linux-next/net/tipc/msg.c

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/*
* net/tipc/msg.c: TIPC message header routines
*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2006, 2014-2015, Ericsson AB
* Copyright (c) 2005, 2010-2011, Wind River Systems
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the names of the copyright holders nor the names of its
* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
* this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of the
* GNU General Public License ("GPL") version 2 as published by the Free
* Software Foundation.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <net/sock.h>
#include "core.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "addr.h"
#include "name_table.h"
tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication This commit offers an option to encrypt and authenticate all messaging, including the neighbor discovery messages. The currently most advanced algorithm supported is the AEAD AES-GCM (like IPSec or TLS). All encryption/decryption is done at the bearer layer, just before leaving or after entering TIPC. Supported features: - Encryption & authentication of all TIPC messages (header + data); - Two symmetric-key modes: Cluster and Per-node; - Automatic key switching; - Key-expired revoking (sequence number wrapped); - Lock-free encryption/decryption (RCU); - Asynchronous crypto, Intel AES-NI supported; - Multiple cipher transforms; - Logs & statistics; Two key modes: - Cluster key mode: One single key is used for both TX & RX in all nodes in the cluster. - Per-node key mode: Each nodes in the cluster has one specific TX key. For RX, a node requires its peers' TX key to be able to decrypt the messages from those peers. Key setting from user-space is performed via netlink by a user program (e.g. the iproute2 'tipc' tool). Internal key state machine: Attach Align(RX) +-+ +-+ | V | V +---------+ Attach +---------+ | IDLE |---------------->| PENDING |(user = 0) +---------+ +---------+ A A Switch| A | | | | | | Free(switch/revoked) | | (Free)| +----------------------+ | |Timeout | (TX) | | |(RX) | | | | | | v | +---------+ Switch +---------+ | PASSIVE |<----------------| ACTIVE | +---------+ (RX) +---------+ (user = 1) (user >= 1) The number of TFMs is 10 by default and can be changed via the procfs 'net/tipc/max_tfms'. At this moment, as for simplicity, this file is also used to print the crypto statistics at runtime: echo 0xfff1 > /proc/sys/net/tipc/max_tfms The patch defines a new TIPC version (v7) for the encryption message (- backward compatibility as well). The message is basically encapsulated as follows: +----------------------------------------------------------+ | TIPCv7 encryption | Original TIPCv2 | Authentication | | header | packet (encrypted) | Tag | +----------------------------------------------------------+ The throughput is about ~40% for small messages (compared with non- encryption) and ~9% for large messages. With the support from hardware crypto i.e. the Intel AES-NI CPU instructions, the throughput increases upto ~85% for small messages and ~55% for large messages. By default, the new feature is inactive (i.e. no encryption) until user sets a key for TIPC. There is however also a new option - "TIPC_CRYPTO" in the kernel configuration to enable/disable the new code when needed. MAINTAINERS | add two new files 'crypto.h' & 'crypto.c' in tipc Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-11-08 05:05:11 +00:00
#include "crypto.h"
#define BUF_ALIGN(x) ALIGN(x, 4)
#define MAX_FORWARD_SIZE 1024
tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication This commit offers an option to encrypt and authenticate all messaging, including the neighbor discovery messages. The currently most advanced algorithm supported is the AEAD AES-GCM (like IPSec or TLS). All encryption/decryption is done at the bearer layer, just before leaving or after entering TIPC. Supported features: - Encryption & authentication of all TIPC messages (header + data); - Two symmetric-key modes: Cluster and Per-node; - Automatic key switching; - Key-expired revoking (sequence number wrapped); - Lock-free encryption/decryption (RCU); - Asynchronous crypto, Intel AES-NI supported; - Multiple cipher transforms; - Logs & statistics; Two key modes: - Cluster key mode: One single key is used for both TX & RX in all nodes in the cluster. - Per-node key mode: Each nodes in the cluster has one specific TX key. For RX, a node requires its peers' TX key to be able to decrypt the messages from those peers. Key setting from user-space is performed via netlink by a user program (e.g. the iproute2 'tipc' tool). Internal key state machine: Attach Align(RX) +-+ +-+ | V | V +---------+ Attach +---------+ | IDLE |---------------->| PENDING |(user = 0) +---------+ +---------+ A A Switch| A | | | | | | Free(switch/revoked) | | (Free)| +----------------------+ | |Timeout | (TX) | | |(RX) | | | | | | v | +---------+ Switch +---------+ | PASSIVE |<----------------| ACTIVE | +---------+ (RX) +---------+ (user = 1) (user >= 1) The number of TFMs is 10 by default and can be changed via the procfs 'net/tipc/max_tfms'. At this moment, as for simplicity, this file is also used to print the crypto statistics at runtime: echo 0xfff1 > /proc/sys/net/tipc/max_tfms The patch defines a new TIPC version (v7) for the encryption message (- backward compatibility as well). The message is basically encapsulated as follows: +----------------------------------------------------------+ | TIPCv7 encryption | Original TIPCv2 | Authentication | | header | packet (encrypted) | Tag | +----------------------------------------------------------+ The throughput is about ~40% for small messages (compared with non- encryption) and ~9% for large messages. With the support from hardware crypto i.e. the Intel AES-NI CPU instructions, the throughput increases upto ~85% for small messages and ~55% for large messages. By default, the new feature is inactive (i.e. no encryption) until user sets a key for TIPC. There is however also a new option - "TIPC_CRYPTO" in the kernel configuration to enable/disable the new code when needed. MAINTAINERS | add two new files 'crypto.h' & 'crypto.c' in tipc Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-11-08 05:05:11 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_TIPC_CRYPTO
#define BUF_HEADROOM ALIGN(((LL_MAX_HEADER + 48) + EHDR_MAX_SIZE), 16)
#define BUF_OVERHEAD (BUF_HEADROOM + TIPC_AES_GCM_TAG_SIZE)
tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication This commit offers an option to encrypt and authenticate all messaging, including the neighbor discovery messages. The currently most advanced algorithm supported is the AEAD AES-GCM (like IPSec or TLS). All encryption/decryption is done at the bearer layer, just before leaving or after entering TIPC. Supported features: - Encryption & authentication of all TIPC messages (header + data); - Two symmetric-key modes: Cluster and Per-node; - Automatic key switching; - Key-expired revoking (sequence number wrapped); - Lock-free encryption/decryption (RCU); - Asynchronous crypto, Intel AES-NI supported; - Multiple cipher transforms; - Logs & statistics; Two key modes: - Cluster key mode: One single key is used for both TX & RX in all nodes in the cluster. - Per-node key mode: Each nodes in the cluster has one specific TX key. For RX, a node requires its peers' TX key to be able to decrypt the messages from those peers. Key setting from user-space is performed via netlink by a user program (e.g. the iproute2 'tipc' tool). Internal key state machine: Attach Align(RX) +-+ +-+ | V | V +---------+ Attach +---------+ | IDLE |---------------->| PENDING |(user = 0) +---------+ +---------+ A A Switch| A | | | | | | Free(switch/revoked) | | (Free)| +----------------------+ | |Timeout | (TX) | | |(RX) | | | | | | v | +---------+ Switch +---------+ | PASSIVE |<----------------| ACTIVE | +---------+ (RX) +---------+ (user = 1) (user >= 1) The number of TFMs is 10 by default and can be changed via the procfs 'net/tipc/max_tfms'. At this moment, as for simplicity, this file is also used to print the crypto statistics at runtime: echo 0xfff1 > /proc/sys/net/tipc/max_tfms The patch defines a new TIPC version (v7) for the encryption message (- backward compatibility as well). The message is basically encapsulated as follows: +----------------------------------------------------------+ | TIPCv7 encryption | Original TIPCv2 | Authentication | | header | packet (encrypted) | Tag | +----------------------------------------------------------+ The throughput is about ~40% for small messages (compared with non- encryption) and ~9% for large messages. With the support from hardware crypto i.e. the Intel AES-NI CPU instructions, the throughput increases upto ~85% for small messages and ~55% for large messages. By default, the new feature is inactive (i.e. no encryption) until user sets a key for TIPC. There is however also a new option - "TIPC_CRYPTO" in the kernel configuration to enable/disable the new code when needed. MAINTAINERS | add two new files 'crypto.h' & 'crypto.c' in tipc Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-11-08 05:05:11 +00:00
#else
#define BUF_HEADROOM (LL_MAX_HEADER + 48)
#define BUF_OVERHEAD BUF_HEADROOM
tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication This commit offers an option to encrypt and authenticate all messaging, including the neighbor discovery messages. The currently most advanced algorithm supported is the AEAD AES-GCM (like IPSec or TLS). All encryption/decryption is done at the bearer layer, just before leaving or after entering TIPC. Supported features: - Encryption & authentication of all TIPC messages (header + data); - Two symmetric-key modes: Cluster and Per-node; - Automatic key switching; - Key-expired revoking (sequence number wrapped); - Lock-free encryption/decryption (RCU); - Asynchronous crypto, Intel AES-NI supported; - Multiple cipher transforms; - Logs & statistics; Two key modes: - Cluster key mode: One single key is used for both TX & RX in all nodes in the cluster. - Per-node key mode: Each nodes in the cluster has one specific TX key. For RX, a node requires its peers' TX key to be able to decrypt the messages from those peers. Key setting from user-space is performed via netlink by a user program (e.g. the iproute2 'tipc' tool). Internal key state machine: Attach Align(RX) +-+ +-+ | V | V +---------+ Attach +---------+ | IDLE |---------------->| PENDING |(user = 0) +---------+ +---------+ A A Switch| A | | | | | | Free(switch/revoked) | | (Free)| +----------------------+ | |Timeout | (TX) | | |(RX) | | | | | | v | +---------+ Switch +---------+ | PASSIVE |<----------------| ACTIVE | +---------+ (RX) +---------+ (user = 1) (user >= 1) The number of TFMs is 10 by default and can be changed via the procfs 'net/tipc/max_tfms'. At this moment, as for simplicity, this file is also used to print the crypto statistics at runtime: echo 0xfff1 > /proc/sys/net/tipc/max_tfms The patch defines a new TIPC version (v7) for the encryption message (- backward compatibility as well). The message is basically encapsulated as follows: +----------------------------------------------------------+ | TIPCv7 encryption | Original TIPCv2 | Authentication | | header | packet (encrypted) | Tag | +----------------------------------------------------------+ The throughput is about ~40% for small messages (compared with non- encryption) and ~9% for large messages. With the support from hardware crypto i.e. the Intel AES-NI CPU instructions, the throughput increases upto ~85% for small messages and ~55% for large messages. By default, the new feature is inactive (i.e. no encryption) until user sets a key for TIPC. There is however also a new option - "TIPC_CRYPTO" in the kernel configuration to enable/disable the new code when needed. MAINTAINERS | add two new files 'crypto.h' & 'crypto.c' in tipc Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-11-08 05:05:11 +00:00
