This reverts commit 2a010c4128.
Rui Ueyama <rui314@gmail.com> writes:
> I'm the creator and the maintainer of the mold linker
> (https://github.com/rui314/mold). Recently, we discovered that mold
> started causing process crashes in certain situations due to a change
> in the Linux kernel. Here are the details:
>
> - In general, overwriting an existing file is much faster than
> creating an empty file and writing to it on Linux, so mold attempts to
> reuse an existing executable file if it exists.
>
> - If a program is running, opening the executable file for writing
> previously failed with ETXTBSY. If that happens, mold falls back to
> creating a new file.
>
> - However, the Linux kernel recently changed the behavior so that
> writing to an executable file is now always permitted
> (https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=2a010c412853).
>
> That caused mold to write to an executable file even if there's a
> process running that file. Since changes to mmap'ed files are
> immediately visible to other processes, any processes running that
> file would almost certainly crash in a very mysterious way.
> Identifying the cause of these random crashes took us a few days.
>
> Rejecting writes to an executable file that is currently running is a
> well-known behavior, and Linux had operated that way for a very long
> time. So, I don’t believe relying on this behavior was our mistake;
> rather, I see this as a regression in the Linux kernel.
Quoting myself from commit 2a010c4128 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec")
> Yes, someone in userspace could potentially be relying on this. It's not
> completely out of the realm of possibility but let's find out if that's
> actually the case and not guess.
It seems we found out that someone is relying on this obscure behavior.
So revert the change.
Link: https://github.com/rui314/mold/issues/1361
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4a2bc207-76be-4715-8e12-7fc45a76a125@leemhuis.info
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
AT_HWCAP3 and AT_HWCAP4 were recently defined for use on PowerPC in commit
3281366a8e ("uapi/auxvec: Define AT_HWCAP3 and AT_HWCAP4 aux vector,
entries"). Since we want to start using AT_HWCAP3 on arm64 add support for
exposing both these new hwcaps via binfmt_elf.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241004-arm64-elf-hwcap3-v2-1-799d1daad8b0@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
create_elf_fdpic_tables() does not correctly account the space for the
AUX vector when an architecture has ELF_HWCAP2 defined. Prior to the
commit 10e29251be ("binfmt_elf_fdpic: fix /proc/<pid>/auxv") it
resulted in the last entry of the AUX vector being set to zero, but with
that change it results in a kernel BUG.
Fix that by adding one to the number of AUXV entries (nitems) when
ELF_HWCAP2 is defined.
Fixes: 10e29251be ("binfmt_elf_fdpic: fix /proc/<pid>/auxv")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5b51975f-6d0b-413c-8b38-39a6a45e8821@westnet.com.au/
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240826032745.3423812-1-jcmvbkbc@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Back in 2021 we already discussed removing deny_write_access() for
executables. Back then I was hesistant because I thought that this might
cause issues in userspace. But even back then I had started taking some
notes on what could potentially depend on this and I didn't come up with
a lot so I've changed my mind and I would like to try this.
Here are some of the notes that I took:
(1) The deny_write_access() mechanism is causing really pointless issues
such as [1]. If a thread in a thread-group opens a file writable,
then writes some stuff, then closing the file descriptor and then
calling execve() they can fail the execve() with ETXTBUSY because
another thread in the thread-group could have concurrently called
fork(). Multi-threaded libraries such as go suffer from this.
(2) There are userspace attacks that rely on overwriting the binary of a
running process. These attacks are _mitigated_ but _not at all
prevented_ from ocurring by the deny_write_access() mechanism.
I'll go over some details. The clearest example of such attacks was
the attack against runC in CVE-2019-5736 (cf. [3]).
An attack could compromise the runC host binary from inside a
_privileged_ runC container. The malicious binary could then be used
to take over the host.
(It is crucial to note that this attack is _not_ possible with
unprivileged containers. IOW, the setup here is already insecure.)
The attack can be made when attaching to a running container or when
starting a container running a specially crafted image. For example,
when runC attaches to a container the attacker can trick it into
executing itself.
This could be done by replacing the target binary inside the
container with a custom binary pointing back at the runC binary
itself. As an example, if the target binary was /bin/bash, this
could be replaced with an executable script specifying the
interpreter path #!/proc/self/exe.
As such when /bin/bash is executed inside the container, instead the
target of /proc/self/exe will be executed. That magic link will
point to the runc binary on the host. The attacker can then proceed
to write to the target of /proc/self/exe to try and overwrite the
runC binary on the host.
