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1e562deace
A sig_alg backend has just been introduced with the intent of moving all asymmetric sign/verify algorithms to it one by one. Migrate the sign/verify operations from rsa-pkcs1pad.c to a separate rsassa-pkcs1.c which uses the new backend. Consequently there are now two templates which build on the "rsa" akcipher_alg: * The existing "pkcs1pad" template, which is instantiated as an akcipher_instance and retains the encrypt/decrypt operations of RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 (RFC 8017 sec 7.2). * The new "pkcs1" template, which is instantiated as a sig_instance and contains the sign/verify operations of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (RFC 8017 sec 8.2). In a separate step, rsa-pkcs1pad.c could optionally be renamed to rsaes-pkcs1.c for clarity. Additional "oaep" and "pss" templates could be added for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS. Note that it's currently allowed to allocate a "pkcs1pad(rsa)" transform without specifying a hash algorithm. That makes sense if the transform is only used for encrypt/decrypt and continues to be supported. But for sign/verify, such transforms previously did not insert the Full Hash Prefix into the padding. The resulting message encoding was incompliant with EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (RFC 8017 sec 9.2) and therefore nonsensical. From here on in, it is no longer allowed to allocate a transform without specifying a hash algorithm if the transform is used for sign/verify operations. This simplifies the code because the insertion of the Full Hash Prefix is no longer optional, so various "if (digest_info)" clauses can be removed. There has been a previous attempt to forbid transform allocation without specifying a hash algorithm, namely by commitc0d20d22e0
("crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Require hash to be present"). It had to be rolled back with commitb3a8c8a5eb
("crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be optional [ver #2]"), presumably because it broke allocation of a transform which was solely used for encrypt/decrypt, not sign/verify. Avoid such breakage by allowing transform allocation for encrypt/decrypt with and without specifying a hash algorithm (and simply ignoring the hash algorithm in the former case). So again, specifying a hash algorithm is now mandatory for sign/verify, but optional and ignored for encrypt/decrypt. The new sig_alg API uses kernel buffers instead of sglists, which avoids the overhead of copying signature and digest from sglists back into kernel buffers. rsassa-pkcs1.c is thus simplified quite a bit. sig_alg is always synchronous, whereas the underlying "rsa" akcipher_alg may be asynchronous. So await the result of the akcipher_alg, similar to crypto_akcipher_sync_{en,de}crypt(). As part of the migration, rename "rsa_digest_info" to "hash_prefix" to adhere to the spec language in RFC 9580. Otherwise keep the code unmodified wherever possible to ease reviewing and bisecting. Leave several simplification and hardening opportunities to separate commits. rsassa-pkcs1.c uses modern __free() syntax for allocation of buffers which need to be freed by kfree_sensitive(), hence a DEFINE_FREE() clause for kfree_sensitive() is introduced herein as a byproduct. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
380 lines
8.9 KiB
C
380 lines
8.9 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/*
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* RSA padding templates.
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2015 Intel Corporation
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*/
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#include <crypto/algapi.h>
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#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/akcipher.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/rsa.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
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struct pkcs1pad_ctx {
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struct crypto_akcipher *child;
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unsigned int key_size;
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};
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struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx {
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struct crypto_akcipher_spawn spawn;
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};
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struct pkcs1pad_request {
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struct scatterlist in_sg[2], out_sg[1];
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uint8_t *in_buf, *out_buf;
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struct akcipher_request child_req;
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};
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static int pkcs1pad_set_pub_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key,
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unsigned int keylen)
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{
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struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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return rsa_set_key(ctx->child, &ctx->key_size, RSA_PUB, key, keylen);
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}
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static int pkcs1pad_set_priv_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key,
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unsigned int keylen)
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{
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struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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return rsa_set_key(ctx->child, &ctx->key_size, RSA_PRIV, key, keylen);
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}
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static unsigned int pkcs1pad_get_max_size(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
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{
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struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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/*
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* The maximum destination buffer size for the encrypt operation
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* will be the same as for RSA, even though it's smaller for
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* decrypt.
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*/
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return ctx->key_size;
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}
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static void pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf(struct scatterlist *sg, void *buf, size_t len,
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struct scatterlist *next)
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{
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int nsegs = next ? 2 : 1;
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sg_init_table(sg, nsegs);
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sg_set_buf(sg, buf, len);
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if (next)
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sg_chain(sg, nsegs, next);
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}
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static int pkcs1pad_encrypt_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
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{
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struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
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struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
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unsigned int pad_len;
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unsigned int len;
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u8 *out_buf;
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if (err)
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goto out;
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len = req_ctx->child_req.dst_len;
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pad_len = ctx->key_size - len;
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/* Four billion to one */
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if (likely(!pad_len))
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goto out;
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out_buf = kzalloc(ctx->key_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
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err = -ENOMEM;
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if (!out_buf)
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goto out;
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sg_copy_to_buffer(req->dst, sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, len),
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out_buf + pad_len, len);
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sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst,
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sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, ctx->key_size),
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out_buf, ctx->key_size);
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kfree_sensitive(out_buf);
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out:
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req->dst_len = ctx->key_size;
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kfree(req_ctx->in_buf);
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return err;
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}
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static void pkcs1pad_encrypt_complete_cb(void *data, int err)
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{
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struct akcipher_request *req = data;
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if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
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goto out;
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err = pkcs1pad_encrypt_complete(req, err);
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out:
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akcipher_request_complete(req, err);
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}
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static int pkcs1pad_encrypt(struct akcipher_request *req)
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{
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struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
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struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
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int err;
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unsigned int i, ps_end;
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if (!ctx->key_size)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (req->src_len > ctx->key_size - 11)
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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if (req->dst_len < ctx->key_size) {
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req->dst_len = ctx->key_size;
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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}
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req_ctx->in_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size - 1 - req->src_len,
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!req_ctx->in_buf)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ps_end = ctx->key_size - req->src_len - 2;
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req_ctx->in_buf[0] = 0x02;
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for (i = 1; i < ps_end; i++)
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req_ctx->in_buf[i] = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, 255);
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req_ctx->in_buf[ps_end] = 0x00;
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pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf(req_ctx->in_sg, req_ctx->in_buf,
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ctx->key_size - 1 - req->src_len, req->src);
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akcipher_request_set_tfm(&req_ctx->child_req, ctx->child);
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akcipher_request_set_callback(&req_ctx->child_req, req->base.flags,
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pkcs1pad_encrypt_complete_cb, req);
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/* Reuse output buffer */
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akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req_ctx->in_sg,
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req->dst, ctx->key_size - 1, req->dst_len);
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err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(&req_ctx->child_req);
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if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY)
