The hotplug support for kexec_load() requires changes to the userspace
kexec-tools and a little extra help from the kernel.
Given a kdump capture kernel loaded via kexec_load(), and a subsequent
hotplug event, the crash hotplug handler finds the elfcorehdr and rewrites
it to reflect the hotplug change. That is the desired outcome, however,
at kernel panic time, the purgatory integrity check fails (because the
elfcorehdr changed), and the capture kernel does not boot and no vmcore is
generated.
Therefore, the userspace kexec-tools/kexec must indicate to the kernel
that the elfcorehdr can be modified (because the kexec excluded the
elfcorehdr from the digest, and sized the elfcorehdr memory buffer
appropriately).
To facilitate hotplug support with kexec_load():
- a new kexec flag KEXEC_UPATE_ELFCOREHDR indicates that it is
safe for the kernel to modify the kexec_load()'d elfcorehdr
- the /sys/kernel/crash_elfcorehdr_size node communicates the
preferred size of the elfcorehdr memory buffer
- The sysfs crash_hotplug nodes (ie.
/sys/devices/system/[cpu|memory]/crash_hotplug) dynamically
take into account kexec_file_load() vs kexec_load() and
KEXEC_UPDATE_ELFCOREHDR.
This is critical so that the udev rule processing of crash_hotplug
is all that is needed to determine if the userspace unload-then-load
of the kdump image is to be skipped, or not. The proposed udev
rule change looks like:
# The kernel updates the crash elfcorehdr for CPU and memory changes
SUBSYSTEM=="cpu", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end"
SUBSYSTEM=="memory", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end"
The table below indicates the behavior of kexec_load()'d kdump image
updates (with the new udev crash_hotplug rule in place):
Kernel |Kexec
-------+-----+----
Old |Old |New
| a | a
-------+-----+----
New | a | b
-------+-----+----
where kexec 'old' and 'new' delineate kexec-tools has the needed
modifications for the crash hotplug feature, and kernel 'old' and 'new'
delineate the kernel supports this crash hotplug feature.
Behavior 'a' indicates the unload-then-reload of the entire kdump image.
For the kexec 'old' column, the unload-then-reload occurs due to the
missing flag KEXEC_UPDATE_ELFCOREHDR. An 'old' kernel (with 'new' kexec)
does not present the crash_hotplug sysfs node, which leads to the
unload-then-reload of the kdump image.
Behavior 'b' indicates the desired optimized behavior of the kernel
directly modifying the elfcorehdr and avoiding the unload-then-reload of
the kdump image.
If the udev rule is not updated with crash_hotplug node check, then no
matter any combination of kernel or kexec is new or old, the kdump image
continues to be unload-then-reload on hotplug changes.
To fully support crash hotplug feature, there needs to be a rollout of
kernel, kexec-tools and udev rule changes. However, the order of the
rollout of these pieces does not matter; kexec_load()'d kdump images still
function for hotplug as-is.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814214446.6659-7-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Akhil Raj <lf32.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
When a crash kernel is loaded via the kexec_file_load() syscall, the
kernel places the various segments (ie crash kernel, crash initrd,
boot_params, elfcorehdr, purgatory, etc) in memory. For those
architectures that utilize purgatory, a hash digest of the segments is
calculated for integrity checking. The digest is embedded into the
purgatory image prior to placing in memory.
Updates to the elfcorehdr in response to CPU and memory changes would
cause the purgatory integrity checking to fail (at crash time, and no
vmcore created). Therefore, the elfcorehdr segment is explicitly excluded
from the purgatory digest, enabling updates to the elfcorehdr while also
avoiding the need to recompute the hash digest and reload purgatory.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814214446.6659-4-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Akhil Raj <lf32.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To support crash hotplug, a mechanism is needed to update the crash
elfcorehdr upon CPU or memory changes (eg. hot un/plug or off/ onlining).
The crash elfcorehdr describes the CPUs and memory to be written into the
vmcore.
To track CPU changes, callbacks are registered with the cpuhp mechanism
via cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN). The crash hotplug
elfcorehdr update has no explicit ordering requirement (relative to other
cpuhp states), so meets the criteria for utilizing CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN.
CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN is a dynamic state and avoids the need to introduce a
new state for crash hotplug. Also, CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN is the last state
in the PREPARE group, just prior to the STARTING group, which is very
close to the CPU starting up in a plug/online situation, or stopping in a
unplug/ offline situation. This minimizes the window of time during an
actual plug/online or unplug/offline situation in which the elfcorehdr
would be inaccurate. Note that for a CPU being unplugged or offlined, the
CPU will still be present in the list of CPUs generated by
crash_prepare_elf64_headers(). However, there is no need to explicitly
omit the CPU, see justification in 'crash: change
crash_prepare_elf64_headers() to for_each_possible_cpu()'.
To track memory changes, a notifier is registered to capture the memblock
MEM_ONLINE and MEM_OFFLINE events via register_memory_notifier().
The CPU callbacks and memory notifiers invoke crash_handle_hotplug_event()
which performs needed tasks and then dispatches the event to the
architecture specific arch_crash_handle_hotplug_event() to update the
elfcorehdr with the current state of CPUs and memory. During the process,
the kexec_lock is held.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814214446.6659-3-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Akhil Raj <lf32.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "crash: Kernel handling of CPU and memory hot un/plug", v28.
Once the kdump service is loaded, if changes to CPUs or memory occur,
either by hot un/plug or off/onlining, the crash elfcorehdr must also be
updated.
The elfcorehdr describes to kdump the CPUs and memory in the system, and
any inaccuracies can result in a vmcore with missing CPU context or memory
regions.
