linux/fs/ecryptfs/main.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
ecryptfs: main: Demote a bunch of non-conformant kernel-doc headers Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s): fs/ecryptfs/main.c:28: warning: Incorrect use of kernel-doc format: * Module parameter that defines the ecryptfs_verbosity level. fs/ecryptfs/main.c:30: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'int ecryptfs_verbosity = 0; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:40: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_message_buf_len = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_MSG_CTX_ELEMS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:52: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'signed long ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout = ECRYPTFS_MAX_MSG_CTX_TTL / HZ; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:65: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_number_of_users = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_NUM_USERS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'dentry' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'lower_file' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Excess function parameter 'ecryptfs_dentry' description in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Function parameter or member 'sbi' not described in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Excess function parameter 'sb' description in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'fs_type' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: expecting prototype for ecryptfs_get_sb(). Prototype was for ecryptfs_mount() instead fs/ecryptfs/main.c:645: warning: Function parameter or member 'vptr' not described in 'inode_info_init_once' Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: "Michael A. Halcrow" <mahalcro@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Michael C. Thompson" <mcthomps@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> [tyhicks: Correct the function documentation for ecryptfs_mount()] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
2021-03-30 16:44:53 +00:00
/*
* eCryptfs: Linux filesystem encryption layer
*
* Copyright (C) 1997-2003 Erez Zadok
* Copyright (C) 2001-2003 Stony Brook University
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 International Business Machines Corp.
* Author(s): Michael A. Halcrow <mahalcro@us.ibm.com>
* Michael C. Thompson <mcthomps@us.ibm.com>
* Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
*/
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include <linux/fs_stack.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 08:04:11 +00:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include "ecryptfs_kernel.h"
ecryptfs: main: Demote a bunch of non-conformant kernel-doc headers Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s): fs/ecryptfs/main.c:28: warning: Incorrect use of kernel-doc format: * Module parameter that defines the ecryptfs_verbosity level. fs/ecryptfs/main.c:30: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'int ecryptfs_verbosity = 0; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:40: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_message_buf_len = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_MSG_CTX_ELEMS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:52: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'signed long ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout = ECRYPTFS_MAX_MSG_CTX_TTL / HZ; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:65: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_number_of_users = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_NUM_USERS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'dentry' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'lower_file' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Excess function parameter 'ecryptfs_dentry' description in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Function parameter or member 'sbi' not described in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Excess function parameter 'sb' description in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'fs_type' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: expecting prototype for ecryptfs_get_sb(). Prototype was for ecryptfs_mount() instead fs/ecryptfs/main.c:645: warning: Function parameter or member 'vptr' not described in 'inode_info_init_once' Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: "Michael A. Halcrow" <mahalcro@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Michael C. Thompson" <mcthomps@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> [tyhicks: Correct the function documentation for ecryptfs_mount()] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
2021-03-30 16:44:53 +00:00
/*
* Module parameter that defines the ecryptfs_verbosity level.
*/
int ecryptfs_verbosity = 0;
module_param(ecryptfs_verbosity, int, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(ecryptfs_verbosity,
"Initial verbosity level (0 or 1; defaults to "
"0, which is Quiet)");
ecryptfs: main: Demote a bunch of non-conformant kernel-doc headers Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s): fs/ecryptfs/main.c:28: warning: Incorrect use of kernel-doc format: * Module parameter that defines the ecryptfs_verbosity level. fs/ecryptfs/main.c:30: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'int ecryptfs_verbosity = 0; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:40: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_message_buf_len = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_MSG_CTX_ELEMS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:52: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'signed long ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout = ECRYPTFS_MAX_MSG_CTX_TTL / HZ; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:65: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_number_of_users = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_NUM_USERS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'dentry' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'lower_file' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Excess function parameter 'ecryptfs_dentry' description in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Function parameter or member 'sbi' not described in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Excess function parameter 'sb' description in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'fs_type' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: expecting prototype for ecryptfs_get_sb(). Prototype was for ecryptfs_mount() instead fs/ecryptfs/main.c:645: warning: Function parameter or member 'vptr' not described in 'inode_info_init_once' Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: "Michael A. Halcrow" <mahalcro@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Michael C. Thompson" <mcthomps@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> [tyhicks: Correct the function documentation for ecryptfs_mount()] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
2021-03-30 16:44:53 +00:00
/*
* Module parameter that defines the number of message buffer elements
*/
unsigned int ecryptfs_message_buf_len = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_MSG_CTX_ELEMS;
module_param(ecryptfs_message_buf_len, uint, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(ecryptfs_message_buf_len,
"Number of message buffer elements");
