performs some cleanups in the resource management code.
- The series "Improve the copy of task comm" from Yafang Shao addresses
possible race-induced overflows in the management of task_struct.comm[].
- The series "Remove unnecessary header includes from
{tools/}lib/list_sort.c" from Kuan-Wei Chiu adds some cleanups and a
small fix to the list_sort library code and to its selftest.
- The series "Enhance min heap API with non-inline functions and
optimizations" also from Kuan-Wei Chiu optimizes and cleans up the
min_heap library code.
- The series "nilfs2: Finish folio conversion" from Ryusuke Konishi
finishes off nilfs2's folioification.
- The series "add detect count for hung tasks" from Lance Yang adds more
userspace visibility into the hung-task detector's activity.
- Apart from that, singelton patches in many places - please see the
individual changelogs for details.
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Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2024-11-24-02-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- The series "resource: A couple of cleanups" from Andy Shevchenko
performs some cleanups in the resource management code
- The series "Improve the copy of task comm" from Yafang Shao addresses
possible race-induced overflows in the management of
task_struct.comm[]
- The series "Remove unnecessary header includes from
{tools/}lib/list_sort.c" from Kuan-Wei Chiu adds some cleanups and a
small fix to the list_sort library code and to its selftest
- The series "Enhance min heap API with non-inline functions and
optimizations" also from Kuan-Wei Chiu optimizes and cleans up the
min_heap library code
- The series "nilfs2: Finish folio conversion" from Ryusuke Konishi
finishes off nilfs2's folioification
- The series "add detect count for hung tasks" from Lance Yang adds
more userspace visibility into the hung-task detector's activity
- Apart from that, singelton patches in many places - please see the
individual changelogs for details
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2024-11-24-02-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (71 commits)
gdb: lx-symbols: do not error out on monolithic build
kernel/reboot: replace sprintf() with sysfs_emit()
lib: util_macros_kunit: add kunit test for util_macros.h
util_macros.h: fix/rework find_closest() macros
Improve consistency of '#error' directive messages
ocfs2: fix uninitialized value in ocfs2_file_read_iter()
hung_task: add docs for hung_task_detect_count
hung_task: add detect count for hung tasks
dma-buf: use atomic64_inc_return() in dma_buf_getfile()
fs/proc/kcore.c: fix coccinelle reported ERROR instances
resource: avoid unnecessary resource tree walking in __region_intersects()
ocfs2: remove unused errmsg function and table
ocfs2: cluster: fix a typo
lib/scatterlist: use sg_phys() helper
checkpatch: always parse orig_commit in fixes tag
nilfs2: convert metadata aops from writepage to writepages
nilfs2: convert nilfs_recovery_copy_block() to take a folio
nilfs2: convert nilfs_page_count_clean_buffers() to take a folio
nilfs2: remove nilfs_writepage
nilfs2: convert checkpoint file to be folio-based
...
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Merge tag 'fsnotify_for_v6.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs
Pull fsnotify updates from Jan Kara:
"A couple of smaller random fsnotify fixes"
* tag 'fsnotify_for_v6.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
fsnotify: Fix ordering of iput() and watched_objects decrement
fsnotify: fix sending inotify event with unexpected filename
fanotify: allow reporting errors on failure to open fd
fsnotify, lsm: Decouple fsnotify from lsm
API:
- Add sig driver API.
- Remove signing/verification from akcipher API.
- Move crypto_simd_disabled_for_test to lib/crypto.
- Add WARN_ON for return values from driver that indicates memory corruption.
Algorithms:
- Provide crc32-arch and crc32c-arch through Crypto API.
- Optimise crc32c code size on x86.
- Optimise crct10dif on arm/arm64.
- Optimise p10-aes-gcm on powerpc.
- Optimise aegis128 on x86.
- Output full sample from test interface in jitter RNG.
- Retry without padata when it fails in pcrypt.
Drivers:
- Add support for Airoha EN7581 TRNG.
- Add support for STM32MP25x platforms in stm32.
- Enable iproc-r200 RNG driver on BCMBCA.
- Add Broadcom BCM74110 RNG driver.