The current solution utilizes udev to initiate an unload-then-reload of
the kdump image (eg. kernel, initrd, boot_params, purgatory and
elfcorehdr) by the userspace kexec utility. In the original post I
outlined the significant performance problems related to offloading this
activity to userspace.
This patchset introduces a generic crash handler that registers with the
CPU and memory notifiers. Upon CPU or memory changes, from either hot
un/plug or off/onlining, this generic handler is invoked and performs
important housekeeping, for example obtaining the appropriate lock, and
then invokes an architecture specific handler to do the appropriate
elfcorehdr update.
Note the description in patch 'crash: change crash_prepare_elf64_headers()
to for_each_possible_cpu()' and 'x86/crash: optimize CPU changes' that
enables further optimizations related to CPU plug/unplug/online/offline
performance of elfcorehdr updates.
In the case of x86_64, the arch specific handler generates a new
elfcorehdr, and overwrites the old one in memory; thus no involvement with
userspace needed.
To realize the benefits/test this patchset, one must make a couple
of minor changes to userspace:
- Prevent udev from updating kdump crash kernel on hot un/plug changes.
Add the following as the first lines to the RHEL udev rule file
/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/98-kexec.rules:
# The kernel updates the crash elfcorehdr for CPU and memory changes
SUBSYSTEM=="cpu", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end"
SUBSYSTEM=="memory", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end"
With this changeset applied, the two rules evaluate to false for
CPU and memory change events and thus skip the userspace
unload-then-reload of kdump.
- Change to the kexec_file_load for loading the kdump kernel:
Eg. on RHEL: in /usr/bin/kdumpctl, change to:
standard_kexec_args="-p -d -s"
which adds the -s to select kexec_file_load() syscall.
This kernel patchset also supports kexec_load() with a modified kexec
userspace utility. A working changeset to the kexec userspace utility is
posted to the kexec-tools mailing list here:
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/kexec/2023-May/027049.html
To use the kexec-tools patch, apply, build and install kexec-tools, then
change the kdumpctl's standard_kexec_args to replace the -s with
--hotplug. The removal of -s reverts to the kexec_load syscall and the
addition of --hotplug invokes the changes put forth in the kexec-tools
patch.
This patch (of 8):
The crash hotplug support leans on the work for the kexec_file_load()
syscall. To also support the kexec_load() syscall, a few bits of code
need to be move outside of CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE. As such, these bits are
moved out of kexec_file.c and into a common location crash_core.c.
In addition, struct crash_mem and crash_notes were moved to new locales so
that PROC_KCORE, which sets CRASH_CORE alone, builds correctly.
No functionality change intended.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814214446.6659-1-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814214446.6659-2-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Akhil Raj <lf32.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
While debugging a recent kallsyms_selftest failure[1], I needed more
details on what specifically was failing. This adds those details for
each failure state that is checked.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/202308232200.1c932a90-oliver.sang@intel.com/
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@meta.com>
Cc: "Erhard F." <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Cc: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Currently, in function bpf_obj_free_fields(), for local kptr,
a warning will be issued if the struct does not contain any
special fields. But actually the kernel seems totally okay
with a local kptr without any special fields. Permitting
no special fields also aligns with future percpu kptr which
also allows no special fields.
Acked-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230824063417.201925-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
After we converted the capabilities of our networking-bpf program from
cap_sys_admin to cap_net_admin+cap_bpf, our networking-bpf program
failed to start. Because it failed the bpf verifier, and the error log
is "R3 pointer comparison prohibited".
A simple reproducer as follows,
SEC("cls-ingress")
int ingress(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iphdr *iph = (void *)(long)skb->data + sizeof(struct ethhdr);
if ((long)(iph + 1) > (long)skb->data_end)
return TC_ACT_STOLEN;
return TC_ACT_OK;
}
Per discussion with Yonghong and Alexei [1], comparison of two packet
pointers is not a pointer leak. This patch fixes it.
Our local kernel is 6.1.y and we expect this fix to be backported to
6.1.y, so stable is CCed.
[1]. https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+Nmspr7Si+pxWn8zkE7hX-7s93ugwC+94aXSy4uQ9vBg@mail.gmail.com/
Suggested-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230823020703.3790-2-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Back when set_fs() was a generic API for altering the address limit,
addr_limit_user_check() was a safety measure to prevent userspace being
able to issue syscalls with an unbound limit.
With the the removal of set_fs() as a generic API, the last user of
addr_limit_user_check() was removed in commit:
b5a5a01d8e9a44ec ("arm64: uaccess: remove addr_limit_user_check()")
... as since that commit, no architecture defines TIF_FSCHECK, and hence
addr_limit_user_check() always expands to nothing.
Remove addr_limit_user_check(), updating the comment in
exit_to_user_mode_prepare() to no longer refer to it. At the same time,
the comment is reworded to be a little more generic so as to cover
kmap_assert_nomap() in addition to lockdep_sys_exit().
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230821163526.2319443-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
The commit being fixed introduced a hunk into check_func_arg_reg_off
that bypasses reg->off == 0 enforcement when offset points to a graph
node or root. This might possibly be done for treating bpf_rbtree_remove
and others as KF_RELEASE and then later check correct reg->off in helper
argument checks.
But this is not the case, those helpers are already not KF_RELEASE and
permit non-zero reg->off and verify it later to match the subobject in
BTF type.
However, this logic leads to bpf_obj_drop permitting free of register
arguments with non-zero offset when they point to a graph root or node
within them, which is not ok.
