Add KMSAN support for the s390 implementations of the string functions.
Do this similar to how it's already done for KASAN, except that the
optimized memset{16,32,64}() functions need to be disabled: it's important
for KMSAN to know that they initialized something.
The way boot code is built with regard to string functions is problematic,
since most files think it's configured with sanitizers, but boot/string.c
doesn't. This creates various problems with the memset64() definitions,
depending on whether the code is built with sanitizers or fortify. This
should probably be streamlined, but in the meantime resolve the issues by
introducing the IN_BOOT_STRING_C macro, similar to the existing
IN_ARCH_STRING_C macro.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-33-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
The pages for the KMSAN metadata associated with most kernel mappings are
taken from memblock by the common code. However, vmalloc and module
metadata needs to be defined by the architectures.
Be a little bit more careful than x86: allocate exactly MODULES_LEN for
the module shadow and origins, and then take 2/3 of vmalloc for the
vmalloc shadow and origins. This ensures that users passing small
vmalloc= values on the command line do not cause module metadata
collisions.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-32-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Lockdep generates the following false positives with KMSAN on s390x:
[ 6.063666] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lockdep_hardirqs_enabled())
[ ...]
[ 6.577050] Call Trace:
[ 6.619637] [<000000000690d2de>] check_flags+0x1fe/0x210
[ 6.665411] ([<000000000690d2da>] check_flags+0x1fa/0x210)
[ 6.707478] [<00000000006cec1a>] lock_acquire+0x2ca/0xce0
[ 6.749959] [<00000000069820ea>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xea/0x190
[ 6.794912] [<00000000041fc988>] __stack_depot_save+0x218/0x5b0
[ 6.838420] [<000000000197affe>] __msan_poison_alloca+0xfe/0x1a0
[ 6.882985] [<0000000007c5827c>] start_kernel+0x70c/0xd50
[ 6.927454] [<0000000000100036>] startup_continue+0x36/0x40
Between trace_hardirqs_on() and `stosm __mask, 3` lockdep thinks that
interrupts are on, but on the CPU they are still off. KMSAN
instrumentation takes spinlocks, giving lockdep a chance to see and
complain about this discrepancy.
KMSAN instrumentation is inserted in order to poison the __mask variable.
Disable instrumentation in the respective functions. They are very small
and it's easy to see that no important metadata updates are lost because
of this.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-31-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
s390 uses assembly code to initialize ftrace_regs and call
kprobe_ftrace_handler(). Therefore, from the KMSAN's point of view,
ftrace_regs is poisoned on kprobe_ftrace_handler() entry. This causes
KMSAN warnings when running the ftrace testsuite.
Fix by trusting the assembly code and always unpoisoning ftrace_regs in
kprobe_ftrace_handler().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-30-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Diagnose 224 stores 4k bytes, which currently cannot be deduced from the
inline assembly constraints. This leads to KMSAN false positives.
Fix the constraints by using a 4k-sized struct instead of a raw pointer.
While at it, prettify them too.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-29-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
stcctm() uses the "Q" constraint for dest, therefore KMSAN does not
understand that it fills multiple doublewords pointed to by dest, not just
one. This results in false positives.
Unpoison the whole dest manually with kmsan_unpoison_memory().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-28-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Add a KMSAN check to the CKSM inline assembly, similar to how it was done
for ASAN in commit e42ac7789d ("s390/checksum: always use cksm
instruction").
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-26-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
It should be possible to have inline functions in the s390 header files,
which call kmsan_unpoison_memory(). The problem is that these header
files might be included by the decompressor, which does not contain KMSAN
runtime, causing linker errors.
Not compiling these calls if __SANITIZE_MEMORY__ is not defined - either
by changing kmsan-checks.h or at the call sites - may cause unintended
side effects, since calling these functions from an uninstrumented code
that is linked into the kernel is valid use case.
One might want to explicitly distinguish between the kernel and the
decompressor. Checking for a decompressor-specific #define is quite
heavy-handed, and will have to be done at all call sites.
A more generic approach is to provide a dummy kmsan_unpoison_memory()
definition. This produces some runtime overhead, but only when building
with CONFIG_KMSAN. The benefit is that it does not disturb the existing
KMSAN build logic and call sites don't need to be changed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-25-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Adjust the stack size for the KMSAN-enabled kernel like it was done for
the KASAN-enabled one in commit 7fef92ccad ("s390/kasan: double the
stack size"). Both tools have similar requirements.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-24-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
All other sanitizers are disabled for boot as well. While at it, add a
comment explaining why we need this.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-23-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
On s390 the virtual address 0 is valid (current CPU's lowcore is mapped
there), therefore KMSAN should not complain about it.