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Merge tag 'v6.13-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add sig driver API
- Remove signing/verification from akcipher API
- Move crypto_simd_disabled_for_test to lib/crypto
- Add WARN_ON for return values from driver that indicates memory
corruption
Algorithms:
- Provide crc32-arch and crc32c-arch through Crypto API
- Optimise crc32c code size on x86
- Optimise crct10dif on arm/arm64
- Optimise p10-aes-gcm on powerpc
- Optimise aegis128 on x86
- Output full sample from test interface in jitter RNG
- Retry without padata when it fails in pcrypt
Drivers:
- Add support for Airoha EN7581 TRNG
- Add support for STM32MP25x platforms in stm32
- Enable iproc-r200 RNG driver on BCMBCA
- Add Broadcom BCM74110 RNG driver"
* tag 'v6.13-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (112 commits)
crypto: marvell/cesa - fix uninit value for struct mv_cesa_op_ctx
crypto: cavium - Fix an error handling path in cpt_ucode_load_fw()
crypto: aesni - Move back to module_init
crypto: lib/mpi - Export mpi_set_bit
crypto: aes-gcm-p10 - Use the correct bit to test for P10
hwrng: amd - remove reference to removed PPC_MAPLE config
crypto: arm/crct10dif - Implement plain NEON variant
crypto: arm/crct10dif - Macroify PMULL asm code
crypto: arm/crct10dif - Use existing mov_l macro instead of __adrl
crypto: arm64/crct10dif - Remove remaining 64x64 PMULL fallback code
crypto: arm64/crct10dif - Use faster 16x64 bit polynomial multiply
crypto: arm64/crct10dif - Remove obsolete chunking logic
crypto: bcm - add error check in the ahash_hmac_init function
crypto: caam - add error check to caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form
hwrng: bcm74110 - Add Broadcom BCM74110 RNG driver
dt-bindings: rng: add binding for BCM74110 RNG
padata: Clean up in padata_do_multithreaded()
crypto: inside-secure - Fix the return value of safexcel_xcbcmac_cra_init()
crypto: qat - Fix missing destroy_workqueue in adf_init_aer()
crypto: rsassa-pkcs1 - Reinstate support for legacy protocols
...
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20241112' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
"Thirteen patches, all focused on moving away from the current 'secid'
LSM identifier to a richer 'lsm_prop' structure.
This move will help reduce the translation that is necessary in many
LSMs, offering better performance, and make it easier to support
different LSMs in the future"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20241112' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: remove lsm_prop scaffolding
netlabel,smack: use lsm_prop for audit data
audit: change context data from secid to lsm_prop
lsm: create new security_cred_getlsmprop LSM hook
audit: use an lsm_prop in audit_names
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_inode_getsecid
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid
audit: update shutdown LSM data
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_ipc_getsecid
audit: maintain an lsm_prop in audit_context
lsm: add lsmprop_to_secctx hook
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_audit_rule_match
lsm: add the lsm_prop data structure
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20241112' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add support for netlink xperms
Some time ago we added the concept of "xperms" to the SELinux policy
so that we could write policy for individual ioctls, this builds upon
this by using extending xperms to netlink so that we can write
SELinux policy for individual netlnk message types and not rely on
the fairly coarse read/write mapping tables we currently have.
There are limitations involving generic netlink due to the
multiplexing that is done, but it's no worse that what we currently
have. As usual, more information can be found in the commit message.
- Deprecate /sys/fs/selinux/user
We removed the only known userspace use of this back in 2020 and now
that several years have elapsed we're starting down the path of
deprecating it in the kernel.
- Cleanup the build under scripts/selinux
A couple of patches to move the genheaders tool under
security/selinux and correct our usage of kernel headers in the tools
located under scripts/selinux. While these changes originated out of
an effort to build Linux on different systems, they are arguably the
right thing to do regardless.
- Minor code cleanups and style fixes
Not much to say here, two minor cleanup patches that came out of the
netlink xperms work
* tag 'selinux-pr-20241112' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: Deprecate /sys/fs/selinux/user
selinux: apply clang format to security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
selinux: streamline selinux_nlmsg_lookup()
selinux: Add netlink xperm support
selinux: move genheaders to security/selinux/
selinux: do not include <linux/*.h> headers from host programs
Making sure that struct fd instances are destroyed in the same
scope where they'd been created, getting rid of reassignments
and passing them by reference, converting to CLASS(fd{,_pos,_raw}).
We are getting very close to having the memory safety of that stuff
trivial to verify.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Merge tag 'pull-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull 'struct fd' class updates from Al Viro:
"The bulk of struct fd memory safety stuff
Making sure that struct fd instances are destroyed in the same scope
where they'd been created, getting rid of reassignments and passing
them by reference, converting to CLASS(fd{,_pos,_raw}).