For instance:
struct foo {
int i;
int j;
struct bpf_rb_node node;
};
struct foo *f = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*f));
if (!f) ...
bpf_obj_drop(f); // OK
bpf_obj_drop(&f->i); // still ok from verifier PoV
bpf_obj_drop(&f->node); // Not OK, but permitted right now
Fix this by dropping the whole part of code altogether.
Fixes: 6a3cd3318ff6 ("bpf: Migrate release_on_unlock logic to non-owning ref semantics")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230822175140.1317749-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CPU latency should never be negative, which will be incorrectly high
when converted to unsigned data type.
Commit 8d36694245f2 ("PM: QoS: Add check to make sure CPU freq is
non-negative") makes sure CPU frequency is non-negative to fix incorrect
behavior in freqency QoS.
Add an analogous check to make sure CPU latency is non-negative so as to
prevent this problem from happening in CPU latency QoS.
Signed-off-by: Clive Lin <clive.lin@mediatek.com>
[ rjw: Changelog edits ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
When reviewing local percpu kptr support, Alexei discovered a bug
wherea bpf_kptr_xchg() may succeed even if the map value kptr type and
locally allocated obj type do not match ([1]). Missed struct btf_id
comparison is the reason for the bug. This patch added such struct btf_id
comparison and will flag verification failure if types do not match.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230819002907.io3iphmnuk43xblu@macbook-pro-8.dhcp.thefacebook.com/#t
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Fixes: 738c96d5e2e3 ("bpf: Allow local kptrs to be exchanged via bpf_kptr_xchg")
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230822050053.2886960-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Several of the list traversals in the user_events facility use safe list
traversals where they could be using the unsafe versions instead.
Replace these safe traversals with their unsafe counterparts in the
interest of optimization.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230810194337.695983-1-ervaughn@linux.microsoft.com
Suggested-by: Beau Belgrave <beaub@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Vaughn <ervaughn@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Beau Belgrave <beaub@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Commit 9457158bbc0e ("tracing: Fix reset of time stamps during trace_clock changes")
left behind tracing_reset_current() declaration.
Also commit 6954e415264e ("tracing: Place trace_pid_list logic into abstract functions")
removed trace_free_pid_list() implementation but leave declaration.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230803144028.25492-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Cc: <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Per the previous commits, we now only enter do_filter_scalar_cpumask() with
a mask of weight greater than one. Optimise the equality checks.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230707172155.70873-9-vschneid@redhat.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Steven noted that when the user-provided cpumask contains a single CPU,
then the filtering function can use a scalar as input instead of a
full-fledged cpumask.
In this case we can directly re-use filter_pred_cpu(), we just need to
transform '&' into '==' before executing it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230707172155.70873-8-vschneid@redhat.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Steven noted that when the user-provided cpumask contains a single CPU,
then the filtering function can use a scalar as input instead of a
full-fledged cpumask.
When the mask contains a single CPU, directly re-use the unsigned field
predicate functions. Transform '&' into '==' beforehand.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230707172155.70873-7-vschneid@redhat.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Steven noted that when the user-provided cpumask contains a single CPU,
then the filtering function can use a scalar as input instead of a
full-fledged cpumask.
Reuse do_filter_scalar_cpumask() when the input mask has a weight of one.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230707172155.70873-6-vschneid@redhat.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
The tracing_cpumask lets us specify which CPUs are traced in a buffer
instance, but doesn't let us do this on a per-event basis (unless one
creates an instance per event).
A previous commit added filtering scalar fields by a user-given cpumask,
make this work with the CPU common field as well.
This enables doing things like
$ trace-cmd record -e 'sched_switch' -f 'CPU & CPUS{12-52}' \
-e 'sched_wakeup' -f 'target_cpu & CPUS{12-52}'
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230707172155.70873-5-vschneid@redhat.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Several events use a scalar field to denote a CPU:
o sched_wakeup.target_cpu
o sched_migrate_task.orig_cpu,dest_cpu
o sched_move_numa.src_cpu,dst_cpu
o ipi_send_cpu.cpu
o ...
Filtering these currently requires using arithmetic comparison functions,
which can be tedious when dealing with interleaved SMT or NUMA CPU ids.
Allow these to be filtered by a user-provided cpumask, which enables e.g.:
$ trace-cmd record -e 'sched_wakeup' -f 'target_cpu & CPUS{2,4,6,8-32}'
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230707172155.70873-4-vschneid@redhat.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
The recently introduced ipi_send_cpumask trace event contains a cpumask
field, but it currently cannot be used in filter expressions.
Make event filtering aware of cpumask fields, and allow these to be
filtered by a user-provided cpumask.
The user-provided cpumask is to be given in cpulist format and wrapped as:
"CPUS{$cpulist}". The use of curly braces instead of parentheses is to
prevent predicate_parse() from parsing the contents of CPUS{...} as a
full-fledged predicate subexpression.
This enables e.g.:
$ trace-cmd record -e 'ipi_send_cpumask' -f 'cpumask & CPUS{2,4,6,8-32}'
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230707172155.70873-3-vschneid@redhat.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Every predicate allocation includes a MAX_FILTER_STR_VAL (256) char array
in the regex field, even if the predicate function does not use the field.
A later commit will introduce a dynamically allocated cpumask to struct
filter_pred, which will require a dedicated freeing function. Bite the
bullet and make filter_pred.regex dynamically allocated.
While at it, reorder the fields of filter_pred to fill in the byte
holes. The struct now fits on a single cacheline.
No change in behaviour intended.
The kfree()'s were patched via Coccinelle:
@@
struct filter_pred *pred;
@@
-kfree(pred);
+free_predicate(pred);
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230707172155.70873-2-vschneid@redhat.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Adding support for bpf_get_func_ip helper being called from
ebpf program attached by uprobe_multi link.
