commit 35d91d95a0 upstream.
This fixes the following code style problem:
ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line
+ if (!bacmp(&hdev->bdaddr, &ev->bdaddr))
+ {
Fixes: 1ffc6f8cc3 ("Bluetooth: Reject connection with the device which has same BD_ADDR")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c7f59461f5 upstream.
Syzbot reports a warning as follows:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 26946 at net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:619
hci_conn_timeout+0x122/0x210 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:619
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
process_one_work+0x884/0x15c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2630
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2703 [inline]
worker_thread+0x8b9/0x1290 kernel/workqueue.c:2784
kthread+0x33c/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
</TASK>
It is because the HCI_EV_SIMPLE_PAIR_COMPLETE event handler drops
hci_conn directly without check Simple Pairing whether be enabled. But
the Simple Pairing process can only be used if both sides have the
support enabled in the host stack.
Add hci_conn_ssp_enabled() for hci_conn in HCI_EV_IO_CAPA_REQUEST and
HCI_EV_SIMPLE_PAIR_COMPLETE event handlers to fix the problem.
Fixes: 0493684ed2 ("[Bluetooth] Disable disconnect timer during Simple Pairing")
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1ffc6f8cc3 upstream.
This change is used to relieve CVE-2020-26555. The description of
the CVE:
Bluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification
1.0B through 5.2 may permit an unauthenticated nearby device to spoof
the BD_ADDR of the peer device to complete pairing without knowledge
of the PIN. [1]
The detail of this attack is in IEEE paper:
BlueMirror: Reflections on Bluetooth Pairing and Provisioning Protocols
[2]
It's a reflection attack. The paper mentioned that attacker can induce
the attacked target to generate null link key (zero key) without PIN
code. In BR/EDR, the key generation is actually handled in the controller
which is below HCI.
A condition of this attack is that attacker should change the
BR_ADDR of his hacking device (Host B) to equal to the BR_ADDR with
the target device being attacked (Host A).
Thus, we reject the connection with device which has same BD_ADDR
both on HCI_Create_Connection and HCI_Connection_Request to prevent
the attack. A similar implementation also shows in btstack project.
[3][4]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-26555 [1]
Link: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9474325/authors#authors [2]
Link: https://github.com/bluekitchen/btstack/blob/master/src/hci.c#L3523 [3]
Link: https://github.com/bluekitchen/btstack/blob/master/src/hci.c#L7297 [4]
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 33155c4aae upstream.
This change is used to relieve CVE-2020-26555. The description of the
CVE:
Bluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification
1.0B through 5.2 may permit an unauthenticated nearby device to spoof
the BD_ADDR of the peer device to complete pairing without knowledge
of the PIN. [1]
The detail of this attack is in IEEE paper:
BlueMirror: Reflections on Bluetooth Pairing and Provisioning Protocols
[2]
It's a reflection attack. The paper mentioned that attacker can induce
the attacked target to generate null link key (zero key) without PIN
code. In BR/EDR, the key generation is actually handled in the controller
which is below HCI.
Thus, we can ignore null link key in the handler of "Link Key Notification
event" to relieve the attack. A similar implementation also shows in
btstack project. [3]
v3: Drop the connection when null link key be detected.
v2:
- Used Link: tag instead of Closes:
- Used bt_dev_dbg instead of BT_DBG
- Added Fixes: tag
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55ed8ca10f ("Bluetooth: Implement link key handling for the management interface")
Link: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-26555 [1]
Link: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9474325/authors#authors [2]
Link: https://github.com/bluekitchen/btstack/blob/master/src/hci.c#L3722 [3]
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5093bbfc10 upstream.
Our current route lookups (mctp_route_lookup and mctp_route_lookup_null)
traverse the net's route list without the RCU read lock held. This means
the route lookup is subject to preemption, resulting in an potential
grace period expiry, and so an eventual kfree() while we still have the
route pointer.
Add the proper read-side critical section locks around the route
lookups, preventing premption and a possible parallel kfree.
The remaining net->mctp.routes accesses are already under a
rcu_read_lock, or protected by the RTNL for updates.
Based on an analysis from Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com>, where
introducing a delay in the route lookup could cause a UAF on
simultaneous sendmsg() and route deletion.
Reported-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com>
Fixes: 889b7da23a ("mctp: Add initial routing framework")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/29c4b0e67dc1bf3571df3982de87df90cae9b631.1696837310.git.jk@codeconstruct.com.au
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7563cf17dc upstream.
Direct calls to ops->connect() can overwrite the address parameter when
used in conjunction with BPF SOCK_ADDR hooks. Recent changes to
kernel_connect() ensure that callers are insulated from such side
effects. This patch wraps the direct call to ops->connect() with
kernel_connect() to prevent unexpected changes to the address passed to
ceph_tcp_connect().
This change was originally part of a larger patch targeting the net tree
addressing all instances of unprotected calls to ops->connect()
throughout the kernel, but this change was split up into several patches
targeting various trees.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230821100007.559638-1-jrife@google.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/9944248dba1bce861375fcce9de663934d933ba9.camel@redhat.com/
Fixes: d74bad4e74 ("bpf: Hooks for sys_connect")
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e2bca4870f ]
Sergei Trofimovich reported a regression [0] caused by commit a0ade8404c
("af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname().").