Disable the respective check on s390. There doesn't seem to be a Kconfig
option to describe this situation, so explicitly check for s390.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-22-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
The constraints of the DFLTCC inline assembly are not precise: they do not
communicate the size of the output buffers to the compiler, so it cannot
automatically instrument it.
Add the manual kmsan_unpoison_memory() calls for the output buffers. The
logic is the same as in [1].
[1] 1f5ddcc009
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-21-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
KMSAN warns about check_canary() accessing the canary.
The reason is that, even though set_canary() is properly instrumented and
sets shadow, slub explicitly poisons the canary's address range
afterwards.
Unpoisoning the canary is not the right thing to do: only check_canary()
is supposed to ever touch it. Instead, disable KMSAN checks around canary
read accesses.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-20-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Even though the KMSAN warnings generated by memchr_inv() are suppressed by
metadata_access_enable(), its return value may still be poisoned.
The reason is that the last iteration of memchr_inv() returns `*start !=
value ? start : NULL`, where *start is poisoned. Because of this,
somewhat counterintuitively, the shadow value computed by
visitSelectInst() is equal to `(uintptr_t)start`.
One possibility to fix this, since the intention behind guarding
memchr_inv() behind metadata_access_enable() is to touch poisoned metadata
without triggering KMSAN, is to unpoison its return value. However, this
approach is too fragile. So simply disable the KMSAN checks in the
respective functions.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-19-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Building the kernel with CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG and CONFIG_KMSAN causes KMSAN
to complain about touching redzones in kfree().
Fix by extending the existing KASAN-related metadata_access_enable() and
metadata_access_disable() functions to KMSAN.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-18-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
KMSAN_WARN_ON() is required for implementing s390-specific KMSAN
functions, but right now it's available only to the KMSAN internal
functions. Expose it to subsystems through <linux/kmsan.h>.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-17-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
x86's alloc_node_data() rounds up node data size to PAGE_SIZE. It's not
explained why it's needed, but it's most likely for performance reasons,
since the padding bytes are not used anywhere. Some other architectures
do it as well, e.g., mips rounds it up to the cache line size.
kmsan_init_shadow() initializes metadata for each node data and assumes
the x86 rounding, which does not match other architectures. This may
cause the range end to overshoot the end of available memory, in turn
causing virt_to_page_or_null() in kmsan_init_alloc_meta_for_range() to
return NULL, which leads to kernel panic shortly after.
Since the padding bytes are not used, drop the rounding.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-16-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Improve the readability by replacing the custom aligning logic with
ALIGN_DOWN(). Unlike other places where a similar sequence is used, there
is no size parameter that needs to be adjusted, so the standard macro
fits.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-15-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Avoid false KMSAN negatives with SLUB_DEBUG by allowing kmsan_slab_free()
to poison the freed memory, and by preventing init_object() from
unpoisoning new allocations by using __memset().
There are two alternatives to this approach. First, init_object() can be
marked with __no_sanitize_memory. This annotation should be used with
great care, because it drops all instrumentation from the function, and
any shadow writes will be lost. Even though this is not a concern with
the current init_object() implementation, this may change in the future.
Second, kmsan_poison_memory() calls may be added after memset() calls.
The downside is that init_object() is called from free_debug_processing(),
in which case poisoning will erase the distinction between simply
uninitialized memory and UAF.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-14-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Like for KASAN, it's useful to temporarily disable KMSAN checks around,
e.g., redzone accesses. Introduce kmsan_disable_current() and
kmsan_enable_current(), which are similar to their KASAN counterparts.
Make them reentrant in order to handle memory allocations in interrupt
context. Repurpose the allow_reporting field for this.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-12-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
When building the kmsan test as a module, modpost fails with the following
error message:
ERROR: modpost: "panic_on_kmsan" [mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.ko] undefined!
Export panic_on_kmsan in order to improve the KMSAN usability for
modules.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-11-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Each s390 CPU has lowcore pages associated with it. Each CPU sees its own
lowcore at virtual address 0 through a hardware mechanism called
prefixing. Additionally, all lowcores are mapped to non-0 virtual
addresses stored in the lowcore_ptr[] array.