#endif
const int one_page_mtu = PAGE_SIZE - SKB_DATA_ALIGN(BUF_OVERHEAD) -
SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info));
/**
* tipc_buf_acquire - creates a TIPC message buffer
* @size: message size (including TIPC header)
net/tipc: fix various kernel-doc warnings kernel-doc and Sphinx fixes to eliminate lots of warnings in preparation for adding to the networking docbook. ../net/tipc/crypto.c:57: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'enum ' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:69: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'enum ' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:130: warning: Function parameter or member 'tfm' not described in 'tipc_tfm' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:130: warning: Function parameter or member 'list' not described in 'tipc_tfm' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:172: warning: Function parameter or member 'stat' not described in 'tipc_crypto_stats' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:232: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'tipc_crypto' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:329: warning: Function parameter or member 'ukey' not described in 'tipc_aead_key_validate' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:329: warning: Function parameter or member 'info' not described in 'tipc_aead_key_validate' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:482: warning: Function parameter or member 'aead' not described in 'tipc_aead_tfm_next' ../net/tipc/trace.c:43: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned long sysctl_tipc_sk_filter[5] __read_mostly = ' Documentation/networking/tipc:57: ../net/tipc/msg.c:584: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:63: ../net/tipc/name_table.c:536: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:63: ../net/tipc/name_table.c:537: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:78: ../net/tipc/socket.c:3809: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:78: ../net/tipc/socket.c:3807: WARNING: Inline strong start-string without end-string. Documentation/networking/tipc:72: ../net/tipc/node.c:904: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:97: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:98: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:141: WARNING: Inline strong start-string without end-string. ../net/tipc/discover.c:82: warning: Function parameter or member 'skb' not described in 'tipc_disc_init_msg' ../net/tipc/msg.c:69: warning: Function parameter or member 'gfp' not described in 'tipc_buf_acquire' ../net/tipc/msg.c:382: warning: Function parameter or member 'offset' not described in 'tipc_msg_build' ../net/tipc/msg.c:708: warning: Function parameter or member 'net' not described in 'tipc_msg_lookup_dest' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'seq' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'found_lower' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'found_upper' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'proto' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'port' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'ipv4' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'ipv6' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:98: warning: Function parameter or member 'rcast' not described in 'udp_bearer' Also fixed a typo of "duest" to "dest". Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-29 18:32:50 +00:00
* @gfp: memory allocation flags
*
* Return: a new buffer with data pointers set to the specified size.
*
net/tipc: fix various kernel-doc warnings kernel-doc and Sphinx fixes to eliminate lots of warnings in preparation for adding to the networking docbook. ../net/tipc/crypto.c:57: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'enum ' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:69: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'enum ' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:130: warning: Function parameter or member 'tfm' not described in 'tipc_tfm' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:130: warning: Function parameter or member 'list' not described in 'tipc_tfm' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:172: warning: Function parameter or member 'stat' not described in 'tipc_crypto_stats' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:232: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'tipc_crypto' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:329: warning: Function parameter or member 'ukey' not described in 'tipc_aead_key_validate' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:329: warning: Function parameter or member 'info' not described in 'tipc_aead_key_validate' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:482: warning: Function parameter or member 'aead' not described in 'tipc_aead_tfm_next' ../net/tipc/trace.c:43: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned long sysctl_tipc_sk_filter[5] __read_mostly = ' Documentation/networking/tipc:57: ../net/tipc/msg.c:584: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:63: ../net/tipc/name_table.c:536: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:63: ../net/tipc/name_table.c:537: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:78: ../net/tipc/socket.c:3809: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:78: ../net/tipc/socket.c:3807: WARNING: Inline strong start-string without end-string. Documentation/networking/tipc:72: ../net/tipc/node.c:904: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:97: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:98: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:141: WARNING: Inline strong start-string without end-string. ../net/tipc/discover.c:82: warning: Function parameter or member 'skb' not described in 'tipc_disc_init_msg' ../net/tipc/msg.c:69: warning: Function parameter or member 'gfp' not described in 'tipc_buf_acquire' ../net/tipc/msg.c:382: warning: Function parameter or member 'offset' not described in 'tipc_msg_build' ../net/tipc/msg.c:708: warning: Function parameter or member 'net' not described in 'tipc_msg_lookup_dest' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'seq' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'found_lower' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'found_upper' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'proto' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'port' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'ipv4' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'ipv6' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:98: warning: Function parameter or member 'rcast' not described in 'udp_bearer' Also fixed a typo of "duest" to "dest". Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-29 18:32:50 +00:00
* NOTE:
* Headroom is reserved to allow prepending of a data link header.
* There may also be unrequested tailroom present at the buffer's end.
*/
struct sk_buff *tipc_buf_acquire(u32 size, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = alloc_skb_fclone(BUF_OVERHEAD + size, gfp);
if (skb) {
skb_reserve(skb, BUF_HEADROOM);
skb_put(skb, size);
skb->next = NULL;
}
return skb;
}
2015-02-05 13:36:36 +00:00
void tipc_msg_init(u32 own_node, struct tipc_msg *m, u32 user, u32 type,
u32 hsize, u32 dnode)
{
memset(m, 0, hsize);
msg_set_version(m);
msg_set_user(m, user);
msg_set_hdr_sz(m, hsize);
msg_set_size(m, hsize);
2015-02-05 13:36:36 +00:00
msg_set_prevnode(m, own_node);
msg_set_type(m, type);
if (hsize > SHORT_H_SIZE) {
2015-02-05 13:36:36 +00:00
msg_set_orignode(m, own_node);
msg_set_destnode(m, dnode);
}
}
2015-02-05 13:36:36 +00:00
struct sk_buff *tipc_msg_create(uint user, uint type,
uint hdr_sz, uint data_sz, u32 dnode,
u32 onode, u32 dport, u32 oport, int errcode)
{
struct tipc_msg *msg;
struct sk_buff *buf;
buf = tipc_buf_acquire(hdr_sz + data_sz, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!buf))
return NULL;
msg = buf_msg(buf);
2015-02-05 13:36:36 +00:00
tipc_msg_init(onode, msg, user, type, hdr_sz, dnode);
msg_set_size(msg, hdr_sz + data_sz);
msg_set_origport(msg, oport);
msg_set_destport(msg, dport);
msg_set_errcode(msg, errcode);
return buf;
}
/* tipc_buf_append(): Append a buffer to the fragment list of another buffer
* @*headbuf: in: NULL for first frag, otherwise value returned from prev call
* out: set when successful non-complete reassembly, otherwise NULL
* @*buf: in: the buffer to append. Always defined
* out: head buf after successful complete reassembly, otherwise NULL
* Returns 1 when reassembly complete, otherwise 0
*/
int tipc_buf_append(struct sk_buff **headbuf, struct sk_buff **buf)
{
struct sk_buff *head = *headbuf;
struct sk_buff *frag = *buf;
struct sk_buff *tail = NULL;
struct tipc_msg *msg;
u32 fragid;
int delta;
bool headstolen;
if (!frag)
goto err;
msg = buf_msg(frag);
fragid = msg_type(msg);
frag->next = NULL;
skb_pull(frag, msg_hdr_sz(msg));
if (fragid == FIRST_FRAGMENT) {
if (unlikely(head))
goto err;
