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2865baf540
The Spectre-v1 mitigations made "access_ok()" much more expensive, since it has to serialize execution with the test for a valid user address. All the normal user copy routines avoid this by just masking the user address with a data-dependent mask instead, but the fast "unsafe_user_read()" kind of patterms that were supposed to be a fast case got slowed down. This introduces a notion of using src = masked_user_access_begin(src); to do the user address sanity using a data-dependent mask instead of the more traditional conditional if (user_read_access_begin(src, len)) { model. This model only works for dense accesses that start at 'src' and on architectures that have a guard region that is guaranteed to fault in between the user space and the kernel space area. With this, the user access doesn't need to be manually checked, because a bad address is guaranteed to fault (by some architecture masking trick: on x86-64 this involves just turning an invalid user address into all ones, since we don't map the top of address space). This only converts a couple of examples for now. Example x86-64 code generation for loading two words from user space: stac mov %rax,%rcx sar $0x3f,%rcx or %rax,%rcx mov (%rcx),%r13 mov 0x8(%rcx),%r14 clac where all the error handling and -EFAULT is now purely handled out of line by the exception path. Of course, if the micro-architecture does badly at 'clac' and 'stac', the above is still pitifully slow. But at least we did as well as we could. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
130 lines
3.5 KiB
C
130 lines
3.5 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/bitops.h>
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#include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
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/*
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* Do a strnlen, return length of string *with* final '\0'.
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* 'count' is the user-supplied count, while 'max' is the
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* address space maximum.
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*
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* Return 0 for exceptions (which includes hitting the address
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* space maximum), or 'count+1' if hitting the user-supplied
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* maximum count.
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*
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* NOTE! We can sometimes overshoot the user-supplied maximum
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* if it fits in a aligned 'long'. The caller needs to check
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* the return value against "> max".
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*/
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static __always_inline long do_strnlen_user(const char __user *src, unsigned long count, unsigned long max)
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{
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const struct word_at_a_time constants = WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS;
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unsigned long align, res = 0;
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unsigned long c;
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/*
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* Do everything aligned. But that means that we
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* need to also expand the maximum..
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*/
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align = (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1) & (unsigned long)src;
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src -= align;
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max += align;
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unsafe_get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)src, efault);
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c |= aligned_byte_mask(align);
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for (;;) {
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unsigned long data;
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if (has_zero(c, &data, &constants)) {
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data = prep_zero_mask(c, data, &constants);
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data = create_zero_mask(data);
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return res + find_zero(data) + 1 - align;
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}
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res += sizeof(unsigned long);
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/* We already handled 'unsigned long' bytes. Did we do it all ? */
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if (unlikely(max <= sizeof(unsigned long)))
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break;
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max -= sizeof(unsigned long);
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unsafe_get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)(src+res), efault);
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}
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res -= align;
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/*
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* Uhhuh. We hit 'max'. But was that the user-specified maximum
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* too? If so, return the marker for "too long".
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*/
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if (res >= count)
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return count+1;
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/*
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* Nope: we hit the address space limit, and we still had more
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* characters the caller would have wanted. That's 0.
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*/
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efault:
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* strnlen_user: - Get the size of a user string INCLUDING final NUL.
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* @str: The string to measure.
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* @count: Maximum count (including NUL character)
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*
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* Context: User context only. This function may sleep if pagefaults are
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* enabled.
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*
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* Get the size of a NUL-terminated string in user space.
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*
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* Returns the size of the string INCLUDING the terminating NUL.
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* If the string is too long, returns a number larger than @count. User
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* has to check the return value against "> count".
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* On exception (or invalid count), returns 0.
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*
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* NOTE! You should basically never use this function. There is
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* almost never any valid case for using the length of a user space
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* string, since the string can be changed at any time by other
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* threads. Use "strncpy_from_user()" instead to get a stable copy
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* of the string.
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*/
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long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long count)
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{
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unsigned long max_addr, src_addr;
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if (unlikely(count <= 0))
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return 0;
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if (can_do_masked_user_access()) {
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long retval;
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str = masked_user_access_begin(str);
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retval = do_strnlen_user(str, count, count);
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user_read_access_end();
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return retval;
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}
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max_addr = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
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src_addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(str);
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if (likely(src_addr < max_addr)) {
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unsigned long max = max_addr - src_addr;
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long retval;
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/*
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* Truncate 'max' to the user-specified limit, so that
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* we only have one limit we need to check in the loop
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*/
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if (max > count)
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max = count;
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if (user_read_access_begin(str, max)) {
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retval = do_strnlen_user(str, count, max);
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user_read_access_end();
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return retval;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(strnlen_user);
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