It introduced a flex array sll_addr_flex in struct sockaddr_ll as a
union-ed member with sll_addr to work around the fortified memcpy() check.
However, a userspace program uses a struct that has struct sockaddr_ll in
the middle, where a flex array is illegal to exist.
include/linux/if_packet.h:24:17: error: flexible array member 'sockaddr_ll::<unnamed union>::<unnamed struct>::sll_addr_flex' not at end of 'struct packet_info_t'
24 | __DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(unsigned char, sll_addr_flex);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
To fix the regression, let's go back to the first attempt [1] telling
memcpy() the actual size of the array.
Reported-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyich@gmail.com>
Closes: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/252587#issuecomment-1741733002 [0]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230720004410.87588-3-kuniyu@amazon.com/ [1]
Fixes: a0ade8404c ("af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname().")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231009153151.75688-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 71c299c711 ]
tcp_stream_alloc_skb() initializes the skb to use tcp_tsorted_anchor
which is a union with the destructor. We need to clean that
TCP-iness up before freeing.
Fixes: 736013292e ("tcp: let tcp_mtu_probe() build headless packets")
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231010173651.3990234-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a950a5921d ]
SMC_STAT_PAYLOAD_SUB(_smc_stats, _tech, key, _len, _rc) will calculate
wrong bucket positions for payloads of exactly 4096 bytes and
(1 << (m + 12)) bytes, with m == SMC_BUF_MAX - 1.
Intended bucket distribution:
Assume l == size of payload, m == SMC_BUF_MAX - 1.
Bucket 0 : 0 < l <= 2^13
Bucket n, 1 <= n <= m-1 : 2^(n+12) < l <= 2^(n+13)
Bucket m : l > 2^(m+12)
Current solution:
_pos = fls64((l) >> 13)
[...]
_pos = (_pos < m) ? ((l == 1 << (_pos + 12)) ? _pos - 1 : _pos) : m
For l == 4096, _pos == -1, but should be _pos == 0.
For l == (1 << (m + 12)), _pos == m, but should be _pos == m - 1.
In order to avoid special treatment of these corner cases, the
calculation is adjusted. The new solution first subtracts the length by
one, and then calculates the correct bucket by shifting accordingly,
i.e. _pos = fls64((l - 1) >> 13), l > 0.
This not only fixes the issues named above, but also makes the whole
bucket assignment easier to follow.
Same is done for SMC_STAT_RMB_SIZE_SUB(_smc_stats, _tech, k, _len),
where the calculation of the bucket position is similar to the one
named above.
Fixes: e0e4b8fa53 ("net/smc: Add SMC statistics support")
Suggested-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nils Hoppmann <niho@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 31c07dffaf ]
Sili Luo reported a race in nfc_llcp_sock_get(), leading to UAF.
Getting a reference on the socket found in a lookup while
holding a lock should happen before releasing the lock.
nfc_llcp_sock_get_sn() has a similar problem.
Finally nfc_llcp_recv_snl() needs to make sure the socket
found by nfc_llcp_sock_from_sn() does not disappear.
Fixes: 8f50020ed9 ("NFC: LLCP late binding")
Reported-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231009123110.3735515-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a72178cfe8 ]
When the SMC protocol is built into the kernel proper while ISM is
configured to be built as module, linking the kernel fails due to
unresolved dependencies out of net/smc/smc_ism.o to
ism_get_smcd_ops, ism_register_client, and ism_unregister_client
as reported via the linux-next test automation (see link).
This however is a bug introduced a while ago.
Correct the dependency list in ISM's and SMC's Kconfig to reflect the
dependencies that are actually inverted. With this you cannot build a
kernel with CONFIG_SMC=y and CONFIG_ISM=m. Either ISM needs to be 'y',
too - or a 'n'. That way, SMC can still be configured on non-s390
architectures that do not have (nor need) an ISM driver.
Fixes: 89e7d2ba61 ("net/ism: Add new API for client registration")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-next/d53b5b50-d894-4df8-8969-fd39e63440ae@infradead.org/
Co-developed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Bayer <gbayer@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> # build-tested
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231006125847.1517840-1-gbayer@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 26c29961b1 ]
syzbot uses panic_on_warn.
This means that the skb_dump() I added in the blamed commit are
not even called.
Rewrite this so that we get the needed skb dump before syzbot crashes.
Fixes: eeee4b77dc ("net: add more debug info in skb_checksum_help()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231006173355.2254983-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a12bbb3ccc ]
Syzkaller reported the following issue:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2807 at mm/vmalloc.c:3247 __vmalloc_node_range (mm/vmalloc.c:3361)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2807 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.6.0-rc2+ #12
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
unwind_backtrace from show_stack (arch/arm/kernel/traps.c:258)
show_stack from dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1))
dump_stack_lvl from __warn (kernel/panic.c:633 kernel/panic.c:680)
__warn from warn_slowpath_fmt (./include/linux/context_tracking.h:153 kernel/panic.c:700)
warn_slowpath_fmt from __vmalloc_node_range (mm/vmalloc.c:3361 (discriminator 3))
__vmalloc_node_range from vmalloc_user (mm/vmalloc.c:3478)
vmalloc_user from xskq_create (net/xdp/xsk_queue.c:40)
xskq_create from xsk_setsockopt (net/xdp/xsk.c:953 net/xdp/xsk.c:1286)
xsk_setsockopt from __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2308)
__sys_setsockopt from ret_fast_syscall (arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S:68)
xskq_get_ring_size() uses struct_size() macro to safely calculate the
size of struct xsk_queue and q->nentries of desc members. But the
syzkaller repro was able to set q->nentries with the value initially
taken from copy_from_sockptr() high enough to return SIZE_MAX by
struct_size(). The next PAGE_ALIGN(size) is such case will overflow
the size_t value and set it to 0. This will trigger WARN_ON_ONCE in
vmalloc_user() -> __vmalloc_node_range().