It returns the ip of the uprobe.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809083440.3209381-7-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Adding support to specify pid for uprobe_multi link and the uprobes
are created only for task with given pid value.
Using the consumer.filter filter callback for that, so the task gets
filtered during the uprobe installation.
We still need to check the task during runtime in the uprobe handler,
because the handler could get executed if there's another system
wide consumer on the same uprobe (thanks Oleg for the insight).
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809083440.3209381-6-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Adding support to specify cookies array for uprobe_multi link.
The cookies array share indexes and length with other uprobe_multi
arrays (offsets/ref_ctr_offsets).
The cookies[i] value defines cookie for i-the uprobe and will be
returned by bpf_get_attach_cookie helper when called from ebpf
program hooked to that specific uprobe.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809083440.3209381-5-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Adding new multi uprobe link that allows to attach bpf program
to multiple uprobes.
Uprobes to attach are specified via new link_create uprobe_multi
union:
struct {
__aligned_u64 path;
__aligned_u64 offsets;
__aligned_u64 ref_ctr_offsets;
__u32 cnt;
__u32 flags;
} uprobe_multi;
Uprobes are defined for single binary specified in path and multiple
calling sites specified in offsets array with optional reference
counters specified in ref_ctr_offsets array. All specified arrays
have length of 'cnt'.
The 'flags' supports single bit for now that marks the uprobe as
return probe.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809083440.3209381-4-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
After synchronous_rcu(), both the dettached XDP program and
xdp_do_flush() are completed, and the only user of bpf_cpu_map_entry
will be cpu_map_kthread_run(), so instead of calling
__cpu_map_entry_replace() to stop kthread and cleanup entry after a RCU
grace period, do these things directly.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230816045959.358059-3-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
As for now __cpu_map_entry_replace() uses call_rcu() to wait for the
inflight xdp program to exit the RCU read critical section, and then
launch kworker cpu_map_kthread_stop() to call kthread_stop() to flush
all pending xdp frames or skbs.
But it is unnecessary to use rcu_barrier() in cpu_map_kthread_stop() to
wait for the completion of __cpu_map_entry_free(), because rcu_barrier()
will wait for all pending RCU callbacks and cpu_map_kthread_stop() only
needs to wait for the completion of a specific __cpu_map_entry_free().
So use queue_rcu_work() to replace call_rcu(), schedule_work() and
rcu_barrier(). queue_rcu_work() will queue a __cpu_map_entry_free()
kworker after a RCU grace period. Because __cpu_map_entry_free() is
running in a kworker context, so it is OK to do all of these freeing
procedures include kthread_stop() in it.
After the update, there is no need to do reference-counting for
bpf_cpu_map_entry, because bpf_cpu_map_entry is freed directly in
__cpu_map_entry_free(), so just remove it.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230816045959.358059-2-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Store the folio order in the low byte of the flags word in the first tail
page. This frees up the word that was being used to store the order and
dtor bytes previously.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230816151201.3655946-11-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stored in the first tail page's flags, this flag replaces the destructor.
That removes the last of the destructors, so remove all references to
folio_dtor and compound_dtor.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230816151201.3655946-9-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
We can use a bit in page[1].flags to indicate that this folio belongs to
hugetlb instead of using a value in page[1].dtors. That lets
folio_test_hugetlb() become an inline function like it should be. We can
also get rid of NULL_COMPOUND_DTOR.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230816151201.3655946-8-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
There is only one Kconfig user of CONFIG_EMBEDDED and it can be switched
to EXPERT or "if !ARCH_MULTIPLATFORM" (suggested by Arnd).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230816055010.31534-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> [RISC-V]
Acked-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [powerpc]
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org>
Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi>
Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
On the parisc architecture, lockdep reports for all static objects which
are in the __initdata section (e.g. "setup_done" in devtmpfs,
"kthreadd_done" in init/main.c) this warning:
INFO: trying to register non-static key.
The warning itself is wrong, because those objects are in the __initdata
section, but the section itself is on parisc outside of range from
_stext to _end, which is why the static_obj() functions returns a wrong
answer.
While fixing this issue, I noticed that the whole existing check can
be simplified a lot.
Instead of checking against the _stext and _end symbols (which include
code areas too) just check for the .data and .bss segments (since we check a
data object). This can be done with the existing is_kernel_core_data()
macro.
In addition objects in the __initdata section can be checked with
init_section_contains(), and is_kernel_rodata() allows keys to be in the
_ro_after_init section.
This partly reverts and simplifies commit bac59d18c701 ("x86/setup: Fix static
memory detection").
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ZNqrLRaOi/3wPAdp@p100
Fixes: bac59d18c701 ("x86/setup: Fix static memory detection")
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
xchg originated in 6e399cd144d8 ("prctl: avoid using mmap_sem for exe_file
serialization"). While the commit message does not explain *why* the
change, I found the original submission [1] which ultimately claims it
cleans things up by removing dependency of exe_file on the semaphore.
However, fe69d560b5bd ("kernel/fork: always deny write access to current
MM exe_file") added a semaphore up/down cycle to synchronize the state of
exe_file against fork, defeating the point of the original change.
This is on top of semaphore trips already present both in the replacing
function and prctl (the only consumer).
Normally replacing exe_file does not happen for busy processes, thus
write-locking is not an impediment to performance in the intended use
case. If someone keeps invoking the routine for a busy processes they are
trying to play dirty and that's another reason to avoid any trickery.
As such I think the atomic here only adds complexity for no benefit.
Just write-lock around the replacement.