tipc: skb_linearize the head skb when reassembling msgs It's not a good idea to append the frag skb to a skb's frag_list if the frag_list already has skbs from elsewhere, such as this skb was created by pskb_copy() where the frag_list was cloned (all the skbs in it were skb_get'ed) and shared by multiple skbs. However, the new appended frag skb should have been only seen by the current skb. Otherwise, it will cause use after free crashes as this appended frag skb are seen by multiple skbs but it only got skb_get called once. The same thing happens with a skb updated by pskb_may_pull() with a skb_cloned skb. Li Shuang has reported quite a few crashes caused by this when doing testing over macvlan devices: [] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:1970! [] Call Trace: [] skb_clone+0x4d/0xb0 [] macvlan_broadcast+0xd8/0x160 [macvlan] [] macvlan_process_broadcast+0x148/0x150 [macvlan] [] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 [] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! [] Call Trace: [] __check_heap_object+0xd3/0x100 [] __check_object_size+0xff/0x16b [] simple_copy_to_iter+0x1c/0x30 [] __skb_datagram_iter+0x7d/0x310 [] __skb_datagram_iter+0x2a5/0x310 [] skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x3b/0x90 [] tipc_recvmsg+0x14a/0x3a0 [tipc] [] ____sys_recvmsg+0x91/0x150 [] ___sys_recvmsg+0x7b/0xc0 [] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:305! [] Call Trace: [] <IRQ> [] kmem_cache_free+0x3ff/0x400 [] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x12c/0xc40 [] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x270 [] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x3d/0xb0 [] ? get_rx_page_info+0x8e/0xa0 [be2net] [] be_poll+0x6ef/0xd00 [be2net] [] ? irq_exit+0x4f/0x100 [] net_rx_action+0x149/0x3b0 ... This patch is to fix it by linearizing the head skb if it has frag_list set in tipc_buf_append(). Note that we choose to do this before calling skb_unshare(), as __skb_linearize() will avoid skb_copy(). Also, we can not just drop the frag_list either as the early time. Fixes: 45c8b7b175ce ("tipc: allow non-linear first fragment buffer") Reported-by: Li Shuang <shuali@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-05-07 19:57:03 +00:00
if (skb_has_frag_list(frag) && __skb_linearize(frag))
goto err;
*buf = NULL;
tipc: fix memory leak caused by tipc_buf_append() Commit ed42989eab57 ("tipc: fix the skb_unshare() in tipc_buf_append()") replaced skb_unshare() with skb_copy() to not reduce the data reference counter of the original skb intentionally. This is not the correct way to handle the cloned skb because it causes memory leak in 2 following cases: 1/ Sending multicast messages via broadcast link The original skb list is cloned to the local skb list for local destination. After that, the data reference counter of each skb in the original list has the value of 2. This causes each skb not to be freed after receiving ACK: tipc_link_advance_transmq() { ... /* release skb */ __skb_unlink(skb, &l->transmq); kfree_skb(skb); <-- memory exists after being freed } 2/ Sending multicast messages via replicast link Similar to the above case, each skb cannot be freed after purging the skb list: tipc_mcast_xmit() { ... __skb_queue_purge(pkts); <-- memory exists after being freed } This commit fixes this issue by using skb_unshare() instead. Besides, to avoid use-after-free error reported by KASAN, the pointer to the fragment is set to NULL before calling skb_unshare() to make sure that the original skb is not freed after freeing the fragment 2 times in case skb_unshare() returns NULL. Fixes: ed42989eab57 ("tipc: fix the skb_unshare() in tipc_buf_append()") Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Reported-by: Thang Hoang Ngo <thang.h.ngo@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.q.nguyen@dektech.com.au> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201027032403.1823-1-tung.q.nguyen@dektech.com.au Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-10-27 03:24:03 +00:00
frag = skb_unshare(frag, GFP_ATOMIC);
tipc: use skb_unshare() instead in tipc_buf_append() In tipc_buf_append() it may change skb's frag_list, and it causes problems when this skb is cloned. skb_unclone() doesn't really make this skb's flag_list available to change. Shuang Li has reported an use-after-free issue because of this when creating quite a few macvlan dev over the same dev, where the broadcast packets will be cloned and go up to the stack: [ ] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pskb_expand_head+0x86d/0xea0 [ ] Call Trace: [ ] dump_stack+0x7c/0xb0 [ ] print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x220 [ ] kasan_report.cold.10+0x37/0x7c [ ] check_memory_region+0x183/0x1e0 [ ] pskb_expand_head+0x86d/0xea0 [ ] process_backlog+0x1df/0x660 [ ] net_rx_action+0x3b4/0xc90 [ ] [ ] Allocated by task 1786: [ ] kmem_cache_alloc+0xbf/0x220 [ ] skb_clone+0x10a/0x300 [ ] macvlan_broadcast+0x2f6/0x590 [macvlan] [ ] macvlan_process_broadcast+0x37c/0x516 [macvlan] [ ] process_one_work+0x66a/0x1060 [ ] worker_thread+0x87/0xb10 [ ] [ ] Freed by task 3253: [ ] kmem_cache_free+0x82/0x2a0 [ ] skb_release_data+0x2c3/0x6e0 [ ] kfree_skb+0x78/0x1d0 [ ] tipc_recvmsg+0x3be/0xa40 [tipc] So fix it by using skb_unshare() instead, which would create a new skb for the cloned frag and it'll be safe to change its frag_list. The similar things were also done in sctp_make_reassembled_event(), which is using skb_copy(). Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com> Fixes: 37e22164a8a3 ("tipc: rename and move message reassembly function") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-13 11:37:31 +00:00
if (unlikely(!frag))
goto err;
head = *headbuf = frag;
TIPC_SKB_CB(head)->tail = NULL;
return 0;
}
if (!head)
goto err;
tipc: fix UAF in error path Sam Page (sam4k) working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative reported a UAF in the tipc_buf_append() error path: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804d2a7c80 by task poc/8034 CPU: 1 PID: 8034 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.8.2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description linux/mm/kasan/report.c:377 print_report+0xc4/0x620 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:601 kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 skb_release_data+0x5af/0x880 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1026 skb_release_all linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1094 __kfree_skb linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1108 kfree_skb_reason+0x12d/0x210 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1144 kfree_skb linux/./include/linux/skbuff.h:1244 tipc_buf_append+0x425/0xb50 linux/net/tipc/msg.c:186 tipc_link_input+0x224/0x7c0 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1324 tipc_link_rcv+0x76e/0x2d70 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1824 tipc_rcv+0x45f/0x10f0 linux/net/tipc/node.c:2159 tipc_udp_recv+0x73b/0x8f0 linux/net/tipc/udp_media.c:390 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xad2/0x1850 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2108 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x131/0xb00 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2186 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x165/0x3b0 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2346 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x2594/0x3400 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2422 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x30c/0x4e0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2e4/0x520 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_local_deliver+0x18e/0x1f0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input linux/./include/net/dst.h:461 ip_rcv_finish linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_rcv+0x2c5/0x5d0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x199/0x1e0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5534 __netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5648 process_backlog+0x101/0x6b0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5976 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 linux/net/core/dev.c:6576 napi_poll linux/net/core/dev.c:6645 net_rx_action+0x95a/0xe90 linux/net/core/dev.c:6781 __do_softirq+0x21f/0x8e7 linux/kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq linux/kernel/softirq.c:454 do_softirq+0xb2/0xf0 linux/kernel/softirq.c:441 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x120 linux/kernel/softirq.c:381 local_bh_enable linux/./include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 rcu_read_unlock_bh linux/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:851 __dev_queue_xmit+0x871/0x3ee0 linux/net/core/dev.c:4378 dev_queue_xmit linux/./include/linux/netdevice.h:3169 neigh_hh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:526 neigh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:540 ip_finish_output2+0x169f/0x2550 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 __ip_finish_output linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:313 __ip_finish_output+0x49e/0x950 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323 NF_HOOK_COND linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:303 ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433 dst_output linux/./include/net/dst.h:451 ip_local_out linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 ip_send_skb+0x3e5/0x560 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 udp_send_skb+0x73f/0x1530 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:963 udp_sendmsg+0x1a36/0x2b40 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:1250 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x140 linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c:850 sock_sendmsg_nosec linux/net/socket.c:730 __sock_sendmsg linux/net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x42c/0x4e0 linux/net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2203 __se_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2199 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 linux/net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x270 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 RIP: 0033:0x7f3434974f29 Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 37 8f 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff9154f2b8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3434974f29 RDX: 00000000000032c8 RSI: 00007fff9154f300 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fff915532e0 R08: 00007fff91553360 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 000055ed86d261d0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> In the critical scenario, either the relevant skb is freed or its ownership is transferred into a frag_lists. In both cases, the cleanup code must not free it again: we need to clear the skb reference earlier. Fixes: 1149557d64c9 ("tipc: eliminate unnecessary linearization of incoming buffers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-23852 Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/752f1ccf762223d109845365d07f55414058e5a3.1714484273.git.pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-04-30 13:53:37 +00:00
/* Either the input skb ownership is transferred to headskb
* or the input skb is freed, clear the reference to avoid
* bad access on error path.