The issue is reproducible on 32-bit arm kernel.
Fixes: 9f78bf330a ("xsk: support use vaddr as ring")
Reported-by: syzbot+fae676d3cf469331fc89@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000c84b4705fb31741e@google.com/T/
Reported-by: syzbot+b132693e925cbbd89e26@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000e20df20606ebab4f@google.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Andrew Kanner <andrew.kanner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: syzbot+fae676d3cf469331fc89@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fae676d3cf469331fc89
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231007075148.1759-1-andrew.kanner@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit aba0e909dc ]
Devlink health dump get callback should take devlink lock as any other
devlink callback. Otherwise, since devlink_mutex was removed, this
callback is not protected from a race of the reporter being destroyed
while handling the callback.
Add devlink lock to the callback and to any call for
devlink_health_do_dump(). This should be safe as non of the drivers dump
callback implementation takes devlink lock.
As devlink lock is added to any callback of dump, the reporter dump_lock
is now redundant and can be removed.
Fixes: d3efc2a6a6 ("net: devlink: remove devlink_mutex")
Signed-off-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1696510216-189379-1-git-send-email-moshe@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d9c2ba65e6 ]
With patch [1], isotp_poll was updated to also queue the poller in the
so->wait queue, which is used for send state changes. Since the queue
now also contains polling tasks that are not interested in sending, the
queue fill state can no longer be used as an indication of send
readiness. As a consequence, nonblocking writes can lead to a race and
lock-up of the socket if there is a second task polling the socket in
parallel.
With this patch, isotp_sendmsg does not consult wq_has_sleepers but
instead tries to atomically set so->tx.state and waits on so->wait if it
is unable to do so. This behavior is in alignment with isotp_poll, which
also checks so->tx.state to determine send readiness.
V2:
- Revert direct exit to goto err_event_drop
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230331125511.372783-1-michal.sojka@cvut.cz
Reported-by: Maxime Jayat <maxime.jayat@mobile-devices.fr>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/11328958-453f-447f-9af8-3b5824dfb041@munic.io/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Magel <lukas.magel@posteo.net>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Fixes: 79e19fa79c ("can: isotp: isotp_ops: fix poll() to not report false EPOLLOUT events")
Link: https://github.com/pylessard/python-udsoncan/issues/178#issuecomment-1743786590
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230827092205.7908-1-lukas.magel@posteo.net
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit c889a99a21 upstream.
Similar to the change in commit 0bdf399342c5("net: Avoid address
overwrite in kernel_connect"), BPF hooks run on bind may rewrite the
address passed to kernel_bind(). This change
1) Makes a copy of the bind address in kernel_bind() to insulate
callers.
2) Replaces direct calls to sock->ops->bind() in net with kernel_bind()
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230912013332.2048422-1-jrife@google.com/
Fixes: 4fbac77d2d ("bpf: Hooks for sys_bind")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 1f4e803cd9 ]
Currently, when hb_interval is changed by users, it won't take effect
until the next expiry of hb timer. As the default value is 30s, users
have to wait up to 30s to wait its hb_interval update to work.
This becomes pretty bad in containers where a much smaller value is
usually set on hb_interval. This patch improves it by resetting the
hb timer immediately once the value of hb_interval is updated by users.
Note that we don't address the already existing 'problem' when sending
a heartbeat 'on demand' if one hb has just been sent(from the timer)
mentioned in:
https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org/msg590224.html
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/75465785f8ee5df2fb3acdca9b8fafdc18984098.1696172660.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2222a78075 ]
During the 4-way handshake, the transport's state is set to ACTIVE in
sctp_process_init() when processing INIT_ACK chunk on client or
COOKIE_ECHO chunk on server.
In the collision scenario below:
192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 3922216408]
192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 144230885]
192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3922216408]
192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]
192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3914796021]
when processing COOKIE_ECHO on 192.168.1.2, as it's in COOKIE_WAIT state,
sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b() is called by sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() where it
creates a new association and sets its transport to ACTIVE then updates
to the old association in sctp_assoc_update().
However, in sctp_assoc_update(), it will skip the transport update if it
finds a transport with the same ipaddr already existing in the old asoc,
and this causes the old asoc's transport state not to move to ACTIVE
after the handshake.
This means if DATA retransmission happens at this moment, it won't be able
to enter PF state because of the check 'transport->state == SCTP_ACTIVE'
in sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike().
This patch fixes it by updating the transport in sctp_assoc_update() with
sctp_assoc_add_peer() where it updates the transport state if there is
already a transport with the same ipaddr exists in the old asoc.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fd17356abe49713ded425250cc1ae51e9f5846c6.1696172325.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4720852ed9 ]
This commit fixes poor delayed ACK behavior that can cause poor TCP
latency in a particular boundary condition: when an application makes
a TCP socket write that is an exact multiple of the MSS size.