I also note that replacement races against the mapping check loop as
nothing synchronizes actual assignment with with said checks but I am not
addressing it in this patch. (Is the loop of any use to begin with?)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1424979417.10344.14.camel@stgolabs.net/ [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814172140.1777161-1-mjguzik@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
This sysctl has the very unusual behaviour of not allowing any user (even
CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to reduce the restriction setting, meaning that if you were
to set this sysctl to a more restrictive option in the host pidns you
would need to reboot your machine in order to reset it.
The justification given in [1] is that this is a security feature and thus
it should not be possible to disable. Aside from the fact that we have
plenty of security-related sysctls that can be disabled after being
enabled (fs.protected_symlinks for instance), the protection provided by
the sysctl is to stop users from being able to create a binary and then
execute it. A user with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can trivially do this without
memfd_create(2):
% cat mount-memfd.c
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#define SHELLCODE "#!/bin/echo this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs:"
int main(void)
{
int fsfd = fsopen("tmpfs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
assert(fsfd >= 0);
assert(!fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 2));
int dfd = fsmount(fsfd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, 0);
assert(dfd >= 0);
int execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0782);
assert(execfd >= 0);
assert(write(execfd, SHELLCODE, strlen(SHELLCODE)) == strlen(SHELLCODE));
assert(!close(execfd));
char *execpath = NULL;
char *argv[] = { "bad-exe", NULL }, *envp[] = { NULL };
execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
assert(execfd >= 0);
assert(asprintf(&execpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", execfd) > 0);
assert(!execve(execpath, argv, envp));
}
% ./mount-memfd
this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs: /proc/self/fd/5
%
Given that it is possible for CAP_SYS_ADMIN users to create executable
binaries without memfd_create(2) and without touching the host filesystem
(not to mention the many other things a CAP_SYS_ADMIN process would be
able to do that would be equivalent or worse), it seems strange to cause a
fair amount of headache to admins when there doesn't appear to be an
actual security benefit to blocking this. There appear to be concerns
about confused-deputy-esque attacks[2] but a confused deputy that can
write to arbitrary sysctls is a bigger security issue than executable
memfds.
/* New API */
The primary requirement from the original author appears to be more based
on the need to be able to restrict an entire system in a hierarchical
manner[3], such that child namespaces cannot re-enable executable memfds.
So, implement that behaviour explicitly -- the vm.memfd_noexec scope is
evaluated up the pidns tree to &init_pid_ns and you have the most
restrictive value applied to you. The new lower limit you can set
vm.memfd_noexec is whatever limit applies to your parent.
Note that a pidns will inherit a copy of the parent pidns's effective
vm.memfd_noexec setting at unshare() time. This matches the existing
behaviour, and it also ensures that a pidns will never have its
vm.memfd_noexec setting *lowered* behind its back (but it will be raised
if the parent raises theirs).
/* Backwards Compatibility */
As the previous version of the sysctl didn't allow you to lower the
setting at all, there are no backwards compatibility issues with this
aspect of the change.
However it should be noted that now that the setting is completely
hierarchical. Previously, a cloned pidns would just copy the current
pidns setting, meaning that if the parent's vm.memfd_noexec was changed it
wouldn't propoagate to existing pid namespaces. Now, the restriction
applies recursively. This is a uAPI change, however:
* The sysctl is very new, having been merged in 6.3.
* Several aspects of the sysctl were broken up until this patchset and
the other patchset by Jeff Xu last month.
And thus it seems incredibly unlikely that any real users would run into
this issue. In the worst case, if this causes userspace isues we could
make it so that modifying the setting follows the hierarchical rules but
the restriction checking uses the cached copy.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/CABi2SkWnAgHK1i6iqSqPMYuNEhtHBkO8jUuCvmG3RmUB5TKHJw@mail.gmail.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/CALmYWFs_dNCzw_pW1yRAo4bGCPEtykroEQaowNULp7svwMLjOg@mail.gmail.com/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/CALmYWFuahdUF7cT4cm7_TGLqPanuHXJ-hVSfZt7vpTnc18DPrw@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-4-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com
Fixes: 105ff5339f49 ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Use the helpers to simplify code, also kill unneeded goto cpy_name.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230728050043.59880-5-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Cc: "Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Felix Kuehling <felix.kuehling@amd.com>
Cc: "Pan, Xinhui" <Xinhui.Pan@amd.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
No portable code calls into this function any more, and on architectures
that don't use or define their own, it causes a warning:
kernel/iomem.c:10:22: warning: no previous prototype for 'ioremap_cache' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
10 | __weak void __iomem *ioremap_cache(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size)
Fold it into the only caller that uses it on architectures
without the #define.
Note that the fallback to ioremap is probably still wrong on
those architectures, but this is what it's always done there.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230726145432.1617809-1-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference counters
with the following properties:
- counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set()
- a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero
- once counter reaches zero, its further
increments aren't allowed
- counter schema uses basic atomic operations
(set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.)
Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided
refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows and
underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows can lead
to use-after-free situation and be exploitable.
The variable nsproxy.count is used as pure reference counter. Convert it
to refcount_t and fix up the operations.
**Important note for maintainers:
Some functions from refcount_t API defined in refcount.h have different
memory ordering guarantees than their atomic counterparts. Please check
Documentation/core-api/refcount-vs-atomic.rst for more information.
Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides
enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in some
rare cases it might matter. Please double check that you don't have
some undocumented memory guarantees for this variable usage.
For the nsproxy.count it might make a difference in following places:
- put_nsproxy() and switch_task_namespaces(): decrement in
refcount_dec_and_test() only provides RELEASE ordering and ACQUIRE
ordering on success vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230818041327.gonna.210-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
There is race issue when concurrently splice_read main trace_pipe and
per_cpu trace_pipes which will result in data read out being different
from what actually writen.
