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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
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a03a728e37
Commit1e562deace
("crypto: rsassa-pkcs1 - Migrate to sig_alg backend") enforced that rsassa-pkcs1 sign/verify operations specify a hash algorithm. That is necessary because per RFC 8017 sec 8.2, a hash algorithm identifier must be prepended to the hash before generating or verifying the signature ("Full Hash Prefix"). However the commit went too far in that it changed user space behavior: KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY system calls now return -EINVAL unless they specify a hash algorithm. Intel Wireless Daemon (iwd) is one application issuing such system calls (for EAP-TLS). Closer analysis of the Embedded Linux Library (ell) used by iwd reveals that the problem runs even deeper: When iwd uses TLS 1.1 or earlier, it not only queries for keys, but performs sign/verify operations without specifying a hash algorithm. These legacy TLS versions concatenate an MD5 to a SHA-1 hash and omit the Full Hash Prefix: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/tree/ell/tls-suites.c#n97 TLS 1.1 was deprecated in 2021 by RFC 8996, but removal of support was inadvertent in this case. It probably should be coordinated with iwd maintainers first. So reinstate support for such legacy protocols by defaulting to hash algorithm "none" which uses an empty Full Hash Prefix. If it is later on decided to remove TLS 1.1 support but still allow KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY without a hash algorithm, that can be achieved by reverting the present commit and replacing it with the following patch: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZxalYZwH5UiGX5uj@wunner.de/ It's worth noting that Python's cryptography library gained support for such legacy use cases very recently, so they do seem to still be a thing. The Python developers identified IKE version 1 as another protocol omitting the Full Hash Prefix: https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/issues/10226 https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/issues/5495 The author of those issues, Zoltan Kelemen, spent considerable effort searching for test vectors but only found one in a 2019 blog post by Kevin Jones. Add it to testmgr.h to verify correctness of this feature. Examination of wpa_supplicant as well as various IKE daemons (libreswan, strongswan, isakmpd, raccoon) has determined that none of them seems to use the kernel's Key Retention Service, so iwd is the only affected user space application known so far. Fixes:1e562deace
("crypto: rsassa-pkcs1 - Migrate to sig_alg backend") Reported-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com> Tested-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2ed09a22-86c0-4cf0-8bda-ef804ccb3413@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
462 lines
12 KiB
C
462 lines
12 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/* In-software asymmetric public-key crypto subtype
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*
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* See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKEY: "fmt
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#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
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#include <crypto/public_key.h>
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#include <crypto/sig.h>
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#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
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#include <linux/asn1.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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MODULE_DESCRIPTION("In-software asymmetric public-key subtype");
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MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
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MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
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/*
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* Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys.
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*/
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static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
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struct seq_file *m)
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{
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struct public_key *key = asymmetric_key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
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if (key)
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seq_printf(m, "%s.%s", key->id_type, key->pkey_algo);
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}
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/*
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* Destroy a public key algorithm key.
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*/
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void public_key_free(struct public_key *key)
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{
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if (key) {
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kfree_sensitive(key->key);
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kfree(key->params);
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kfree(key);
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}
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_free);
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/*
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* Destroy a public key algorithm key.
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*/
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static void public_key_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3)
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{
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public_key_free(payload0);
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public_key_signature_free(payload3);
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}
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/*
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* Given a public_key, and an encoding and hash_algo to be used for signing
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* and/or verification with that key, determine the name of the corresponding
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* akcipher algorithm. Also check that encoding and hash_algo are allowed.
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*/
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static int
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software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
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const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo,
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char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME], bool *sig,
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enum kernel_pkey_operation op)
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{
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int n;
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*sig = true;
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if (!encoding)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0) {
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/*
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* RSA signatures usually use EMSA-PKCS1-1_5 [RFC3447 sec 8.2].
