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0f75ef6a9c
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIVAwUAXRyyVvu3V2unywtrAQL3xQ//eifjlELkRAPm2EReWwwahdM+9QL/0bAy e8eAzP9EaphQGUhpIzM9Y7Cx+a8XW2xACljY8hEFGyxXhDMoLa35oSoJOeay6vQt QcgWnDYsET8Z7HOsFCP3ZQqlbbqfsB6CbIKtZoEkZ8ib7eXpYcy1qTydu7wqrl4A AaJalAhlUKKUx9hkGGJTh2xvgmxgSJkxx3cNEWJQ2uGgY/ustBpqqT4iwFDsgA/q fcYTQFfNQBsC8/SmvQgxJSc+reUdQdp0z1vd8qjpSdFFcTq1qOtK0qDdz1Bbyl24 hAxvNM1KKav83C8aF7oHhEwLrkD+XiYKixdEiCJJp+A2i+vy2v8JnfgtFTpTgLNK 5xu2VmaiWmee9SLCiDIBKE4Ghtkr8DQ/5cKFCwthT8GXgQUtdsdwAaT3bWdCNfRm DqgU/AyyXhoHXrUM25tPeF3hZuDn2yy6b1TbKA9GCpu5TtznZIHju40Px/XMIpQH 8d6s/pg+u/SnkhjYWaTvTcvsQ2FB/vZY/UzAVyosnoMBkVfL4UtAHGbb8FBVj1nf Dv5VjSjl4vFjgOr3jygEAeD2cJ7L6jyKbtC/jo4dnOmPrSRShIjvfSU04L3z7FZS XFjMmGb2Jj8a7vAGFmsJdwmIXZ1uoTwX56DbpNL88eCgZWFPGKU7TisdIWAmJj8U N9wholjHJgw= =E3bF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells: "This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be based on an internal ACL by the following means: - Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask. Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings. ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain tags/namespaces. Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus acquiring use of possessor permits. - Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed" * tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
396 lines
9.1 KiB
C
396 lines
9.1 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/* Key permission checking
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*/
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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struct key_acl default_key_acl = {
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.usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
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.nr_ace = 2,
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.possessor_viewable = true,
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.aces = {
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KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE__PERMS & ~KEY_ACE_JOIN),
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KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW),
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}
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};
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(default_key_acl);
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struct key_acl joinable_keyring_acl = {
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.usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
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.nr_ace = 2,
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.possessor_viewable = true,
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.aces = {
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KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE__PERMS & ~KEY_ACE_JOIN),
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KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_LINK | KEY_ACE_JOIN),
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}
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};
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(joinable_keyring_acl);
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struct key_acl internal_key_acl = {
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.usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
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.nr_ace = 2,
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.aces = {
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KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH),
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KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_SEARCH),
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}
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};
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(internal_key_acl);
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struct key_acl internal_keyring_acl = {
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.usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
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.nr_ace = 2,
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.aces = {
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KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH),
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KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_SEARCH),
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}
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};
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(internal_keyring_acl);
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struct key_acl internal_writable_keyring_acl = {
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.usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
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.nr_ace = 2,
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.aces = {
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KEY_POSSESSOR_ACE(KEY_ACE_SEARCH | KEY_ACE_WRITE),
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KEY_OWNER_ACE(KEY_ACE_VIEW | KEY_ACE_READ | KEY_ACE_WRITE | KEY_ACE_SEARCH),
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}
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};
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(internal_writable_keyring_acl);
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/**
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* key_task_permission - Check a key can be used
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* @key_ref: The key to check.
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* @cred: The credentials to use.
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* @desired_perm: The permission to check for.
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*
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* Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way,
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* but permit the security modules to override.
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*
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* The caller must hold either a ref on cred or must hold the RCU readlock.
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*
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* Returns 0 if successful, -EACCES if access is denied based on the
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* permissions bits or the LSM check.