As suggested by Steven:
> I believe we should add a ref count to trace_pipe and the per_cpu
> trace_pipes, where if they are opened, nothing else can read it.
>
> Opening trace_pipe locks all per_cpu ref counts, if any of them are
> open, then the trace_pipe open will fail (and releases any ref counts
> it had taken).
>
> Opening a per_cpu trace_pipe will up the ref count for just that
> CPU buffer. This will allow multiple tasks to read different per_cpu
> trace_pipe files, but will prevent the main trace_pipe file from
> being opened.
But because we only need to know whether per_cpu trace_pipe is open or
not, using a cpumask instead of using ref count may be easier.
After this patch, users will find that:
- Main trace_pipe can be opened by only one user, and if it is
opened, all per_cpu trace_pipes cannot be opened;
- Per_cpu trace_pipes can be opened by multiple users, but each per_cpu
trace_pipe can only be opened by one user. And if one of them is
opened, main trace_pipe cannot be opened.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230818022645.1948314-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.com
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/tc.c
fa165e194997 ("sfc: don't unregister flow_indr if it was never registered")
3bf969e88ada ("sfc: add MAE table machinery for conntrack table")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230818112159.7430e9b4@canb.auug.org.au/
No adjacent changes.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
After commit 77c12fc95980 ("watchdog/hardlockup: add a "cpu" param to
watchdog_hardlockup_check()") we started storing a `struct cpumask` on the
stack in watchdog_hardlockup_check(). On systems with CONFIG_NR_CPUS set
to 8192 this takes up 1K on the stack. That triggers warnings with
`CONFIG_FRAME_WARN` set to 1024.
We'll use the new trigger_allbutcpu_cpu_backtrace() to avoid needing to
use a CPU mask at all.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230804065935.v4.2.I501ab68cb926ee33a7c87e063d207abf09b9943c@changeid
Fixes: 77c12fc95980 ("watchdog/hardlockup: add a "cpu" param to watchdog_hardlockup_check()")
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202307310955.pLZDhpnl-lkp@intel.com
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
The APIs that allow backtracing across CPUs have always had a way to
exclude the current CPU. This convenience means callers didn't need to
find a place to allocate a CPU mask just to handle the common case.
Let's extend the API to take a CPU ID to exclude instead of just a
boolean. This isn't any more complex for the API to handle and allows the
hardlockup detector to exclude a different CPU (the one it already did a
trace for) without needing to find space for a CPU mask.
Arguably, this new API also encourages safer behavior. Specifically if
the caller wants to avoid tracing the current CPU (maybe because they
already traced the current CPU) this makes it more obvious to the caller
that they need to make sure that the current CPU ID can't change.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix trigger_allbutcpu_cpu_backtrace() stub]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230804065935.v4.1.Ia35521b91fc781368945161d7b28538f9996c182@changeid
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
There are no in-kernel users of __kthread_should_park() so mark it as
static and do not export it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2023080450-handcuff-stump-1d6e@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Arve Hjønnevåg" <arve@android.com>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Zqiang <qiang1.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Prathu Baronia <quic_pbaronia@quicinc.com>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
gcov uses global functions that are called from generated code, but these
have no prototype in a header, which causes a W=1 build warning:
kernel/gcov/gcc_base.c:12:6: error: no previous prototype for '__gcov_init' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
kernel/gcov/gcc_base.c:40:6: error: no previous prototype for '__gcov_flush' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
kernel/gcov/gcc_base.c:46:6: error: no previous prototype for '__gcov_merge_add' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
kernel/gcov/gcc_base.c:52:6: error: no previous prototype for '__gcov_merge_single' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
Just turn off these warnings unconditionally for the two files that
contain them.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0820010f-e9dc-779d-7924-49c7df446bce@linux.ibm.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230725123042.2269077-1-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Tested-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
buf is assigned first, so it does not need to initialize the assignment.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230713234459.2908-1-kunyu@nfschina.com
Signed-off-by: Li kunyu <kunyu@nfschina.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foudation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
This patch is a minor cleanup to the series "refactor Kconfig to
consolidate KEXEC and CRASH options".
In that series, a new option ARCH_DEFAULT_KEXEC was introduced in order to
obtain the equivalent behavior of s390 original Kconfig settings for
KEXEC. As it turns out, this new option did not fully provide the
equivalent behavior, rather a "select KEXEC" did.
As such, the ARCH_DEFAULT_KEXEC is not needed anymore, so remove it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230802161750.2215-1-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
The Kconfig refactor to consolidate KEXEC and CRASH options utilized
option names of the form ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option>. Thus rename the
ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY to ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_PURGATORY to follow
the same.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230712161545.87870-15-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "refactor Kconfig to consolidate KEXEC and CRASH options", v6.
The Kconfig is refactored to consolidate KEXEC and CRASH options from
various arch/<arch>/Kconfig files into new file kernel/Kconfig.kexec.
The Kconfig.kexec is now a submenu titled "Kexec and crash features"
located under "General Setup".
The following options are impacted:
- KEXEC
- KEXEC_FILE
- KEXEC_SIG
- KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
- KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
- KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
- KEXEC_JUMP
- CRASH_DUMP
Over time, these options have been copied between Kconfig files and
are very similar to one another, but with slight differences.
The following architectures are impacted by the refactor (because of
use of one or more KEXEC/CRASH options):
- arm
- arm64
- ia64
- loongarch
- m68k
- mips
- parisc
- powerpc
- riscv
- s390
- sh
- x86
More information:
In the patch series "crash: Kernel handling of CPU and memory hot
un/plug"
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230503224145.7405-1-eric.devolder@oracle.com/
the new kernel feature introduces the config option CRASH_HOTPLUG.
