Kees Cook 2e72d51b4a security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to
the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let
Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its
read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example,
read extended attributes for signatures, etc.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-12-14 13:05:24 +10:30
..
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