However, this will not succeed because of deny_write_access(). Now,
one might think that this would prevent the attack but it doesn't.
To overcome this, the attacker has multiple ways:
* Open a file descriptor to /proc/self/exe using the O_PATH flag and
then proceed to reopen the binary as O_WRONLY through
/proc/self/fd/<nr> and try to write to it in a busy loop from a
separate process. Ultimately it will succeed when the runC binary
exits. After this the runC binary is compromised and can be used
to attack other containers or the host itself.
* Use a malicious shared library annotating a function in there with
the constructor attribute making the malicious function run as an
initializor. The malicious library will then open /proc/self/exe
for creating a new entry under /proc/self/fd/<nr>. It'll then call
exec to a) force runC to exit and b) hand the file descriptor off
to a program that then reopens /proc/self/fd/<nr> for writing
(which is now possible because runC has exited) and overwriting
that binary.
To sum up: the deny_write_access() mechanism doesn't prevent such
attacks in insecure setups. It just makes them minimally harder.
That's all.
The only way back then to prevent this is to create a temporary copy
of the calling binary itself when it starts or attaches to
containers. So what I did back then for LXC (and Aleksa for runC)
was to create an anonymous, in-memory file using the memfd_create()
system call and to copy itself into the temporary in-memory file,
which is then sealed to prevent further modifications. This sealed,
in-memory file copy is then executed instead of the original on-disk
binary.
Any compromising write operations from a privileged container to the
host binary will then write to the temporary in-memory binary and
not to the host binary on-disk, preserving the integrity of the host
binary. Also as the temporary, in-memory binary is sealed, writes to
this will also fail.
The point is that deny_write_access() is uselss to prevent these
attacks.
(3) Denying write access to an inode because it's currently used in an
exec path could easily be done on an LSM level. It might need an
additional hook but that should be about it.
(4) The MAP_DENYWRITE flag for mmap() has been deprecated a long time
ago so while we do protect the main executable the bigger portion of
the things you'd think need protecting such as the shared libraries
aren't. IOW, we let anyone happily overwrite shared libraries.
(5) We removed all remaining uses of VM_DENYWRITE in [2]. That means:
(5.1) We removed the legacy uselib() protection for preventing
overwriting of shared libraries. Nobody cared in 3 years.
(5.2) We allow write access to the elf interpreter after exec
completed treating it on a par with shared libraries.
Yes, someone in userspace could potentially be relying on this. It's not
completely out of the realm of possibility but let's find out if that's
actually the case and not guess.
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/22315 [1]
Link: 49624efa65 ("Merge tag 'denywrite-for-5.15' of git://github.com/davidhildenbrand/linux") [2]
Link: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/breaking-docker-via-runc-explaining-cve-2019-5736 [3]
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/866493
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/22220
Link: 5bf8c0cf09/src/cmd/go/internal/work/buildid.go (L724)
Link: 5bf8c0cf09/src/cmd/go/internal/work/exec.go (L1493)
Link: 5bf8c0cf09/src/cmd/go/internal/script/cmds.go (L457)
Link: 5bf8c0cf09/src/cmd/go/internal/test/test.go (L1557)
Link: 5bf8c0cf09/src/os/exec/lp_linux_test.go (L61)
Link: https://github.com/buildkite/agent/pull/2736
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/114554
Link: https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-8068370
Link: https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/issues/58964
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240531-vfs-i_writecount-v1-1-a17bea7ee36b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Althought FDPIC linux kernel provides /proc/<pid>/auxv files they are
empty because there's no code that initializes mm->saved_auxv in the
FDPIC ELF loader.
Synchronize FDPIC ELF aux vector setup with ELF. Replace entry-by-entry
aux vector copying to userspace with initialization of mm->saved_auxv
first and then copying it to userspace as a whole.
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322195418.2160164-1-jcmvbkbc@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Static FDPIC executable may get an executable stack even when it has
non-executable GNU_STACK segment. This happens when STACK segment has rw
permissions, but does not specify stack size. In that case FDPIC loader
uses permissions of the interpreter's stack, and for static executables
with no interpreter it results in choosing the arch-default permissions
for the stack.
Fix that by using the interpreter's properties only when the interpreter
is actually used.