When lowcore is accessed through virtual address 0, one needs to resolve
metadata for lowcore_ptr[raw_smp_processor_id()].
Expose kmsan_get_metadata() to make it possible to do this from the arch
code.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-10-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Replace the x86-specific asm/pgtable_64_types.h #include with the
linux/pgtable.h one, which all architectures have.
While at it, sort the headers alphabetically for the sake of consistency
with other KMSAN code.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-9-iii@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: f80be4571b ("kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
The value assigned to prot is immediately overwritten on the next line
with PAGE_KERNEL. The right hand side of the assignment has no
side-effects.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-8-iii@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: b073d7f8ae ("mm: kmsan: maintain KMSAN metadata for page operations")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Comparing pointers with TASK_SIZE does not make sense when kernel and
userspace overlap. Assume that we are handling user memory access in this
case.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-7-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Comparing pointers with TASK_SIZE does not make sense when kernel and
userspace overlap. Skip the comparison when this is the case.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-6-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
KMSAN relies on memblock returning all available pages to it (see
kmsan_memblock_free_pages()). It partitions these pages into 3
categories: pages available to the buddy allocator, shadow pages and
origin pages. This partitioning is static.
If new pages appear after kmsan_init_runtime(), it is considered an error.
DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT causes this, so mark it as incompatible with
KMSAN.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-4-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
It's useful to have both tests and kmsan.panic=1 during development, but
right now the warnings, that the tests cause, lead to kernel panics.
Temporarily set kmsan.panic=0 for the duration of the KMSAN testing.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-3-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "kmsan: Enable on s390", v7.
Architectures use assembly code to initialize ftrace_regs and call
ftrace_ops_list_func(). Therefore, from the KMSAN's point of view,
ftrace_regs is poisoned on ftrace_ops_list_func entry(). This causes
KMSAN warnings when running the ftrace testsuite.
Fix by trusting the architecture-specific assembly code and always
unpoisoning ftrace_regs in ftrace_ops_list_func.
The issue was not encountered on x86_64 so far only by accident:
assembly-allocated ftrace_regs was overlapping a stale partially
unpoisoned stack frame. Poisoning stack frames before returns [1] makes
the issue appear on x86_64 as well.
[1] https://github.com/iii-i/llvm-project/commits/msan-poison-allocas-before-returning-2024-06-12/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-1-iii@linux.ibm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-2-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
DAMON bi-weekly community meetup series has continued since 2022-08-15 for
community members who prefer synchronous chat over asynchronous mails.
Recently I got some feedbacks about the series from a few people. They
told me the series is helpful for understanding of the project and
particiapting to the development, but it could be further better in terms
of the visibility. Based on that, I started sending meeting reminder for
every occurrence. For people who don't subscribe the mailing list,
however, adding an announcement on the official document could be helpful.
Document the series on DAMON maintainer's profile for the purpose.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621163626.74815-3-sj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "Docs/mm/damon/maintaier-profile: document a mailing tool and
community meetup series", v2.
There is a mailing tool that developed and maintained by DAMON
maintainer aiming to support DAMON community. Also there are DAMON
community meetup series. Both are known to have rooms of improvements
in terms of their visibility. Document those on the maintainer's
profile document.
This patch (of 2):
Since DAMON was merged into mainline, I periodically received some
questions around DAMON's mailing lists based workflow. The workflow is
not different from the normal ones that well documented, but it is also
true that it is not always easy and familiar for everyone.
I personally overcame it by developing and using a simple tool, named
HacKerMaiL (hkml)[1]. Based on my experience, I believe it is matured
enough to be used for simple workflows like that of DAMON. Actually some
DAMON contributors and Linux kernel developers other than myself told me
they are using the tool.
As DAMON maintainer, I also believe helping new DAMON community members
onboarding to the worklow is one of the most important parts of my
responsibilities. For the reason, the tool is announced[2] to support
DAMON community. To further increasing the visibility of the fact,
document the tool and the support plan on DAMON maintainer's profile.
[1] https://github.com/damonitor/hackermail
[2] https://github.com/damonitor/hackermail/commit/3909dad91301
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621163626.74815-1-sj@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621163626.74815-2-sj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
KCSAN complains about possible data races: while we check for a page_type
-- for example for sanity checks -- we might concurrently modify the
mapcount that overlays page_type.
Let's use READ_ONCE to avoid load tearing (shouldn't make a difference)
and to make KCSAN happy.
Likely, we might also want to use WRITE_ONCE for the writer side of
page_type, if KCSAN ever complains about that. But we'll not mess with
that for now.