The problem is that there is painful boundary discontinuity in the
current delayed ACK behavior. With the current delayed ACK behavior,
we have:
(1) If an app reads data when > 1*MSS is unacknowledged, then
tcp_cleanup_rbuf() ACKs immediately because of:
tp->rcv_nxt - tp->rcv_wup > icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss ||
(2) If an app reads all received data, and the packets were < 1*MSS,
and either (a) the app is not ping-pong or (b) we received two
packets < 1*MSS, then tcp_cleanup_rbuf() ACKs immediately beecause
of:
((icsk->icsk_ack.pending & ICSK_ACK_PUSHED2) ||
((icsk->icsk_ack.pending & ICSK_ACK_PUSHED) &&
!inet_csk_in_pingpong_mode(sk))) &&
(3) *However*: if an app reads exactly 1*MSS of data,
tcp_cleanup_rbuf() does not send an immediate ACK. This is true
even if the app is not ping-pong and the 1*MSS of data had the PSH
bit set, suggesting the sending application completed an
application write.
Thus if the app is not ping-pong, we have this painful case where
>1*MSS gets an immediate ACK, and <1*MSS gets an immediate ACK, but a
write whose last skb is an exact multiple of 1*MSS can get a 40ms
delayed ACK. This means that any app that transfers data in one
direction and takes care to align write size or packet size with MSS
can suffer this problem. With receive zero copy making 4KB MSS values
more common, it is becoming more common to have application writes
naturally align with MSS, and more applications are likely to
encounter this delayed ACK problem.
The fix in this commit is to refine the delayed ACK heuristics with a
simple check: immediately ACK a received 1*MSS skb with PSH bit set if
the app reads all data. Why? If an skb has a len of exactly 1*MSS and
has the PSH bit set then it is likely the end of an application
write. So more data may not be arriving soon, and yet the data sender
may be waiting for an ACK if cwnd-bound or using TX zero copy. Thus we
set ICSK_ACK_PUSHED in this case so that tcp_cleanup_rbuf() will send
an ACK immediately if the app reads all of the data and is not
ping-pong. Note that this logic is also executed for the case where
len > MSS, but in that case this logic does not matter (and does not
hurt) because tcp_cleanup_rbuf() will always ACK immediately if the
app reads data and there is more than an MSS of unACKed data.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Xin Guo <guoxin0309@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231001151239.1866845-2-ncardwell.sw@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 059217c18b ]
This commit fixes quick-ack counting so that it only considers that a
quick-ack has been provided if we are sending an ACK that newly
acknowledges data.
The code was erroneously using the number of data segments in outgoing
skbs when deciding how many quick-ack credits to remove. This logic
does not make sense, and could cause poor performance in
request-response workloads, like RPC traffic, where requests or
responses can be multi-segment skbs.
When a TCP connection decides to send N quick-acks, that is to
accelerate the cwnd growth of the congestion control module
controlling the remote endpoint of the TCP connection. That quick-ack
decision is purely about the incoming data and outgoing ACKs. It has
nothing to do with the outgoing data or the size of outgoing data.
And in particular, an ACK only serves the intended purpose of allowing
the remote congestion control to grow the congestion window quickly if
the ACK is ACKing or SACKing new data.
The fix is simple: only count packets as serving the goal of the
quickack mechanism if they are ACKing/SACKing new data. We can tell
whether this is the case by checking inet_csk_ack_scheduled(), since
we schedule an ACK exactly when we are ACKing/SACKing new data.
Fixes: fc6415bcb0 ("[TCP]: Fix quick-ack decrementing with TSO.")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231001151239.1866845-1-ncardwell.sw@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 08e50cf071 ]
It seems that tipc_crypto_key_revoke() could be be invoked by
wokequeue tipc_crypto_work_rx() under process context and
timer/rx callback under softirq context, thus the lock acquisition
on &tx->lock seems better use spin_lock_bh() to prevent possible
deadlock.
This flaw was found by an experimental static analysis tool I am
developing for irq-related deadlock.
tipc_crypto_work_rx() <workqueue>
--> tipc_crypto_key_distr()
--> tipc_bcast_xmit()
--> tipc_bcbase_xmit()
--> tipc_bearer_bc_xmit()
--> tipc_crypto_xmit()
--> tipc_ehdr_build()
--> tipc_crypto_key_revoke()
--> spin_lock(&tx->lock)
<timer interrupt>
--> tipc_disc_timeout()
--> tipc_bearer_xmit_skb()
--> tipc_crypto_xmit()
--> tipc_ehdr_build()
--> tipc_crypto_key_revoke()
--> spin_lock(&tx->lock) <deadlock here>
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <dg573847474@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Fixes: fc1b6d6de2 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230927181414.59928-1-dg573847474@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0add5c597f ]
Due to a small omission, the offload_failed flag is missing from ipv4
fibmatch results. Make sure it is set correctly.