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118150637.660461-1-jcmvbkbc@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
- Support non-BSS ELF segments with 0 filesz (Eric W. Biederman, Kees Cook)
- Enable namespaced binfmt_misc (Christian Brauner)
- Remove struct tag 'dynamic' from ELF UAPI (Alejandro Colomar)
- Clean up binfmt_elf_fdpic debug output (Greg Ungerer)
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Merge tag 'execve-v6.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull execve updates from Kees Cook:
- Support non-BSS ELF segments with zero filesz
Eric Biederman and I refactored ELF segment loading to handle the
case where a segment has a smaller filesz than memsz. Traditionally
linkers only did this for .bss and it was always the last segment. As
a result, the kernel only handled this case when it was the last
segment. We've had two recent cases where linkers were trying to use
these kinds of segments for other reasons, and the were in the middle
of the segment list. There was no good reason for the kernel not to
support this, and the refactor actually ends up making things more
readable too.
- Enable namespaced binfmt_misc
Christian Brauner has made it possible to use binfmt_misc with mount
namespaces. This means some traditionally root-only interfaces (for
adding/removing formats) are now more exposed (but believed to be
safe).
- Remove struct tag 'dynamic' from ELF UAPI
Alejandro Colomar noticed that the ELF UAPI has been polluting the
struct namespace with an unused and overly generic tag named
"dynamic" for no discernible reason for many many years. After
double-checking various distro source repositories, it has been
removed.
- Clean up binfmt_elf_fdpic debug output (Greg Ungerer)
* tag 'execve-v6.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
binfmt_misc: cleanup on filesystem umount
binfmt_elf_fdpic: clean up debug warnings
mm: Remove unused vm_brk()
binfmt_elf: Only report padzero() errors when PROT_WRITE
binfmt_elf: Use elf_load() for library
binfmt_elf: Use elf_load() for interpreter
binfmt_elf: elf_bss no longer used by load_elf_binary()
binfmt_elf: Support segments with 0 filesz and misaligned starts
elf, uapi: Remove struct tag 'dynamic'
The binfmt_elf_fdpic loader has some debug trace that can be enabled at
build time. The recent 64-bit additions cause some warnings if that
debug is enabled, such as:
fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c: In function ‘elf_fdpic_map_file’:
fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c:46:33: warning: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 3 has type ‘Elf64_Addr’ {aka ‘long long unsigned int’} [-Wformat=]
46 | #define kdebug(fmt, ...) printk("FDPIC "fmt"\n" ,##__VA_ARGS__ )
| ^~~~~~~~
./include/linux/printk.h:427:25: note: in definition of macro ‘printk_index_wrap’
427 | _p_func(_fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); \
| ^~~~
Cast values to the largest possible type (which is equivilent to unsigned
long long in this case) and use appropriate format specifiers to match.
Fixes: b922bf04d2 ("binfmt_elf_fdpic: support 64-bit systems")
Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230927132933.3290734-1-gerg@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The elf-fdpic loader hard sets the process personality to either
PER_LINUX_FDPIC for true elf-fdpic binaries or to PER_LINUX for normal ELF
binaries (in this case they would be constant displacement compiled with
-pie for example). The problem with that is that it will lose any other
bits that may be in the ELF header personality (such as the "bug
emulation" bits).
On the ARM architecture the ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT flag is used to signify a
normal 32bit binary - as opposed to a legacy 26bit address binary. This
matters since start_thread() will set the ARM CPSR register as required
based on this flag. If the elf-fdpic loader loses this bit the process
will be mis-configured and crash out pretty quickly.
Modify elf-fdpic loader personality setting so that it preserves the upper
three bytes by using the SET_PERSONALITY macro to set it. This macro in
the generic case sets PER_LINUX and preserves the upper bytes.
Architectures can override this for their specific use case, and ARM does
exactly this.
The problem shows up quite easily running under qemu using the ARM
architecture, but not necessarily on all types of real ARM hardware. If
the underlying ARM processor does not support the legacy 26-bit addressing
mode then everything will work as expected.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230907011808.2985083-1-gerg@kernel.org
Fixes: 1bde925d23 ("fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c: provide NOMMU loader for regular ELF binaries")
Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
The binfmt_flat_fdpic code has a number of 32-bit specific data
structures associated with it. Extend it to be able to support and
be used on 64-bit systems as well.
The new code defines a number of key 64-bit variants of the core
elf-fdpic data structures - along side the existing 32-bit sized ones.
