages, + read_off, op->extent.sparse_ext, + op->extent.sparse_ext_cnt); + if (fret < 0) { + ret = fret; + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + break; + } + + /* account for any partial block at the beginning */ + fret -= (off - read_off); + + /* + * Short read after big offset adjustment? + * Nothing is usable, just call it a zero + * len read. + */ + fret = max(fret, 0); + + /* account for partial block at the end */ + ret = min_t(ssize_t, fret, len); + } + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + /* Short read but not EOF? Zero out the remainder. */ if (ret >= 0 && ret < len && (off + ret < i_size)) { int zlen = min(len - ret, i_size - off - ret); int zoff = page_off + ret; @@ -1072,15 +1112,16 @@ ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos, idx = 0; left = ret > 0 ? ret : 0; while (left > 0) { - size_t len, copied; - page_off = off & ~PAGE_MASK; - len = min_t(size_t, left, PAGE_SIZE - page_off); + size_t plen, copied; + + plen = min_t(size_t, left, PAGE_SIZE - page_off); SetPageUptodate(pages[idx]); copied = copy_page_to_iter(pages[idx++], - page_off, len, to); + page_off, plen, to); off += copied; left -= copied; - if (copied < len) { + page_off = 0; + if (copied < plen) { ret = -EFAULT; break; } @@ -1097,20 +1138,21 @@ ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos, break; } - if (off > *ki_pos) { - if (off >= i_size) { - *retry_op = CHECK_EOF; - ret = i_size - *ki_pos; - *ki_pos = i_size; - } else { - ret = off - *ki_pos; - *ki_pos = off; + if (ret > 0) { + if (off > *ki_pos) { + if (off >= i_size) { + *retry_op = CHECK_EOF; + ret = i_size - *ki_pos; + *ki_pos = i_size; + } else { + ret = off - *ki_pos; + *ki_pos = off; + } } + + if (last_objver) + *last_objver = objver; } - - if (last_objver && ret > 0) - *last_objver = objver; - dout("sync_read result %zd retry_op %d\n", ret, *retry_op); return ret; } From b422f115044328e1753d6c1e3bb4955b4ca5df27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Lu=C3=ADs=20Henriques?= Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:27 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 42/53] ceph: invalidate pages when doing direct/sync writes MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When doing a direct/sync write, we need to invalidate the page cache in the range being written to. If we don't do this, the cache will include invalid data as we just did a write that avoided the page cache. In the event that invalidation fails, just ignore the error. That likely just means that we raced with another task doing a buffered write, in which case we want to leave the page intact anyway. [ jlayton: minor comment update ] Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/file.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index 9d1a77cdc494..e58787233e42 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -1636,11 +1636,6 @@ ceph_sync_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from, loff_t pos, return ret; ceph_fscache_invalidate(inode, false); - ret = invalidate_inode_pages2_range(inode->i_mapping, - pos >> PAGE_SHIFT, - (pos + count - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT); - if (ret < 0) - dout("invalidate_inode_pages2_range returned %d\n", ret); while ((len = iov_iter_count(from)) > 0) { size_t left; @@ -1968,6 +1963,20 @@ ceph_sync_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from, loff_t pos, } ceph_clear_error_write(ci); + + /* + * We successfully wrote to a range of the file. Declare + * that region of the pagecache invalid. + */ + ret = invalidate_inode_pages2_range( + inode->i_mapping, + pos >> PAGE_SHIFT, + (pos + len - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT); + if (ret < 0) { + dout("invalidate_inode_pages2_range returned %d\n", + ret); + ret = 0; + } pos += len; written += len; dout("sync_write written %d\n", written); From dd66df0053ef84add5e684df517aa9b498342381 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Lu=C3=ADs=20Henriques?= Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:28 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 43/53] ceph: add support for encrypted snapshot names MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Since filenames in encrypted directories are encrypted and shown as a base64-encoded string when the directory is locked, make snapshot names show a similar behaviour. When creating a snapshot, .snap directories for every subdirectory will show the snapshot name in the "long format": # mkdir .snap/my-snap # ls my-dir/.snap/ _my-snap_1099511627782 Encrypted snapshots will need to be able to handle these by encrypting/decrypting only the snapshot part of the string ('my-snap'). Also, since the MDS prevents snapshot names to be bigger than 240 characters it is necessary to adapt CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX to accommodate this extra limitation. [ idryomov: drop const on !CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION branch too ] Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 197 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- fs/ceph/crypto.h | 12 +-- fs/ceph/inode.c | 33 +++++++- 3 files changed, 201 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c index 9494bf485f6a..e4d5cd56a80b 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c @@ -193,17 +193,101 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, swap(req->r_fscrypt_auth, as->fscrypt_auth); } -int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, - struct qstr *d_name, char *buf) +/* + * User-created snapshots can't start with '_'. Snapshots that start with this + * character are special (hint: there aren't real snapshots) and use the + * following format: + * + * __ + * + * where: + * - - the real snapshot name that may need to be decrypted, + * - - the inode number (in decimal) for the actual snapshot + * + * This function parses these snapshot names and returns the inode + * . 'name_len' will also bet set with the + * length. + */ +static struct inode *parse_longname(const struct inode *parent, + const char *name, int *name_len) { + struct inode *dir = NULL; + struct ceph_vino vino = { .snap = CEPH_NOSNAP }; + char *inode_number; + char *name_end; + int orig_len = *name_len; + int ret = -EIO; + + /* Skip initial '_' */ + name++; + name_end = strrchr(name, '_'); + if (!name_end) { + dout("Failed to parse long snapshot name: %s\n", name); + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); + } + *name_len = (name_end - name); + if (*name_len <= 0) { + pr_err("Failed to parse long snapshot name\n"); + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); + } + + /* Get the inode number */ + inode_number = kmemdup_nul(name_end + 1, + orig_len - *name_len - 2, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!inode_number) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + ret = kstrtou64(inode_number, 10, &vino.ino); + if (ret) { + dout("Failed to parse inode number: %s\n", name); + dir = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto out; + } + + /* And finally the inode */ + dir = ceph_find_inode(parent->i_sb, vino); + if (!dir) { + /* This can happen if we're not mounting cephfs on the root */ + dir = ceph_get_inode(parent->i_sb, vino, NULL); + if (!dir) + dir = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); + } + if (IS_ERR(dir)) + dout("Can't find inode %s (%s)\n", inode_number, name); + +out: + kfree(inode_number); + return dir; +} + +int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, + char *buf) +{ + struct inode *dir = parent; + struct qstr iname; u32 len; + int name_len; int elen; int ret; - u8 *cryptbuf; + u8 *cryptbuf = NULL; - if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent)) { + iname.name = d_name->name; + name_len = d_name->len; + + /* Handle the special case of snapshot names that start with '_' */ + if ((ceph_snap(dir) == CEPH_SNAPDIR) && (name_len > 0) && + (iname.name[0] == '_')) { + dir = parse_longname(parent, iname.name, &name_len); + if (IS_ERR(dir)) + return PTR_ERR(dir); + iname.name++; /* skip initial '_' */ + } + iname.len = name_len; + + if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { memcpy(buf, d_name->name, d_name->len); - return d_name->len; + elen = d_name->len; + goto out; } /* @@ -212,19 +296,23 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, * * See: fscrypt_setup_filename */ - if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(parent, d_name->len, NAME_MAX, &len)) - return -ENAMETOOLONG; + if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(dir, iname.len, NAME_MAX, &len)) { + elen = -ENAMETOOLONG; + goto out; + } /* Allocate a buffer appropriate to hold the result */ cryptbuf = kmalloc(len > CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX ? NAME_MAX : len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!cryptbuf) - return -ENOMEM; + if (!cryptbuf) { + elen = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } - ret = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(parent, d_name, cryptbuf, len); + ret = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(dir, &iname, cryptbuf, len); if (ret) { - kfree(cryptbuf); - return ret; + elen = ret; + goto out; } /* hash the end if the name is long enough */ @@ -243,13 +331,31 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, /* base64 encode the encrypted name */ elen = ceph_base64_encode(cryptbuf, len, buf); - kfree(cryptbuf); dout("base64-encoded ciphertext name = %.*s\n", elen, buf); + + /* To understand the 240 limit, see CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX comments */ + WARN_ON(elen > 240); + if ((elen > 0) && (dir != parent)) { + char tmp_buf[NAME_MAX]; + + elen = snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "_%.*s_%ld", + elen, buf, dir->i_ino); + memcpy(buf, tmp_buf, elen); + } + +out: + kfree(cryptbuf); + if (dir != parent) { + if ((dir->i_state & I_NEW)) + discard_new_inode(dir); + else + iput(dir); + } return elen; } -int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, - struct dentry *dentry, char *buf) +int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, + char *buf) { WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent)); @@ -274,29 +380,42 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, struct fscrypt_str *oname, bool *is_nokey) { - int ret; + struct inode *dir = fname->dir; struct fscrypt_str _tname = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0); struct fscrypt_str iname; - - if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(fname->dir)) { - oname->name = fname->name; - oname->len = fname->name_len; - return 0; - } + char *name = fname->name; + int name_len = fname->name_len; + int ret; /* Sanity check that the resulting name will fit in the buffer */ if (fname->name_len > NAME_MAX || fname->ctext_len > NAME_MAX) return -EIO; - ret = ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(fname->dir); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; + /* Handle the special case of snapshot names that start with '_' */ + if ((ceph_snap(dir) == CEPH_SNAPDIR) && (name_len > 0) && + (name[0] == '_')) { + dir = parse_longname(dir, name, &name_len); + if (IS_ERR(dir)) + return PTR_ERR(dir); + name++; /* skip initial '_' */ + } + + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { + oname->name = fname->name; + oname->len = fname->name_len; + ret = 0; + goto out_inode; + } + + ret = ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(dir); + if (ret) + goto out_inode; /* * Use the raw dentry name as sent by the MDS instead of * generating a nokey name via fscrypt. */ - if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(fname->dir)) { + if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { if (fname->no_copy) oname->name = fname->name; else @@ -304,7 +423,8 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, oname->len = fname->name_len; if (is_nokey) *is_nokey = true; - return 0; + ret = 0; + goto out_inode; } if (fname->ctext_len == 0) { @@ -313,12 +433,11 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, if (!tname) { ret = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(NAME_MAX, &_tname); if (ret) - return ret; + goto out_inode; tname = &_tname; } - declen = ceph_base64_decode(fname->name, fname->name_len, - tname->name); + declen = ceph_base64_decode(name, name_len, tname->name); if (declen <= 0) { ret = -EIO; goto out; @@ -330,9 +449,25 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname, iname.len = fname->ctext_len; } - ret = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(fname->dir, 0, 0, &iname, oname); + ret = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(dir, 0, 0, &iname, oname); + if (!ret && (dir != fname->dir)) { + char tmp_buf[CEPH_BASE64_CHARS(NAME_MAX)]; + + name_len = snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "_%.*s_%ld", + oname->len, oname->name, dir->i_ino); + memcpy(oname->name, tmp_buf, name_len); + oname->len = name_len; + } + out: fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(&_tname); +out_inode: + if ((dir != fname->dir) && !IS_ERR(dir)) { + if ((dir->i_state & I_NEW)) + discard_new_inode(dir); + else + iput(dir); + } return ret; } diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h index 6afa6d888fe0..47e0c319fc68 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h @@ -102,10 +102,10 @@ int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); -int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, - struct qstr *d_name, char *buf); -int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, - struct dentry *dentry, char *buf); +int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, + char *buf); +int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, + char *buf); static inline int ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(struct inode *parent, struct fscrypt_str *fname) @@ -194,14 +194,14 @@ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, { } -static inline int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, +static inline int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, char *buf) { memcpy(buf, d_name->name, d_name->len); return d_name->len; } -static inline int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, +static inline int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index 054fd66609b7..83c420646f90 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -91,9 +91,15 @@ struct inode *ceph_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, if (err < 0) goto out_err; - err = ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(dir, inode, as_ctx); - if (err) - goto out_err; + /* + * We'll skip setting fscrypt context for snapshots, leaving that for + * the handle_reply(). + */ + if (ceph_snap(dir) != CEPH_SNAPDIR) { + err = ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(dir, inode, as_ctx); + if (err) + goto out_err; + } return inode; out_err: @@ -159,6 +165,7 @@ struct inode *ceph_get_snapdir(struct inode *parent) }; struct inode *inode = ceph_get_inode(parent->i_sb, vino, NULL); struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); + int ret = -ENOTDIR; if (IS_ERR(inode)) return inode; @@ -184,6 +191,24 @@ struct inode *ceph_get_snapdir(struct inode *parent) ci->i_rbytes = 0; ci->i_btime = ceph_inode(parent)->i_btime; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + /* if encrypted, just borrow fscrypt_auth from parent */ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) { + struct ceph_inode_info *pci = ceph_inode(parent); + + ci->fscrypt_auth = kmemdup(pci->fscrypt_auth, + pci->fscrypt_auth_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (ci->fscrypt_auth) { + inode->i_flags |= S_ENCRYPTED; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = pci->fscrypt_auth_len; + } else { + dout("Failed to alloc snapdir fscrypt_auth\n"); + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + } +#endif if (inode->i_state & I_NEW) { inode->i_op = &ceph_snapdir_iops; inode->i_fop = &ceph_snapdir_fops; @@ -197,7 +222,7 @@ struct inode *ceph_get_snapdir(struct inode *parent) discard_new_inode(inode); else iput(inode); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR); + return ERR_PTR(ret); } const struct inode_operations ceph_file_iops = { From abd4fc775857cda97cde08d500a60b00617b8168 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Lu=C3=ADs=20Henriques?= Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:31 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 44/53] ceph: prevent snapshot creation in encrypted locked directories MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit With snapshot names encryption we can not allow snapshots to be created in locked directories because the names wouldn't be encrypted. This patch forces the directory to be unlocked to allow a snapshot to be created. Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/dir.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index 4990886a366c..0e4f8e07022d 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -1090,6 +1090,11 @@ static int ceph_mkdir(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, err = -EDQUOT; goto out; } + if ((op == CEPH_MDS_OP_MKSNAP) && IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && + !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { + err = -ENOKEY; + goto out; + } req = ceph_mdsc_create_request(mdsc, op, USE_AUTH_MDS); From 230bd8b98ddfae3b7093671d4973236dc724d0bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Lu=C3=ADs=20Henriques?= Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 09:31:30 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 45/53] ceph: update documentation regarding snapshot naming limitations MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- Documentation/filesystems/ceph.rst | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/ceph.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/ceph.rst index 76ce938e7024..085f309ece60 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/ceph.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/ceph.rst @@ -57,6 +57,16 @@ a snapshot on any subdirectory (and its nested contents) in the system. Snapshot creation and deletion are as simple as 'mkdir .snap/foo' and 'rmdir .snap/foo'. +Snapshot names have two limitations: + +* They can not start with an underscore ('_'), as these names are reserved + for internal usage by the MDS. +* They can not exceed 240 characters in size. This is because the MDS makes + use of long snapshot names internally, which follow the format: + `__`. Since filenames in general can't have + more than 255 characters, and `` takes 13 characters, the long + snapshot names can take as much as 255 - 1 - 1 - 13 = 240. + Ceph also provides some recursive accounting on directories for nested files and bytes. That is, a 'getfattr -d foo' on any directory in the system will reveal the total number of nested regular files and From e3dfcab2080dc1f9a4b09cc1327361bc2845bfcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiubo Li Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2022 14:13:51 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 46/53] ceph: drop messages from MDS when unmounting MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When unmounting all the dirty buffers will be flushed and after the last osd request is finished the last reference of the i_count will be released. Then it will flush the dirty cap/snap to MDSs, and the unmounting won't wait the possible acks, which will ihold the inodes when updating the metadata locally but makes no sense any more, of this. This will make the evict_inodes() to skip these inodes. If encrypt is enabled the kernel generate a warning when removing the encrypt keys when the skipped inodes still hold the keyring: WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 168846 at fs/crypto/keyring.c:242 fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 CPU: 4 PID: 168846 Comm: umount Tainted: G S 6.1.0-rc5-ceph-g72ead199864c #1 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5018R-WR/X10SRW-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015 RIP: 0010:fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b277e28 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88810d52ac00 RCX: ffff88810b56aa00 RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff822f3a09 RDI: ffff888108f59000 RBP: ffff8881d394fb88 R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 11ff4fe6834fcd91 R12: ffff8881d394fc40 R13: ffff888108f59000 R14: ffff8881d394f800 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fd83f6f1080(0000) GS:ffff88885fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f918d417000 CR3: 000000017f89a005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: generic_shutdown_super+0x47/0x120 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 ceph_kill_sb+0x36/0x90 [ceph] deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140 task_work_run+0x67/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23d/0x240 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fd83dc39e9b Later the kernel will crash when iput() the inodes and dereferencing the "sb->s_master_keys", which has been released by the generic_shutdown_super(). Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/59162 Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/caps.c | 6 +++- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 12 +++++-- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 11 +++++-- fs/ceph/quota.c | 14 ++++----- fs/ceph/snap.c | 10 +++--- fs/ceph/super.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- fs/ceph/super.h | 3 ++ 7 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c index 5c2b28ac9410..54041d9c1e25 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/caps.c +++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c @@ -4247,6 +4247,9 @@ void ceph_handle_caps(struct ceph_mds_session *session, dout("handle_caps from mds%d\n", session->s_mds); + if (!ceph_inc_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc, session)) + return; + /* decode */ end = msg->front.iov_base + msg->front.iov_len; if (msg->front.iov_len < sizeof(*h)) @@ -4348,7 +4351,6 @@ void ceph_handle_caps(struct ceph_mds_session *session, vino.snap, inode); mutex_lock(&session->s_mutex); - inc_session_sequence(session); dout(" mds%d seq %lld cap seq %u\n", session->s_mds, session->s_seq, (unsigned)seq); @@ -4457,6 +4459,8 @@ void ceph_handle_caps(struct ceph_mds_session *session, done_unlocked: iput(inode); out: + ceph_dec_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc); + ceph_put_string(extra_info.pool_ns); /* Defer closing the sessions after s_mutex lock being released */ diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index c257d75c5757..04a881343e43 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -4889,6 +4889,9 @@ static void handle_lease(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, dout("handle_lease from mds%d\n", mds); + if (!ceph_inc_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc, session)) + return; + /* decode */ if (msg->front.iov_len < sizeof(*h) + sizeof(u32)) goto bad; @@ -4907,8 +4910,6 @@ static void handle_lease(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, dname.len, dname.name); mutex_lock(&session->s_mutex); - inc_session_sequence(session); - if (!inode) { dout("handle_lease no inode %llx\n", vino.ino); goto release; @@ -4970,9 +4971,13 @@ static void handle_lease(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, out: mutex_unlock(&session->s_mutex); iput(inode); + + ceph_dec_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc); return; bad: + ceph_dec_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc); + pr_err("corrupt lease message\n"); ceph_msg_dump(msg); } @@ -5168,6 +5173,9 @@ int ceph_mdsc_init(struct