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*/
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int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
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unsigned int desired_perm)
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{
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const struct key_acl *acl;
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const struct key *key;
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unsigned int allow = 0;
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int i;
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BUILD_BUG_ON(KEY_NEED_VIEW != KEY_ACE_VIEW ||
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KEY_NEED_READ != KEY_ACE_READ ||
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KEY_NEED_WRITE != KEY_ACE_WRITE ||
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KEY_NEED_SEARCH != KEY_ACE_SEARCH ||
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KEY_NEED_LINK != KEY_ACE_LINK ||
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KEY_NEED_SETSEC != KEY_ACE_SET_SECURITY ||
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KEY_NEED_INVAL != KEY_ACE_INVAL ||
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KEY_NEED_REVOKE != KEY_ACE_REVOKE ||
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KEY_NEED_JOIN != KEY_ACE_JOIN ||
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KEY_NEED_CLEAR != KEY_ACE_CLEAR);
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key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
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rcu_read_lock();
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acl = rcu_dereference(key->acl);
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if (!acl || acl->nr_ace == 0)
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goto no_access_rcu;
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for (i = 0; i < acl->nr_ace; i++) {
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const struct key_ace *ace = &acl->aces[i];
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switch (ace->type) {
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case KEY_ACE_SUBJ_STANDARD:
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switch (ace->subject_id) {
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case KEY_ACE_POSSESSOR:
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if (is_key_possessed(key_ref))
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allow |= ace->perm;
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break;
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case KEY_ACE_OWNER:
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if (uid_eq(key->uid, cred->fsuid))
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allow |= ace->perm;
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break;
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case KEY_ACE_GROUP:
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if (gid_valid(key->gid)) {
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if (gid_eq(key->gid, cred->fsgid))
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allow |= ace->perm;
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else if (groups_search(cred->group_info, key->gid))
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allow |= ace->perm;
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}
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break;
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case KEY_ACE_EVERYONE:
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allow |= ace->perm;
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break;
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}
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break;
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}
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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if (!(allow & desired_perm))
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goto no_access;
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return security_key_permission(key_ref, cred, desired_perm);
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no_access_rcu:
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rcu_read_unlock();
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no_access:
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return -EACCES;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_task_permission);
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/**
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* key_validate - Validate a key.
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* @key: The key to be validated.
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*
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* Check that a key is valid, returning 0 if the key is okay, -ENOKEY if the
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* key is invalidated, -EKEYREVOKED if the key's type has been removed or if
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* the key has been revoked or -EKEYEXPIRED if the key has expired.
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*/
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int key_validate(const struct key *key)
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{
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unsigned long flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags);
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time64_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry);
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if (flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED))
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return -ENOKEY;
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/* check it's still accessible */
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if (flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
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(1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD)))
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return -EKEYREVOKED;
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/* check it hasn't expired */
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if (expiry) {
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if (ktime_get_real_seconds() >= expiry)
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return -EKEYEXPIRED;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_validate);
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/*
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* Roughly render an ACL to an old-style permissions mask. We cannot
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* accurately render what the ACL, particularly if it has ACEs that represent
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* subjects outside of { poss, user, group, other }.
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*/
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unsigned int key_acl_to_perm(const struct key_acl *acl)
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{
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unsigned int perm = 0, tperm;
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int i;
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BUILD_BUG_ON(KEY_OTH_VIEW != KEY_ACE_VIEW ||
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KEY_OTH_READ != KEY_ACE_READ ||
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KEY_OTH_WRITE != KEY_ACE_WRITE ||
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KEY_OTH_SEARCH != KEY_ACE_SEARCH ||
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KEY_OTH_LINK != KEY_ACE_LINK ||
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KEY_OTH_SETATTR != KEY_ACE_SET_SECURITY);
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if (!acl || acl->nr_ace == 0)
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return 0;
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for (i = 0; i < acl->nr_ace; i++) {
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const struct key_ace *ace = &acl->aces[i];
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switch (ace->type) {
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case KEY_ACE_SUBJ_STANDARD:
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tperm = ace->perm & KEY_OTH_ALL;
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/* Invalidation and joining were allowed by SEARCH */
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if (ace->perm & (KEY_ACE_INVAL | KEY_ACE_JOIN))
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tperm |= KEY_OTH_SEARCH;
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/* Revocation was allowed by either SETATTR or WRITE */
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if ((ace->perm & KEY_ACE_REVOKE) && !(tperm & KEY_OTH_SETATTR))
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tperm |= KEY_OTH_WRITE;
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/* Clearing was allowed by WRITE */
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if (ace->perm & KEY_ACE_CLEAR)
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tperm |= KEY_OTH_WRITE;
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switch (ace->subject_id) {
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case KEY_ACE_POSSESSOR:
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perm |= tperm << 24;
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break;
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case KEY_ACE_OWNER:
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perm |= tperm << 16;
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break;
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case KEY_ACE_GROUP:
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perm |= tperm << 8;
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break;
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case KEY_ACE_EVERYONE:
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perm |= tperm << 0;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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return perm;
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}
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/*
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* Destroy a key's ACL.
