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Bluetooth: use inclusive language in SMP

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This patch replaces some non-inclusive terms based on the appropriate
language mapping table compiled by the Bluetooth SIG:
https://specificationrefs.bluetooth.com/language-mapping/Appropriate_Language_Mapping_Table.pdf

Specifically, these terms are replaced:
master -> initiator
slave  -> responder

Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka <apusaka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
This commit is contained in:
Archie Pusaka 2021-05-31 16:37:25 +08:00 committed by Marcel Holtmann
parent ef365da180
commit fad646e16d
4 changed files with 43 additions and 41 deletions
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2
include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h
View File

@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ struct mgmt_cp_load_link_keys {
struct mgmt_ltk_info { struct mgmt_ltk_info {
struct mgmt_addr_info addr; struct mgmt_addr_info addr;
__u8 type; __u8 type;
__u8 master; __u8 initiator;
__u8 enc_size; __u8 enc_size;
__le16 ediv; __le16 ediv;
__le64 rand; __le64 rand;

10
net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
View File

@ -6169,7 +6169,7 @@ static int load_irks(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *cp_data,
static bool ltk_is_valid(struct mgmt_ltk_info *key) static bool ltk_is_valid(struct mgmt_ltk_info *key)
{ {
if (key->master != 0x00 && key->master != 0x01) if (key->initiator != 0x00 && key->initiator != 0x01)
return false; return false;
switch (key->addr.type) { switch (key->addr.type) {
@ -6247,11 +6247,11 @@ static int load_long_term_keys(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev,
switch (key->type) { switch (key->type) {
case MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED: case MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED:
authenticated = 0x00; authenticated = 0x00;
type = key->master ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_SLAVE; type = key->initiator ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_RESPONDER;
break; break;
case MGMT_LTK_AUTHENTICATED: case MGMT_LTK_AUTHENTICATED:
authenticated = 0x01; authenticated = 0x01;
type = key->master ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_SLAVE; type = key->initiator ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_RESPONDER;
break; break;
case MGMT_LTK_P256_UNAUTH: case MGMT_LTK_P256_UNAUTH:
authenticated = 0x00; authenticated = 0x00;
@ -8649,7 +8649,7 @@ static u8 mgmt_ltk_type(struct smp_ltk *ltk)
{ {
switch (ltk->type) { switch (ltk->type) {
case SMP_LTK: case SMP_LTK:
case SMP_LTK_SLAVE: case SMP_LTK_RESPONDER:
if (ltk->authenticated) if (ltk->authenticated)
return MGMT_LTK_AUTHENTICATED; return MGMT_LTK_AUTHENTICATED;
return MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED; return MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED;
@ -8695,7 +8695,7 @@ void mgmt_new_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct smp_ltk *key, bool persistent)
ev.key.rand = key->rand; ev.key.rand = key->rand;
if (key->type == SMP_LTK) if (key->type == SMP_LTK)
ev.key.master = 1; ev.key.initiator = 1;
/* Make sure we copy only the significant bytes based on the /* Make sure we copy only the significant bytes based on the
* encryption key size, and set the rest of the value to zeroes. * encryption key size, and set the rest of the value to zeroes.

66
net/bluetooth/smp.c
View File

@ -111,9 +111,9 @@ struct smp_chan {
u8 id_addr_type; u8 id_addr_type;
u8 irk[16]; u8 irk[16];
struct smp_csrk *csrk; struct smp_csrk *csrk;
struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk; struct smp_csrk *responder_csrk;
struct smp_ltk *ltk; struct smp_ltk *ltk;
struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk; struct smp_ltk *responder_ltk;
struct smp_irk *remote_irk; struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
u8 *link_key; u8 *link_key;
unsigned long flags; unsigned long flags;
@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete); mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk); kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk);
kfree_sensitive(smp->slave_csrk); kfree_sensitive(smp->responder_csrk);
kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key); kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
@ -776,9 +776,9 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
} }
if (smp->slave_ltk) { if (smp->responder_ltk) {
list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list); list_del_rcu(&smp->responder_ltk->list);
kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu); kfree_rcu(smp->responder_ltk, rcu);
} }
if (smp->remote_irk) { if (smp->remote_irk) {
@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
int ret; int ret;
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); conn->hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
@ -1021,8 +1021,8 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
else else
auth = 0; auth = 0;
/* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the /* Even though there's no _RESPONDER suffix this is the
* slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master * responder STK we're adding for later lookup (the initiator
* STK never needs to be stored). * STK never needs to be stored).
*/ */
hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
@ -1077,10 +1077,10 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent); mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
} }
if (smp->slave_csrk) { if (smp->responder_csrk) {
smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); bacpy(&smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent); mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->responder_csrk, persistent);
} }
if (smp->ltk) { if (smp->ltk) {
@ -1089,10 +1089,10 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent); mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
} }
if (smp->slave_ltk) { if (smp->responder_ltk) {
smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); bacpy(&smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent); mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->responder_ltk, persistent);
} }
if (smp->link_key) { if (smp->link_key) {
@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident ident;
struct smp_ltk *ltk; struct smp_ltk *ltk;
u8 authenticated; u8 authenticated;
__le16 ediv; __le16 ediv;
@ -1293,14 +1293,15 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH; authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk, SMP_LTK_RESPONDER, authenticated, enc.ltk,
smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
smp->slave_ltk = ltk; smp->responder_ltk = ltk;
ident.ediv = ediv; ident.ediv = ediv;
ident.rand = rand; ident.rand = rand;
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT, sizeof(ident),
&ident);
*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
} }
@ -1343,7 +1344,7 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED; csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
} }
smp->slave_csrk = csrk; smp->responder_csrk = csrk;
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
@ -2048,7 +2049,7 @@ static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
u8 auth; u8 auth;
/* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */ /* The issue is only observed when we're in responder role */
if (hcon->out) if (hcon->out)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@ -2084,7 +2085,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf)) if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
@ -2251,7 +2253,7 @@ static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size); hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size; hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
/* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */ /* We never store STKs for initiator role, so clear this flag */
clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
return true; return true;
@ -2467,7 +2469,7 @@ int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
/* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to /* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to
* remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */ * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */
smp->ltk = NULL; smp->ltk = NULL;
smp->slave_ltk = NULL; smp->responder_ltk = NULL;
smp->remote_irk = NULL; smp->remote_irk = NULL;
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags)) if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
@ -2503,7 +2505,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
} }
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT); SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT);
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
@ -2512,9 +2514,9 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0; return 0;
} }
static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) static int smp_cmd_initiator_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{ {
struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data; struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident *rp = (void *)skb->data;
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
@ -2913,7 +2915,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0; return 0;
} }
/* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */ /* Responder sends DHKey check as response to initiator */
sc_dhkey_check(smp); sc_dhkey_check(smp);
} }
@ -3000,8 +3002,8 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb); reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
break; break;
case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT: case SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT:
reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb); reason = smp_cmd_initiator_ident(conn, skb);
break; break;
case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:

6
net/bluetooth/smp.h
View File

@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info {
__u8 ltk[16]; __u8 ltk[16];
} __packed; } __packed;
#define SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT 0x07 #define SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT 0x07
struct smp_cmd_master_ident { struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident {
__le16 ediv; __le16 ediv;
__le64 rand; __le64 rand;
} __packed; } __packed;
@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify {
enum { enum {
SMP_STK, SMP_STK,
SMP_LTK, SMP_LTK,
SMP_LTK_SLAVE, SMP_LTK_RESPONDER,
SMP_LTK_P256, SMP_LTK_P256,
SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG, SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG,
}; };