We are getting very close to having the memory safety of that stuff
trivial to verify"
* tag 'pull-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (28 commits)
deal with the last remaing boolean uses of fd_file()
css_set_fork(): switch to CLASS(fd_raw, ...)
memcg_write_event_control(): switch to CLASS(fd)
assorted variants of irqfd setup: convert to CLASS(fd)
do_pollfd(): convert to CLASS(fd)
convert do_select()
convert vfs_dedupe_file_range().
convert cifs_ioctl_copychunk()
convert media_request_get_by_fd()
convert spu_run(2)
switch spufs_calls_{get,put}() to CLASS() use
convert cachestat(2)
convert do_preadv()/do_pwritev()
fdget(), more trivial conversions
fdget(), trivial conversions
privcmd_ioeventfd_assign(): don't open-code eventfd_ctx_fdget()
o2hb_region_dev_store(): avoid goto around fdget()/fdput()
introduce "fd_pos" class, convert fdget_pos() users to it.
fdget_raw() users: switch to CLASS(fd_raw)
convert vmsplice() to CLASS(fd)
...
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Merge tag 'vfs-6.13.file' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs file updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains changes the changes for files for this cycle:
- Introduce a new reference counting mechanism for files.
As atomic_inc_not_zero() is implemented with a try_cmpxchg() loop
it has O(N^2) behaviour under contention with N concurrent
operations and it is in a hot path in __fget_files_rcu().
The rcuref infrastructures remedies this problem by using an
unconditional increment relying on safe- and dead zones to make
this work and requiring rcu protection for the data structure in
question. This not just scales better it also introduces overflow
protection.
However, in contrast to generic rcuref, files require a memory
barrier and thus cannot rely on *_relaxed() atomic operations and
also require to be built on atomic_long_t as having massive amounts
of reference isn't unheard of even if it is just an attack.
This adds a file specific variant instead of making this a generic
library.
This has been tested by various people and it gives consistent
improvement up to 3-5% on workloads with loads of threads.
- Add a fastpath for find_next_zero_bit(). Skip 2-levels searching
via find_next_zero_bit() when there is a free slot in the word that
contains the next fd. This improves pts/blogbench-1.1.0 read by 8%
and write by 4% on Intel ICX 160.
- Conditionally clear full_fds_bits since it's very likely that a bit
in full_fds_bits has been cleared during __clear_open_fds(). This
improves pts/blogbench-1.1.0 read up to 13%, and write up to 5% on
Intel ICX 160.
- Get rid of all lookup_*_fdget_rcu() variants. They were used to
lookup files without taking a reference count. That became invalid
once files were switched to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU and now we're
always taking a reference count. Switch to an already existing
helper and remove the legacy variants.
- Remove pointless includes of <linux/fdtable.h>.
- Avoid cmpxchg() in close_files() as nobody else has a reference to
the files_struct at that point.
- Move close_range() into fs/file.c and fold __close_range() into it.
- Cleanup calling conventions of alloc_fdtable() and expand_files().
- Merge __{set,clear}_close_on_exec() into one.
- Make __set_open_fd() set cloexec as well instead of doing it in two
separate steps"
* tag 'vfs-6.13.file' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
selftests: add file SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU recycling stressor
fs: port files to file_ref
fs: add file_ref
expand_files(): simplify calling conventions
make __set_open_fd() set cloexec state as well
fs: protect backing files with rcu
file.c: merge __{set,clear}_close_on_exec()
alloc_fdtable(): change calling conventions.
fs/file.c: add fast path in find_next_fd()
fs/file.c: conditionally clear full_fds
fs/file.c: remove sanity_check and add likely/unlikely in alloc_fd()
move close_range(2) into fs/file.c, fold __close_range() into it
close_files(): don't bother with xchg()
remove pointless includes of <linux/fdtable.h>
get rid of ...lookup...fdget_rcu() family
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Merge tag 'integrity-v6.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity fixes from Mimi Zohar:
"One bug fix, one performance improvement, and the use of
static_assert:
- The bug fix addresses "only a cosmetic change" commit, which didn't
take into account the original 'ima' template definition.
- The performance improvement limits the atomic_read()"
* tag 'integrity-v6.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Use static_assert() to check struct sizes
evm: stop avoidably reading i_writecount in evm_file_release
ima: fix buffer overrun in ima_eventdigest_init_common
Do not walk through the domain hierarchy when the required scope is not
supported by this domain. This is the same approach as for filesystem
and network restrictions.
Cc: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>
Cc: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241109110856.222842-4-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Replace get_raw_handled_fs_accesses() with a generic
landlock_union_access_masks(), and replace get_fs_domain() with a
generic landlock_get_applicable_domain(). These helpers will also be
useful for other types of access.