In reviewing, Thomas Gleixner requested that the new config option
not be placed in x86 Kconfig. Rather the option needs a generic/common
home. To Thomas' point, the KEXEC and CRASH options have largely been
duplicated in the various arch/<arch>/Kconfig files, with minor
differences. This kind of proliferation is to be avoid/stopped.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/875y91yv63.ffs@tglx/
To that end, I have refactored the arch Kconfigs so as to consolidate
the various KEXEC and CRASH options. Generally speaking, this work has
the following themes:
- KEXEC and CRASH options are moved into new file kernel/Kconfig.kexec
- These items from arch/Kconfig:
CRASH_CORE KEXEC_CORE KEXEC_ELF HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
- These items from arch/x86/Kconfig form the common options:
KEXEC KEXEC_FILE KEXEC_SIG KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG KEXEC_JUMP CRASH_DUMP
- These items from arch/arm64/Kconfig form the common options:
KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
- The crash hotplug series appends CRASH_HOTPLUG to Kconfig.kexec
- The Kconfig.kexec is now a submenu titled "Kexec and crash features"
and is now listed in "General Setup" submenu from init/Kconfig.
- To control the common options, each has a new ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option>
option. These gateway options determine whether the common options
options are valid for the architecture.
- To account for the slight differences in the original architecture
coding of the common options, each now has a corresponding
ARCH_SELECTS_<option> which are used to elicit the same side effects
as the original arch/<arch>/Kconfig files for KEXEC and CRASH options.
An example, 'make menuconfig' illustrating the submenu:
> General setup > Kexec and crash features
[*] Enable kexec system call
[*] Enable kexec file based system call
[*] Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall
[ ] Require a valid signature in kexec_file_load() syscall
[ ] Enable bzImage signature verification support
[*] kexec jump
[*] kernel crash dumps
[*] Update the crash elfcorehdr on system configuration changes
In the process of consolidating the common options, I encountered
slight differences in the coding of these options in several of the
architectures. As a result, I settled on the following solution:
- Each of the common options has a 'depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option>'
statement. For example, the KEXEC_FILE option has a 'depends on
ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_FILE' statement.
This approach is needed on all common options so as to prevent
options from appearing for architectures which previously did
not allow/enable them. For example, arm supports KEXEC but not
KEXEC_FILE. The arch/arm/Kconfig does not provide
ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_FILE and so KEXEC_FILE and related options
are not available to arm.
- The boolean ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option> in effect allows the arch to
determine when the feature is allowed. Archs which don't have the
feature simply do not provide the corresponding ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option>.
For each arch, where there previously were KEXEC and/or CRASH
options, these have been replaced with the corresponding boolean
ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option>, and an appropriate def_bool statement.
For example, if the arch supports KEXEC_FILE, then the
ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_FILE simply has a 'def_bool y'. This permits
the KEXEC_FILE option to be available.
If the arch has a 'depends on' statement in its original coding
of the option, then that expression becomes part of the def_bool
expression. For example, arm64 had:
config KEXEC
depends on PM_SLEEP_SMP
and in this solution, this converts to:
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC
def_bool PM_SLEEP_SMP
- In order to account for the architecture differences in the
coding for the common options, the ARCH_SELECTS_<option> in the
arch/<arch>/Kconfig is used. This option has a 'depends on
<option>' statement to couple it to the main option, and from
there can insert the differences from the common option and the
arch original coding of that option.
For example, a few archs enable CRYPTO and CRYTPO_SHA256 for
KEXEC_FILE. These require a ARCH_SELECTS_KEXEC_FILE and
'select CRYPTO' and 'select CRYPTO_SHA256' statements.
Illustrating the option relationships:
For each of the common KEXEC and CRASH options:
ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option> <- <option> <- ARCH_SELECTS_<option>
<option> # in Kconfig.kexec
ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option> # in arch/<arch>/Kconfig, as needed
ARCH_SELECTS_<option> # in arch/<arch>/Kconfig, as needed
For example, KEXEC:
ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC <- KEXEC <- ARCH_SELECTS_KEXEC
KEXEC # in Kconfig.kexec
ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC # in arch/<arch>/Kconfig, as needed
ARCH_SELECTS_KEXEC # in arch/<arch>/Kconfig, as needed
To summarize, the ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option> permits the <option> to be
enabled, and the ARCH_SELECTS_<option> handles side effects (ie.
select statements).
Examples:
A few examples to show the new strategy in action:
===== x86 (minus the help section) =====
Original:
config KEXEC
bool "kexec system call"
select KEXEC_CORE
config KEXEC_FILE
bool "kexec file based system call"
select KEXEC_CORE
select HAVE_IMA_KEXEC if IMA
depends on X86_64
depends on CRYPTO=y
depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y
config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
def_bool KEXEC_FILE
config KEXEC_SIG
bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
depends on KEXEC_FILE
config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
bool "Require a valid signature in kexec_file_load() syscall"
depends on KEXEC_SIG
config KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
bool "Enable bzImage signature verification support"
depends on KEXEC_SIG
depends on SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
config CRASH_DUMP
bool "kernel crash dumps"
depends on X86_64 || (X86_32 && HIGHMEM)
config KEXEC_JUMP
bool "kexec jump"
depends on KEXEC && HIBERNATION
help
becomes...