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return pkcs1pad_encrypt_complete(req, err);
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return err;
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}
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static int pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
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{
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struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
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struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
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unsigned int dst_len;
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unsigned int pos;
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u8 *out_buf;
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if (err)
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goto done;
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err = -EINVAL;
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dst_len = req_ctx->child_req.dst_len;
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if (dst_len < ctx->key_size - 1)
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goto done;
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out_buf = req_ctx->out_buf;
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if (dst_len == ctx->key_size) {
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if (out_buf[0] != 0x00)
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/* Decrypted value had no leading 0 byte */
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goto done;
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dst_len--;
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out_buf++;
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}
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if (out_buf[0] != 0x02)
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goto done;
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for (pos = 1; pos < dst_len; pos++)
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if (out_buf[pos] == 0x00)
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break;
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if (pos < 9 || pos == dst_len)
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goto done;
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pos++;
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err = 0;
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if (req->dst_len < dst_len - pos)
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err = -EOVERFLOW;
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req->dst_len = dst_len - pos;
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if (!err)
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sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst,
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sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->dst_len),
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out_buf + pos, req->dst_len);
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done:
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kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf);
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return err;
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}
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static void pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete_cb(void *data, int err)
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{
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struct akcipher_request *req = data;
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if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
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goto out;
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err = pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete(req, err);
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out:
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akcipher_request_complete(req, err);
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}
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static int pkcs1pad_decrypt(struct akcipher_request *req)
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{
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struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
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struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
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int err;
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if (!ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size)
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return -EINVAL;
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req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!req_ctx->out_buf)
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return -ENOMEM;
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pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf(req_ctx->out_sg, req_ctx->out_buf,
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ctx->key_size, NULL);
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akcipher_request_set_tfm(&req_ctx->child_req, ctx->child);
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akcipher_request_set_callback(&req_ctx->child_req, req->base.flags,
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pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete_cb, req);
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/* Reuse input buffer, output to a new buffer */
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akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req->src,
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req_ctx->out_sg, req->src_len,
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ctx->key_size);
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err = crypto_akcipher_decrypt(&req_ctx->child_req);
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if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY)
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return pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete(req, err);
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return err;
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}
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static int pkcs1pad_init_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
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{
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struct akcipher_instance *inst = akcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
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struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
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struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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struct crypto_akcipher *child_tfm;
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child_tfm = crypto_spawn_akcipher(&ictx->spawn);
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if (IS_ERR(child_tfm))
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return PTR_ERR(child_tfm);
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ctx->child = child_tfm;
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akcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct pkcs1pad_request) +
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crypto_akcipher_reqsize(child_tfm));
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return 0;
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}
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static void pkcs1pad_exit_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
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{
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struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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crypto_free_akcipher(ctx->child);
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}
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static void pkcs1pad_free(struct akcipher_instance *inst)
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{
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struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ctx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
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struct crypto_akcipher_spawn *spawn = &ctx->spawn;
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crypto_drop_akcipher(spawn);
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kfree(inst);
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}
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static int pkcs1pad_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
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{
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u32 mask;
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struct akcipher_instance *inst;
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struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ctx;
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struct akcipher_alg *rsa_alg;
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int err;
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err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AKCIPHER, &mask);
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if (err)
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return err;
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inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!inst)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ctx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
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err = crypto_grab_akcipher(&ctx->spawn, akcipher_crypto_instance(inst),
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crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]), 0, mask);
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if (err)
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goto err_free_inst;
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rsa_alg = crypto_spawn_akcipher_alg(&ctx->spawn);
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if (strcmp(rsa_alg->base.cra_name, "rsa") != 0) {
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err = -EINVAL;
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goto err_free_inst;
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}
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err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
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if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name,
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CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(%s)",
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rsa_alg->base.cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
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goto err_free_inst;
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if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name,
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CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(%s)",
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rsa_alg->base.cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
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goto err_free_inst;
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inst->alg.base.cra_priority = rsa_alg->base.cra_priority;
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inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct pkcs1pad_ctx);
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inst->alg.init = pkcs1pad_init_tfm;
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inst->alg.exit = pkcs1pad_exit_tfm;
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inst->alg.encrypt = pkcs1pad_encrypt;
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inst->alg.decrypt = pkcs1pad_decrypt;
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inst->alg.set_pub_key = pkcs1pad_set_pub_key;
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inst->alg.set_priv_key = pkcs1pad_set_priv_key;
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inst->alg.max_size = pkcs1pad_get_max_size;
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inst->free = pkcs1pad_free;
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err = akcipher_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
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if (err) {
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err_free_inst:
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pkcs1pad_free(inst);
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}
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return err;
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}
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struct crypto_template rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl = {
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.name = "pkcs1pad",
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.create = pkcs1pad_create,
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.module = THIS_MODULE,
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};
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MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("pkcs1pad");
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