Cc: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241109110856.222842-2-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Slightly improve doc as suggested by Günther]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Quoted from Linus [0]:
selinux never wanted a lock, and never wanted any kind of *consistent*
result, it just wanted a *stable* result.
Using get_task_comm() to read the task comm ensures that the name is
always NUL-terminated, regardless of the source string. This approach also
facilitates future extensions to the task comm.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241007144911.27693-4-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wivfrF0_zvf+oj6==Sh=-npJooP8chLPEfaFV0oNYTTBA@mail.gmail.com/ [0]
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matus Jokay <matus.jokay@stuba.sk>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
When sealing or unsealing a key blob we currently do not wait for
the AEAD cipher operation to finish and simply return after submitting
the request. If there is some load on the system we can exit before
the cipher operation is done and the buffer we read from/write to
is already removed from the stack. This will e.g. result in NULL
pointer dereference errors in the DCP driver during blob creation.
Fix this by waiting for the AEAD cipher operation to finish before
resuming the seal and unseal calls.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 0e28bf61a5 ("KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key")
Reported-by: Parthiban N <parthiban@linumiz.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/254d3bb1-6dbc-48b4-9c08-77df04baee2f@linumiz.com/
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
KASAN reports an out of bounds read:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __kuid_val include/linux/uidgid.h:36
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in uid_eq include/linux/uidgid.h:63 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in key_task_permission+0x394/0x410
security/keys/permission.c:54
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88813c3ab618 by task stress-ng/4362
CPU: 2 PID: 4362 Comm: stress-ng Not tainted 5.10.0-14930-gafbffd6c3ede #15
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:82 [inline]
dump_stack+0x107/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:123
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:400
__kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 mm/kasan/report.c:560
kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 mm/kasan/report.c:585
__kuid_val include/linux/uidgid.h:36 [inline]
uid_eq include/linux/uidgid.h:63 [inline]
key_task_permission+0x394/0x410 security/keys/permission.c:54
search_nested_keyrings+0x90e/0xe90 security/keys/keyring.c:793
This issue was also reported by syzbot.
It can be reproduced by following these steps(more details [1]):
1. Obtain more than 32 inputs that have similar hashes, which ends with the
pattern '0xxxxxxxe6'.
2. Reboot and add the keys obtained in step 1.
The reproducer demonstrates how this issue happened:
1. In the search_nested_keyrings function, when it iterates through the
slots in a node(below tag ascend_to_node), if the slot pointer is meta
and node->back_pointer != NULL(it means a root), it will proceed to
descend_to_node. However, there is an exception. If node is the root,
and one of the slots points to a shortcut, it will be treated as a
keyring.
2. Whether the ptr is keyring decided by keyring_ptr_is_keyring function.
However, KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE is 0x2UL, the same as
ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SUBTYPE_MASK.
3. When 32 keys with the similar hashes are added to the tree, the ROOT
has keys with hashes that are not similar (e.g. slot 0) and it splits
NODE A without using a shortcut. When NODE A is filled with keys that
all hashes are xxe6, the keys are similar, NODE A will split with a
shortcut. Finally, it forms the tree as shown below, where slot 6 points
to a shortcut.
NODE A
+------>+---+
ROOT | | 0 | xxe6
+---+ | +---+
xxxx | 0 | shortcut : : xxe6
+---+ | +---+
xxe6 : : | | | xxe6
+---+ | +---+
| 6 |---+ : : xxe6
+---+ +---+
xxe6 : : | f | xxe6
+---+ +---+
xxe6 | f |
+---+
4. As mentioned above, If a slot(slot 6) of the root points to a shortcut,
it may be mistakenly transferred to a key*, leading to a read
out-of-bounds read.
To fix this issue, one should jump to descend_to_node if the ptr is a
shortcut, regardless of whether the node is root or not.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/1cfa878e-8c7b-4570-8606-21daf5e13ce7@huaweicloud.com/
[jarkko: tweaked the commit message a bit to have an appropriate closes
tag.]
Fixes: b2a4df200d ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Reported-by: syzbot+5b415c07907a2990d1a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000cbb7860611f61147@google.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
all failure exits prior to fdget() leave the scope, all matching fdput()
are immediately followed by leaving the scope.
[xfs_ioc_commit_range() chunk moved here as well]
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
fdget() is the first thing done in scope, all matching fdput() are
immediately followed by leaving the scope.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
If enabled, we fallback to the platform keyring if the trusted keyring
doesn't have the key used to sign the ipe policy. But if pkcs7_verify()
rejects the key for other reasons, such as usage restrictions, we do not
fallback. Do so, following the same change in dm-verity.
Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[FW: fixed some line length issues and a typo in the commit message]
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
The current policy management makes it impossible to use IPE
in a general purpose distribution. In such cases the users are not
building the kernel, the distribution is, and access to the private
key included in the trusted keyring is, for obvious reason, not
available.
This means that users have no way to enable IPE, since there will
be no built-in generic policy, and no access to the key to sign
updates validated by the trusted keyring.
Just as we do for dm-verity, kernel modules and more, allow the
secondary and platform keyrings to also validate policies. This
allows users enrolling their own keys in UEFI db or MOK to also
sign policies, and enroll them. This makes it sensible to enable
IPE in general purpose distributions, as it becomes usable by
any user wishing to do so. Keys in these keyrings can already
load kernels and kernel modules, so there is no security
downgrade.
Add a kconfig each, like dm-verity does, but default to enabled if
the dependencies are available.
Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[FW: fixed some style issues]
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
Currently IPE accepts an update that has the same version as the policy
being updated, but it doesn't make it a no-op nor it checks that the
old and new policyes are the same. So it is possible to change the
content of a policy, without changing its version. This is very
confusing from userspace when managing policies.
Instead change the update logic to reject updates that have the same
version with ESTALE, as that is much clearer and intuitive behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
When loading policies in userspace we want a recognizable error when an
update attempts to use an old policy, as that is an error that needs
to be treated differently from an invalid policy. Use -ESTALE as it is
clear enough for an update mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
Currently, fsnotify_open_perm() is called from security_file_open().
This is a a bit unexpected and creates otherwise unnecessary dependency
of CONFIG_FANOTIFY_ACCESS_PERMISSIONS on CONFIG_SECURITY. Fix this by
calling fsnotify_open_perm() directly.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241013002248.3984442-1-song@kernel.org
Remove the scaffold member from the lsm_prop. Remove the
remaining places it is being set.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace the secid in the netlbl_audit structure with an lsm_prop.
Remove scaffolding that was required when the value was a secid.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: fix the subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Create a new LSM hook security_cred_getlsmprop() which, like
security_cred_getsecid(), fetches LSM specific attributes from the
cred structure. The associated data elements in the audit sub-system
are changed from a secid to a lsm_prop to accommodate multiple possible
LSM audit users.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsm_prop structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
for IMA and audit. Change the name to security_inode_getlsmprop().
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and
security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in a lsm_prop structure
instead of a u32 secid. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible security data for possible reporting.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing.
Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in a lsm_prop structure instead
of the u32 secid. Change the name to security_ipc_getlsmprop() to
reflect the change.
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a new hook security_lsmprop_to_secctx() and its LSM specific
implementations. The LSM specific code will use the lsm_prop element
allocated for that module. This allows for the possibility that more
than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string,
as can occur in the audit code.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsm_prop structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsm_prop structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsm_prop instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmprop_init()
fills the structure with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the lsm_prop structure later in the series.
At that point the use of lsmprop_init() is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 38aa3f5ac6 ("integrity: Avoid -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end
warnings") introduced tagged `struct evm_ima_xattr_data_hdr` and
`struct ima_digest_data_hdr`. We want to ensure that when new members
need to be added to the flexible structures, they are always included
within these tagged structs.
So, we use `static_assert()` to ensure that the memory layout for
both the flexible structure and the tagged struct is the same after
any changes.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The EVM_NEW_FILE flag is unset if the file already existed at the time
of open and this can be checked without looking at i_writecount.
Not accessing it reduces traffic on the cacheline during parallel open
of the same file and drop the evm_file_release routine from second place
to bottom of the profile.
Fixes: 75a323e604 ("evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM")
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.9+
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Function ima_eventdigest_init() calls ima_eventdigest_init_common()
with HASH_ALGO__LAST which is then used to access the array
hash_digest_size[] leading to buffer overrun. Have a conditional
statement to handle this.
Fixes: 9fab303a2c ("ima: fix violation measurement list record")
Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Enrico Bravi (PhD at polito.it) <enrico.bravi@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.19+
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Patch series "remove PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM" v3.
This patch (of 2):
bch2_new_inode relies on PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM to try to allocate a new
inode to achieve GFP_NOWAIT semantic while holding locks. If this
allocation fails it will drop locks and use GFP_NOFS allocation context.