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*/
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void key_put_acl(struct key_acl *acl)
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{
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if (acl && refcount_dec_and_test(&acl->usage))
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kfree_rcu(acl, rcu);
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}
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/*
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* Try to set the ACL. This either attaches or discards the proposed ACL.
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*/
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long key_set_acl(struct key *key, struct key_acl *acl)
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{
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int i;
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/* If we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own. */
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if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) {
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key_put_acl(acl);
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return -EACCES;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < acl->nr_ace; i++) {
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const struct key_ace *ace = &acl->aces[i];
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if (ace->type == KEY_ACE_SUBJ_STANDARD &&
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ace->subject_id == KEY_ACE_POSSESSOR) {
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if (ace->perm & KEY_ACE_VIEW)
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acl->possessor_viewable = true;
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break;
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}
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}
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rcu_swap_protected(key->acl, acl, lockdep_is_held(&key->sem));
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key_put_acl(acl);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Allocate a new ACL with an extra ACE slot.
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*/
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static struct key_acl *key_alloc_acl(const struct key_acl *old_acl, int nr, int skip)
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{
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struct key_acl *acl;
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int nr_ace, i, j = 0;
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nr_ace = old_acl->nr_ace + nr;
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if (nr_ace > 16)
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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acl = kzalloc(struct_size(acl, aces, nr_ace), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!acl)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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refcount_set(&acl->usage, 1);
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acl->nr_ace = nr_ace;
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for (i = 0; i < old_acl->nr_ace; i++) {
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if (i == skip)
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continue;
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acl->aces[j] = old_acl->aces[i];
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j++;
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}
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return acl;
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}
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/*
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* Generate the revised ACL.
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*/
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static long key_change_acl(struct key *key, struct key_ace *new_ace)
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{
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struct key_acl *acl, *old;
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int i;
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old = rcu_dereference_protected(key->acl, lockdep_is_held(&key->sem));
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for (i = 0; i < old->nr_ace; i++)
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if (old->aces[i].type == new_ace->type &&
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old->aces[i].subject_id == new_ace->subject_id)
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goto found_match;
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if (new_ace->perm == 0)
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return 0; /* No permissions to remove. Add deny record? */
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acl = key_alloc_acl(old, 1, -1);
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if (IS_ERR(acl))
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return PTR_ERR(acl);
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acl->aces[i] = *new_ace;
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goto change;
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found_match:
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if (new_ace->perm == 0)
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goto delete_ace;
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if (new_ace->perm == old->aces[i].perm)
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return 0;
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acl = key_alloc_acl(old, 0, -1);
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if (IS_ERR(acl))
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return PTR_ERR(acl);
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acl->aces[i].perm = new_ace->perm;
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goto change;
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delete_ace:
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acl = key_alloc_acl(old, -1, i);
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if (IS_ERR(acl))
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return PTR_ERR(acl);
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goto change;
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change:
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return key_set_acl(key, acl);
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}
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/*
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* Add, alter or remove (if perm == 0) an ACE in a key's ACL.
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*/
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long keyctl_grant_permission(key_serial_t keyid,
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enum key_ace_subject_type type,
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unsigned int subject,
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unsigned int perm)
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{
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struct key_ace new_ace;
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struct key *key;
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key_ref_t key_ref;
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long ret;
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new_ace.type = type;
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new_ace.perm = perm;
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switch (type) {
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case KEY_ACE_SUBJ_STANDARD:
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if (subject >= nr__key_ace_standard_subject)
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return -ENOENT;
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new_ace.subject_id = subject;
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break;
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default:
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return -ENOENT;
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}
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key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_SETSEC);
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if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
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goto error;
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}
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key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
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down_write(&key->sem);
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/* If we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
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ret = -EACCES;
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if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid()))
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ret = key_change_acl(key, &new_ace);
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up_write(&key->sem);
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key_put(key);
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error:
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return ret;
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}
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