*/
*buf = NULL;
if (skb_try_coalesce(head, frag, &headstolen, &delta)) {
kfree_skb_partial(frag, headstolen);
} else {
tail = TIPC_SKB_CB(head)->tail;
if (!skb_has_frag_list(head))
skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list = frag;
else
tail->next = frag;
head->truesize += frag->truesize;
head->data_len += frag->len;
head->len += frag->len;
TIPC_SKB_CB(head)->tail = frag;
}
if (fragid == LAST_FRAGMENT) {
tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication This commit offers an option to encrypt and authenticate all messaging, including the neighbor discovery messages. The currently most advanced algorithm supported is the AEAD AES-GCM (like IPSec or TLS). All encryption/decryption is done at the bearer layer, just before leaving or after entering TIPC. Supported features: - Encryption & authentication of all TIPC messages (header + data); - Two symmetric-key modes: Cluster and Per-node; - Automatic key switching; - Key-expired revoking (sequence number wrapped); - Lock-free encryption/decryption (RCU); - Asynchronous crypto, Intel AES-NI supported; - Multiple cipher transforms; - Logs & statistics; Two key modes: - Cluster key mode: One single key is used for both TX & RX in all nodes in the cluster. - Per-node key mode: Each nodes in the cluster has one specific TX key. For RX, a node requires its peers' TX key to be able to decrypt the messages from those peers. Key setting from user-space is performed via netlink by a user program (e.g. the iproute2 'tipc' tool). Internal key state machine: Attach Align(RX) +-+ +-+ | V | V +---------+ Attach +---------+ | IDLE |---------------->| PENDING |(user = 0) +---------+ +---------+ A A Switch| A | | | | | | Free(switch/revoked) | | (Free)| +----------------------+ | |Timeout | (TX) | | |(RX) | | | | | | v | +---------+ Switch +---------+ | PASSIVE |<----------------| ACTIVE | +---------+ (RX) +---------+ (user = 1) (user >= 1) The number of TFMs is 10 by default and can be changed via the procfs 'net/tipc/max_tfms'. At this moment, as for simplicity, this file is also used to print the crypto statistics at runtime: echo 0xfff1 > /proc/sys/net/tipc/max_tfms The patch defines a new TIPC version (v7) for the encryption message (- backward compatibility as well). The message is basically encapsulated as follows: +----------------------------------------------------------+ | TIPCv7 encryption | Original TIPCv2 | Authentication | | header | packet (encrypted) | Tag | +----------------------------------------------------------+ The throughput is about ~40% for small messages (compared with non- encryption) and ~9% for large messages. With the support from hardware crypto i.e. the Intel AES-NI CPU instructions, the throughput increases upto ~85% for small messages and ~55% for large messages. By default, the new feature is inactive (i.e. no encryption) until user sets a key for TIPC. There is however also a new option - "TIPC_CRYPTO" in the kernel configuration to enable/disable the new code when needed. MAINTAINERS | add two new files 'crypto.h' & 'crypto.c' in tipc Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-11-08 05:05:11 +00:00
TIPC_SKB_CB(head)->validated = 0;
if (unlikely(!tipc_msg_validate(&head)))
goto err;
*buf = head;
TIPC_SKB_CB(head)->tail = NULL;
*headbuf = NULL;
return 1;
}
return 0;
err:
kfree_skb(*buf);
kfree_skb(*headbuf);
*buf = *headbuf = NULL;
return 0;
}
tipc: add smart nagle feature We introduce a feature that works like a combination of TCP_NAGLE and TCP_CORK, but without some of the weaknesses of those. In particular, we will not observe long delivery delays because of delayed acks, since the algorithm itself decides if and when acks are to be sent from the receiving peer. - The nagle property as such is determined by manipulating a new 'maxnagle' field in struct tipc_sock. If certain conditions are met, 'maxnagle' will define max size of the messages which can be bundled. If it is set to zero no messages are ever bundled, implying that the nagle property is disabled. - A socket with the nagle property enabled enters nagle mode when more than 4 messages have been sent out without receiving any data message from the peer. - A socket leaves nagle mode whenever it receives a data message from the peer. In nagle mode, messages smaller than 'maxnagle' are accumulated in the socket write queue. The last buffer in the queue is marked with a new 'ack_required' bit, which forces the receiving peer to send a CONN_ACK message back to the sender upon reception. The accumulated contents of the write queue is transmitted when one of the following events or conditions occur. - A CONN_ACK message is received from the peer. - A data message is received from the peer. - A SOCK_WAKEUP pseudo message is received from the link level. - The write queue contains more than 64 1k blocks of data. - The connection is being shut down. - There is no CONN_ACK message to expect. I.e., there is currently no outstanding message where the 'ack_required' bit was set. As a consequence, the first message added after we enter nagle mode is always sent directly with this bit set. This new feature gives a 50-100% improvement of throughput for small (i.e., less than MTU size) messages, while it might add up to one RTT to latency time when the socket is in nagle mode. Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-30 13:00:41 +00:00
/**
* tipc_msg_append(): Append data to tail of an existing buffer queue
* @_hdr: header to be used
tipc: add smart nagle feature We introduce a feature that works like a combination of TCP_NAGLE and TCP_CORK, but without some of the weaknesses of those. In particular, we will not observe long delivery delays because of delayed acks, since the algorithm itself decides if and when acks are to be sent from the receiving peer. - The nagle property as such is determined by manipulating a new 'maxnagle' field in struct tipc_sock. If certain conditions are met, 'maxnagle' will define max size of the messages which can be bundled. If it is set to zero no messages are ever bundled, implying that the nagle property is disabled. - A socket with the nagle property enabled enters nagle mode when more than 4 messages have been sent out without receiving any data message from the peer. - A socket leaves nagle mode whenever it receives a data message from the peer. In nagle mode, messages smaller than 'maxnagle' are accumulated in the socket write queue. The last buffer in the queue is marked with a new 'ack_required' bit, which forces the receiving peer to send a CONN_ACK message back to the sender upon reception. The accumulated contents of the write queue is transmitted when one of the following events or conditions occur. - A CONN_ACK message is received from the peer. - A data message is received from the peer. - A SOCK_WAKEUP pseudo message is received from the link level. - The write queue contains more than 64 1k blocks of data. - The connection is being shut down. - There is no CONN_ACK message to expect. I.e., there is currently no outstanding message where the 'ack_required' bit was set. As a consequence, the first message added after we enter nagle mode is always sent directly with this bit set. This new feature gives a 50-100% improvement of throughput for small (i.e., less than MTU size) messages, while it might add up to one RTT to latency time when the socket is in nagle mode. Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-30 13:00:41 +00:00
* @m: the data to be appended
* @mss: max allowable size of buffer
* @dlen: size of data to be appended
* @txq: queue to append to
*
* Return: the number of 1k blocks appended or errno value
tipc: add smart nagle feature We introduce a feature that works like a combination of TCP_NAGLE and TCP_CORK, but without some of the weaknesses of those. In particular, we will not observe long delivery delays because of delayed acks, since the algorithm itself decides if and when acks are to be sent from the receiving peer. - The nagle property as such is determined by manipulating a new 'maxnagle' field in struct tipc_sock. If certain conditions are met, 'maxnagle' will define max size of the messages which can be bundled. If it is set to zero no messages are ever bundled, implying that the nagle property is disabled. - A socket with the nagle property enabled enters nagle mode when more than 4 messages have been sent out without receiving any data message from the peer. - A socket leaves nagle mode whenever it receives a data message from the peer. In nagle mode, messages smaller than 'maxnagle' are accumulated in the socket write queue. The last buffer in the queue is marked with a new 'ack_required' bit, which forces the receiving peer to send a CONN_ACK message back to the sender upon reception. The accumulated contents of the write queue is transmitted when one of the following events or conditions occur. - A CONN_ACK message is received from the peer. - A data message is received from the peer. - A SOCK_WAKEUP pseudo message is received from the link level. - The write queue contains more than 64 1k blocks of data. - The connection is being shut down. - There is no CONN_ACK message to expect. I.e., there is currently no outstanding message where the 'ack_required' bit was set. As a consequence, the first message added after we enter nagle mode is always sent directly with this bit set. This new feature gives a 50-100% improvement of throughput for small (i.e., less than MTU size) messages, while it might add up to one RTT to latency time when the socket is in nagle mode. Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-30 13:00:41 +00:00
*/
int tipc_msg_append(struct tipc_msg *_hdr, struct msghdr *m, int dlen,
int mss, struct sk_buff_head *txq)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
tipc: add smart nagle feature We introduce a feature that works like a combination of TCP_NAGLE and TCP_CORK, but without some of the weaknesses of those. In particular, we will not observe long delivery delays because of delayed acks, since the algorithm itself decides if and when acks are to be sent from the receiving peer. - The nagle property as such is determined by manipulating a new 'maxnagle' field in struct tipc_sock. If certain conditions are met, 'maxnagle' will define max size of the messages which can be bundled. If it is set to zero no messages are ever bundled, implying that the nagle property is disabled. - A socket with the nagle property enabled enters nagle mode when more than 4 messages have been sent out without receiving any data message from the peer. - A socket leaves nagle mode whenever it receives a data message from the peer. In nagle mode, messages smaller than 'maxnagle' are accumulated in the socket write queue. The last buffer in the queue is marked with a new 'ack_required' bit, which forces the receiving peer to send a CONN_ACK message back to the sender upon reception. The accumulated contents of the write queue is transmitted when one of the following events or conditions occur. - A CONN_ACK message is received from the peer. - A data message is received from the peer. - A SOCK_WAKEUP pseudo message is received from the link level. - The write queue contains more than 64 1k blocks of data. - The connection is being shut down. - There is no CONN_ACK message to expect. I.e., there is currently no outstanding message where the 'ack_required' bit was set. As a consequence, the first message added after we enter nagle mode is always sent directly with this bit set. This new feature gives a 50-100% improvement of throughput for small (i.e., less than MTU size) messages, while it might add up to one RTT to latency time when the socket is in nagle mode. Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-30 13:00:41 +00:00
int accounted, total, curr;
int mlen, cpy, rem = dlen;
struct tipc_msg *hdr;
skb = skb_peek_tail(txq);
accounted = skb ? msg_blocks(buf_msg(skb)) : 0;
total = accounted;