ceph_fs_client *fsc) } init_completion(&mdsc->safe_umount_waiters); + spin_lock_init(&mdsc->stopping_lock); + atomic_set(&mdsc->stopping_blockers, 0); + init_completion(&mdsc->stopping_waiter); init_waitqueue_head(&mdsc->session_close_wq); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mdsc->waiting_for_map); mdsc->quotarealms_inodes = RB_ROOT; diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h index 0477388a0d1c..1fa0f78b7b79 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h @@ -399,8 +399,9 @@ struct cap_wait { }; enum { - CEPH_MDSC_STOPPING_BEGIN = 1, - CEPH_MDSC_STOPPING_FLUSHED = 2, + CEPH_MDSC_STOPPING_BEGIN = 1, + CEPH_MDSC_STOPPING_FLUSHING = 2, + CEPH_MDSC_STOPPING_FLUSHED = 3, }; /* @@ -419,7 +420,11 @@ struct ceph_mds_client { struct ceph_mds_session **sessions; /* NULL for mds if no session */ atomic_t num_sessions; int max_sessions; /* len of sessions array */ - int stopping; /* true if shutting down */ + + spinlock_t stopping_lock; /* protect snap_empty */ + int stopping; /* the stage of shutting down */ + atomic_t stopping_blockers; + struct completion stopping_waiter; atomic64_t quotarealms_count; /* # realms with quota */ /* diff --git a/fs/ceph/quota.c b/fs/ceph/quota.c index 64592adfe48f..f7fcf7f08ec6 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/quota.c +++ b/fs/ceph/quota.c @@ -47,25 +47,23 @@ void ceph_handle_quota(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, struct inode *inode; struct ceph_inode_info *ci; + if (!ceph_inc_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc, session)) + return; + if (msg->front.iov_len < sizeof(*h)) { pr_err("%s corrupt message mds%d len %d\n", __func__, session->s_mds, (int)msg->front.iov_len); ceph_msg_dump(msg); - return; + goto out; } - /* increment msg sequence number */ - mutex_lock(&session->s_mutex); - inc_session_sequence(session); - mutex_unlock(&session->s_mutex); - /* lookup inode */ vino.ino = le64_to_cpu(h->ino); vino.snap = CEPH_NOSNAP; inode = ceph_find_inode(sb, vino); if (!inode) { pr_warn("Failed to find inode %llu\n", vino.ino); - return; + goto out; } ci = ceph_inode(inode); @@ -78,6 +76,8 @@ void ceph_handle_quota(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); iput(inode); +out: + ceph_dec_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc); } static struct ceph_quotarealm_inode * diff --git a/fs/ceph/snap.c b/fs/ceph/snap.c index 343d738448dc..7ddc6bad77ef 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/snap.c +++ b/fs/ceph/snap.c @@ -1015,6 +1015,9 @@ void ceph_handle_snap(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, int locked_rwsem = 0; bool close_sessions = false; + if (!ceph_inc_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc, session)) + return; + /* decode */ if (msg->front.iov_len < sizeof(*h)) goto bad; @@ -1030,10 +1033,6 @@ void ceph_handle_snap(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, dout("%s from mds%d op %s split %llx tracelen %d\n", __func__, mds, ceph_snap_op_name(op), split, trace_len); - mutex_lock(&session->s_mutex); - inc_session_sequence(session); - mutex_unlock(&session->s_mutex); - down_write(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); locked_rwsem = 1; @@ -1151,6 +1150,7 @@ void ceph_handle_snap(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, up_write(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); flush_snaps(mdsc); + ceph_dec_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc); return; bad: @@ -1160,6 +1160,8 @@ void ceph_handle_snap(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, if (locked_rwsem) up_write(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); + ceph_dec_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc); + if (close_sessions) ceph_mdsc_close_sessions(mdsc); return; diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.c b/fs/ceph/super.c index 75dd1b6b3d01..1c14d87ed871 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.c +++ b/fs/ceph/super.c @@ -1462,25 +1462,90 @@ static int ceph_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) return -ENOMEM; } +/* + * Return true if it successfully increases the blocker counter, + * or false if the mdsc is in stopping and flushed state. + */ +static bool __inc_stopping_blocker(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) +{ + spin_lock(&mdsc->stopping_lock); + if (mdsc->stopping >= CEPH_MDSC_STOPPING_FLUSHING) { + spin_unlock(&mdsc->stopping_lock); + return false; + } + atomic_inc(&mdsc->stopping_blockers); + spin_unlock(&mdsc->stopping_lock); + return true; +} + +static void __dec_stopping_blocker(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) +{ + spin_lock(&mdsc->stopping_lock); + if (!atomic_dec_return(&mdsc->stopping_blockers) && + mdsc->stopping >= CEPH_MDSC_STOPPING_FLUSHING) + complete_all(&mdsc->stopping_waiter); + spin_unlock(&mdsc->stopping_lock); +} + +/* For metadata IO requests */ +bool ceph_inc_mds_stopping_blocker(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, + struct ceph_mds_session *session) +{ + mutex_lock(&session->s_mutex); + inc_session_sequence(session); + mutex_unlock(&session->s_mutex); + + return __inc_stopping_blocker(mdsc); +} + +void ceph_dec_mds_stopping_blocker(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) +{ + __dec_stopping_blocker(mdsc); +} + static void ceph_kill_sb(struct super_block *s) { struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_sb_to_client(s); + struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = fsc->mdsc; + bool wait; dout("kill_sb %p\n", s); - ceph_mdsc_pre_umount(fsc->mdsc); + ceph_mdsc_pre_umount(mdsc); flush_fs_workqueues(fsc); /* * Though the kill_anon_super() will finally trigger the - * sync_filesystem() anyway, we still need to do it here - * and then bump the stage of shutdown to stop the work - * queue as earlier as possible. + * sync_filesystem() anyway, we still need to do it here and + * then bump the stage of shutdown. This will allow us to + * drop any further message, which will increase the inodes' + * i_count reference counters but makes no sense any more, + * from MDSs. + * + * Without this when evicting the inodes it may fail in the + * kill_anon_super(), which will trigger a warning when + * destroying the fscrypt keyring and then possibly trigger + * a further crash in ceph module when the iput() tries to + * evict the inodes later. */ sync_filesystem(s); - fsc->mdsc->stopping = CEPH_MDSC_STOPPING_FLUSHED; + spin_lock(&mdsc->stopping_lock); + mdsc->stopping = CEPH_MDSC_STOPPING_FLUSHING; + wait = !!atomic_read(&mdsc->stopping_blockers); + spin_unlock(&mdsc->stopping_lock); + if (wait && atomic_read(&mdsc->stopping_blockers)) { + long timeleft = wait_for_completion_killable_timeout( + &mdsc->stopping_waiter, + fsc->client->options->mount_timeout); + if (!timeleft) /* timed out */ + pr_warn("umount timed out, %ld\n", timeleft); + else if (timeleft < 0) /* killed */ + pr_warn("umount was killed, %ld\n", timeleft); + } + + mdsc->stopping = CEPH_MDSC_STOPPING_FLUSHED; kill_anon_super(s); fsc->client->extra_mon_dispatch = NULL; diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h index b5e54c8f010b..d8eb35d73a23 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.h +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h @@ -1413,4 +1413,7 @@ extern bool ceph_quota_update_statfs(struct ceph_fs_client *fsc, struct kstatfs *buf); extern void ceph_cleanup_quotarealms_inodes(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc); +bool ceph_inc_mds_stopping_blocker(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, + struct ceph_mds_session *session); +void ceph_dec_mds_stopping_blocker(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc); #endif /* _FS_CEPH_SUPER_H */ From 1464de9f813e35559ff049f1f1f20f1e2a31d6b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiubo Li Date: Tue, 9 May 2023 16:38:49 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 47/53] ceph: wait for OSD requests' callbacks to finish when unmounting MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The sync_filesystem() will flush all the dirty buffer and submit the osd reqs to the osdc and then is blocked to wait for all the reqs to finish. But the when the reqs' replies come, the reqs will be removed from osdc just before the req->r_callback()s are called. Which means the sync_filesystem() will be woke up by leaving the req->r_callback()s are still running. This will be buggy when the waiter require the req->r_callback()s to release some resources before continuing. So we need to make sure the req->r_callback()s are called before removing the reqs from the osdc. WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 168846 at fs/crypto/keyring.c:242 fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 CPU: 4 PID: 168846 Comm: umount Tainted: G S 6.1.0-rc5-ceph-g72ead199864c #1 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5018R-WR/X10SRW-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015 RIP: 0010:fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b277e28 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88810d52ac00 RCX: ffff88810b56aa00 RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff822f3a09 RDI: ffff888108f59000 RBP: ffff8881d394fb88 R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 11ff4fe6834fcd91 R12: ffff8881d394fc40 R13: ffff888108f59000 R14: ffff8881d394f800 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fd83f6f1080(0000) GS:ffff88885fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f918d417000 CR3: 000000017f89a005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: generic_shutdown_super+0x47/0x120 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 ceph_kill_sb+0x36/0x90 [ceph] deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140 task_work_run+0x67/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23d/0x240 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fd83dc39e9b We need to increase the blocker counter to make sure all the osd requests' callbacks have been finished just before calling the kill_anon_super() when unmounting. Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/58126 Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/addr.c | 10 ++++++++++ fs/ceph/super.c | 11 +++++++++++ fs/ceph/super.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c index 95ff84930dcf..f4863078f7fe 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/addr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c @@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ static void finish_netfs_read(struct ceph_osd_request *req) } netfs_subreq_terminated(subreq, err, false); iput(req->r_inode); + ceph_dec_osd_stopping_blocker(fsc->mdsc); } static bool ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq) @@ -414,6 +415,10 @@ static void ceph_netfs_issue_read(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq) } else { osd_req_op_extent_osd_iter(req, 0, &iter); } + if (!ceph_inc_osd_stopping_blocker(fsc->mdsc)) { + err = -EIO; + goto out; + } req->r_callback = finish_netfs_read; req->r_priv = subreq; req->r_inode = inode; @@ -910,6 +915,7 @@ static void writepages_finish(struct ceph_osd_request *req) else kfree(osd_data->pages); ceph_osdc_put_request(req); + ceph_dec_osd_stopping_blocker(fsc->mdsc); } /* @@ -1218,6 +1224,10 @@ static int ceph_writepages_start(struct address_space *mapping, BUG_ON(len < ceph_fscrypt_page_offset(pages[locked_pages - 1]) + thp_size(pages[locked_pages - 1]) - offset); + if (!ceph_inc_osd_stopping_blocker(fsc->mdsc)) { + rc = -EIO; + goto release_folios; + } req->r_callback = writepages_finish; req->r_inode = inode; diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.c b/fs/ceph/super.c index 1c14d87ed871..2d7f5a8d4a92 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.c +++ b/fs/ceph/super.c @@ -1503,6 +1503,17 @@ void ceph_dec_mds_stopping_blocker(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) __dec_stopping_blocker(mdsc); } +/* For data IO requests */ +bool ceph_inc_osd_stopping_blocker(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) +{ + return __inc_stopping_blocker(mdsc); +} + +void ceph_dec_osd_stopping_blocker(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) +{ + __dec_stopping_blocker(mdsc); +} + static void ceph_kill_sb(struct super_block *s) { struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_sb_to_client(s); diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h index d8eb35d73a23..51c7f2b14f6f 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.h +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h @@ -1416,4 +1416,6 @@ extern void ceph_cleanup_quotarealms_inodes(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc); bool ceph_inc_mds_stopping_blocker(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, struct ceph_mds_session *session); void ceph_dec_mds_stopping_blocker(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc); +bool ceph_inc_osd_stopping_blocker(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc); +void ceph_dec_osd_stopping_blocker(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc); #endif /* _FS_CEPH_SUPER_H */ From 295fc4aa7de4b72cfd764b75a238f79b9433e3ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiubo Li Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 15:01:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 48/53] ceph: fix updating i_truncate_pagecache_size for fscrypt MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When fscrypt is enabled we will align the truncate size up to the CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE always, so if we truncate the size in the same block more than once, the latter ones will be skipped being invalidated from the page caches. This will force invalidating the page caches by using the smaller size than the real file size. At the same time add more debug log and fix the debug log for truncate code. Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/58834 Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/caps.c | 4 ++-- fs/ceph/inode.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c index 54041d9c1e25..028b5140a85d 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/caps.c +++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c @@ -3950,8 +3950,8 @@ static bool handle_cap_trunc(struct inode *inode, if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && size) size = extra_info->fscrypt_file_size; - dout("handle_cap_trunc inode %p mds%d seq %d to %lld seq %d\n", - inode, mds, seq, truncate_size, truncate_seq); + dout("%s inode %p mds%d seq %d to %lld truncate seq %d\n", + __func__, inode, mds, seq, truncate_size, truncate_seq); queue_trunc = ceph_fill_file_size(inode, issued, truncate_seq, truncate_size, size); return queue_trunc; diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index 83c420646f90..ea6f966dacd5 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -764,7 +764,7 @@ int ceph_fill_file_size(struct inode *inode, int issued, ceph_fscache_update(inode); ci->i_reported_size = size; if (truncate_seq != ci->i_truncate_seq) { - dout("truncate_seq %u -> %u\n", + dout("%s truncate_seq %u -> %u\n", __func__, ci->i_truncate_seq, truncate_seq); ci->i_truncate_seq = truncate_seq; @@ -788,15 +788,26 @@ int ceph_fill_file_size(struct inode *inode, int issued, } } } - if (ceph_seq_cmp(truncate_seq, ci->i_truncate_seq) >= 0 && - ci->i_truncate_size != truncate_size) { - dout("truncate_size %lld -> %llu\n", ci->i_truncate_size, - truncate_size); + + /* + * It's possible that the new sizes of the two consecutive + * size truncations will be in the same fscrypt last block, + * and we need to truncate the corresponding page caches + * anyway. + */ + if (ceph_seq_cmp(truncate_seq, ci->i_truncate_seq) >= 0) { + dout("%s truncate_size %lld -> %llu, encrypted %d\n", __func__, + ci->i_truncate_size, truncate_size, !!