ecryptfs: main: Demote a bunch of non-conformant kernel-doc headers Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s): fs/ecryptfs/main.c:28: warning: Incorrect use of kernel-doc format: * Module parameter that defines the ecryptfs_verbosity level. fs/ecryptfs/main.c:30: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'int ecryptfs_verbosity = 0; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:40: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_message_buf_len = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_MSG_CTX_ELEMS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:52: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'signed long ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout = ECRYPTFS_MAX_MSG_CTX_TTL / HZ; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:65: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_number_of_users = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_NUM_USERS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'dentry' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'lower_file' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Excess function parameter 'ecryptfs_dentry' description in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Function parameter or member 'sbi' not described in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Excess function parameter 'sb' description in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'fs_type' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: expecting prototype for ecryptfs_get_sb(). Prototype was for ecryptfs_mount() instead fs/ecryptfs/main.c:645: warning: Function parameter or member 'vptr' not described in 'inode_info_init_once' Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: "Michael A. Halcrow" <mahalcro@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Michael C. Thompson" <mcthomps@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> [tyhicks: Correct the function documentation for ecryptfs_mount()] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
2021-03-30 16:44:53 +00:00
/*
* Module parameter that defines the maximum guaranteed amount of time to wait
* for a response from ecryptfsd. The actual sleep time will be, more than
* likely, a small amount greater than this specified value, but only less if
* the message successfully arrives.
*/
signed long ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout = ECRYPTFS_MAX_MSG_CTX_TTL / HZ;
module_param(ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout, long, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout,
"Maximum number of seconds that an operation will "
"sleep while waiting for a message response from "
"userspace");
ecryptfs: main: Demote a bunch of non-conformant kernel-doc headers Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s): fs/ecryptfs/main.c:28: warning: Incorrect use of kernel-doc format: * Module parameter that defines the ecryptfs_verbosity level. fs/ecryptfs/main.c:30: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'int ecryptfs_verbosity = 0; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:40: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_message_buf_len = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_MSG_CTX_ELEMS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:52: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'signed long ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout = ECRYPTFS_MAX_MSG_CTX_TTL / HZ; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:65: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_number_of_users = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_NUM_USERS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'dentry' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'lower_file' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Excess function parameter 'ecryptfs_dentry' description in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Function parameter or member 'sbi' not described in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Excess function parameter 'sb' description in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'fs_type' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: expecting prototype for ecryptfs_get_sb(). Prototype was for ecryptfs_mount() instead fs/ecryptfs/main.c:645: warning: Function parameter or member 'vptr' not described in 'inode_info_init_once' Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: "Michael A. Halcrow" <mahalcro@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Michael C. Thompson" <mcthomps@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> [tyhicks: Correct the function documentation for ecryptfs_mount()] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
2021-03-30 16:44:53 +00:00
/*
* Module parameter that is an estimate of the maximum number of users
* that will be concurrently using eCryptfs. Set this to the right
* value to balance performance and memory use.
*/
unsigned int ecryptfs_number_of_users = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_NUM_USERS;
module_param(ecryptfs_number_of_users, uint, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(ecryptfs_number_of_users, "An estimate of the number of "
"concurrent users of eCryptfs");
void __ecryptfs_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
if (fmt[1] == '7') { /* KERN_DEBUG */
if (ecryptfs_verbosity >= 1)
vprintk(fmt, args);
} else
vprintk(fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
ecryptfs: main: Demote a bunch of non-conformant kernel-doc headers Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s): fs/ecryptfs/main.c:28: warning: Incorrect use of kernel-doc format: * Module parameter that defines the ecryptfs_verbosity level. fs/ecryptfs/main.c:30: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'int ecryptfs_verbosity = 0; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:40: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_message_buf_len = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_MSG_CTX_ELEMS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:52: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'signed long ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout = ECRYPTFS_MAX_MSG_CTX_TTL / HZ; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:65: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_number_of_users = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_NUM_USERS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'dentry' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'lower_file' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Excess function parameter 'ecryptfs_dentry' description in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Function parameter or member 'sbi' not described in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Excess function parameter 'sb' description in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'fs_type' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: expecting prototype for ecryptfs_get_sb(). Prototype was for ecryptfs_mount() instead fs/ecryptfs/main.c:645: warning: Function parameter or member 'vptr' not described in 'inode_info_init_once' Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: "Michael A. Halcrow" <mahalcro@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Michael C. Thompson" <mcthomps@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> [tyhicks: Correct the function documentation for ecryptfs_mount()] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
2021-03-30 16:44:53 +00:00
/*
* ecryptfs_init_lower_file
* @ecryptfs_dentry: Fully initialized eCryptfs dentry object, with
* the lower dentry and the lower mount set
*
* eCryptfs only ever keeps a single open file for every lower
* inode. All I/O operations to the lower inode occur through that
* file. When the first eCryptfs dentry that interposes with the first
* lower dentry for that inode is created, this function creates the
* lower file struct and associates it with the eCryptfs
* inode. When all eCryptfs files associated with the inode are released, the
* file is closed.
