Eric Paris ab5a91a836 Security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low vm space ...

On a kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY but without an LSM which implements
security_file_mmap it is impossible for an application to mmap addresses
lower than mmap_min_addr.  Based on a suggestion from a developer in the
openwall community this patch adds a check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  It is
assumed that any process with this capability can harm the system a lot
more easily than writing some stuff on the zero page and then trying to
get the kernel to trip over itself.  It also means that programs like X
on i686 which use vm86 emulation can work even with mmap_min_addr set.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

2007-12-06 00:24:30 +11:00

..

keys

KEYS: Make request_key() and co fundamentally asynchronous

2007-10-17 08:42:57 -07:00

selinux

SELinux: detect dead booleans

2007-12-06 00:24:09 +11:00

capability.c

Implement file posix capabilities

2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00

commoncap.c

file capabilities: don't prevent signaling setuid root programs

2007-11-29 09:24:53 -08:00

dummy.c

Security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low vm space

2007-12-06 00:24:30 +11:00

inode.c

security/ cleanups

2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00

Kconfig

Implement file posix capabilities

2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00

Makefile

[PATCH] LSM: remove BSD secure level security module

2006-09-29 09:18:10 -07:00

root_plug.c

security: Convert LSM into a static interface

2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00

security.c

security/ cleanups

2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00