We would like to drop PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM because it is really
dangerous to use if the caller doesn't control the full call chain with
this flag set. E.g. if any of the function down the chain needed
GFP_NOFAIL request the PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM would override this and
cause unexpected failure.
While this is not the case in this particular case using the scoped gfp
semantic is not really needed bacause we can easily pus the allocation
context down the chain without too much clutter.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix kerneldoc warnings]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240926172940.167084-1-mhocko@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240926172940.167084-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> # For vfs changes
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
The only known user of this interface was libselinux and its
internal usage of this interface for get_ordered_context_list(3)
was removed in Feb 2020, with a deprecation warning added to
security_compute_user(3) at the same time. Add a deprecation
warning to the kernel and schedule it for final removal in 2025.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Streamline the code in selinux_nlmsg_lookup() to improve the code flow,
readability, and remove the unnecessary local variables.
Tested-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reuse the existing extended permissions infrastructure to support
policies based on the netlink message types.
A new policy capability "netlink_xperm" is introduced. When disabled,
the previous behaviour is preserved. That is, netlink_send will rely on
the permission mappings defined in nlmsgtab.c (e.g, nlmsg_read for
RTM_GETADDR on NETLINK_ROUTE). When enabled, the mappings are ignored
and the generic "nlmsg" permission is used instead.
The new "nlmsg" permission is an extended permission. The 16 bits of the
extended permission are mapped to the nlmsg_type field.
Example policy on Android, preventing regular apps from accessing the
device's MAC address and ARP table, but allowing this access to
privileged apps, looks as follows:
allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket {
create read getattr write setattr lock append connect getopt
setopt shutdown nlmsg
};
allowxperm netdomain self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg ~{
RTM_GETLINK RTM_GETNEIGH RTM_GETNEIGHTBL
};
allowxperm priv_app self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg {
RTM_GETLINK RTM_GETNEIGH RTM_GETNEIGHTBL
};
The constants in the example above (e.g., RTM_GETLINK) are explicitly
defined in the policy.
It is possible to generate policies to support kernels that may or
may not have the capability enabled by generating a rule for each
scenario. For instance:
allow domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_read;
allow domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg;
allowxperm domain self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg { AUDIT_GET };
The approach of defining a new permission ("nlmsg") instead of relying
on the existing permissions (e.g., "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_readpriv" or
"nlmsg_tty_audit") has been preferred because:
1. This is similar to the other extended permission ("ioctl");
2. With the new extended permission, the coarse-grained mapping is not
necessary anymore. It could eventually be removed, which would be
impossible if the extended permission was defined below these.
3. Having a single extra extended permission considerably simplifies
the implementation here and in libselinux.
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Bram Bonné <brambonne@google.com>
[PM: manual merge fixes for sock_skip_has_perm()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
some of those used to be needed, some had been cargo-culted for
no reason...
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
- gcc plugins: Avoid Kconfig warnings with randstruct (Nathan Chancellor)
- MAINTAINERS: Add security/Kconfig.hardening to hardening section
(Nathan Chancellor)
- MAINTAINERS: Add unsafe_memcpy() to the FORTIFY review list
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Merge tag 'hardening-v6.12-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardening fixes from Kees Cook:
- gcc plugins: Avoid Kconfig warnings with randstruct (Nathan
Chancellor)
- MAINTAINERS: Add security/Kconfig.hardening to hardening section
(Nathan Chancellor)
- MAINTAINERS: Add unsafe_memcpy() to the FORTIFY review list
* tag 'hardening-v6.12-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
MAINTAINERS: Add security/Kconfig.hardening to hardening section
hardening: Adjust dependencies in selection of MODVERSIONS
MAINTAINERS: Add unsafe_memcpy() to the FORTIFY review list
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20241004' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm revert from Paul Moore:
"Here is the CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_LKM revert that we've been
discussing this week. With near unanimous agreement that the original
TOMOYO patches were not the right way to solve the distro problem
Tetsuo is trying the solve, reverting is our best option at this time"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20241004' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
tomoyo: revert CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_LKM support
A sig_alg backend has just been introduced with the intent of moving all
asymmetric sign/verify algorithms to it one by one.
Migrate the sign/verify operations from rsa-pkcs1pad.c to a separate
rsassa-pkcs1.c which uses the new backend.
Consequently there are now two templates which build on the "rsa"
akcipher_alg:
* The existing "pkcs1pad" template, which is instantiated as an
akcipher_instance and retains the encrypt/decrypt operations of
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 (RFC 8017 sec 7.2).
* The new "pkcs1" template, which is instantiated as a sig_instance
and contains the sign/verify operations of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
(RFC 8017 sec 8.2).