*
* The lower file will be opened with read/write permissions, if
* possible. Otherwise, it is opened read-only.
*
* This function does nothing if a lower file is already
* associated with the eCryptfs inode.
*
* Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise
*/
static int ecryptfs_init_lower_file(struct dentry *dentry,
struct file **lower_file)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
const struct path *path = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path(dentry);
int rc;
rc = ecryptfs_privileged_open(lower_file, path->dentry, path->mnt,
cred);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error opening lower file "
"for lower_dentry [0x%p] and lower_mnt [0x%p]; "
"rc = [%d]\n", path->dentry, path->mnt, rc);
(*lower_file) = NULL;
}
return rc;
}
int ecryptfs_get_lower_file(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
{
struct ecryptfs_inode_info *inode_info;
int count, rc = 0;
inode_info = ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode);
mutex_lock(&inode_info->lower_file_mutex);
count = atomic_inc_return(&inode_info->lower_file_count);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(count < 1))
rc = -EINVAL;
else if (count == 1) {
rc = ecryptfs_init_lower_file(dentry,
&inode_info->lower_file);
if (rc)
atomic_set(&inode_info->lower_file_count, 0);
}
mutex_unlock(&inode_info->lower_file_mutex);
return rc;
}
void ecryptfs_put_lower_file(struct inode *inode)
{
struct ecryptfs_inode_info *inode_info;
inode_info = ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode);
if (atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(&inode_info->lower_file_count,
&inode_info->lower_file_mutex)) {
filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
fput(inode_info->lower_file);
inode_info->lower_file = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&inode_info->lower_file_mutex);
}
}
enum {
Opt_sig, Opt_ecryptfs_sig, Opt_cipher, Opt_ecryptfs_cipher,
Opt_ecryptfs_key_bytes, Opt_passthrough, Opt_xattr_metadata,
Opt_encrypted_view, Opt_fnek_sig, Opt_fn_cipher,
Opt_fn_cipher_key_bytes, Opt_unlink_sigs, Opt_mount_auth_tok_only,
Opt_check_dev_ruid
};
static const struct fs_parameter_spec ecryptfs_fs_param_spec[] = {
fsparam_string ("sig", Opt_sig),
fsparam_string ("ecryptfs_sig", Opt_ecryptfs_sig),
fsparam_string ("cipher", Opt_cipher),
fsparam_string ("ecryptfs_cipher", Opt_ecryptfs_cipher),
fsparam_u32 ("ecryptfs_key_bytes", Opt_ecryptfs_key_bytes),
fsparam_flag ("ecryptfs_passthrough", Opt_passthrough),
fsparam_flag ("ecryptfs_xattr_metadata", Opt_xattr_metadata),
fsparam_flag ("ecryptfs_encrypted_view", Opt_encrypted_view),
fsparam_string ("ecryptfs_fnek_sig", Opt_fnek_sig),
fsparam_string ("ecryptfs_fn_cipher", Opt_fn_cipher),
fsparam_u32 ("ecryptfs_fn_key_bytes", Opt_fn_cipher_key_bytes),
fsparam_flag ("ecryptfs_unlink_sigs", Opt_unlink_sigs),
fsparam_flag ("ecryptfs_mount_auth_tok_only", Opt_mount_auth_tok_only),
fsparam_flag ("ecryptfs_check_dev_ruid", Opt_check_dev_ruid),
{}
};
static int ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks(
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat)
{
struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok;
struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok;
int rc = 0;
list_for_each_entry(global_auth_tok,
&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list,
mount_crypt_stat_list) {
rc = ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(
&global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key, &auth_tok,
global_auth_tok->sig);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find valid key in user "
"session keyring for sig specified in mount "
"option: [%s]\n", global_auth_tok->sig);
global_auth_tok->flags |= ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID;
goto out;
} else {
global_auth_tok->flags &= ~ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID;
up_write(&(global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key)->sem);
}
}
out:
return rc;
}
static void ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_stat(
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat)
{
memset((void *)mount_crypt_stat, 0,
sizeof(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list);
mutex_init(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED;
}
struct ecryptfs_fs_context {
/* Mount option status trackers */
bool check_ruid;
bool sig_set;
bool cipher_name_set;
bool cipher_key_bytes_set;
bool fn_cipher_name_set;
bool fn_cipher_key_bytes_set;
};
/**
* ecryptfs_parse_param
* @fc: The ecryptfs filesystem context
* @param: The mount parameter to parse
*
* The signature of the key to use must be the description of a key
* already in the keyring. Mounting will fail if the key can not be
* found.