A common set of generic named structures are defined to be either
the 32-bit or 64-bit ones as required at compile time. This is a
similar technique to that used in the ELF binfmt loader.
For example:
elf_fdpic_loadseg is either elf32_fdpic_loadseg or elf64_fdpic_loadseg
elf_fdpic_loadmap is either elf32_fdpic_loadmap or elf64_fdpic_loadmap
the choice based on ELFCLASS32 or ELFCLASS64.
Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230711130754.481209-2-gerg@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
There is no point in initializing 'load_addr' and 'seg' here, they are both
re-written just before being used below.
Doing so, 'load_addr' can be moved in the #ifdef CONFIG_MMU section.
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4f5e4096ad7f17716e924b5bd080e5709fc0b84b.1685290790.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr
ELF is acronym and therefore should be spelled in all caps.
I left one exception at Documentation/arm/nwfpe/nwfpe.rst which looks like
being written in the first person.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Y/3wGWQviIOkyLJW@p183
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
A subsequent fix for arm64 will use this parameter to parse the vma
information from the snapshot created by dump_vma_snapshot() rather than
traversing the vma list without the mmap_lock.
Fixes: 6dd8b1a0b6 ("arm64: mte: Dump the MTE tags in the core file")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.18.x
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reported-by: Seth Jenkins <sethjenkins@google.com>
Suggested-by: Seth Jenkins <sethjenkins@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221222181251.1345752-3-catalin.marinas@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Move the call of dump_vma_snapshot and kvfree(vma_meta) out of the
individual coredump routines into do_coredump itself. This makes
the code less error prone and easier to maintain.
Make the vma snapshot available to the coredump routines
in struct coredump_params. This makes it easier to
change and update what is captures in the vma snapshot
and will be needed for fixing fill_file_notes.
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
struct linux_binfmt::core_dump and struct min_coredump::min_coredump
are used under CONFIG_COREDUMP only. Shrink those embedded configs
a bit.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YglbIFyN+OtwVyjW@localhost.localdomain
Today when a signal is delivered with a handler of SIG_DFL whose
default behavior is to generate a core dump not only that process but
every process that shares the mm is killed.
In the case of vfork this looks like a real world problem. Consider
the following well defined sequence.
if (vfork() == 0) {
execve(...);
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
If a signal that generates a core dump is received after vfork but
before the execve changes the mm the process that called vfork will
also be killed (as the mm is shared).
Similarly if the execve fails after the point of no return the kernel
delivers SIGSEGV which will kill both the exec'ing process and because
the mm is shared the process that called vfork as well.
As far as I can tell this behavior is a violation of people's
reasonable expectations, POSIX, and is unnecessarily fragile when the
system is low on memory.
Solve this by making a userspace visible change to only kill a single
process/thread group. This is possible because Jann Horn recently
modified[1] the coredump code so that the mm can safely be modified
while the coredump is happening. With LinuxThreads long gone I don't
expect anyone to have a notice this behavior change in practice.
To accomplish this move the core_state pointer from mm_struct to
signal_struct, which allows different thread groups to coredump
simultatenously.
In zap_threads remove the work to kill anything except for the current
thread group.
v2: Remove core_state from the VM_BUG_ON_MM print to fix
compile failure when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM is enabled.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
[1] a07279c9a8 ("binfmt_elf, binfmt_elf_fdpic: use a VMA list snapshot")
Fixes: d89f3847def4 ("[PATCH] thread-aware coredumps, 2.5.43-C3")
History-tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87y27mvnke.fsf@disp2133
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211007144701.67592574@canb.auug.org.au
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
At exec time when we mmap the new executable via MAP_DENYWRITE we have it
opened via do_open_execat() and already deny_write_access()'ed the file
successfully. Once exec completes, we allow_write_acces(); however,
we set mm->exe_file in begin_new_exec() via set_mm_exe_file() and
also deny_write_access() as long as mm->exe_file remains set. We'll
effectively deny write access to our executable via mm->exe_file
until mm->exe_file is changed -- when the process is removed, on new
exec, or via sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE).
Let's remove all usage of MAP_DENYWRITE, it's no longer necessary for
mm->exe_file.
In case of an elf interpreter, we'll now only deny write access to the file
during exec. This is somewhat okay, because the interpreter behaves
(and sometime is) a shared library; all shared libraries, especially the
ones loaded directly in user space like via dlopen() won't ever be mapped
via MAP_DENYWRITE, because we ignore that from user space completely;
these shared libraries can always be modified while mapped and executed.