Note: nothing should really be broken besides wrong KCSAN complaints. The
sanity check that triggers this was added in commit 68f0320824
("mm/rmap: convert folio_add_file_rmap_range() into
folio_add_file_rmap_[pte|ptes|pmd]()"). Even before that similar races
likely where possible, ever since we added page_type in commit
6e292b9be7 ("mm: split page_type out from _mapcount").
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240531125616.2850153-1-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202405281431.c46a3be9-lkp@intel.com
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Since the callers are converted to use nr_pages naming, use it inside too.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240618091242.2140164-5-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Use nr_pages instead of pages_per_huge_page and move the address alignment
from copy_user_large_folio() into the callers since it is only needed when
we don't know which address will be accessed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240618091242.2140164-4-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Directly use folio in struct copy_subpage_arg.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240618091242.2140164-3-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "mm: improve clear and copy user folio", v2.
Some folio conversions. An improvement is to move address alignment into
the caller as it is only needed if we don't know which address will be
accessed when clearing/copying user folios.
This patch (of 4):
Replace clear_huge_page() with folio_zero_user(), and take a folio
instead of a page. Directly get number of pages by folio_nr_pages()
to remove pages_per_huge_page argument, furthermore, move the address
alignment from folio_zero_user() to the callers since the alignment
is only needed when we don't know which address will be accessed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240618091242.2140164-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240618091242.2140164-2-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
For page with order O, we are checking its order (O + 1)'s buddy. If it
is free, we would like to put it to the tail and expect it would be merged
to a page with order (O + 2).
Reword the comment to reflect it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240619010612.20740-4-richard.weiyang@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
The GFP flags used to choose the zonelist is __GFP_THISNODE.
Let's change it to what exactly it should be.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240619010612.20740-3-richard.weiyang@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Current check on MAX_ZONELISTS is wrapped in CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT,
which may not be triggered all the time.
Let's move it out to a more general place.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240619010612.20740-2-richard.weiyang@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Function subsection_map_init() is only used in free_area_init() in the
loop of for_each_mem_pfn_range(). And we are sure in each iteration of
for_each_mem_pfn_range(), start_pfn < end_pfn.
So nr_pages is not possible to be 0 and we can remove the check.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240619010612.20740-1-richard.weiyang@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Logs from memory_failure and other memory-failure.c code follow the
format:
"Memory failure: 0x{pfn}: ${lower_case_message}"
Convert the logs in unpoison_memory to follow similar format:
"Unpoison: 0x${pfn}: ${lower_case_message}"
For example (from local test):
[ 1331.938397] Unpoison: 0x144bc8: page was already unpoisoned
No functional change in this commit.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240619063355.171313-1-jiaqiyan@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jiaqi Yan <jiaqiyan@google.com>
Acked-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Cc: Lance Yang <ioworker0@gmail.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Currently ppc64 and x86 are mentioned as architectures where a 65536 value
is reasonable but arm64 isn't listed and it is also a 64-bit architecture.
The help text says that for "arm" the value should be no higher than 32768
but it's only talking about 32-bit ARM. Adding arm64 to the above list
can make this more clear and avoid confusing users who may think that the
32k limit would also apply to 64-bit ARM.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240619083047.114613-1-javierm@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Cc: Brian Masney <bmasney@redhat.com>
Cc: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Since the return value of mas_wr_store_entry() is not used,
the return type can be changed to void.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240614092428.29491-1-rgbi3307@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: JaeJoon Jung <rgbi3307@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
The folio_test_anon(folio)==false cases has been relocated to
folio_add_new_anon_rmap(). Additionally, four other callers consistently
pass anonymous folios.
stack 1:
remove_migration_pmd
-> folio_add_anon_rmap_pmd
-> __folio_add_anon_rmap
stack 2:
__split_huge_pmd_locked
-> folio_add_anon_rmap_ptes
-> __folio_add_anon_rmap
stack 3:
remove_migration_pmd
-> folio_add_anon_rmap_pmd
-> __folio_add_anon_rmap (RMAP_LEVEL_PMD)
stack 4:
try_to_merge_one_page
-> replace_page
-> folio_add_anon_rmap_pte
-> __folio_add_anon_rmap
__folio_add_anon_rmap() only needs to handle the cases
folio_test_anon(folio)==true now.