*
* Returns zero on success; non-zero on error
*/
static int ecryptfs_parse_param(
struct fs_context *fc,
struct fs_parameter *param)
{
int rc;
int opt;
struct fs_parse_result result;
struct ecryptfs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi = fc->s_fs_info;
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
&sbi->mount_crypt_stat;
opt = fs_parse(fc, ecryptfs_fs_param_spec, param, &result);
if (opt < 0)
return opt;
switch (opt) {
case Opt_sig:
case Opt_ecryptfs_sig:
rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(mount_crypt_stat,
param->string, 0);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register "
"global sig; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
return rc;
}
ctx->sig_set = 1;
break;
case Opt_cipher:
case Opt_ecryptfs_cipher:
strscpy(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
param->string);
ctx->cipher_name_set = 1;
break;
case Opt_ecryptfs_key_bytes:
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size =
result.uint_32;
ctx->cipher_key_bytes_set = 1;
break;
case Opt_passthrough:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH_ENABLED;
break;
case Opt_xattr_metadata:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED;
break;
case Opt_encrypted_view:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED;
mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED;
break;
case Opt_fnek_sig:
strscpy(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig,
param->string);
rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(
mount_crypt_stat,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig,
ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register "
"global fnek sig [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig, rc);
return rc;
}
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
(ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES
| ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCFN_USE_MOUNT_FNEK);
break;
case Opt_fn_cipher:
strscpy(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
param->string);
ctx->fn_cipher_name_set = 1;
break;
case Opt_fn_cipher_key_bytes:
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes =
result.uint_32;
ctx->fn_cipher_key_bytes_set = 1;
break;
case Opt_unlink_sigs:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_UNLINK_SIGS;
break;
case Opt_mount_auth_tok_only:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_MOUNT_AUTH_TOK_ONLY;
break;
case Opt_check_dev_ruid:
ctx->check_ruid = 1;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
static int ecryptfs_validate_options(struct fs_context *fc)
{
int rc = 0;
u8 cipher_code;
struct ecryptfs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi = fc->s_fs_info;
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
mount_crypt_stat = &sbi->mount_crypt_stat;
if (!ctx->sig_set) {
rc = -EINVAL;
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "You must supply at least one valid "
"auth tok signature as a mount "
"parameter; see the eCryptfs README\n");
goto out;
}
if (!ctx->cipher_name_set) {
int cipher_name_len = strlen(ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CIPHER);
BUG_ON(cipher_name_len > ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
strcpy(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CIPHER);
}
eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: mount option Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option. Note that the ecryptfs-utils userspace package versions 61 or later support this option. When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the mount. If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has already entered for encrypting the file contents. When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option. This key must be available in the user's keyring. The mount helper usually takes care of this step. If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06 22:42:01 +00:00
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !ctx->fn_cipher_name_set)
eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: mount option Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option. Note that the ecryptfs-utils userspace package versions 61 or later support this option. When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the mount. If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has already entered for encrypting the file contents. When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option. This key must be available in the user's keyring. The mount helper usually takes care of this step. If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06 22:42:01 +00:00
strcpy(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name);
if (!ctx->cipher_key_bytes_set)
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size = 0;
eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: mount option Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option. Note that the ecryptfs-utils userspace package versions 61 or later support this option. When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the mount. If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has already entered for encrypting the file contents. When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option. This key must be available in the user's keyring. The mount helper usually takes care of this step. If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06 22:42:01 +00:00
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !ctx->fn_cipher_key_bytes_set)
eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: mount option Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option. Note that the ecryptfs-utils userspace package versions 61 or later support this option. When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the mount. If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has already entered for encrypting the file contents. When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option. This key must be available in the user's keyring. The mount helper usually takes care of this step. If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06 22:42:01 +00:00
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes =
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size;
cipher_code = ecryptfs_code_for_cipher_string(
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size);
if (!cipher_code) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR,
"eCryptfs doesn't support cipher: %s\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
if (!ecryptfs_tfm_exists(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: mount option Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option. Note that the ecryptfs-utils userspace package versions 61 or later support this option. When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the mount. If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has already entered for encrypting the file contents. When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option. This key must be available in the user's keyring. The mount helper usually takes care of this step. If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06 22:42:01 +00:00