tipc: fix NULL pointer dereference in streaming syzbot found the following crash: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000019: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000c8-0x00000000000000cf] CPU: 1 PID: 7060 Comm: syz-executor394 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:__tipc_sendstream+0xbde/0x11f0 net/tipc/socket.c:1591 Code: 00 00 00 00 48 39 5c 24 28 48 0f 44 d8 e8 fa 3e db f9 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d bb c8 00 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 e2 04 00 00 48 8b 9b c8 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ef7818 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8797fd9d RDX: 0000000000000019 RSI: ffffffff8797fde6 RDI: 00000000000000c8 RBP: ffff888099848040 R08: ffff88809a5f6440 R09: fffffbfff1860b4c R10: ffffffff8c305a5f R11: fffffbfff1860b4b R12: ffff88809984857e R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888086aa4000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00000000009b4880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000140 CR3: 00000000a7fdf000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: tipc_sendstream+0x4c/0x70 net/tipc/socket.c:1533 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x32f/0x810 net/socket.c:2352 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2406 __sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x480 net/socket.c:2496 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2525 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2522 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2522 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 RIP: 0033:0x440199 ... This bug was bisected to commit 0a3e060f340d ("tipc: add test for Nagle algorithm effectiveness"). However, it is not the case, the trouble was from the base in the case of zero data length message sending, we would unexpectedly make an empty 'txq' queue after the 'tipc_msg_append()' in Nagle mode. A similar crash can be generated even without the bisected patch but at the link layer when it accesses the empty queue. We solve the issues by building at least one buffer to go with socket's header and an optional data section that may be empty like what we had with the 'tipc_msg_build()'. Note: the previous commit 4c21daae3dbc ("tipc: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __tipc_sendstream()") is obsoleted by this one since the 'txq' will be never empty and the check of 'skb != NULL' is unnecessary but it is safe anyway. Reported-by: syzbot+8eac6d030e7807c21d32@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: c0bceb97db9e ("tipc: add smart nagle feature") Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-03 05:06:01 +00:00
do {
tipc: add smart nagle feature We introduce a feature that works like a combination of TCP_NAGLE and TCP_CORK, but without some of the weaknesses of those. In particular, we will not observe long delivery delays because of delayed acks, since the algorithm itself decides if and when acks are to be sent from the receiving peer. - The nagle property as such is determined by manipulating a new 'maxnagle' field in struct tipc_sock. If certain conditions are met, 'maxnagle' will define max size of the messages which can be bundled. If it is set to zero no messages are ever bundled, implying that the nagle property is disabled. - A socket with the nagle property enabled enters nagle mode when more than 4 messages have been sent out without receiving any data message from the peer. - A socket leaves nagle mode whenever it receives a data message from the peer. In nagle mode, messages smaller than 'maxnagle' are accumulated in the socket write queue. The last buffer in the queue is marked with a new 'ack_required' bit, which forces the receiving peer to send a CONN_ACK message back to the sender upon reception. The accumulated contents of the write queue is transmitted when one of the following events or conditions occur. - A CONN_ACK message is received from the peer. - A data message is received from the peer. - A SOCK_WAKEUP pseudo message is received from the link level. - The write queue contains more than 64 1k blocks of data. - The connection is being shut down. - There is no CONN_ACK message to expect. I.e., there is currently no outstanding message where the 'ack_required' bit was set. As a consequence, the first message added after we enter nagle mode is always sent directly with this bit set. This new feature gives a 50-100% improvement of throughput for small (i.e., less than MTU size) messages, while it might add up to one RTT to latency time when the socket is in nagle mode. Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-30 13:00:41 +00:00
if (!skb || skb->len >= mss) {
skb = tipc_buf_acquire(mss, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!skb))
return -ENOMEM;
skb_orphan(skb);
skb_trim(skb, MIN_H_SIZE);
hdr = buf_msg(skb);
skb_copy_to_linear_data(skb, _hdr, MIN_H_SIZE);
msg_set_hdr_sz(hdr, MIN_H_SIZE);
msg_set_size(hdr, MIN_H_SIZE);
__skb_queue_tail(txq, skb);
total += 1;
}
hdr = buf_msg(skb);
curr = msg_blocks(hdr);
mlen = msg_size(hdr);
tipc: fix kernel WARNING in tipc_msg_append() syzbot found the following issue: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6808 at include/linux/thread_info.h:150 check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:150 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6808 at include/linux/thread_info.h:150 copy_from_iter include/linux/uio.h:144 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6808 at include/linux/thread_info.h:150 tipc_msg_append+0x49a/0x5e0 net/tipc/msg.c:242 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... This happens after commit 5e9eeccc58f3 ("tipc: fix NULL pointer dereference in streaming") that tried to build at least one buffer even when the message data length is zero... However, it now exposes another bug that the 'mss' can be zero and the 'cpy' will be negative, thus the above kernel WARNING will appear! The zero value of 'mss' is never expected because it means Nagle is not enabled for the socket (actually the socket type was 'SOCK_SEQPACKET'), so the function 'tipc_msg_append()' must not be called at all. But that was in this particular case since the message data length was zero, and the 'send <= maxnagle' check became true. We resolve the issue by explicitly checking if Nagle is enabled for the socket, i.e. 'maxnagle != 0' before calling the 'tipc_msg_append()'. We also reinforce the function to against such a negative values if any. Reported-by: syzbot+75139a7d2605236b0b7f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: c0bceb97db9e ("tipc: add smart nagle feature") Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-11 10:07:35 +00:00
cpy = min_t(size_t, rem, mss - mlen);
tipc: add smart nagle feature We introduce a feature that works like a combination of TCP_NAGLE and TCP_CORK, but without some of the weaknesses of those. In particular, we will not observe long delivery delays because of delayed acks, since the algorithm itself decides if and when acks are to be sent from the receiving peer. - The nagle property as such is determined by manipulating a new 'maxnagle' field in struct tipc_sock. If certain conditions are met, 'maxnagle' will define max size of the messages which can be bundled. If it is set to zero no messages are ever bundled, implying that the nagle property is disabled. - A socket with the nagle property enabled enters nagle mode when more than 4 messages have been sent out without receiving any data message from the peer. - A socket leaves nagle mode whenever it receives a data message from the peer. In nagle mode, messages smaller than 'maxnagle' are accumulated in the socket write queue. The last buffer in the queue is marked with a new 'ack_required' bit, which forces the receiving peer to send a CONN_ACK message back to the sender upon reception. The accumulated contents of the write queue is transmitted when one of the following events or conditions occur. - A CONN_ACK message is received from the peer. - A data message is received from the peer. - A SOCK_WAKEUP pseudo message is received from the link level. - The write queue contains more than 64 1k blocks of data. - The connection is being shut down. - There is no CONN_ACK message to expect. I.e., there is currently no outstanding message where the 'ack_required' bit was set. As a consequence, the first message added after we enter nagle mode is always sent directly with this bit set. This new feature gives a 50-100% improvement of throughput for small (i.e., less than MTU size) messages, while it might add up to one RTT to latency time when the socket is in nagle mode. Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-30 13:00:41 +00:00
if (cpy != copy_from_iter(skb->data + mlen, cpy, &m->msg_iter))
return -EFAULT;
msg_set_size(hdr, mlen + cpy);
skb_put(skb, cpy);
rem -= cpy;
total += msg_blocks(hdr) - curr;
tipc: fix kernel WARNING in tipc_msg_append() syzbot found the following issue: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6808 at include/linux/thread_info.h:150 check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:150 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6808 at include/linux/thread_info.h:150 copy_from_iter include/linux/uio.h:144 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6808 at include/linux/thread_info.h:150 tipc_msg_append+0x49a/0x5e0 net/tipc/msg.c:242 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... This happens after commit 5e9eeccc58f3 ("tipc: fix NULL pointer dereference in streaming") that tried to build at least one buffer even when the message data length is zero... However, it now exposes another bug that the 'mss' can be zero and the 'cpy' will be negative, thus the above kernel WARNING will appear! The zero value of 'mss' is never expected because it means Nagle is not enabled for the socket (actually the socket type was 'SOCK_SEQPACKET'), so the function 'tipc_msg_append()' must not be called at all. But that was in this particular case since the message data length was zero, and the 'send <= maxnagle' check became true. We resolve the issue by explicitly checking if Nagle is enabled for the socket, i.e. 'maxnagle != 0' before calling the 'tipc_msg_append()'. We also reinforce the function to against such a negative values if any. Reported-by: syzbot+75139a7d2605236b0b7f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: c0bceb97db9e ("tipc: add smart nagle feature") Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-06-11 10:07:35 +00:00
} while (rem > 0);
tipc: add smart nagle feature We introduce a feature that works like a combination of TCP_NAGLE and TCP_CORK, but without some of the weaknesses of those. In particular, we will not observe long delivery delays because of delayed acks, since the algorithm itself decides if and when acks are to be sent from the receiving peer. - The nagle property as such is determined by manipulating a new 'maxnagle' field in struct tipc_sock. If certain conditions are met, 'maxnagle' will define max size of the messages which can be bundled. If it is set to zero no messages are ever bundled, implying that the nagle property is disabled. - A socket with the nagle property enabled enters nagle mode when more than 4 messages have been sent out without receiving any data message from the peer. - A socket leaves nagle mode whenever it receives a data message from the peer. In nagle mode, messages smaller than 'maxnagle' are accumulated in the socket write queue. The last buffer in the queue is marked with a new 'ack_required' bit, which forces the receiving peer to send a CONN_ACK message back to the sender upon reception. The accumulated contents of the write queue is transmitted when one of the following events or conditions occur. - A CONN_ACK message is received from the peer. - A data message is received from the peer. - A SOCK_WAKEUP pseudo message is received from the link level. - The write queue contains more than 64 1k blocks of data. - The connection is being shut down. - There is no CONN_ACK message to expect. I.e., there is currently no outstanding message where the 'ack_required' bit was set. As a consequence, the first message added after we enter nagle mode is always sent directly with this bit set. This new feature gives a 50-100% improvement of throughput for small (i.e., less than MTU size) messages, while it might add up to one RTT to latency time when the socket is in nagle mode. Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-30 13:00:41 +00:00
return total - accounted;
}
/* tipc_msg_validate - validate basic format of received message
*
* This routine ensures a TIPC message has an acceptable header, and at least
* as much data as the header indicates it should. The routine also ensures
* that the entire message header is stored in the main fragment of the message
* buffer, to simplify future access to message header fields.