The issue can be witnessed using the following commands:
echo "1 1" > /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device
ip link add dummy1 up type dummy
ip route add 192.0.2.0/24 dev dummy1
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/netdevsim/netdevsim1/fib/fail_route_offload
ip route add 198.51.100.0/24 dev dummy1
ip route
# 192.168.15.0/24 has rt_trap
# 198.51.100.0/24 has rt_offload_failed
ip route get 192.168.15.1 fibmatch
# Result has rt_trap
ip route get 198.51.100.1 fibmatch
# Result differs from the route shown by `ip route`, it is missing
# rt_offload_failed
ip link del dev dummy1
echo 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/del_device
Fixes: 36c5100e85 ("IPv4: Add "offload failed" indication to routes")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230926182730.231208-1-bpoirier@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 087388278e ]
nft_rbtree_gc_elem() walks back and removes the end interval element that
comes before the expired element.
There is a small chance that we've cached this element as 'rbe_ge'.
If this happens, we hold and test a pointer that has been queued for
freeing.
It also causes spurious insertion failures:
$ cat test-testcases-sets-0044interval_overlap_0.1/testout.log
Error: Could not process rule: File exists
add element t s { 0 - 2 }
^^^^^^
Failed to insert 0 - 2 given:
table ip t {
set s {
type inet_service
flags interval,timeout
timeout 2s
gc-interval 2s
}
}
The set (rbtree) is empty. The 'failure' doesn't happen on next attempt.
Reason is that when we try to insert, the tree may hold an expired
element that collides with the range we're adding.
While we do evict/erase this element, we can trip over this check:
if (rbe_ge && nft_rbtree_interval_end(rbe_ge) && nft_rbtree_interval_end(new))
return -ENOTEMPTY;
rbe_ge was erased by the synchronous gc, we should not have done this
check. Next attempt won't find it, so retry results in successful
insertion.
Restart in-kernel to avoid such spurious errors.
Such restart are rare, unless userspace intentionally adds very large
numbers of elements with very short timeouts while setting a huge
gc interval.
Even in this case, this cannot loop forever, on each retry an existing
element has been removed.
As the caller is holding the transaction mutex, its impossible
for a second entity to add more expiring elements to the tree.
After this it also becomes feasible to remove the async gc worker
and perform all garbage collection from the commit path.
Fixes: c9e6978e27 ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: Switch to node list walk for overlap detection")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0d880dc6f0 ]
When adding/updating an object, the transaction handler emits suitable
audit log entries already, the one in nft_obj_notify() is redundant. To
fix that (and retain the audit logging from objects' 'update' callback),
Introduce an "audit log free" variant for internal use.
Fixes: c520292f29 ("audit: log nftables configuration change events once per table")
Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (Audit)
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8e56b063c8 ]
In Scenario A and B below, as the delayed INIT_ACK always changes the peer
vtag, SCTP ct with the incorrect vtag may cause packet loss.
Scenario A: INIT_ACK is delayed until the peer receives its own INIT_ACK
192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: [INIT] [init tag: 1328086772]
192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: [INIT] [init tag: 1414468151]
192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: [INIT ACK] [init tag: 1328086772]
192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: [INIT ACK] [init tag: 1650211246] *
192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: [COOKIE ECHO]
192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: [COOKIE ECHO]
192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: [COOKIE ACK]
Scenario B: INIT_ACK is delayed until the peer completes its own handshake
192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 3922216408]
192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 144230885]
192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3922216408]
192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]
192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3914796021] *
This patch fixes it as below:
In SCTP_CID_INIT processing:
- clear ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir] if ct->proto.sctp.init[dir] &&
ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir]. (Scenario E)
- set ct->proto.sctp.init[dir].
In SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK processing:
- drop it if !ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir] && ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] &&
ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] != ih->init_tag. (Scenario B, Scenario C)
- drop it if ct->proto.sctp.init[dir] && ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir] &&
ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] != ih->init_tag. (Scenario A)
In SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ACK processing:
- clear ct->proto.sctp.init[dir] and ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir].
(Scenario D)
Also, it's important to allow the ct state to move forward with cookie_echo
and cookie_ack from the opposite dir for the collision scenarios.
There are also other Scenarios where it should allow the packet through,
addressed by the processing above:
Scenario C: new CT is created by INIT_ACK.
Scenario D: start INIT on the existing ESTABLISHED ct.
Scenario E: start INIT after the old collision on the existing ESTABLISHED
ct.
192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 3922216408]
192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 144230885]
(both side are stopped, then start new connection again in hours)
192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 242308742]
Fixes: 9fb9cbb108 ("[NETFILTER]: Add nf_conntrack subsystem.")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit af84f9e447 ]
nft can perform merging of adjacent payload requests.
This means that:
ether saddr 00:11 ... ether type 8021ad ...
is a single payload expression, for 8 bytes, starting at the
ethernet source offset.
Check that offset+length is fully within the source/destination mac
addersses.
This bug prevents 'ether type' from matching the correct h_proto in case
vlan tag got stripped.
Fixes: de6843be30 ("netfilter: nft_payload: rebuild vlan header when needed")
Reported-by: David Ward <david.ward@ll.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8957261cd8 ]
The ETHTOOL_A_PLCA_ENABLED data type is u8. But while parsing the
value from the attribute, nla_get_u32() is used in the plca_update_sint()
function instead of nla_get_u8(). So plca_cfg.enabled variable is updated
with some garbage value instead of 0 or 1 and always enables plca even
though plca is disabled through ethtool application. This bug has been
fixed by parsing the values based on the attributes type in the policy.