NULL)) {
rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(
NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size);
eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: mount option Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option. Note that the ecryptfs-utils userspace package versions 61 or later support this option. When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the mount. If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has already entered for encrypting the file contents. When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option. This key must be available in the user's keyring. The mount helper usually takes care of this step. If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06 22:42:01 +00:00
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize "
"cipher with name = [%s] and key size = [%td]; "
"rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size,
rc);
rc = -EINVAL;
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !ecryptfs_tfm_exists(
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name, NULL)) {
rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(
NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize "
"cipher with name = [%s] and key size = [%td]; "
"rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes,
rc);
rc = -EINVAL;
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: mount option Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option. Note that the ecryptfs-utils userspace package versions 61 or later support this option. When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the mount. If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has already entered for encrypting the file contents. When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option. This key must be available in the user's keyring. The mount helper usually takes care of this step. If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06 22:42:01 +00:00
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
rc = ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks(mount_crypt_stat);
eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: mount option Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option. Note that the ecryptfs-utils userspace package versions 61 or later support this option. When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the mount. If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has already entered for encrypting the file contents. When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option. This key must be available in the user's keyring. The mount helper usually takes care of this step. If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06 22:42:01 +00:00
if (rc)
printk(KERN_WARNING "One or more global auth toks could not "
"properly register; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
out:
return rc;
}
struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_sb_info_cache;
static struct file_system_type ecryptfs_fs_type;
ecryptfs: main: Demote a bunch of non-conformant kernel-doc headers Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s): fs/ecryptfs/main.c:28: warning: Incorrect use of kernel-doc format: * Module parameter that defines the ecryptfs_verbosity level. fs/ecryptfs/main.c:30: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'int ecryptfs_verbosity = 0; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:40: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_message_buf_len = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_MSG_CTX_ELEMS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:52: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'signed long ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout = ECRYPTFS_MAX_MSG_CTX_TTL / HZ; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:65: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_number_of_users = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_NUM_USERS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'dentry' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'lower_file' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Excess function parameter 'ecryptfs_dentry' description in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Function parameter or member 'sbi' not described in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Excess function parameter 'sb' description in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'fs_type' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: expecting prototype for ecryptfs_get_sb(). Prototype was for ecryptfs_mount() instead fs/ecryptfs/main.c:645: warning: Function parameter or member 'vptr' not described in 'inode_info_init_once' Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: "Michael A. Halcrow" <mahalcro@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Michael C. Thompson" <mcthomps@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> [tyhicks: Correct the function documentation for ecryptfs_mount()] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
2021-03-30 16:44:53 +00:00
/*
* ecryptfs_get_tree
* @fc: The filesystem context
*/
static int ecryptfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
{
struct super_block *s;
struct ecryptfs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi = fc->s_fs_info;
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
int rc;
if (!fc->source) {
rc = -EINVAL;
err = "Device name cannot be null";
goto out;
}
mount_crypt_stat = &sbi->mount_crypt_stat;
rc = ecryptfs_validate_options(fc);
if (rc) {
err = "Error validating options";
goto out;
}
s = sget_fc(fc, NULL, set_anon_super_fc);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(s);
goto out;
}
rc = super_setup_bdi(s);
if (rc)
goto out1;
ecryptfs_set_superblock_private(s, sbi);
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of sbi after that point */
sbi = NULL;
s->s_op = &ecryptfs_sops;
s->s_xattr = ecryptfs_xattr_handlers;
s->s_d_op = &ecryptfs_dops;
err = "Reading sb failed";
rc = kern_path(fc->source, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "kern_path() failed\n");
goto out1;
}
if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_type == &ecryptfs_fs_type) {
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mount on filesystem of type "
"eCryptfs explicitly disallowed due to "
"known incompatibilities\n");
goto out_free;
}
if (is_idmapped_mnt(path.mnt)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mounting on idmapped mounts currently disallowed\n");
goto out_free;
}
if (ctx->check_ruid &&
!uid_eq(d_inode(path.dentry)->i_uid, current_uid())) {
rc = -EPERM;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mount of device (uid: %d) not owned by "
"requested user (uid: %d)\n",
i_uid_read(d_inode(path.dentry)),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()));
goto out_free;
}
ecryptfs_set_superblock_lower(s, path.dentry->d_sb);
/**
* Set the POSIX ACL flag based on whether they're enabled in the lower
* mount.