Let's only special-case the main executable, denying write access while
being executed by a process. This can be considered a minor user space
visible change.
While this is a cleanup, it also fixes part of a problem reported with
VM_DENYWRITE on overlayfs, as VM_DENYWRITE is effectively unused with
this patch and will be removed next:
"Overlayfs did not honor positive i_writecount on realfile for
VM_DENYWRITE mappings." [1]
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/YNHXzBgzRrZu1MrD@miu.piliscsaba.redhat.com/
Reported-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton:
"191 patches.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: kthread, ia64, scripts,
ntfs, squashfs, ocfs2, kernel/watchdog, and mm (gup, pagealloc, slab,
slub, kmemleak, dax, debug, pagecache, gup, swap, memcg, pagemap,
mprotect, bootmem, dma, tracing, vmalloc, kasan, initialization,
pagealloc, and memory-failure)"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (191 commits)
mm,hwpoison: make get_hwpoison_page() call get_any_page()
mm,hwpoison: send SIGBUS with error virutal address
mm/page_alloc: split pcp->high across all online CPUs for cpuless nodes
mm/page_alloc: allow high-order pages to be stored on the per-cpu lists
mm: replace CONFIG_FLAT_NODE_MEM_MAP with CONFIG_FLATMEM
mm: replace CONFIG_NEED_MULTIPLE_NODES with CONFIG_NUMA
docs: remove description of DISCONTIGMEM
arch, mm: remove stale mentions of DISCONIGMEM
mm: remove CONFIG_DISCONTIGMEM
m68k: remove support for DISCONTIGMEM
arc: remove support for DISCONTIGMEM
arc: update comment about HIGHMEM implementation
alpha: remove DISCONTIGMEM and NUMA
mm/page_alloc: move free_the_page
mm/page_alloc: fix counting of managed_pages
mm/page_alloc: improve memmap_pages dbg msg
mm: drop SECTION_SHIFT in code comments
mm/page_alloc: introduce vm.percpu_pagelist_high_fraction
mm/page_alloc: limit the number of pages on PCP lists when reclaim is active
mm/page_alloc: scale the number of pages that are batch freed
...
Change the type and name of task_struct::state. Drop the volatile and
shrink it to an 'unsigned int'. Rename it in order to find all uses
such that we can use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE as appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210611082838.550736351@infradead.org
have dump_skip() just remember how much needs to be skipped,
leave actual seeks/writing zeroes to the next dump_emit()
or the end of coredump output, whichever comes first.
And instead of playing with do_truncate() in the end, just
write one NUL at the end of the last gap (if any).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull parisc updates from Helge Deller:
- Optimize parisc page table locks by using the existing
page_table_lock
- Export argv0-preserve flag in binfmt_misc for usage in qemu-user
- Fix interrupt table (IVT) checksum so firmware will call crash
handler (HPMC)
- Increase IRQ stack to 64kb on 64-bit kernel
- Switch to common devmem_is_allowed() implementation
- Minor fix to get_whan()
* 'parisc-5.12-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/deller/parisc-linux:
binfmt_misc: pass binfmt_misc flags to the interpreter
parisc: Optimize per-pagetable spinlocks
parisc: Replace test_ti_thread_flag() with test_tsk_thread_flag()
parisc: Bump 64-bit IRQ stack size to 64 KB
parisc: Fix IVT checksum calculation wrt HPMC
parisc: Use the generic devmem_is_allowed()
parisc: Drop out of get_whan() if task is running again
It can be useful to the interpreter to know which flags are in use.
For instance, knowing if the preserve-argv[0] is in use would
allow to skip the pathname argument.
This patch uses an unused auxiliary vector, AT_FLAGS, to add a
flag to inform interpreter if the preserve-argv[0] is enabled.
Note by Helge Deller:
The real-world user of this patch is qemu-user, which needs to know
if it has to preserve the argv[0]. See Debian bug #970460.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Reviewed-by: YunQiang Su <ysu@wavecomp.com>
URL: http://bugs.debian.org/970460
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Preparations to doing i386 compat elf_prstatus sanely - rather than duplicating
the beginning of compat_elf_prstatus, take these fields into a separate
structure (compat_elf_prstatus_common), so that it could be reused. Due to
the incestous relationship between binfmt_elf.c and compat_binfmt_elf.c we
need the same shape change done to native struct elf_prstatus, gathering the
fields prior to pr_reg into a new structure (struct elf_prstatus_common).