In a separate step, rsa-pkcs1pad.c could optionally be renamed to
rsaes-pkcs1.c for clarity. Additional "oaep" and "pss" templates
could be added for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS.
Note that it's currently allowed to allocate a "pkcs1pad(rsa)" transform
without specifying a hash algorithm. That makes sense if the transform
is only used for encrypt/decrypt and continues to be supported. But for
sign/verify, such transforms previously did not insert the Full Hash
Prefix into the padding. The resulting message encoding was incompliant
with EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (RFC 8017 sec 9.2) and therefore nonsensical.
From here on in, it is no longer allowed to allocate a transform without
specifying a hash algorithm if the transform is used for sign/verify
operations. This simplifies the code because the insertion of the Full
Hash Prefix is no longer optional, so various "if (digest_info)" clauses
can be removed.
There has been a previous attempt to forbid transform allocation without
specifying a hash algorithm, namely by commit c0d20d22e0 ("crypto:
rsa-pkcs1pad - Require hash to be present"). It had to be rolled back
with commit b3a8c8a5eb ("crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be
optional [ver #2]"), presumably because it broke allocation of a
transform which was solely used for encrypt/decrypt, not sign/verify.
Avoid such breakage by allowing transform allocation for encrypt/decrypt
with and without specifying a hash algorithm (and simply ignoring the
hash algorithm in the former case).
So again, specifying a hash algorithm is now mandatory for sign/verify,
but optional and ignored for encrypt/decrypt.
The new sig_alg API uses kernel buffers instead of sglists, which
avoids the overhead of copying signature and digest from sglists back
into kernel buffers. rsassa-pkcs1.c is thus simplified quite a bit.
sig_alg is always synchronous, whereas the underlying "rsa" akcipher_alg
may be asynchronous. So await the result of the akcipher_alg, similar
to crypto_akcipher_sync_{en,de}crypt().
As part of the migration, rename "rsa_digest_info" to "hash_prefix" to
adhere to the spec language in RFC 9580. Otherwise keep the code
unmodified wherever possible to ease reviewing and bisecting. Leave
several simplification and hardening opportunities to separate commits.
rsassa-pkcs1.c uses modern __free() syntax for allocation of buffers
which need to be freed by kfree_sensitive(), hence a DEFINE_FREE()
clause for kfree_sensitive() is introduced herein as a byproduct.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch reverts two TOMOYO patches that were merged into Linus' tree
during the v6.12 merge window:
8b985bbfab ("tomoyo: allow building as a loadable LSM module")
268225a1de ("tomoyo: preparation step for building as a loadable LSM module")
Together these two patches introduced the CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_LKM
Kconfig build option which enabled a TOMOYO specific dynamic LSM loading
mechanism (see the original commits for more details). Unfortunately,
this approach was widely rejected by the LSM community as well as some
members of the general kernel community. Objections included concerns
over setting a bad precedent regarding individual LSMs managing their
LSM callback registrations as well as general kernel symbol exporting
practices. With little to no support for the CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_LKM
approach outside of Tetsuo, and multiple objections, we need to revert
these changes.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0c4b443a-9c72-4800-97e8-a3816b6a9ae2@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHC9VhR=QjdoHG3wJgHFJkKYBg7vkQH2MpffgVzQ0tAByo_wRg@mail.gmail.com
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This tool is only used in security/selinux/Makefile.
Move it to security/selinux/ so that 'make clean' can clean it up.
Please note 'make clean' does not clean scripts/ because tools under
scripts/ are often used for external module builds. Obviously, genheaders
is not the case here.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The header, security/selinux/include/classmap.h, is included not only
from kernel space but also from host programs.
It includes <linux/capability.h> and <linux/socket.h>, which pull in
more <linux/*.h> headers. This makes the host programs less portable,
specifically causing build errors on macOS.
Those headers are included for the following purposes:
- <linux/capability.h> for checking CAP_LAST_CAP
- <linux/socket.h> for checking PF_MAX
These checks can be guarded by __KERNEL__ so they are skipped when
building host programs. Testing them when building the kernel should
be sufficient.
The header, security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h, includes
<linux/stddef.h> for the NULL definition, but this is not portable
either. Instead, <stddef.h> should be included for host programs.