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*/
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if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
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*sig = op == kernel_pkey_sign ||
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op == kernel_pkey_verify;
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if (!*sig) {
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/*
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* For encrypt/decrypt, hash_algo is not used
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* but allowed to be set for historic reasons.
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*/
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n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
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"pkcs1pad(%s)",
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pkey->pkey_algo);
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} else {
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if (!hash_algo)
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hash_algo = "none";
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n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
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"pkcs1(%s,%s)",
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pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo);
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}
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return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;
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}
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if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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/*
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* Raw RSA cannot differentiate between different hash
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* algorithms.
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*/
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if (hash_algo)
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return -EINVAL;
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*sig = false;
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} else if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
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if (strcmp(encoding, "x962") != 0 &&
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strcmp(encoding, "p1363") != 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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/*
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* ECDSA signatures are taken over a raw hash, so they don't
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* differentiate between different hash algorithms. That means
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* that the verifier should hard-code a specific hash algorithm.
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* Unfortunately, in practice ECDSA is used with multiple SHAs,
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* so we have to allow all of them and not just one.
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*/
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if (!hash_algo)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sha1") != 0 &&
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strcmp(hash_algo, "sha224") != 0 &&
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strcmp(hash_algo, "sha256") != 0 &&
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strcmp(hash_algo, "sha384") != 0 &&
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strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0 &&
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strcmp(hash_algo, "sha3-256") != 0 &&
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strcmp(hash_algo, "sha3-384") != 0 &&
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strcmp(hash_algo, "sha3-512") != 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s(%s)",
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encoding, pkey->pkey_algo);
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return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;
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} else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0) {
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if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (!hash_algo)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog256") != 0 &&
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strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog512") != 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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} else {
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/* Unknown public key algorithm */
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return -ENOPKG;
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}
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if (strscpy(alg_name, pkey->pkey_algo, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) < 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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return 0;
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}
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static u8 *pkey_pack_u32(u8 *dst, u32 val)
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{
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memcpy(dst, &val, sizeof(val));
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return dst + sizeof(val);
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}
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/*
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* Query information about a key.
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*/
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static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
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struct kernel_pkey_query *info)
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{
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struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
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struct public_key *pkey = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
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char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
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struct crypto_sig *sig;
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u8 *key, *ptr;
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int ret, len;
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bool issig;
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ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding,
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params->hash_algo, alg_name,
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&issig, kernel_pkey_sign);
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!key)
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return -ENOMEM;
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memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
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ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
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ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo);
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ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen);
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memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
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if (issig) {
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sig = crypto_alloc_sig(alg_name, 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(sig)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(sig);
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goto error_free_key;
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}
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if (pkey->key_is_private)
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ret = crypto_sig_set_privkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
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else
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ret = crypto_sig_set_pubkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error_free_tfm;
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len = crypto_sig_keysize(sig);
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info->max_sig_size = crypto_sig_maxsize(sig);
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info->max_data_size = crypto_sig_digestsize(sig);
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info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_VERIFY;
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if (pkey->key_is_private)
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info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_SIGN;
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if (strcmp(params->encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
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info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT;
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if (pkey->key_is_private)
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info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT;
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}
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} else {
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tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
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goto error_free_key;
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}
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if (pkey->key_is_private)
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ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
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else
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ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error_free_tfm;
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len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
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info->max_sig_size = len;
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info->max_data_size = len;
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info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT;
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if (pkey->key_is_private)
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info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT;
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}
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info->key_size = len * 8;
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info->max_enc_size = len;
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info->max_dec_size = len;
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ret = 0;
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error_free_tfm:
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if (issig)
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crypto_free_sig(sig);
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else
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crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
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error_free_key:
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kfree_sensitive(key);
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pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Do encryption, decryption and signing ops.