Fortunately, offset of pr_reg is always a multiple of 16 with no padding
right before it, so it's possible to turn all the stuff prior to it into
a single member without disturbing the layout.
[build fix from Geert Uytterhoeven folded in]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In both binfmt_elf and binfmt_elf_fdpic, use a new helper
dump_vma_snapshot() to take a snapshot of the VMA list (including the gate
VMA, if we have one) while protected by the mmap_lock, and then use that
snapshot instead of walking the VMA list without locking.
An alternative approach would be to keep the mmap_lock held across the
entire core dumping operation; however, keeping the mmap_lock locked while
we may be blocked for an unbounded amount of time (e.g. because we're
dumping to a FUSE filesystem or so) isn't really optimal; the mmap_lock
blocks things like the ->release handler of userfaultfd, and we don't
really want critical system daemons to grind to a halt just because
someone "gifted" them SCM_RIGHTS to an eternally-locked userfaultfd, or
something like that.
Since both the normal ELF code and the FDPIC ELF code need this
functionality (and if any other binfmt wants to add coredump support in
the future, they'd probably need it, too), implement this with a common
helper in fs/coredump.c.
A downside of this approach is that we now need a bigger amount of kernel
memory per userspace VMA in the normal ELF case, and that we need O(n)
kernel memory in the FDPIC ELF case at all; but 40 bytes per VMA shouldn't
be terribly bad.
There currently is a data race between stack expansion and anything that
reads ->vm_start or ->vm_end under the mmap_lock held in read mode; to
mitigate that for core dumping, take the mmap_lock in write mode when
taking a snapshot of the VMA hierarchy. (If we only took the mmap_lock in
read mode, we could end up with a corrupted core dump if someone does
get_user_pages_remote() concurrently. Not really a major problem, but
taking the mmap_lock either way works here, so we might as well avoid the
issue.) (This doesn't do anything about the existing data races with stack
expansion in other mm code.)
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827114932.3572699-6-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
At the moment, the binfmt_elf and binfmt_elf_fdpic code have slightly
different code to figure out which VMAs should be dumped, and if so,
whether the dump should contain the entire VMA or just its first page.
Eliminate duplicate code by reworking the binfmt_elf version into a
generic core dumping helper in coredump.c.
As part of that, change the heuristic for detecting executable/library
header pages to check whether the inode is executable instead of looking
at the file mode.
This is less problematic in terms of locking because it lets us avoid
get_user() under the mmap_sem. (And arguably it looks nicer and makes
more sense in generic code.)
Adjust a little bit based on the binfmt_elf_fdpic version: ->anon_vma is
only meaningful under CONFIG_MMU, otherwise we have to assume that the VMA
has been written to.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827114932.3572699-5-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Both fs/binfmt_elf.c and fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c need to dump ranges of
pages into the coredump file. Extract that logic into a common helper.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827114932.3572699-4-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "Fix ELF / FDPIC ELF core dumping, and use mmap_lock properly in there", v5.
At the moment, we have that rather ugly mmget_still_valid() helper to work
around <https://crbug.com/project-zero/1790>: ELF core dumping doesn't
take the mmap_sem while traversing the task's VMAs, and if anything (like
userfaultfd) then remotely messes with the VMA tree, fireworks ensue. So
at the moment we use mmget_still_valid() to bail out in any writers that
might be operating on a remote mm's VMAs.
With this series, I'm trying to get rid of the need for that as cleanly as
possible. ("cleanly" meaning "avoid holding the mmap_lock across
unbounded sleeps".)
Patches 1, 2, 3 and 4 are relatively unrelated cleanups in the core
dumping code.
Patches 5 and 6 implement the main change: Instead of repeatedly accessing
the VMA list with sleeps in between, we snapshot it at the start with
proper locking, and then later we just use our copy of the VMA list. This
ensures that the kernel won't crash, that VMA metadata in the coredump is
consistent even in the presence of concurrent modifications, and that any
virtual addresses that aren't being concurrently modified have their
contents show up in the core dump properly.
The disadvantage of this approach is that we need a bit more memory during
core dumping for storing metadata about all VMAs.
At the end of the series, patch 7 removes the old workaround for this
issue (mmget_still_valid()).