*
* Note: Having extra info present in the message header or data areas is OK.
* TIPC will ignore the excess, under the assumption that it is optional info
* introduced by a later release of the protocol.
*/
bool tipc_msg_validate(struct sk_buff **_skb)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = *_skb;
struct tipc_msg *hdr;
int msz, hsz;
/* Ensure that flow control ratio condition is satisfied */
if (unlikely(skb->truesize / buf_roundup_len(skb) >= 4)) {
skb = skb_copy_expand(skb, BUF_HEADROOM, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return false;
kfree_skb(*_skb);
*_skb = skb;
}
if (unlikely(TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->validated))
return true;
tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication This commit offers an option to encrypt and authenticate all messaging, including the neighbor discovery messages. The currently most advanced algorithm supported is the AEAD AES-GCM (like IPSec or TLS). All encryption/decryption is done at the bearer layer, just before leaving or after entering TIPC. Supported features: - Encryption & authentication of all TIPC messages (header + data); - Two symmetric-key modes: Cluster and Per-node; - Automatic key switching; - Key-expired revoking (sequence number wrapped); - Lock-free encryption/decryption (RCU); - Asynchronous crypto, Intel AES-NI supported; - Multiple cipher transforms; - Logs & statistics; Two key modes: - Cluster key mode: One single key is used for both TX & RX in all nodes in the cluster. - Per-node key mode: Each nodes in the cluster has one specific TX key. For RX, a node requires its peers' TX key to be able to decrypt the messages from those peers. Key setting from user-space is performed via netlink by a user program (e.g. the iproute2 'tipc' tool). Internal key state machine: Attach Align(RX) +-+ +-+ | V | V +---------+ Attach +---------+ | IDLE |---------------->| PENDING |(user = 0) +---------+ +---------+ A A Switch| A | | | | | | Free(switch/revoked) | | (Free)| +----------------------+ | |Timeout | (TX) | | |(RX) | | | | | | v | +---------+ Switch +---------+ | PASSIVE |<----------------| ACTIVE | +---------+ (RX) +---------+ (user = 1) (user >= 1) The number of TFMs is 10 by default and can be changed via the procfs 'net/tipc/max_tfms'. At this moment, as for simplicity, this file is also used to print the crypto statistics at runtime: echo 0xfff1 > /proc/sys/net/tipc/max_tfms The patch defines a new TIPC version (v7) for the encryption message (- backward compatibility as well). The message is basically encapsulated as follows: +----------------------------------------------------------+ | TIPCv7 encryption | Original TIPCv2 | Authentication | | header | packet (encrypted) | Tag | +----------------------------------------------------------+ The throughput is about ~40% for small messages (compared with non- encryption) and ~9% for large messages. With the support from hardware crypto i.e. the Intel AES-NI CPU instructions, the throughput increases upto ~85% for small messages and ~55% for large messages. By default, the new feature is inactive (i.e. no encryption) until user sets a key for TIPC. There is however also a new option - "TIPC_CRYPTO" in the kernel configuration to enable/disable the new code when needed. MAINTAINERS | add two new files 'crypto.h' & 'crypto.c' in tipc Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-11-08 05:05:11 +00:00
if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, MIN_H_SIZE)))
return false;
hsz = msg_hdr_sz(buf_msg(skb));
if (unlikely(hsz < MIN_H_SIZE) || (hsz > MAX_H_SIZE))
return false;
if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, hsz)))
return false;
hdr = buf_msg(skb);
if (unlikely(msg_version(hdr) != TIPC_VERSION))
return false;
msz = msg_size(hdr);
if (unlikely(msz < hsz))
return false;
if (unlikely((msz - hsz) > TIPC_MAX_USER_MSG_SIZE))
return false;
if (unlikely(skb->len < msz))
return false;
tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication This commit offers an option to encrypt and authenticate all messaging, including the neighbor discovery messages. The currently most advanced algorithm supported is the AEAD AES-GCM (like IPSec or TLS). All encryption/decryption is done at the bearer layer, just before leaving or after entering TIPC. Supported features: - Encryption & authentication of all TIPC messages (header + data); - Two symmetric-key modes: Cluster and Per-node; - Automatic key switching; - Key-expired revoking (sequence number wrapped); - Lock-free encryption/decryption (RCU); - Asynchronous crypto, Intel AES-NI supported; - Multiple cipher transforms; - Logs & statistics; Two key modes: - Cluster key mode: One single key is used for both TX & RX in all nodes in the cluster. - Per-node key mode: Each nodes in the cluster has one specific TX key. For RX, a node requires its peers' TX key to be able to decrypt the messages from those peers. Key setting from user-space is performed via netlink by a user program (e.g. the iproute2 'tipc' tool). Internal key state machine: Attach Align(RX) +-+ +-+ | V | V +---------+ Attach +---------+ | IDLE |---------------->| PENDING |(user = 0) +---------+ +---------+ A A Switch| A | | | | | | Free(switch/revoked) | | (Free)| +----------------------+ | |Timeout | (TX) | | |(RX) | | | | | | v | +---------+ Switch +---------+ | PASSIVE |<----------------| ACTIVE | +---------+ (RX) +---------+ (user = 1) (user >= 1) The number of TFMs is 10 by default and can be changed via the procfs 'net/tipc/max_tfms'. At this moment, as for simplicity, this file is also used to print the crypto statistics at runtime: echo 0xfff1 > /proc/sys/net/tipc/max_tfms The patch defines a new TIPC version (v7) for the encryption message (- backward compatibility as well). The message is basically encapsulated as follows: +----------------------------------------------------------+ | TIPCv7 encryption | Original TIPCv2 | Authentication | | header | packet (encrypted) | Tag | +----------------------------------------------------------+ The throughput is about ~40% for small messages (compared with non- encryption) and ~9% for large messages. With the support from hardware crypto i.e. the Intel AES-NI CPU instructions, the throughput increases upto ~85% for small messages and ~55% for large messages. By default, the new feature is inactive (i.e. no encryption) until user sets a key for TIPC. There is however also a new option - "TIPC_CRYPTO" in the kernel configuration to enable/disable the new code when needed. MAINTAINERS | add two new files 'crypto.h' & 'crypto.c' in tipc Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windreiver.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-11-08 05:05:11 +00:00
TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->validated = 1;
return true;
}
tipc: fix changeover issues due to large packet In conjunction with changing the interfaces' MTU (e.g. especially in the case of a bonding) where the TIPC links are brought up and down in a short time, a couple of issues were detected with the current link changeover mechanism: 1) When one link is up but immediately forced down again, the failover procedure will be carried out in order to failover all the messages in the link's transmq queue onto the other working link. The link and node state is also set to FAILINGOVER as part of the process. The message will be transmited in form of a FAILOVER_MSG, so its size is plus of 40 bytes (= the message header size). There is no problem if the original message size is not larger than the link's MTU - 40, and indeed this is the max size of a normal payload messages. However, in the situation above, because the link has just been up, the messages in the link's transmq are almost SYNCH_MSGs which had been generated by the link synching procedure, then their size might reach the max value already! When the FAILOVER_MSG is built on the top of such a SYNCH_MSG, its size will exceed the link's MTU. As a result, the messages are dropped silently and the failover procedure will never end up, the link will not be able to exit the FAILINGOVER state, so cannot be re-established. 2) The same scenario above can happen more easily in case the MTU of the links is set differently or when changing. In that case, as long as a large message in the failure link's transmq queue was built and fragmented with its link's MTU > the other link's one, the issue will happen (there is no need of a link synching in advance). 3) The link synching procedure also faces with the same issue but since the link synching is only started upon receipt of a SYNCH_MSG, dropping the message will not result in a state deadlock, but it is not expected as design. The 1) & 3) issues are resolved by the last commit that only a dummy SYNCH_MSG (i.e. without data) is generated at the link synching, so the size of a FAILOVER_MSG if any then will never exceed the link's MTU. For the 2) issue, the only solution is trying to fragment the messages in the failure link's transmq queue according to the working link's MTU so they can be failovered then. A new function is made to accomplish this, it will still be a TUNNEL PROTOCOL/FAILOVER MSG but if the original message size is too large, it will be fragmented & reassembled at the receiving side. Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-07-24 01:56:12 +00:00
/**
* tipc_msg_fragment - build a fragment skb list for TIPC message
*
* @skb: TIPC message skb
* @hdr: internal msg header to be put on the top of the fragments
* @pktmax: max size of a fragment incl. the header
* @frags: returned fragment skb list
*
* Return: 0 if the fragmentation is successful, otherwise: -EINVAL
tipc: fix changeover issues due to large packet In conjunction with changing the interfaces' MTU (e.g. especially in the case of a bonding) where the TIPC links are brought up and down in a short time, a couple of issues were detected with the current link changeover mechanism: 1) When one link is up but immediately forced down again, the failover procedure will be carried out in order to failover all the messages in the link's transmq queue onto the other working link. The link and node state is also set to FAILINGOVER as part of the process. The message will be transmited in form of a FAILOVER_MSG, so its size is plus of 40 bytes (= the message header size). There is no problem if the original message size is not larger than the link's MTU - 40, and indeed this is the max size of a normal payload messages. However, in the situation above, because the link has just been up, the messages in the link's transmq are almost SYNCH_MSGs which had been generated by the link synching procedure, then their size might reach the max value already! When the FAILOVER_MSG is built on the top of such a SYNCH_MSG, its size will exceed the link's MTU. As a result, the messages are dropped silently and the failover procedure will never end up, the link will not be able to exit the FAILINGOVER state, so cannot be re-established. 2) The same scenario above can happen more easily in case the MTU of the links is set differently or when changing. In that case, as long as a large message in the failure link's transmq queue was built and fragmented with its link's MTU > the other link's one, the issue will happen (there is no need of a link synching in advance). 3) The link synching procedure also faces with the same issue but since the link synching is only started upon receipt of a SYNCH_MSG, dropping the message will not result in a state deadlock, but it is not expected as design. The 1) & 3) issues are resolved by the last commit that only a dummy SYNCH_MSG (i.e. without data) is generated at the link synching, so the size of a FAILOVER_MSG if any then will never exceed the link's MTU. For the 2) issue, the only solution is trying to fragment the messages in the failure link's transmq queue according to the working link's MTU so they can be failovered then. A new function is made to accomplish this, it will still be a TUNNEL PROTOCOL/FAILOVER MSG but if the original message size is too large, it will be fragmented & reassembled at the receiving side. Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-07-24 01:56:12 +00:00