*/
s->s_flags = fc->sb_flags & ~SB_POSIXACL;
Rename superblock flags (MS_xyz -> SB_xyz) This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel superblock flags. The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to. Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call, while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags. The script to do this was: # places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be # touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but # there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags. FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \ include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h" # the list of MS_... constants SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \ DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \ POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \ I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \ ACTIVE NOUSER" SED_PROG= for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done # we want files that contain at least one of MS_..., # with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded. L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c') for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-27 21:05:09 +00:00
s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_POSIXACL;
/**
* Force a read-only eCryptfs mount when:
* 1) The lower mount is ro
* 2) The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified
*/
if (sb_rdonly(path.dentry->d_sb) || mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
Rename superblock flags (MS_xyz -> SB_xyz) This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel superblock flags. The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to. Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call, while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags. The script to do this was: # places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be # touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but # there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags. FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \ include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h" # the list of MS_... constants SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \ DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \ POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \ I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \ ACTIVE NOUSER" SED_PROG= for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done # we want files that contain at least one of MS_..., # with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded. L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c') for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-27 21:05:09 +00:00
s->s_flags |= SB_RDONLY;
s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
s->s_magic = ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
s->s_stack_depth = path.dentry->d_sb->s_stack_depth + 1;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (s->s_stack_depth > FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH) {
pr_err("eCryptfs: maximum fs stacking depth exceeded\n");
goto out_free;
}
inode = ecryptfs_get_inode(d_inode(path.dentry), s);
rc = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_free;
s->s_root = d_make_root(inode);
if (!s->s_root) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
root_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_dentry_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!root_info)
goto out_free;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of root_info */
ecryptfs_set_dentry_private(s->s_root, root_info);
root_info->lower_path = path;
Rename superblock flags (MS_xyz -> SB_xyz) This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel superblock flags. The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to. Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call, while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags. The script to do this was: # places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be # touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but # there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags. FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \ include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h" # the list of MS_... constants SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \ DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \ POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \ I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \ ACTIVE NOUSER" SED_PROG= for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done # we want files that contain at least one of MS_..., # with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded. L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c') for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-27 21:05:09 +00:00
s->s_flags |= SB_ACTIVE;
fc->root = dget(s->s_root);
return 0;
out_free:
path_put(&path);
out1:
deactivate_locked_super(s);
out:
if (sbi)
ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat(&sbi->mount_crypt_stat);
printk(KERN_ERR "%s; rc = [%d]\n", err, rc);
return rc;
}
/**
* ecryptfs_kill_block_super
* @sb: The ecryptfs super block
*
* Used to bring the superblock down and free the private data.