I have tested:
- Creating a simple core dump on X86-64 still works.
- The created coredump on X86-64 opens in GDB and looks plausible.
- X86-64 core dumps contain the first page for executable mappings at
offset 0, and don't contain the first page for non-executable file
mappings or executable mappings at offset !=0.
- NOMMU 32-bit ARM can still generate plausible-looking core dumps
through the FDPIC implementation. (I can't test this with GDB because
GDB is missing some structure definition for nommu ARM, but I've
poked around in the hexdump and it looked decent.)
This patch (of 7):
dump_emit() is for kernel pointers, and VMAs describe userspace memory.
Let's be tidy here and avoid accessing userspace pointers under KERNEL_DS,
even if it probably doesn't matter much on !MMU systems - especially given
that it looks like we can just use the same get_dump_page() as on MMU if
we move it out of the CONFIG_MMU block.
One small change we have to make in get_dump_page() is to use
__get_user_pages_locked() instead of __get_user_pages(), since the latter
doesn't exist on nommu. On mmu builds, __get_user_pages_locked() will
just call __get_user_pages() for us.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827114932.3572699-1-jannh@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827114932.3572699-2-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull fdpick coredump update from Al Viro:
"Switches fdpic coredumps away from original aout dumping primitives to
the same kind of regset use as regular elf coredumps do"
* 'work.fdpic' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
[elf-fdpic] switch coredump to regsets
[elf-fdpic] use elf_dump_thread_status() for the dumper thread as well
[elf-fdpic] move allocation of elf_thread_status into elf_dump_thread_status()
[elf-fdpic] coredump: don't bother with cyclic list for per-thread objects
kill elf_fpxregs_t
take fdpic-related parts of elf_prstatus out
unexport linux/elfcore.h
Patch series "mm: cleanup usage of <asm/pgalloc.h>"
Most architectures have very similar versions of pXd_alloc_one() and
pXd_free_one() for intermediate levels of page table. These patches add
generic versions of these functions in <asm-generic/pgalloc.h> and enable
use of the generic functions where appropriate.
In addition, functions declared and defined in <asm/pgalloc.h> headers are
used mostly by core mm and early mm initialization in arch and there is no
actual reason to have the <asm/pgalloc.h> included all over the place.
The first patch in this series removes unneeded includes of
<asm/pgalloc.h>
In the end it didn't work out as neatly as I hoped and moving
pXd_alloc_track() definitions to <asm-generic/pgalloc.h> would require
unnecessary changes to arches that have custom page table allocations, so
I've decided to move lib/ioremap.c to mm/ and make pgalloc-track.h local
to mm/.
This patch (of 8):
In most cases <asm/pgalloc.h> header is required only for allocations of
page table memory. Most of the .c files that include that header do not
use symbols declared in <asm/pgalloc.h> and do not require that header.
As for the other header files that used to include <asm/pgalloc.h>, it is
possible to move that include into the .c file that actually uses symbols
from <asm/pgalloc.h> and drop the include from the header file.
The process was somewhat automated using
sed -i -E '/[<"]asm\/pgalloc\.h/d' \
$(grep -L -w -f /tmp/xx \
$(git grep -E -l '[<"]asm/pgalloc\.h'))
where /tmp/xx contains all the symbols defined in
arch/*/include/asm/pgalloc.h.
[rppt@linux.ibm.com: fix powerpc warning]
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k]
Cc: Abdul Haleem <abdhalee@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Satheesh Rajendran <sathnaga@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200627143453.31835-1-rppt@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200627143453.31835-2-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
similar to how elf coredump is working on architectures that
have regsets, and all architectures with elf-fdpic support *do*
have that.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
the only reason to have it open-coded for the first (dumper) thread is
that coredump has a couple of process-wide notes stuck right after the
first (NT_PRSTATUS) note of the first thread. But we don't need to
make the data collection side irregular for the first thread to handle
that - it's only the logics ordering the calls of writenote() that
needs to take care of that.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
all uses are conditional upon ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS, which has not
been defined on any architecture since 2010
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The only architecture where we might end up using both is arm,
and there we definitely don't want fdpic-related fields in
elf_prstatus - coredump layout of ELF binaries should not
depend upon having the kernel built with the support of ELF_FDPIC
ones. Just move the fdpic-modified variant into binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
(and call it elf_prstatus_fdpic there)
[name stolen from nico]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull misc uaccess updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted uaccess patches for this cycle - the stuff that didn't fit
into thematic series"
* 'uaccess.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
bpf: make bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero() use check_zeroed_user()
x86: kvm_hv_set_msr(): use __put_user() instead of 32bit __clear_user()
user_regset_copyout_zero(): use clear_user()
TEST_ACCESS_OK _never_ had been checked anywhere
x86: switch cp_stat64() to unsafe_put_user()
binfmt_flat: don't use __put_user()
binfmt_elf_fdpic: don't use __... uaccess primitives
binfmt_elf: don't bother with __{put,copy_to}_user()
pselect6() and friends: take handling the combined 6th/7th args into helper
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
"Last cycle for the Nth time I ran into bugs and quality of
implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily be
fixed because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been digging
into exec and cleanup up what I can.