Fixes: 8580e16c28 ("net/ethtool: add netlink interface for the PLCA RS")
Signed-off-by: Parthiban Veerasooran <Parthiban.Veerasooran@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230908044548.5878-1-Parthiban.Veerasooran@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9593c7cb6c ]
Commit b0e214d212 ("netfilter: keep conntrack reference until
IPsecv6 policy checks are done") is a direct copy of the old
commit b59c270104 ("[NETFILTER]: Keep conntrack reference until
IPsec policy checks are done") but for IPv6. However, it also
copies a bug that this old commit had. That is: when the third
packet of 3WHS connection establishment contains payload, it is
added into socket receive queue without the XFRM check and the
drop of connection tracking context.
That leads to nf_conntrack module being impossible to unload as
it waits for all the conntrack references to be dropped while
the packet release is deferred in per-cpu cache indefinitely, if
not consumed by the application.
The issue for IPv4 was fixed in commit 6f0012e351 ("tcp: add a
missing nf_reset_ct() in 3WHS handling") by adding a missing XFRM
check and correctly dropping the conntrack context. However, the
issue was introduced to IPv6 code afterwards. Fixing it the
same way for IPv6 now.
Fixes: b0e214d212 ("netfilter: keep conntrack reference until IPsecv6 policy checks are done")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/d589a999-d4dd-2768-b2d5-89dec64a4a42@ovn.org/
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230922210530.2045146-1-i.maximets@ovn.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9d4c75800f ]
Including the transhdrlen in length is a problem when the packet is
partially filled (e.g. something like send(MSG_MORE) happened previously)
when appending to an IPv4 or IPv6 packet as we don't want to repeat the
transport header or account for it twice. This can happen under some
circumstances, such as splicing into an L2TP socket.
The symptom observed is a warning in __ip6_append_data():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5042 at net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1800 __ip6_append_data.isra.0+0x1be8/0x47f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1800
that occurs when MSG_SPLICE_PAGES is used to append more data to an already
partially occupied skbuff. The warning occurs when 'copy' is larger than
the amount of data in the message iterator. This is because the requested
length includes the transport header length when it shouldn't. This can be
triggered by, for example:
sfd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_L2TP);
bind(sfd, ...); // ::1
connect(sfd, ...); // ::1 port 7
send(sfd, buffer, 4100, MSG_MORE);
sendfile(sfd, dfd, NULL, 1024);
Fix this by only adding transhdrlen into the length if the write queue is
empty in l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(), analogously to how UDP does things.
l2tp_ip_sendmsg() looks like it won't suffer from this problem as it builds
the UDP packet itself.
Fixes: a32e0eec70 ("l2tp: introduce L2TPv3 IP encapsulation support for IPv6")
Reported-by: syzbot+62cbf263225ae13ff153@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0000000000001c12b30605378ce8@google.com/
Suggested-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5baa0433a1 ]
n->output field can be read locklessly, while a writer
might change the pointer concurrently.
Add missing annotations to prevent load-store tearing.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 25563b581b ]
While looking at a related syzbot report involving neigh_periodic_work(),
I found that I forgot to add an annotation when deleting an
RCU protected item from a list.
Readers use rcu_deference(*np), we need to use either
rcu_assign_pointer() or WRITE_ONCE() on writer side
to prevent store tearing.
I use rcu_assign_pointer() to have lockdep support,
this was the choice made in neigh_flush_dev().
Fixes: 767e97e1e0 ("neigh: RCU conversion of struct neighbour")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b80e31baa4 ]
With a SOCKMAP/SOCKHASH map and an sk_msg program user can steer messages
sent from one TCP socket (s1) to actually egress from another TCP
socket (s2):
tcp_bpf_sendmsg(s1) // = sk_prot->sendmsg
tcp_bpf_send_verdict(s1) // __SK_REDIRECT case
tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(s2)
tcp_bpf_push_locked(s2)
tcp_bpf_push(s2)
tcp_rate_check_app_limited(s2) // expects tcp_sock
tcp_sendmsg_locked(s2) // ditto
There is a hard-coded assumption in the call-chain, that the egress
socket (s2) is a TCP socket.
However in commit 122e6c79ef ("sock_map: Update sock type checks for
UDP") we have enabled redirects to non-TCP sockets. This was done for the
sake of BPF sk_skb programs. There was no indention to support sk_msg
send-to-egress use case.
As a result, attempts to send-to-egress through a non-TCP socket lead to a
crash due to invalid downcast from sock to tcp_sock:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002f
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x60/0x70
? __die+0x1f/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x80/0x160
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2d7/0x800
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50
? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x1c0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
? tcp_tso_segs+0x14/0xa0
tcp_write_xmit+0x67/0xce0
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x32/0xf0
tcp_push+0x107/0x140
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x99f/0xbb0
tcp_bpf_push+0x19d/0x3a0
tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir+0x55/0xd0
tcp_bpf_send_verdict+0x407/0x550
tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x390
inet_sendmsg+0x6a/0x70
sock_sendmsg+0x9d/0xc0
? sockfd_lookup_light+0x12/0x80
__sys_sendto+0x10e/0x160
? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x20/0x60
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x82/0x110
__x64_sys_sendto+0x1f/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Reject selecting a non-TCP sockets as redirect target from a BPF sk_msg
program to prevent the crash. When attempted, user will receive an EACCES
error from send/sendto/sendmsg() syscall.