*/
static void ecryptfs_kill_block_super(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sb_info = ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(sb);
kill_anon_super(sb);
if (!sb_info)
return;
ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat(&sb_info->mount_crypt_stat);
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, sb_info);
}
static void ecryptfs_free_fc(struct fs_context *fc)
{
struct ecryptfs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi = fc->s_fs_info;
kfree(ctx);
if (sbi) {
ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat(&sbi->mount_crypt_stat);
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, sbi);
}
}
static const struct fs_context_operations ecryptfs_context_ops = {
.free = ecryptfs_free_fc,
.parse_param = ecryptfs_parse_param,
.get_tree = ecryptfs_get_tree,
.reconfigure = NULL,
};
static int ecryptfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
{
struct ecryptfs_fs_context *ctx;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi = NULL;
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ecryptfs_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
sbi = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi) {
kfree(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
return -ENOMEM;
}
ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_stat(&sbi->mount_crypt_stat);
fc->fs_private = ctx;
fc->s_fs_info = sbi;
fc->ops = &ecryptfs_context_ops;
return 0;
}
static struct file_system_type ecryptfs_fs_type = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.name = "ecryptfs",
.init_fs_context = ecryptfs_init_fs_context,
.parameters = ecryptfs_fs_param_spec,
.kill_sb = ecryptfs_kill_block_super,
.fs_flags = 0
};
fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules. Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-" and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules to match. A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel. Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially making things safer with no real cost. Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf with blacklist and alias directives. Allowing simple, safe, well understood work-arounds to known problematic software. This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading would not work. While writing this patch I saw a handful of such cases. The most significant being autofs that lives in the module autofs4. This is relevant to user namespaces because we can reach the request module in get_fs_type() without having any special permissions, and people get uncomfortable when a user specified string (in this case the filesystem type) goes all of the way to request_module. After having looked at this issue I don't think there is any particular reason to perform any filtering or permission checks beyond making it clear in the module request that we want a filesystem module. The common pattern in the kernel is to call request_module() without regards to the users permissions. In general all a filesystem module does once loaded is call register_filesystem() and go to sleep. Which means there is not much attack surface exposed by loading a filesytem module unless the filesystem is mounted. In a user namespace filesystems are not mounted unless .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT, which most filesystems do not set today. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-03-03 03:39:14 +00:00
MODULE_ALIAS_FS("ecryptfs");
ecryptfs: main: Demote a bunch of non-conformant kernel-doc headers Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s): fs/ecryptfs/main.c:28: warning: Incorrect use of kernel-doc format: * Module parameter that defines the ecryptfs_verbosity level. fs/ecryptfs/main.c:30: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'int ecryptfs_verbosity = 0; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:40: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_message_buf_len = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_MSG_CTX_ELEMS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:52: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'signed long ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout = ECRYPTFS_MAX_MSG_CTX_TTL / HZ; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:65: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_number_of_users = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_NUM_USERS; ' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'dentry' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'lower_file' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Excess function parameter 'ecryptfs_dentry' description in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Function parameter or member 'sbi' not described in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Excess function parameter 'sb' description in 'ecryptfs_parse_options' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'fs_type' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount' fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: expecting prototype for ecryptfs_get_sb(). Prototype was for ecryptfs_mount() instead fs/ecryptfs/main.c:645: warning: Function parameter or member 'vptr' not described in 'inode_info_init_once' Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: "Michael A. Halcrow" <mahalcro@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Michael C. Thompson" <mcthomps@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> [tyhicks: Correct the function documentation for ecryptfs_mount()] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
2021-03-30 16:44:53 +00:00
/*
* inode_info_init_once
*
* Initializes the ecryptfs_inode_info_cache when it is created
*/
static void
inode_info_init_once(void *vptr)
{
struct ecryptfs_inode_info *ei = (struct ecryptfs_inode_info *)vptr;
inode_init_once(&ei->vfs_inode);
}
static struct ecryptfs_cache_info {
struct kmem_cache **cache;
const char *name;
size_t size;
slab_flags_t flags;
void (*ctor)(void *obj);
} ecryptfs_cache_infos[] = {
{
.cache = &ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache,
.name = "ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item",
.size = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item),
},
{
.cache = &ecryptfs_file_info_cache,
.name = "ecryptfs_file_cache",
.size = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_file_info),
},
{
.cache = &ecryptfs_dentry_info_cache,
.name = "ecryptfs_dentry_info_cache",
.size = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_dentry_info),
},
{
.cache = &ecryptfs_inode_info_cache,
.name = "ecryptfs_inode_cache",
.size = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_inode_info),
2016-01-14 23:18:21 +00:00
.flags = SLAB_ACCOUNT,
.ctor = inode_info_init_once,
},
{
.cache = &ecryptfs_sb_info_cache,
.name = "ecryptfs_sb_cache",
.size = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_sb_info),
},
{
.cache = &ecryptfs_header_cache,
.name = "ecryptfs_headers",
mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 12:29:47 +00:00
.size = PAGE_SIZE,
},
{
.cache = &ecryptfs_xattr_cache,
.name = "ecryptfs_xattr_cache",
mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 12:29:47 +00:00
.size = PAGE_SIZE,
},
{
.cache = &ecryptfs_key_record_cache,
.name = "ecryptfs_key_record_cache",
.size = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_record),
},
{
.cache = &ecryptfs_key_sig_cache,
.name = "ecryptfs_key_sig_cache",
.size = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_sig),
},
{
.cache = &ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache,
.name = "ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache",
.size = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok),
},
{
.cache = &ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache,
.name = "ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache",
.size = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_tfm),
},
};
static void ecryptfs_free_kmem_caches(void)
{
int i;
/*
* Make sure all delayed rcu free inodes are flushed before we
* destroy cache.