I don't think I have exec sorted out enough to fix the issues I
started with but I have made some headway this cycle with 4 sets of
changes.
- promised cleanups after introducing exec_update_mutex
- trivial cleanups for exec
- control flow simplifications
- remove the recomputation of bprm->cred
The net result is code that is a bit easier to understand and work
with and a decrease in the number of lines of code (if you don't count
the added tests)"
* 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (24 commits)
exec: Compute file based creds only once
exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear
binfmt_elf_fdpic: fix execfd build regression
selftests/exec: Add binfmt_script regression test
exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler
exec: Generic execfd support
exec/binfmt_script: Don't modify bprm->buf and then return -ENOEXEC
exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler
exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binprm unconditionally
exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds
exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds
exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids
exec: Set the point of no return sooner
exec: Move handling of the point of no return to the top level
exec: Run sync_mm_rss before taking exec_update_mutex
exec: Fix spelling of search_binary_handler in a comment
exec: Move the comment from above de_thread to above unshare_sighand
exec: Rename flush_old_exec begin_new_exec
exec: Move most of setup_new_exec into flush_old_exec
exec: In setup_new_exec cache current in the local variable me
...
The change to bprm->have_execfd was incomplete, leading
to a build failure:
fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c: In function 'create_elf_fdpic_tables':
fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c:591:27: error: 'BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD' undeclared
Change the last user of BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD in a corresponding
way.
Reported-by: Valdis Klētnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Fixes: b8a61c9e7b ("exec: Generic execfd support")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Most of the support for passing the file descriptor of an executable
to an interpreter already lives in the generic code and in binfmt_elf.
Rework the fields in binfmt_elf that deal with executable file
descriptor passing to make executable file descriptor passing a first
class concept.
Move the fd_install from binfmt_misc into begin_new_exec after the new
creds have been installed. This means that accessing the file through
/proc/<pid>/fd/N is able to see the creds for the new executable
before allowing access to the new executables files.
Performing the install of the executables file descriptor after
the point of no return also means that nothing special needs to
be done on error. The exiting of the process will close all
of it's open files.
Move the would_dump from binfmt_misc into begin_new_exec right
after would_dump is called on the bprm->file. This makes it
obvious this case exists and that no nesting of bprm->file is
currently supported.
In binfmt_misc the movement of fd_install into generic code means
that it's special error exit path is no longer needed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87y2poyd91.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
There is and has been for a very long time been a lot more going on in
flush_old_exec than just flushing the old state. After the movement
of code from setup_new_exec there is a whole lot more going on than
just flushing the old executables state.
Rename flush_old_exec to begin_new_exec to more accurately reflect
what this function does.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The two functions are now always called one right after the
other so merge them together to make future maintenance easier.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
In 2016 Linus moved install_exec_creds immediately after
setup_new_exec, in binfmt_elf as a cleanup and as part of closing a
potential information leak.
Perform the same cleanup for the other binary formats.
Different binary formats doing the same things the same way makes exec
easier to reason about and easier to maintain.
Greg Ungerer reports:
> I tested the the whole series on non-MMU m68k and non-MMU arm
> (exercising binfmt_flat) and it all tested out with no problems,
> so for the binfmt_flat changes:
Tested-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Ref: 9f834ec18d ("binfmt_elf: switch to new creds when switching to new mm")
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
There is no logic in elf_fdpic_core_dump itself or in the various arch
helpers called from it which use uaccess routines on kernel pointers
except for the file writes thate are nicely encapsulated by using
__kernel_write in dump_emit.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