We can remove the !folio_test_anon(folio)) path within
__folio_add_anon_rmap() now.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617231137.80726-4-21cnbao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua@oppo.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Shuai Yuan <yuanshuai@oppo.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Chris Li <chrisl@kernel.org>
Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
For the !folio_test_anon(folio) case, we can now invoke
folio_add_new_anon_rmap() with the rmap flags set to either EXCLUSIVE or
non-EXCLUSIVE. This action will suppress the VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO check
within __folio_add_anon_rmap() while initiating the process of bringing up
mTHP swapin.
static __always_inline void __folio_add_anon_rmap(struct folio *folio,
struct page *page, int nr_pages, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, rmap_t flags, enum rmap_level level)
{
...
if (unlikely(!folio_test_anon(folio))) {
VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO(folio_test_large(folio) &&
level != RMAP_LEVEL_PMD, folio);
}
...
}
It also improves the code's readability. Currently, all new anonymous
folios calling folio_add_anon_rmap_ptes() are order-0. This ensures that
new folios cannot be partially exclusive; they are either entirely
exclusive or entirely shared.
A useful comment from Hugh's fix:
: Commit "mm: use folio_add_new_anon_rmap() if folio_test_anon(folio)==
: false" has extended folio_add_new_anon_rmap() to use on non-exclusive
: folios, already visible to others in swap cache and on LRU.
:
: That renders its non-atomic __folio_set_swapbacked() unsafe: it risks
: overwriting concurrent atomic operations on folio->flags, losing bits
: added or restoring bits cleared. Since it's only used in this risky way
: when folio_test_locked and !folio_test_anon, many such races are excluded;
: but, for example, isolations by folio_test_clear_lru() are vulnerable, and
: setting or clearing active.
:
: It could just use the atomic folio_set_swapbacked(); but this function
: does try to avoid atomics where it can, so use a branch instead: just
: avoid setting swapbacked when it is already set, that is good enough.
: (Swapbacked is normally stable once set: lazyfree can undo it, but only
: later, when found anon in a page table.)
:
: This fixes a lot of instability under compaction and swapping loads:
: assorted "Bad page"s, VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO()s, apparently even page double
: frees - though I've not worked out what races could lead to the latter.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: comment fixes, per David and akpm]
[v-songbaohua@oppo.com: lock the folio to avoid race]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240622032002.53033-1-21cnbao@gmail.com
[hughd@google.com: folio_add_new_anon_rmap() careful __folio_set_swapbacked()]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3599b1d-8323-0dc5-e9e0-fdb3cfc3dd5a@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617231137.80726-3-21cnbao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua@oppo.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Shuai Yuan <yuanshuai@oppo.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Chris Li <chrisl@kernel.org>
Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "mm: clarify folio_add_new_anon_rmap() and
__folio_add_anon_rmap()", v2.
This patchset is preparatory work for mTHP swapin.
folio_add_new_anon_rmap() assumes that new anon rmaps are always
exclusive. However, this assumption doesn’t hold true for cases like
do_swap_page(), where a new anon might be added to the swapcache and is
not necessarily exclusive.
The patchset extends the rmap flags to allow folio_add_new_anon_rmap() to
handle both exclusive and non-exclusive new anon folios. The
do_swap_page() function is updated to use this extended API with rmap
flags. Consequently, all new anon folios now consistently use
folio_add_new_anon_rmap(). The special case for !folio_test_anon() in
__folio_add_anon_rmap() can be safely removed.
In conclusion, new anon folios always use folio_add_new_anon_rmap(),
regardless of exclusivity. Old anon folios continue to use
__folio_add_anon_rmap() via folio_add_anon_rmap_pmd() and
folio_add_anon_rmap_ptes().
This patch (of 3):
In the case of a swap-in, a new anonymous folio is not necessarily
exclusive. This patch updates the rmap flags to allow a new anonymous
folio to be treated as either exclusive or non-exclusive. To maintain the
existing behavior, we always use EXCLUSIVE as the default setting.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup and constifications per David and akpm]
[v-songbaohua@oppo.com: fix missing doc for flags of folio_add_new_anon_rmap()]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240619210641.62542-1-21cnbao@gmail.com
[v-songbaohua@oppo.com: enhance doc for extend rmap flags arguments for folio_add_new_anon_rmap]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240622030256.43775-1-21cnbao@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617231137.80726-1-21cnbao@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617231137.80726-2-21cnbao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua@oppo.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Shuai Yuan <yuanshuai@oppo.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Chris Li <chrisl@kernel.org>
Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