*/
rcu_barrier();
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ecryptfs_cache_infos); i++) {
struct ecryptfs_cache_info *info;
info = &ecryptfs_cache_infos[i];
kmem_cache_destroy(*(info->cache));
}
}
/**
* ecryptfs_init_kmem_caches
*
* Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise
*/
static int ecryptfs_init_kmem_caches(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ecryptfs_cache_infos); i++) {
struct ecryptfs_cache_info *info;
info = &ecryptfs_cache_infos[i];
2016-01-14 23:18:21 +00:00
*(info->cache) = kmem_cache_create(info->name, info->size, 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | info->flags, info->ctor);
if (!*(info->cache)) {
ecryptfs_free_kmem_caches();
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "%s: "
"kmem_cache_create failed\n",
info->name);
return -ENOMEM;
}
}
return 0;
}
static struct kobject *ecryptfs_kobj;
static ssize_t version_show(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buff)
{
return snprintf(buff, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MASK);
}
static struct kobj_attribute version_attr = __ATTR_RO(version);
static struct attribute *attributes[] = {
&version_attr.attr,
NULL,
};
static const struct attribute_group attr_group = {
.attrs = attributes,
};
static int do_sysfs_registration(void)
{
int rc;
ecryptfs_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("ecryptfs", fs_kobj);
if (!ecryptfs_kobj) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to create ecryptfs kset\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
rc = sysfs_create_group(ecryptfs_kobj, &attr_group);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"Unable to create ecryptfs version attributes\n");
kobject_put(ecryptfs_kobj);
}
out:
return rc;
}
static void do_sysfs_unregistration(void)
{
sysfs_remove_group(ecryptfs_kobj, &attr_group);
kobject_put(ecryptfs_kobj);
}
static int __init ecryptfs_init(void)
{
int rc;
mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 12:29:47 +00:00
if (ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_EXTENT_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE) {
rc = -EINVAL;
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "The eCryptfs extent size is "
"larger than the host's page size, and so "
"eCryptfs cannot run on this system. The "
"default eCryptfs extent size is [%u] bytes; "
"the page size is [%lu] bytes.\n",
ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_EXTENT_SIZE,
mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 12:29:47 +00:00
(unsigned long)PAGE_SIZE);
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_init_kmem_caches();
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"Failed to allocate one or more kmem_cache objects\n");
goto out;
}
rc = do_sysfs_registration();
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "sysfs registration failed\n");
goto out_free_kmem_caches;
}
rc = ecryptfs_init_kthread();
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: kthread initialization failed; "
"rc = [%d]\n", __func__, rc);
goto out_do_sysfs_unregistration;
}
rc = ecryptfs_init_messaging();
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Failure occurred while attempting to "
"initialize the communications channel to "
"ecryptfsd\n");
goto out_destroy_kthread;
}
rc = ecryptfs_init_crypto();
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Failure whilst attempting to init crypto; "
"rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto out_release_messaging;
}
rc = register_filesystem(&ecryptfs_fs_type);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to register filesystem\n");
goto out_destroy_crypto;
}
if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)
printk(KERN_CRIT "eCryptfs verbosity set to %d. Secret values "
"will be written to the syslog!\n", ecryptfs_verbosity);
goto out;
out_destroy_crypto:
ecryptfs_destroy_crypto();
out_release_messaging:
ecryptfs_release_messaging();
out_destroy_kthread:
ecryptfs_destroy_kthread();
out_do_sysfs_unregistration:
do_sysfs_unregistration();
out_free_kmem_caches:
ecryptfs_free_kmem_caches();
out:
return rc;
}
static void __exit ecryptfs_exit(void)
{
int rc;
rc = ecryptfs_destroy_crypto();
if (rc)
printk(KERN_ERR "Failure whilst attempting to destroy crypto; "
"rc = [%d]\n", rc);
ecryptfs_release_messaging();
ecryptfs_destroy_kthread();
do_sysfs_unregistration();
unregister_filesystem(&ecryptfs_fs_type);
ecryptfs_free_kmem_caches();
}
MODULE_AUTHOR("Michael A. Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("eCryptfs");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
module_init(ecryptfs_init)
module_exit(ecryptfs_exit)