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590bfb57b2
It is insecure to allow arbitrary hash algorithms and signature encodings to be used with arbitrary signature algorithms. Notably, ECDSA, ECRDSA, and SM2 all sign/verify raw hash values and don't disambiguate between different hash algorithms like RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding does. Therefore, they need to be restricted to certain sets of hash algorithms (ideally just one, but in practice small sets are used). Additionally, the encoding is an integral part of modern signature algorithms, and is not supposed to vary. Therefore, tighten the checks of hash_algo and encoding done by software_key_determine_akcipher(). Also rearrange the parameters to software_key_determine_akcipher() to put the public_key first, as this is the most important parameter and it often determines everything else. Fixes: |
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| asymmetric_keys.h | ||
| asymmetric_type.c | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Makefile | ||
| mscode_parser.c | ||
| mscode.asn1 | ||
| pkcs7_key_type.c | ||
| pkcs7_parser.c | ||
| pkcs7_parser.h | ||
| pkcs7_trust.c | ||
| pkcs7_verify.c | ||
| pkcs7.asn1 | ||
| pkcs8_parser.c | ||
| pkcs8.asn1 | ||
| public_key.c | ||
| restrict.c | ||
| signature.c | ||
| verify_pefile.c | ||
| verify_pefile.h | ||
| x509_akid.asn1 | ||
| x509_cert_parser.c | ||
| x509_parser.h | ||
| x509_public_key.c | ||
| x509.asn1 | ||