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)); + ci->i_truncate_size = truncate_size; - if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) + + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { + dout("%s truncate_pagecache_size %lld -> %llu\n", + __func__, ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size, size); ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size = size; - else + } else { ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size = truncate_size; + } } return queue_trunc; } @@ -2155,7 +2166,7 @@ void __ceph_do_pending_vmtruncate(struct inode *inode) retry: spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); if (ci->i_truncate_pending == 0) { - dout("__do_pending_vmtruncate %p none pending\n", inode); + dout("%s %p none pending\n", __func__, inode); spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); mutex_unlock(&ci->i_truncate_mutex); return; @@ -2167,8 +2178,7 @@ void __ceph_do_pending_vmtruncate(struct inode *inode) */ if (ci->i_wrbuffer_ref_head < ci->i_wrbuffer_ref) { spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); - dout("__do_pending_vmtruncate %p flushing snaps first\n", - inode); + dout("%s %p flushing snaps first\n", __func__, inode); filemap_write_and_wait_range(&inode->i_data, 0, inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes); goto retry; @@ -2179,7 +2189,7 @@ void __ceph_do_pending_vmtruncate(struct inode *inode) to = ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size; wrbuffer_refs = ci->i_wrbuffer_ref; - dout("__do_pending_vmtruncate %p (%d) to %lld\n", inode, + dout("%s %p (%d) to %lld\n", __func__, inode, ci->i_truncate_pending, to); spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); @@ -2371,6 +2381,9 @@ static int fill_fscrypt_truncate(struct inode *inode, header.data_len = cpu_to_le32(8 + 8 + 4 + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE); header.file_offset = cpu_to_le64(orig_pos); + dout("%s encrypt block boff/bsize %d/%lu\n", __func__, + boff, CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE); + /* truncate and zero out the extra contents for the last block */ memset(iov.iov_base + boff, 0, PAGE_SIZE - boff); From d9ae977d2d5635bde4fe75657417f5cffb14c954 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Lu=C3=ADs=20Henriques?= Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2023 18:14:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 49/53] ceph: switch ceph_lookup/atomic_open() to use new fscrypt helper MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Instead of setting the no-key dentry, use the new fscrypt_prepare_lookup_partial() helper. We still need to mark the directory as incomplete if the directory was just unlocked. In ceph_atomic_open() this fixes a bug where a dentry is incorrectly set with DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME when 'dir' has been evicted but the key is still available (for example, where there's a drop_caches). Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/dir.c | 13 +++++++------ fs/ceph/file.c | 8 +++----- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index 0e4f8e07022d..854cbdd66661 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -785,14 +785,15 @@ static struct dentry *ceph_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { - err = ceph_fscrypt_prepare_readdir(dir); + bool had_key = fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir); + + err = fscrypt_prepare_lookup_partial(dir, dentry); if (err < 0) return ERR_PTR(err); - if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { - spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock); - dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME; - spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); - } + + /* mark directory as incomplete if it has been unlocked */ + if (!had_key && fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) + ceph_dir_clear_complete(dir); } /* can we conclude ENOENT locally? */ diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index e58787233e42..b1da02f5dbe3 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -791,11 +791,9 @@ int ceph_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, ihold(dir); if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_FSCRYPT_FILE, &req->r_req_flags); - if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { - spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock); - dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME; - spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); - } + err = fscrypt_prepare_lookup_partial(dir, dentry); + if (err < 0) + goto out_req; } if (flags & O_CREAT) { From e6a28d6303a987a922b9107321d87592b2e6da77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2023 18:32:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 50/53] libceph: do not include crypto/algapi.h The header file crypto/algapi.h is for internal use only. Use the header file crypto/utils.h instead. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c index d0a1fb422617..d09a39ff2cf0 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ #include #include -#include /* for crypto_memneq() */ #include #include +#include #include #include #include From cd59cdefc2f101bfc99ee5bd38512ebba7b75471 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jinjie Ruan Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2023 16:59:29 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 51/53] rbd: use list_for_each_entry() helper Convert list_for_each() to list_for_each_entry() so that the tmp list_head pointer and list_entry() call are no longer needed, which can reduce a few lines of code. No functional changed. Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- drivers/block/rbd.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/rbd.c b/drivers/block/rbd.c index 2328cc05be36..3de11f077144 100644 --- a/drivers/block/rbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/rbd.c @@ -7199,7 +7199,6 @@ static void rbd_dev_remove_parent(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev) static ssize_t do_rbd_remove(const char *buf, size_t count) { struct rbd_device *rbd_dev = NULL; - struct list_head *tmp; int dev_id; char opt_buf[6]; bool force = false; @@ -7226,8 +7225,7 @@ static ssize_t do_rbd_remove(const char *buf, size_t count) ret = -ENOENT; spin_lock(&rbd_dev_list_lock); - list_for_each(tmp, &rbd_dev_list) { - rbd_dev = list_entry(tmp, struct rbd_device, node); + list_for_each_entry(rbd_dev, &rbd_dev_list, node) { if (rbd_dev->dev_id == dev_id) { ret = 0; break; From 3af5ae22030cb59fab4fba35f5a2b62f47e14df9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiubo Li Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 09:44:40 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 52/53] ceph: make members in struct ceph_mds_request_args_ext a union In ceph mainline it will allow to set the btime in the setattr request and just add a 'btime' member in the union 'ceph_mds_request_args' and then bump up the header version to 4. That means the total size of union 'ceph_mds_request_args' will increase sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) bytes, but in kclient it will increase the sizeof(setattr_ext) bytes for each request. Since the MDS will always depend on the header's vesion and front_len members to decode the 'ceph_mds_request_head' struct, at the same time kclient hasn't supported the 'btime' feature yet in setattr request, so it's safe to do this change here. This will save 48 bytes memories for each request. Fixes: 4f1ddb1ea874 ("ceph: implement updated ceph_mds_request_head structure") Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h | 24 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h b/include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h index 45f8ce61e103..ae44812eb6d4 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h @@ -467,17 +467,19 @@ union ceph_mds_request_args { } __attribute__ ((packed)); union ceph_mds_request_args_ext { - union ceph_mds_request_args old; - struct { - __le32 mode; - __le32 uid; - __le32 gid; - struct ceph_timespec mtime; - struct ceph_timespec atime; - __le64 size, old_size; /* old_size needed by truncate */ - __le32 mask; /* CEPH_SETATTR_* */ - struct ceph_timespec btime; - } __attribute__ ((packed)) setattr_ext; + union { + union ceph_mds_request_args old; + struct { + __le32 mode; + __le32 uid; + __le32 gid; + struct ceph_timespec mtime; + struct ceph_timespec atime; + __le64 size, old_size; /* old_size needed by truncate */ + __le32 mask; /* CEPH_SETATTR_* */ + struct ceph_timespec btime; + } __attribute__ ((packed)) setattr_ext; + }; }; #define CEPH_MDS_FLAG_REPLAY 1 /* this is a replayed op */ From ce0d5bd3a6c176f9a3bf867624a07119dd4d0878 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiubo Li Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 17:51:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 53/53] ceph: make num_fwd and num_retry to __u32 The num_fwd in MClientRequestForward is int32_t, while the num_fwd in ceph_mds_request_head is __u8. This is buggy when the num_fwd is larger than 256 it will always be truncate to 0 again. But the client couldn't recoginize this. This will make them to __u32 instead. Because the old cephs will directly copy the raw memories when decoding the reqeust's head, so we need to make sure this kclient will be compatible with old cephs. For newer cephs they will decode the requests depending the version, which will be much simpler and easier to extend new members. Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/62145 Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Reviewed-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn Reviewed-by: Milind Changire Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 189 +++++++++++++++++++---------------- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 4 +- include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h | 23 ++++- 3 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 04a881343e43..615db141b6c4 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -2840,6 +2840,18 @@ static void encode_mclientrequest_tail(void **p, } } +static struct ceph_mds_request_head_legacy * +find_legacy_request_head(void *p, u64 features) +{ + bool legacy = !(features & CEPH_FEATURE_FS_BTIME); + struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *ohead; + + if (legacy) + return (struct ceph_mds_request_head_legacy *)p; + ohead = (struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *)p; + return (struct ceph_mds_request_head_legacy *)&ohead->oldest_client_tid; +} + /* * called under mdsc->mutex */ @@ -2850,7 +2862,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, int mds = session->s_mds; struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = session->s_mdsc; struct ceph_msg *msg; - struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *head; + struct ceph_mds_request_head_legacy *lhead; const char *path1 = NULL; const char *path2 = NULL; u64 ino1 = 0, ino2 = 0; @@ -2862,6 +2874,8 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, void *p, *end; int ret; bool legacy = !(session->s_con.peer_features & CEPH_FEATURE_FS_BTIME); + bool old_version = !test_bit(CEPHFS_FEATURE_32BITS_RETRY_FWD, + &session->s_features); ret = set_request_path_attr(req->r_inode, req->r_dentry, req->r_parent, req->r_path1, req->r_ino1.ino, @@ -2893,7 +2907,19 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, goto out_free2; } - len = legacy ? sizeof(*head) : sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_head); + /* + * For old cephs without supporting the 32bit retry/fwd feature + * it will copy the raw memories directly when decoding the + * requests. While new cephs will decode the head depending the + * version member, so we need to make sure it will be compatible + * with them both. + */ + if (legacy) + len = sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_head_legacy); + else if (old_version) + len = sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_head_old); + else + len = sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_head); /* filepaths */ len += 2 * (1 + sizeof(u32) + sizeof(u64)); @@ -2938,33 +2964,40 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, msg->hdr.tid = cpu_to_le64(req->r_tid); + lhead = find_legacy_request_head(msg->front.iov_base, + session->s_con.peer_features); + /* - * The old ceph_mds_request_head didn't contain a version field, and + * The ceph_mds_request_head_legacy didn't contain a version field, and * one was added when we moved the message version from 3->4. */ if (legacy) { msg->hdr.version = cpu_to_le16(3); - head = msg->front.iov_base; - p = msg->front.iov_base + sizeof(*head); + p = msg->front.iov_base + sizeof(*lhead); + } else if (old_version) { + struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *ohead = msg->front.iov_base; + + msg->hdr.version = cpu_to_le16(4); + ohead->version = cpu_to_le16(1); + p = msg->front.iov_base + sizeof(*ohead); } else { - struct ceph_mds_request_head *new_head = msg->front.iov_base; + struct ceph_mds_request_head *nhead = msg->front.iov_base; msg->hdr.version = cpu_to_le16(6); - new_head->version = cpu_to_le16(CEPH_MDS_REQUEST_HEAD_VERSION); - head = (struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *)&new_head->oldest_client_tid; - p = msg->front.iov_base + sizeof(*new_head); + nhead->version = cpu_to_le16(CEPH_MDS_REQUEST_HEAD_VERSION); + p = msg->front.iov_base + sizeof(*nhead); } end = msg->front.iov_base + msg->front.iov_len; - head->mdsmap_epoch = cpu_to_le32(mdsc->mdsmap->m_epoch); - head->op = cpu_to_le32(req->r_op); - head->caller_uid = cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(&init_user_ns, - req->r_cred->fsuid)); - head->caller_gid = cpu_to_le32(from_kgid(&init_user_ns, - req->r_cred->fsgid)); - head->ino = cpu_to_le64(req->r_deleg_ino); - head->args = req->r_args; + lhead->mdsmap_epoch = cpu_to_le32(mdsc->mdsmap->m_epoch); + lhead->op = cpu_to_le32(req->r_op); + lhead->caller_uid = cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(&init_user_ns, + req->r_cred->fsuid)); + lhead->caller_gid = cpu_to_le32(from_kgid(&init_user_ns, + req->r_cred->fsgid)); + lhead->ino = cpu_to_le64(req->r_deleg_ino); + lhead->args = req->r_args; ceph_encode_filepath(&p, end, ino1, path1); ceph_encode_filepath(&p, end, ino2, path2); @@ -3006,7 +3039,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, p = msg->front.iov_base + req->r_request_release_offset; } - head->num_releases = cpu_to_le16(releases); + lhead->num_releases = cpu_to_le16(releases); encode_mclientrequest_tail(&p, req); @@ -3057,18 +3090,6 @@ static void complete_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, complete_all(&req->r_completion); } -static struct ceph_mds_request_head_old * -find_old_request_head(void *p, u64 features) -{ - bool legacy = !