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a02d83f994
Currently, kernel would set MSG_CTRUNC flag if msg_control buffer
wasn't provided and SO_PASSCRED was set or if there was pending SCM_RIGHTS.
For some reason we have no corresponding check for SO_PASSSEC.
In the recvmsg(2) doc we have:
MSG_CTRUNC
indicates that some control data was discarded due to lack
of space in the buffer for ancillary data.
So, we need to set MSG_CTRUNC flag for all types of SCM.
This change can break applications those don't check MSG_CTRUNC flag.
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3
("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
v2:
- commit message was rewritten according to Eric's suggestion
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
157 lines
3.7 KiB
C
157 lines
3.7 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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#ifndef __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
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#define __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
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#include <linux/limits.h>
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#include <linux/net.h>
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#include <linux/cred.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/pid.h>
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#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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/* Well, we should have at least one descriptor open
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* to accept passed FDs 8)
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*/
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#define SCM_MAX_FD 253
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struct scm_creds {
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u32 pid;
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kuid_t uid;
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kgid_t gid;
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};
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struct scm_fp_list {
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short count;
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short max;
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struct user_struct *user;
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struct file *fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
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};
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struct scm_cookie {
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struct pid *pid; /* Skb credentials */
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struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
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struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
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u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
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#endif
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};
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void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
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void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
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int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
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void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm);
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struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
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static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{
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security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
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}
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#else
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static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{ }
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#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
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static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm,
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struct pid *pid, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
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{
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scm->pid = get_pid(pid);
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scm->creds.pid = pid_vnr(pid);
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scm->creds.uid = uid;
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scm->creds.gid = gid;
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}
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static __inline__ void scm_destroy_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{
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put_pid(scm->pid);
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scm->pid = NULL;
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}
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static __inline__ void scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{
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scm_destroy_cred(scm);
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if (scm->fp)
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__scm_destroy(scm);
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}
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static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
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struct scm_cookie *scm, bool forcecreds)
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{
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memset(scm, 0, sizeof(*scm));
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scm->creds.uid = INVALID_UID;
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scm->creds.gid = INVALID_GID;
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if (forcecreds)
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scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_uid(), current_gid());
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unix_get_peersec_dgram(sock, scm);
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if (msg->msg_controllen <= 0)
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return 0;
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return __scm_send(sock, msg, scm);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
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static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{
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char *secdata;
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u32 seclen;
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int err;
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if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
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err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
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if (!err) {
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put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
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security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
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}
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}
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}
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static inline bool scm_has_secdata(struct socket *sock)
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{
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return test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
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}
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#else
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static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{ }
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static inline bool scm_has_secdata(struct socket *sock)
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{
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return false;
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
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static __inline__ void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
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struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
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{
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if (!msg->msg_control) {
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if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) || scm->fp ||
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scm_has_secdata(sock))
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msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
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scm_destroy(scm);
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return;
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}
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if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags)) {
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struct user_namespace *current_ns = current_user_ns();
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struct ucred ucreds = {
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.pid = scm->creds.pid,
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.uid = from_kuid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.uid),
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.gid = from_kgid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.gid),
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};
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put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_CREDENTIALS, sizeof(ucreds), &ucreds);
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}
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scm_destroy_cred(scm);
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scm_passec(sock, msg, scm);
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if (!scm->fp)
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return;
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scm_detach_fds(msg, scm);
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}
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#endif /* __LINUX_NET_SCM_H */
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