New:
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC
def_bool y
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_FILE
def_bool X86_64 && CRYPTO && CRYPTO_SHA256
config ARCH_SELECTS_KEXEC_FILE
def_bool y
depends on KEXEC_FILE
select HAVE_IMA_KEXEC if IMA
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
def_bool KEXEC_FILE
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_SIG
def_bool y
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
def_bool y
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
def_bool y
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_JUMP
def_bool y
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CRASH_DUMP
def_bool X86_64 || (X86_32 && HIGHMEM)
===== powerpc (minus the help section) =====
Original:
config KEXEC
bool "kexec system call"
depends on PPC_BOOK3S || PPC_E500 || (44x && !SMP)
select KEXEC_CORE
config KEXEC_FILE
bool "kexec file based system call"
select KEXEC_CORE
select HAVE_IMA_KEXEC if IMA
select KEXEC_ELF
depends on PPC64
depends on CRYPTO=y
depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y
config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
def_bool KEXEC_FILE
config CRASH_DUMP
bool "Build a dump capture kernel"
depends on PPC64 || PPC_BOOK3S_32 || PPC_85xx || (44x && !SMP)
select RELOCATABLE if PPC64 || 44x || PPC_85xx
becomes...
New:
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC
def_bool PPC_BOOK3S || PPC_E500 || (44x && !SMP)
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_FILE
def_bool PPC64 && CRYPTO=y && CRYPTO_SHA256=y
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
def_bool KEXEC_FILE
config ARCH_SELECTS_KEXEC_FILE
def_bool y
depends on KEXEC_FILE
select KEXEC_ELF
select HAVE_IMA_KEXEC if IMA
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CRASH_DUMP
def_bool PPC64 || PPC_BOOK3S_32 || PPC_85xx || (44x && !SMP)
config ARCH_SELECTS_CRASH_DUMP
def_bool y
depends on CRASH_DUMP
select RELOCATABLE if PPC64 || 44x || PPC_85xx
Testing Approach and Results
There are 388 config files in the arch/<arch>/configs directories.
For each of these config files, a .config is generated both before and
after this Kconfig series, and checked for equivalence. This approach
allows for a rather rapid check of all architectures and a wide
variety of configs wrt/ KEXEC and CRASH, and avoids requiring
compiling for all architectures and running kernels and run-time
testing.
For each config file, the olddefconfig, allnoconfig and allyesconfig
targets are utilized. In testing the randconfig has revealed problems
as well, but is not used in the before and after equivalence check
since one can not generate the "same" .config for before and after,
even if using the same KCONFIG_SEED since the option list is
different.
As such, the following script steps compare the before and after
of 'make olddefconfig'. The new symbols introduced by this series
are filtered out, but otherwise the config files are PASS only if
they were equivalent, and FAIL otherwise.
The script performs the test by doing the following:
# Obtain the "golden" .config output for given config file
# Reset test sandbox
git checkout master
git branch -D test_Kconfig
git checkout -B test_Kconfig master
make distclean
# Write out updated config
cp -f <config file> .config
make ARCH=<arch> olddefconfig
# Track each item in .config, LHSB is "golden"
scoreboard .config
# Obtain the "changed" .config output for given config file
# Reset test sandbox
make distclean
# Apply this Kconfig series
git am <this Kconfig series>
# Write out updated config
cp -f <config file> .config
make ARCH=<arch> olddefconfig
# Track each item in .config, RHSB is "changed"
scoreboard .config
# Determine test result
# Filter-out new symbols introduced by this series
# Filter-out symbol=n which not in either scoreboard
# Compare LHSB "golden" and RHSB "changed" scoreboards and issue PASS/FAIL
The script was instrumental during the refactoring of Kconfig as it
continually revealed problems. The end result being that the solution
presented in this series passes all configs as checked by the script,
with the following exceptions:
- arch/ia64/configs/zx1_config with olddefconfig
This config file has:
# CONFIG_KEXEC is not set
CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y
and this refactor now couples KEXEC to CRASH_DUMP, so it is not
possible to enable CRASH_DUMP without KEXEC.
- arch/sh/configs/* with allyesconfig
The arch/sh/Kconfig codes CRASH_DUMP as dependent upon BROKEN_ON_MMU
(which clearly is not meant to be set). This symbol is not provided
but with the allyesconfig it is set to yes which enables CRASH_DUMP.
But KEXEC is coded as dependent upon MMU, and is set to no in
arch/sh/mm/Kconfig, so KEXEC is not enabled.
This refactor now couples KEXEC to CRASH_DUMP, so it is not
possible to enable CRASH_DUMP without KEXEC.
While the above exceptions are not equivalent to their original,
the config file produced is valid (and in fact better wrt/ CRASH_DUMP
handling).
This patch (of 14)
The config options for kexec and crash features are consolidated
into new file kernel/Kconfig.kexec. Under the "General Setup" submenu
is a new submenu "Kexec and crash handling". All the kexec and
crash options that were once in the arch-dependent submenu "Processor
type and features" are now consolidated in the new submenu.
The following options are impacted:
- KEXEC
- KEXEC_FILE
- KEXEC_SIG
- KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
- KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
- KEXEC_JUMP
- CRASH_DUMP
The three main options are KEXEC, KEXEC_FILE and CRASH_DUMP.
Architectures specify support of certain KEXEC and CRASH features with
similarly named new ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option> config options.
Architectures can utilize the new ARCH_SELECTS_<option> config
options to specify additional components when <option> is enabled.
To summarize, the ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option> permits the <option> to be
enabled, and the ARCH_SELECTS_<option> handles side effects (ie.
select statements).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230712161545.87870-1-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230712161545.87870-2-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Cc. "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> # for x86
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc: Marc Aurèle La France <tsi@tuyoix.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