* or -ENOMEM
*/
int tipc_msg_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tipc_msg *hdr,
int pktmax, struct sk_buff_head *frags)
{
int pktno, nof_fragms, dsz, dmax, eat;
struct tipc_msg *_hdr;
struct sk_buff *_skb;
u8 *data;
/* Non-linear buffer? */
if (skb_linearize(skb))
return -ENOMEM;
data = (u8 *)skb->data;
dsz = msg_size(buf_msg(skb));
dmax = pktmax - INT_H_SIZE;
if (dsz <= dmax || !dmax)
return -EINVAL;
nof_fragms = dsz / dmax + 1;
for (pktno = 1; pktno <= nof_fragms; pktno++) {
if (pktno < nof_fragms)
eat = dmax;
else
eat = dsz % dmax;
/* Allocate a new fragment */
_skb = tipc_buf_acquire(INT_H_SIZE + eat, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!_skb)
goto error;
skb_orphan(_skb);
__skb_queue_tail(frags, _skb);
/* Copy header & data to the fragment */
skb_copy_to_linear_data(_skb, hdr, INT_H_SIZE);
skb_copy_to_linear_data_offset(_skb, INT_H_SIZE, data, eat);
data += eat;
/* Update the fragment's header */
_hdr = buf_msg(_skb);
msg_set_fragm_no(_hdr, pktno);
msg_set_nof_fragms(_hdr, nof_fragms);
msg_set_size(_hdr, INT_H_SIZE + eat);
}
return 0;
error:
__skb_queue_purge(frags);
__skb_queue_head_init(frags);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/**
* tipc_msg_build - create buffer chain containing specified header and data
* @mhdr: Message header, to be prepended to data
* @m: User message
net/tipc: fix various kernel-doc warnings kernel-doc and Sphinx fixes to eliminate lots of warnings in preparation for adding to the networking docbook. ../net/tipc/crypto.c:57: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'enum ' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:69: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'enum ' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:130: warning: Function parameter or member 'tfm' not described in 'tipc_tfm' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:130: warning: Function parameter or member 'list' not described in 'tipc_tfm' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:172: warning: Function parameter or member 'stat' not described in 'tipc_crypto_stats' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:232: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'tipc_crypto' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:329: warning: Function parameter or member 'ukey' not described in 'tipc_aead_key_validate' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:329: warning: Function parameter or member 'info' not described in 'tipc_aead_key_validate' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:482: warning: Function parameter or member 'aead' not described in 'tipc_aead_tfm_next' ../net/tipc/trace.c:43: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned long sysctl_tipc_sk_filter[5] __read_mostly = ' Documentation/networking/tipc:57: ../net/tipc/msg.c:584: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:63: ../net/tipc/name_table.c:536: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:63: ../net/tipc/name_table.c:537: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:78: ../net/tipc/socket.c:3809: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:78: ../net/tipc/socket.c:3807: WARNING: Inline strong start-string without end-string. Documentation/networking/tipc:72: ../net/tipc/node.c:904: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:97: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:98: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:141: WARNING: Inline strong start-string without end-string. ../net/tipc/discover.c:82: warning: Function parameter or member 'skb' not described in 'tipc_disc_init_msg' ../net/tipc/msg.c:69: warning: Function parameter or member 'gfp' not described in 'tipc_buf_acquire' ../net/tipc/msg.c:382: warning: Function parameter or member 'offset' not described in 'tipc_msg_build' ../net/tipc/msg.c:708: warning: Function parameter or member 'net' not described in 'tipc_msg_lookup_dest' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'seq' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'found_lower' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'found_upper' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'proto' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'port' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'ipv4' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'ipv6' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:98: warning: Function parameter or member 'rcast' not described in 'udp_bearer' Also fixed a typo of "duest" to "dest". Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-29 18:32:50 +00:00
* @offset: buffer offset for fragmented messages (FIXME)
* @dsz: Total length of user data
* @pktmax: Max packet size that can be used
* @list: Buffer or chain of buffers to be returned to caller
*
* Note that the recursive call we are making here is safe, since it can
* logically go only one further level down.
*
* Return: message data size or errno: -ENOMEM, -EFAULT
*/
int tipc_msg_build(struct tipc_msg *mhdr, struct msghdr *m, int offset,
int dsz, int pktmax, struct sk_buff_head *list)
{
int mhsz = msg_hdr_sz(mhdr);
struct tipc_msg pkthdr;
int msz = mhsz + dsz;
int pktrem = pktmax;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int drem = dsz;
int pktno = 1;
char *pktpos;
int pktsz;
int rc;
msg_set_size(mhdr, msz);
/* No fragmentation needed? */
if (likely(msz <= pktmax)) {
skb = tipc_buf_acquire(msz, GFP_KERNEL);
/* Fall back to smaller MTU if node local message */
if (unlikely(!skb)) {
if (pktmax != MAX_MSG_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = tipc_msg_build(mhdr, m, offset, dsz,
one_page_mtu, list);
if (rc != dsz)
return rc;
if (tipc_msg_assemble(list))
return dsz;
return -ENOMEM;
}
skb_orphan(skb);
__skb_queue_tail(list, skb);
skb_copy_to_linear_data(skb, mhdr, mhsz);
pktpos = skb->data + mhsz;
if (copy_from_iter_full(pktpos, dsz, &m->msg_iter))
return dsz;
rc = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
/* Prepare reusable fragment header */
2015-02-05 13:36:36 +00:00
tipc_msg_init(msg_prevnode(mhdr), &pkthdr, MSG_FRAGMENTER,
FIRST_FRAGMENT, INT_H_SIZE, msg_destnode(mhdr));
msg_set_size(&pkthdr, pktmax);
msg_set_fragm_no(&pkthdr, pktno);
tipc: clean up handling of message priorities Messages transferred by TIPC are assigned an "importance priority", -an integer value indicating how to treat the message when there is link or destination socket congestion. There is no separate header field for this value. Instead, the message user values have been chosen in ascending order according to perceived importance, so that the message user field can be used for this. This is not a good solution. First, we have many more users than the needed priority levels, so we end up with treating more priority levels than necessary. Second, the user field cannot always accurately reflect the priority of the message. E.g., a message fragment packet should really have the priority of the enveloped user data message, and not the priority of the MSG_FRAGMENTER user. Until now, we have been working around this problem in different ways, but it is now time to implement a consistent way of handling such priorities, although still within the constraint that we cannot allocate any more bits in the regular data message header for this. In this commit, we define a new priority level, TIPC_SYSTEM_IMPORTANCE, that will be the only one used apart from the four (lower) user data levels. All non-data messages map down to this priority. Furthermore, we take some free bits from the MSG_FRAGMENTER header and allocate them to store the priority of the enveloped message. We then adjust the functions msg_importance()/msg_set_importance() so that they read/set the correct header fields depending on user type. This small protocol change is fully compatible, because the code at the receiving end of a link currently reads the importance level only from user data messages, where there is no change. Reviewed-by: Erik Hugne <erik.hugne@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 20:08:11 +00:00
msg_set_importance(&pkthdr, msg_importance(mhdr));
/* Prepare first fragment */
skb = tipc_buf_acquire(pktmax, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
return -ENOMEM;
skb_orphan(skb);
__skb_queue_tail(list, skb);
pktpos = skb->data;
skb_copy_to_linear_data(skb, &pkthdr, INT_H_SIZE);
pktpos += INT_H_SIZE;
pktrem -= INT_H_SIZE;
skb_copy_to_linear_data_offset(skb, INT_H_SIZE, mhdr, mhsz);
pktpos += mhsz;
pktrem -= mhsz;
do {
if (drem < pktrem)
pktrem = drem;
if (!copy_from_iter_full(pktpos, pktrem, &m->msg_iter)) {
rc = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
drem -= pktrem;
if (!drem)
break;
/* Prepare new fragment: */
if (drem < (pktmax - INT_H_SIZE))
pktsz = drem + INT_H_SIZE;
else
pktsz = pktmax;
skb = tipc_buf_acquire(pktsz, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
skb_orphan(skb);
__skb_queue_tail(list, skb);
msg_set_type(&pkthdr, FRAGMENT);
msg_set_size(&pkthdr, pktsz);
msg_set_fragm_no(&pkthdr, ++pktno);
skb_copy_to_linear_data(skb, &pkthdr, INT_H_SIZE);
pktpos = skb->data + INT_H_SIZE;
pktrem = pktsz - INT_H_SIZE;
} while (1);
msg_set_type(buf_msg(skb), LAST_FRAGMENT);
return dsz;
error:
__skb_queue_purge(list);
__skb_queue_head_init(list);
return rc;
}
/**
* tipc_msg_bundle - Append contents of a buffer to tail of an existing one
* @bskb: the bundle buffer to append to
* @msg: message to be appended
* @max: max allowable size for the bundle buffer
*
* Return: "true" if bundling has been performed, otherwise "false"
*/
static bool tipc_msg_bundle(struct sk_buff *bskb, struct tipc_msg *msg,
u32 max)
{
struct tipc_msg *bmsg = buf_msg(bskb);
u32 msz, bsz, offset, pad;
msz = msg_size(msg);
bsz = msg_size(bmsg);
offset = BUF_ALIGN(bsz);
pad = offset - bsz;
if (unlikely(skb_tailroom(bskb) < (pad + msz)))
return false;
if (unlikely(max < (offset + msz)))
return false;
skb_put(bskb, pad + msz);
skb_copy_to_linear_data_offset(bskb, offset, msg, msz);
msg_set_size(bmsg, offset + msz);
msg_set_msgcnt(bmsg, msg_msgcnt(bmsg) + 1);
return true;
}
/**
* tipc_msg_try_bundle - Try to bundle a new message to the last one
* @tskb: the last/target message to which the new one will be appended
* @skb: the new message skb pointer
* @mss: max message size (header inclusive)
* @dnode: destination node for the message
* @new_bundle: if this call made a new bundle or not
*
* Return: "true" if the new message skb is potential for bundling this time or
* later, in the case a bundling has been done this time, the skb is consumed
* (the skb pointer = NULL).