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*/
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static int software_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
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const void *in, void *out)
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{
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const struct public_key *pkey = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
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char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
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struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
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struct crypto_sig *sig;
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char *key, *ptr;
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bool issig;
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int ksz;
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int ret;
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pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
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ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding,
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params->hash_algo, alg_name,
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&issig, params->op);
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!key)
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return -ENOMEM;
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memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
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ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
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ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo);
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ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen);
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memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
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if (issig) {
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sig = crypto_alloc_sig(alg_name, 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(sig)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(sig);
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goto error_free_key;
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}
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if (pkey->key_is_private)
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ret = crypto_sig_set_privkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
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else
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ret = crypto_sig_set_pubkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
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if (ret)
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goto error_free_tfm;
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ksz = crypto_sig_keysize(sig);
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} else {
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tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
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goto error_free_key;
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}
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if (pkey->key_is_private)
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ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
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else
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ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
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if (ret)
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goto error_free_tfm;
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ksz = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
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}
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ret = -EINVAL;
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/* Perform the encryption calculation. */
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switch (params->op) {
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case kernel_pkey_encrypt:
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if (issig)
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break;
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ret = crypto_akcipher_sync_encrypt(tfm, in, params->in_len,
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out, params->out_len);
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break;
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case kernel_pkey_decrypt:
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if (issig)
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break;
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ret = crypto_akcipher_sync_decrypt(tfm, in, params->in_len,
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out, params->out_len);
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break;
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case kernel_pkey_sign:
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if (!issig)
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break;
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ret = crypto_sig_sign(sig, in, params->in_len,
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out, params->out_len);
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break;
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default:
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BUG();
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}
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if (ret == 0)
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ret = ksz;
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error_free_tfm:
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if (issig)
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crypto_free_sig(sig);
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else
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crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
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error_free_key:
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kfree_sensitive(key);
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pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Verify a signature using a public key.
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*/
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int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
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const struct public_key_signature *sig)
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{
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char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
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struct crypto_sig *tfm;
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char *key, *ptr;
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bool issig;
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int ret;
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pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
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BUG_ON(!pkey);
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BUG_ON(!sig);
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BUG_ON(!sig->s);
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/*
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* If the signature specifies a public key algorithm, it *must* match
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* the key's actual public key algorithm.
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*
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* Small exception: ECDSA signatures don't specify the curve, but ECDSA
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* keys do. So the strings can mismatch slightly in that case:
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* "ecdsa-nist-*" for the key, but "ecdsa" for the signature.
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*/
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if (sig->pkey_algo) {
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if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, sig->pkey_algo) != 0 &&
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(strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 ||
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strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0))
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return -EKEYREJECTED;
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}
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ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, sig->encoding,
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sig->hash_algo, alg_name,
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&issig, kernel_pkey_verify);
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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tfm = crypto_alloc_sig(alg_name, 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(tfm))
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return PTR_ERR(tfm);
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key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!key) {
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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goto error_free_tfm;
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}
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memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
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ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
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ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo);
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ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen);
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memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
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if (pkey->key_is_private)
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ret = crypto_sig_set_privkey(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
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else
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ret = crypto_sig_set_pubkey(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
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if (ret)
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goto error_free_key;
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ret = crypto_sig_verify(tfm, sig->s, sig->s_size,
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sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
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error_free_key:
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kfree_sensitive(key);
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error_free_tfm:
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crypto_free_sig(tfm);
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pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret > 0))
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ret = -EINVAL;
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_verify_signature);
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static int public_key_verify_signature_2(const struct key *key,
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const struct public_key_signature *sig)
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{
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const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
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return public_key_verify_signature(pk, sig);
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}
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/*
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* Public key algorithm asymmetric key subtype
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*/
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struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype = {
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.owner = THIS_MODULE,
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.name = "public_key",
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.name_len = sizeof("public_key") - 1,
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.describe = public_key_describe,
|
|
.destroy = public_key_destroy,
|
|
.query = software_key_query,
|
|
.eds_op = software_key_eds_op,
|
|
.verify_signature = public_key_verify_signature_2,
|
|
};
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_subtype);
|