Fixes: 122e6c79ef ("sock_map: Update sock type checks for UDP")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230920102055.42662-1-jakub@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit da9e915eaf ]
When data is peek'd off the receive queue we shouldn't considered it
copied from tcp_sock side. When we increment copied_seq this will confuse
tcp_data_ready() because copied_seq can be arbitrarily increased. From
application side it results in poll() operations not waking up when
expected.
Notice tcp stack without BPF recvmsg programs also does not increment
copied_seq.
We broke this when we moved copied_seq into recvmsg to only update when
actual copy was happening. But, it wasn't working correctly either before
because the tcp_data_ready() tried to use the copied_seq value to see
if data was read by user yet. See fixes tags.
Fixes: e5c6de5fa0 ("bpf, sockmap: Incorrectly handling copied_seq")
Fixes: 04919bed94 ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230926035300.135096-3-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9b7177b1df ]
Before fix e5c6de5fa0 tcp_read_skb() would increment the tp->copied-seq
value. This (as described in the commit) would cause an error for apps
because once that is incremented the application might believe there is no
data to be read. Then some apps would stall or abort believing no data is
available.
However, the fix is incomplete because it introduces another issue in
the skb dequeue. The loop does tcp_recv_skb() in a while loop to consume
as many skbs as possible. The problem is the call is ...
tcp_recv_skb(sk, seq, &offset)
... where 'seq' is:
u32 seq = tp->copied_seq;
Now we can hit a case where we've yet incremented copied_seq from BPF side,
but then tcp_recv_skb() fails this test ...
if (offset < skb->len || (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_FIN))
... so that instead of returning the skb we call tcp_eat_recv_skb() which
frees the skb. This is because the routine believes the SKB has been collapsed
per comment:
/* This looks weird, but this can happen if TCP collapsing
* splitted a fat GRO packet, while we released socket lock
* in skb_splice_bits()
*/
This can't happen here we've unlinked the full SKB and orphaned it. Anyways
it would confuse any BPF programs if the data were suddenly moved underneath
it.
To fix this situation do simpler operation and just skb_peek() the data
of the queue followed by the unlink. It shouldn't need to check this
condition and tcp_read_skb() reads entire skbs so there is no need to
handle the 'offset!=0' case as we would see in tcp_read_sock().
Fixes: e5c6de5fa0 ("bpf, sockmap: Incorrectly handling copied_seq")
Fixes: 04919bed94 ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230926035300.135096-2-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit aaba3cd33f ]
When associating to an MLD AP, links may be disabled. Create all
resources associated with a disabled link so that we can later enable it
without having to create these resources on the fly.
Fixes: 6d543b34db ("wifi: mac80211: Support disabled links during association")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Berg <benjamin.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925173028.f9afdb26f6c7.I4e6e199aaefc1bf017362d64f3869645fa6830b5@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 31db78a492 ]
When ieee80211_key_link() is called by ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()
but returns 0 due to KRACK protection (identical key reinstall),
ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add() will still return a pointer into the
key, in a potential use-after-free. This normally doesn't happen
since it's only called by iwlwifi in case of WoWLAN rekey offload
which has its own KRACK protection, but still better to fix, do
that by returning an error code and converting that to success on
the cfg80211 boundary only, leaving the error for bad callers of
ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add().
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Fixes: fdf7cb4185 ("mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e0275ea521 ]
iso_listen_cis shall only return -EADDRINUSE if the listening socket has
the destination set to BDADDR_ANY otherwise if the destination is set to
a specific address it is for broadcast which shall be ignored.
Fixes: f764a6c2c1 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Add broadcast support")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c7eaf80bfb ]
Syzbot found a bug "BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context
at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580". It is because hci_link_tx_to holds an
RCU read lock and calls hci_disconnect which would hold a mutex lock
since the commit a13f316e90 ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Consolidate code
for aborting connections"). Here's an example call trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xfc/0x174 lib/dump_stack.c:106
___might_sleep+0x4a9/0x4d3 kernel/sched/core.c:9663
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:576 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xc7/0x6e7 kernel/locking/mutex.c:732
hci_cmd_sync_queue+0x3a/0x287 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:388
hci_abort_conn+0x2cd/0x2e4 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1812
hci_disconnect+0x207/0x237 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:244
hci_link_tx_to net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3254 [inline]
__check_timeout net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3419 [inline]
__check_timeout+0x310/0x361 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3399
hci_sched_le net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3602 [inline]
hci_tx_work+0xe8f/0x12d0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3652
process_one_work+0x75c/0xba1 kernel/workqueue.c:2310
worker_thread+0x5b2/0x73a kernel/workqueue.c:2457
kthread+0x2f7/0x30b kernel/kthread.c:319
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:298
This patch releases RCU read lock before calling hci_disconnect and
reacquires it afterward to fix the bug.
Fixes: a13f316e90 ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Consolidate code for aborting connections")
Signed-off-by: Ying Hsu <yinghsu@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit cbaabbcdcb ]
hci_req_prepare_suspend() has been deprecated in favor of
hci_suspend_sync().
Fixes: 182ee45da0 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Rework hci_suspend_notifier")
Signed-off-by: Yao Xiao <xiaoyao@rock-chips.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6e48ebffc2 ]
Since the changed field size was increased to u64, mesh_bss_info_changed
pulls invalid bits from the first 3 bytes of the mesh id, clears them, and
passes them on to ieee80211_link_info_change_notify, because
ifmsh->mbss_changed was not updated to match its size.