Reported-by: Daniel Gomez <da.gomez@samsung.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240807-macos-build-support-v1-6-4cd1ded85694@samsung.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240807-macos-build-support-v1-7-4cd1ded85694@samsung.com/
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
asm/unaligned.h is always an include of asm-generic/unaligned.h;
might as well move that thing to linux/unaligned.h and include
that - there's nothing arch-specific in that header.
auto-generated by the following:
for i in `git grep -l -w asm/unaligned.h`; do
sed -i -e "s/asm\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
for i in `git grep -l -w asm-generic/unaligned.h`; do
sed -i -e "s/asm-generic\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
git mv include/asm-generic/unaligned.h include/linux/unaligned.h
git mv tools/include/asm-generic/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
sed -i -e "/unaligned.h/d" include/asm-generic/Kbuild
sed -i -e "s/__ASM_GENERIC/__LINUX/" include/linux/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
MODVERSIONS recently grew a dependency on !COMPILE_TEST so that Rust
could be more easily tested. However, this introduces a Kconfig warning
when building allmodconfig with a clang version that supports RANDSTRUCT
natively because RANDSTRUCT_FULL and RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE select
MODVERSIONS when MODULES is enabled, bypassing the !COMPILE_TEST
dependency:
WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for MODVERSIONS
Depends on [n]: MODULES [=y] && !COMPILE_TEST [=y]
Selected by [y]:
- RANDSTRUCT_FULL [=y] && (CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT [=y] || GCC_PLUGINS [=n]) && MODULES [=y]
Add the !COMPILE_TEST dependency to the selections to clear up the
warning.
Fixes: 1f9c4a9967 ("Kbuild: make MODVERSIONS support depend on not being a compile test build")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240928-fix-randstruct-modversions-kconfig-warning-v1-1-27d3edc8571e@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
TOMOYO is useful as an analysis tool for learning how a Linux system works.
My boss was hoping that SELinux's policy is generated from what TOMOYO has
observed. A translated paper describing it is available at
https://master.dl.sourceforge.net/project/tomoyo/docs/nsf2003-en.pdf/nsf2003-en.pdf?viasf=1 .
Although that attempt failed due to mapping problem between inode and pathname,
TOMOYO remains as an access restriction tool due to ability to write custom
policy by individuals.
I was delivering pure LKM version of TOMOYO (named AKARI) to users who
cannot afford rebuilding their distro kernels with TOMOYO enabled. But
since the LSM framework was converted to static calls, it became more
difficult to deliver AKARI to such users. Therefore, I decided to update
TOMOYO so that people can use mostly LKM version of TOMOYO with minimal
burden for both distributors and users.
Tetsuo Handa (3):
tomoyo: preparation step for building as a loadable LSM module
tomoyo: allow building as a loadable LSM module
tomoyo: fallback to realpath if symlink's pathname does not exist
security/tomoyo/Kconfig | 15 ++++++++
security/tomoyo/Makefile | 10 ++++-
security/tomoyo/common.c | 14 ++++++-
security/tomoyo/common.h | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/tomoyo/domain.c | 9 +++-
security/tomoyo/gc.c | 3 +
security/tomoyo/hooks.h | 110 -----------------------------------------------------------
security/tomoyo/init.c | 366 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/tomoyo/load_policy.c | 12 ++++++
security/tomoyo/proxy.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c | 12 ++++--
security/tomoyo/util.c | 3 -
12 files changed, 585 insertions(+), 123 deletions(-)
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Merge tag 'tomoyo-pr-20240927' of git://git.code.sf.net/p/tomoyo/tomoyo
Pull tomoyo updates from Tetsuo Handa:
"One bugfix patch, one preparation patch, and one conversion patch.
TOMOYO is useful as an analysis tool for learning how a Linux system
works. My boss was hoping that SELinux's policy is generated from what
TOMOYO has observed. A translated paper describing it is available at
https://master.dl.sourceforge.net/project/tomoyo/docs/nsf2003-en.pdf/nsf2003-en.pdf?viasf=1
Although that attempt failed due to mapping problem between inode and
pathname, TOMOYO remains as an access restriction tool due to ability
to write custom policy by individuals.
I was delivering pure LKM version of TOMOYO (named AKARI) to users who
cannot afford rebuilding their distro kernels with TOMOYO enabled. But
since the LSM framework was converted to static calls, it became more
difficult to deliver AKARI to such users. Therefore, I decided to
update TOMOYO so that people can use mostly LKM version of TOMOYO with
minimal burden for both distributors and users"
* tag 'tomoyo-pr-20240927' of git://git.code.sf.net/p/tomoyo/tomoyo:
tomoyo: fallback to realpath if symlink's pathname does not exist
tomoyo: allow building as a loadable LSM module
tomoyo: preparation step for building as a loadable LSM module