(features & CEPH_FEATURE_FS_BTIME); - struct ceph_mds_request_head *new_head; - - if (legacy) - return (struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *)p; - new_head = (struct ceph_mds_request_head *)p; - return (struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *)&new_head->oldest_client_tid; -} - /* * called under mdsc->mutex */ @@ -3078,29 +3099,28 @@ static int __prepare_send_request(struct ceph_mds_session *session, { int mds = session->s_mds; struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = session->s_mdsc; - struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *rhead; + struct ceph_mds_request_head_legacy *lhead; + struct ceph_mds_request_head *nhead; struct ceph_msg *msg; - int flags = 0, max_retry; + int flags = 0, old_max_retry; + bool old_version = !test_bit(CEPHFS_FEATURE_32BITS_RETRY_FWD, + &session->s_features); /* - * The type of 'r_attempts' in kernel 'ceph_mds_request' - * is 'int', while in 'ceph_mds_request_head' the type of - * 'num_retry' is '__u8'. So in case the request retries - * exceeding 256 times, the MDS will receive a incorrect - * retry seq. - * - * In this case it's ususally a bug in MDS and continue - * retrying the request makes no sense. - * - * In future this could be fixed in ceph code, so avoid - * using the hardcode here. + * Avoid inifinite retrying after overflow. The client will + * increase the retry count and if the MDS is old version, + * so we limit to retry at most 256 times. */ - max_retry = sizeof_field(struct ceph_mds_request_head, num_retry); - max_retry = 1 << (max_retry * BITS_PER_BYTE); - if (req->r_attempts >= max_retry) { - pr_warn_ratelimited("%s request tid %llu seq overflow\n", - __func__, req->r_tid); - return -EMULTIHOP; + if (req->r_attempts) { + old_max_retry = sizeof_field(struct ceph_mds_request_head_old, + num_retry); + old_max_retry = 1 << (old_max_retry * BITS_PER_BYTE); + if ((old_version && req->r_attempts >= old_max_retry) || + ((uint32_t)req->r_attempts >= U32_MAX)) { + pr_warn_ratelimited("%s request tid %llu seq overflow\n", + __func__, req->r_tid); + return -EMULTIHOP; + } } req->r_attempts++; @@ -3126,20 +3146,24 @@ static int __prepare_send_request(struct ceph_mds_session *session, * d_move mangles the src name. */ msg = req->r_request; - rhead = find_old_request_head(msg->front.iov_base, - session->s_con.peer_features); + lhead = find_legacy_request_head(msg->front.iov_base, + session->s_con.peer_features); - flags = le32_to_cpu(rhead->flags); + flags = le32_to_cpu(lhead->flags); flags |= CEPH_MDS_FLAG_REPLAY; - rhead->flags = cpu_to_le32(flags); + lhead->flags = cpu_to_le32(flags); if (req->r_target_inode) - rhead->ino = cpu_to_le64(ceph_ino(req->r_target_inode)); + lhead->ino = cpu_to_le64(ceph_ino(req->r_target_inode)); - rhead->num_retry = req->r_attempts - 1; + lhead->num_retry = req->r_attempts - 1; + if (!old_version) { + nhead = (struct ceph_mds_request_head*)msg->front.iov_base; + nhead->ext_num_retry = cpu_to_le32(req->r_attempts - 1); + } /* remove cap/dentry releases from message */ - rhead->num_releases = 0; + lhead->num_releases = 0; p = msg->front.iov_base + req->r_request_release_offset; encode_mclientrequest_tail(&p, req); @@ -3160,18 +3184,23 @@ static int __prepare_send_request(struct ceph_mds_session *session, } req->r_request = msg; - rhead = find_old_request_head(msg->front.iov_base, - session->s_con.peer_features); - rhead->oldest_client_tid = cpu_to_le64(__get_oldest_tid(mdsc)); + lhead = find_legacy_request_head(msg->front.iov_base, + session->s_con.peer_features); + lhead->oldest_client_tid = cpu_to_le64(__get_oldest_tid(mdsc)); if (test_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_GOT_UNSAFE, &req->r_req_flags)) flags |= CEPH_MDS_FLAG_REPLAY; if (test_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_ASYNC, &req->r_req_flags)) flags |= CEPH_MDS_FLAG_ASYNC; if (req->r_parent) flags |= CEPH_MDS_FLAG_WANT_DENTRY; - rhead->flags = cpu_to_le32(flags); - rhead->num_fwd = req->r_num_fwd; - rhead->num_retry = req->r_attempts - 1; + lhead->flags = cpu_to_le32(flags); + lhead->num_fwd = req->r_num_fwd; + lhead->num_retry = req->r_attempts - 1; + if (!old_version) { + nhead = (struct ceph_mds_request_head*)msg->front.iov_base; + nhead->ext_num_fwd = cpu_to_le32(req->r_num_fwd); + nhead->ext_num_retry = cpu_to_le32(req->r_attempts - 1); + } dout(" r_parent = %p\n", req->r_parent); return 0; @@ -3830,33 +3859,21 @@ static void handle_forward(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, if (test_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_ABORTED, &req->r_req_flags)) { dout("forward tid %llu aborted, unregistering\n", tid); __unregister_request(mdsc, req); - } else if (fwd_seq <= req->r_num_fwd) { + } else if (fwd_seq <= req->r_num_fwd || (uint32_t)fwd_seq >= U32_MAX) { /* - * The type of 'num_fwd' in ceph 'MClientRequestForward' - * is 'int32_t', while in 'ceph_mds_request_head' the - * type is '__u8'. So in case the request bounces between - * MDSes exceeding 256 times, the client will get stuck. + * Avoid inifinite retrying after overflow. * - * In this case it's ususally a bug in MDS and continue - * bouncing the request makes no sense. - * - * In future this could be fixed in ceph code, so avoid - * using the hardcode here. + * The MDS will increase the fwd count and in client side + * if the num_fwd is less than the one saved in request + * that means the MDS is an old version and overflowed of + * 8 bits. */ - int max = sizeof_field(struct ceph_mds_request_head, num_fwd); - max = 1 << (max * BITS_PER_BYTE); - if (req->r_num_fwd >= max) { - mutex_lock(&req->r_fill_mutex); - req->r_err = -EMULTIHOP; - set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_ABORTED, &req->r_req_flags); - mutex_unlock(&req->r_fill_mutex); - aborted = true; - pr_warn_ratelimited("forward tid %llu seq overflow\n", - tid); - } else { - dout("forward tid %llu to mds%d - old seq %d <= %d\n", - tid, next_mds, req->r_num_fwd, fwd_seq); - } + mutex_lock(&req->r_fill_mutex); + req->r_err = -EMULTIHOP; + set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_ABORTED, &req->r_req_flags); + mutex_unlock(&req->r_fill_mutex); + aborted = true; + pr_warn_ratelimited("forward tid %llu seq overflow\n", tid); } else { /* resend. forward race not possible; mds would drop */ dout("forward tid %llu to mds%d (we resend)\n", tid, next_mds); diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h index 1fa0f78b7b79..5a3714bdd64a 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h @@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ enum ceph_feature_type { CEPHFS_FEATURE_ALTERNATE_NAME, CEPHFS_FEATURE_NOTIFY_SESSION_STATE, CEPHFS_FEATURE_OP_GETVXATTR, + CEPHFS_FEATURE_32BITS_RETRY_FWD, - CEPHFS_FEATURE_MAX = CEPHFS_FEATURE_OP_GETVXATTR, + CEPHFS_FEATURE_MAX = CEPHFS_FEATURE_32BITS_RETRY_FWD, }; #define CEPHFS_FEATURES_CLIENT_SUPPORTED { \ @@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ enum ceph_feature_type { CEPHFS_FEATURE_ALTERNATE_NAME, \ CEPHFS_FEATURE_NOTIFY_SESSION_STATE, \ CEPHFS_FEATURE_OP_GETVXATTR, \ + CEPHFS_FEATURE_32BITS_RETRY_FWD, \ } /* diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h b/include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h index ae44812eb6d4..5f2301ee88bc 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ union ceph_mds_request_args_ext { #define CEPH_MDS_FLAG_WANT_DENTRY 2 /* want dentry in reply */ #define CEPH_MDS_FLAG_ASYNC 4 /* request is asynchronous */ -struct ceph_mds_request_head_old { +struct ceph_mds_request_head_legacy { __le64 oldest_client_tid; __le32 mdsmap_epoch; /* on client */ __le32 flags; /* CEPH_MDS_FLAG_* */ @@ -499,9 +499,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_request_head_old { union ceph_mds_request_args args; } __attribute__ ((packed)); -#define CEPH_MDS_REQUEST_HEAD_VERSION 1 +#define CEPH_MDS_REQUEST_HEAD_VERSION 2 -struct ceph_mds_request_head { +struct ceph_mds_request_head_old { __le16 version; /* struct version */ __le64 oldest_client_tid; __le32 mdsmap_epoch; /* on client */ @@ -515,6 +515,23 @@ struct ceph_mds_request_head { union ceph_mds_request_args_ext args; } __attribute__ ((packed)); +struct ceph_mds_request_head { + __le16 version; /* struct version */ + __le64 oldest_client_tid; + __le32 mdsmap_epoch; /* on client */ + __le32 flags; /* CEPH_MDS_FLAG_* */ + __u8 num_retry, num_fwd; /* legacy count retry and fwd attempts */ + __le16 num_releases; /* # include cap/lease release records */ + __le32 op; /* mds op code */ + __le32 caller_uid, caller_gid; + __le64 ino; /* use this ino for openc, mkdir, mknod, + etc. (if replaying) */ + union ceph_mds_request_args_ext args; + + __le32 ext_num_retry; /* new count retry attempts */ + __le32 ext_num_fwd; /* new count fwd attempts */ +} __attribute__ ((packed)); + /* cap/lease release record */ struct ceph_mds_request_release { __le64 ino, cap_id; /* ino and unique cap id */