Fix this by turning into ifmsh->mbss_changed into an unsigned long array with
64 bit size.
Fixes: 15ddba5f43 ("wifi: mac80211: consistently use u64 for BSS changes")
Reported-by: Thomas Hühn <thomas.huehn@hs-nordhausen.de>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913050134.53536-1-nbd@nbd.name
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 37c20b2eff ]
Max Schulze reports crashes with brcmfmac. The reason seems
to be a race between userspace removing the CQM config and
the driver calling cfg80211_cqm_rssi_notify(), where if the
data is freed while cfg80211_cqm_rssi_notify() runs it will
crash since it assumes wdev->cqm_config is set. This can't
be fixed with a simple non-NULL check since there's nothing
we can do for locking easily, so use RCU instead to protect
the pointer, but that requires pulling the updates out into
an asynchronous worker so they can sleep and call back into
the driver.
Since we need to change the free anyway, also change it to
go back to the old settings if changing the settings fails.
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Schulze <max.schulze@online.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ac96309a-8d8d-4435-36e6-6d152eb31876@online.de
Fixes: 4a4b816950 ("cfg80211: Accept multiple RSSI thresholds for CQM")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 234249d88b ]
When connect to MLO AP with more than one link, and the assoc response of
AP is not success, then cfg80211_unhold_bss() is not called for all the
links' cfg80211_bss except the primary link which means the link used by
the latest successful association request. Thus the hold value of the
cfg80211_bss is not reset to 0 after the assoc fail, and then the
__cfg80211_unlink_bss() will not be called for the cfg80211_bss by
__cfg80211_bss_expire().
Then the AP always looks exist even the AP is shutdown or reconfigured
to another type, then it will lead error while connecting it again.
The detail info are as below.
When connect with muti-links AP, cfg80211_hold_bss() is called by
cfg80211_mlme_assoc() for each cfg80211_bss of all the links. When
assoc response from AP is not success(such as status_code==1), the
ieee80211_link_data of non-primary link(sdata->link[link_id]) is NULL
because ieee80211_assoc_success()->ieee80211_vif_update_links() is
not called for the links.
Then struct cfg80211_rx_assoc_resp resp in cfg80211_rx_assoc_resp() and
struct cfg80211_connect_resp_params cr in __cfg80211_connect_result()
will only have the data of the primary link, and finally function
cfg80211_connect_result_release_bsses() only call cfg80211_unhold_bss()
for the primary link. Then cfg80211_bss of the other links will never free
because its hold is always > 0 now.
Hence assign value for the bss and status from assoc_data since it is
valid for this case. Also assign value of addr from assoc_data when the
link is NULL because the addrs of assoc_data and link both represent the
local link addr and they are same value for success connection.
Fixes: 81151ce462 ("wifi: mac80211: support MLO authentication/association with one link")
Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <quic_wgong@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230825070055.28164-1-quic_wgong@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 86a7e0b69b upstream.
Callers of sock_sendmsg(), and similarly kernel_sendmsg(), in kernel
space may observe their value of msg_name change in cases where BPF
sendmsg hooks rewrite the send address. This has been confirmed to break
NFS mounts running in UDP mode and has the potential to break other
systems.
This patch:
1) Creates a new function called __sock_sendmsg() with same logic as the
old sock_sendmsg() function.
2) Replaces calls to sock_sendmsg() made by __sys_sendto() and
__sys_sendmsg() with __sock_sendmsg() to avoid an unnecessary copy,
as these system calls are already protected.
3) Modifies sock_sendmsg() so that it makes a copy of msg_name if
present before passing it down the stack to insulate callers from
changes to the send address.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230912013332.2048422-1-jrife@google.com/
Fixes: 1cedee13d2 ("bpf: Hooks for sys_sendmsg")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 26297b4ce1 upstream.
commit 0bdf399342 ("net: Avoid address overwrite in kernel_connect")
ensured that kernel_connect() will not overwrite the address parameter
in cases where BPF connect hooks perform an address rewrite. This change
replaces direct calls to sock->ops->connect() in net with kernel_connect()
to make these call safe.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230912013332.2048422-1-jrife@google.com/
Fixes: d74bad4e74 ("bpf: Hooks for sys_connect")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 941c998b42 upstream.
When HCI_QUIRK_STRICT_DUPLICATE_FILTER is set LE scanning requires
periodic restarts of the scanning procedure as the controller would
consider device previously found as duplicated despite of RSSI changes,
but in order to set the scan timeout properly set le_scan_restart needs
to be synchronous so it shall not use hci_cmd_sync_queue which defers
the command processing to cmd_sync_work.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/578e6d7afd676129decafba846a933f5@agner.ch/#t
Fixes: 27d54b778a ("Bluetooth: Rework le_scan_restart for hci_sync")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e5ed101a60 upstream.
This patch drops id 0 limitation in mptcp_nl_cmd_sf_create() to allow
creating additional subflows with the local addr ID 0.
There is no reason not to allow additional subflows from this local
address: we should be able to create new subflows from the initial
endpoint. This limitation was breaking fullmesh support from userspace.
Fixes: 702c2f646d ("mptcp: netlink: allow userspace-driven subflow establishment")
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/391
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliang.tang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231004-send-net-20231004-v1-2-28de4ac663ae@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