* Otherwise, "false" if the skb cannot be bundled at all.
*/
bool tipc_msg_try_bundle(struct sk_buff *tskb, struct sk_buff **skb, u32 mss,
u32 dnode, bool *new_bundle)
{
struct tipc_msg *msg, *inner, *outer;
u32 tsz;
/* First, check if the new buffer is suitable for bundling */
msg = buf_msg(*skb);
if (msg_user(msg) == MSG_FRAGMENTER)
return false;
if (msg_user(msg) == TUNNEL_PROTOCOL)
return false;
if (msg_user(msg) == BCAST_PROTOCOL)
return false;
if (mss <= INT_H_SIZE + msg_size(msg))
tipc: improve link congestion algorithm The link congestion algorithm used until now implies two problems. - It is too generous towards lower-level messages in situations of high load by giving "absolute" bandwidth guarantees to the different priority levels. LOW traffic is guaranteed 10%, MEDIUM is guaranted 20%, HIGH is guaranteed 30%, and CRITICAL is guaranteed 40% of the available bandwidth. But, in the absence of higher level traffic, the ratio between two distinct levels becomes unreasonable. E.g. if there is only LOW and MEDIUM traffic on a system, the former is guaranteed 1/3 of the bandwidth, and the latter 2/3. This again means that if there is e.g. one LOW user and 10 MEDIUM users, the former will have 33.3% of the bandwidth, and the others will have to compete for the remainder, i.e. each will end up with 6.7% of the capacity. - Packets of type MSG_BUNDLER are created at SYSTEM importance level, but only after the packets bundled into it have passed the congestion test for their own respective levels. Since bundled packets don't result in incrementing the level counter for their own importance, only occasionally for the SYSTEM level counter, they do in practice obtain SYSTEM level importance. Hence, the current implementation provides a gap in the congestion algorithm that in the worst case may lead to a link reset. We now refine the congestion algorithm as follows: - A message is accepted to the link backlog only if its own level counter, and all superior level counters, permit it. - The importance of a created bundle packet is set according to its contents. A bundle packet created from messges at levels LOW to CRITICAL is given importance level CRITICAL, while a bundle created from a SYSTEM level message is given importance SYSTEM. In the latter case only subsequent SYSTEM level messages are allowed to be bundled into it. This solves the first problem described above, by making the bandwidth guarantee relative to the total number of users at all levels; only the upper limit for each level remains absolute. In the example described above, the single LOW user would use 1/11th of the bandwidth, the same as each of the ten MEDIUM users, but he still has the same guarantee against starvation as the latter ones. The fix also solves the second problem. If the CRITICAL level is filled up by bundle packets of that level, no lower level packets will be accepted any more. Suggested-by: Gergely Kiss <gergely.kiss@ericsson.com> Reviewed-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-14 14:46:17 +00:00
return false;
/* Ok, but the last/target buffer can be empty? */
if (unlikely(!tskb))
return true;
/* Is it a bundle already? Try to bundle the new message to it */
if (msg_user(buf_msg(tskb)) == MSG_BUNDLER) {
*new_bundle = false;
goto bundle;
}
/* Make a new bundle of the two messages if possible */
tsz = msg_size(buf_msg(tskb));
if (unlikely(mss < BUF_ALIGN(INT_H_SIZE + tsz) + msg_size(msg)))
return true;
if (unlikely(pskb_expand_head(tskb, INT_H_SIZE, mss - tsz - INT_H_SIZE,
GFP_ATOMIC)))
return true;
inner = buf_msg(tskb);
skb_push(tskb, INT_H_SIZE);
outer = buf_msg(tskb);
tipc_msg_init(msg_prevnode(inner), outer, MSG_BUNDLER, 0, INT_H_SIZE,
dnode);
msg_set_importance(outer, msg_importance(inner));
msg_set_size(outer, INT_H_SIZE + tsz);
msg_set_msgcnt(outer, 1);
*new_bundle = true;
bundle:
if (likely(tipc_msg_bundle(tskb, msg, mss))) {
consume_skb(*skb);
*skb = NULL;
}
return true;
}
tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception TIPC handles message cardinality and sequencing at the link layer, before passing messages upwards to the destination sockets. During the upcall from link to socket no locks are held. It is therefore possible, and we see it happen occasionally, that messages arriving in different threads and delivered in sequence still bypass each other before they reach the destination socket. This must not happen, since it violates the sequentiality guarantee. We solve this by adding a new input buffer queue to the link structure. Arriving messages are added safely to the tail of that queue by the link, while the head of the queue is consumed, also safely, by the receiving socket. Sequentiality is secured per socket by only allowing buffers to be dequeued inside the socket lock. Since there may be multiple simultaneous readers of the queue, we use a 'filter' parameter to reduce the risk that they peek the same buffer from the queue, hence also reducing the risk of contention on the receiving socket locks. This solves the sequentiality problem, and seems to cause no measurable performance degradation. A nice side effect of this change is that lock handling in the functions tipc_rcv() and tipc_bcast_rcv() now becomes uniform, something that will enable future simplifications of those functions. Reviewed-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-02-05 13:36:41 +00:00
/**
* tipc_msg_extract(): extract bundled inner packet from buffer
* @skb: buffer to be extracted from.
tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception TIPC handles message cardinality and sequencing at the link layer, before passing messages upwards to the destination sockets. During the upcall from link to socket no locks are held. It is therefore possible, and we see it happen occasionally, that messages arriving in different threads and delivered in sequence still bypass each other before they reach the destination socket. This must not happen, since it violates the sequentiality guarantee. We solve this by adding a new input buffer queue to the link structure. Arriving messages are added safely to the tail of that queue by the link, while the head of the queue is consumed, also safely, by the receiving socket. Sequentiality is secured per socket by only allowing buffers to be dequeued inside the socket lock. Since there may be multiple simultaneous readers of the queue, we use a 'filter' parameter to reduce the risk that they peek the same buffer from the queue, hence also reducing the risk of contention on the receiving socket locks. This solves the sequentiality problem, and seems to cause no measurable performance degradation. A nice side effect of this change is that lock handling in the functions tipc_rcv() and tipc_bcast_rcv() now becomes uniform, something that will enable future simplifications of those functions. Reviewed-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-02-05 13:36:41 +00:00
* @iskb: extracted inner buffer, to be returned
* @pos: position in outer message of msg to be extracted.
net/tipc: fix various kernel-doc warnings kernel-doc and Sphinx fixes to eliminate lots of warnings in preparation for adding to the networking docbook. ../net/tipc/crypto.c:57: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'enum ' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:69: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'enum ' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:130: warning: Function parameter or member 'tfm' not described in 'tipc_tfm' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:130: warning: Function parameter or member 'list' not described in 'tipc_tfm' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:172: warning: Function parameter or member 'stat' not described in 'tipc_crypto_stats' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:232: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'tipc_crypto' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:329: warning: Function parameter or member 'ukey' not described in 'tipc_aead_key_validate' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:329: warning: Function parameter or member 'info' not described in 'tipc_aead_key_validate' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:482: warning: Function parameter or member 'aead' not described in 'tipc_aead_tfm_next' ../net/tipc/trace.c:43: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned long sysctl_tipc_sk_filter[5] __read_mostly = ' Documentation/networking/tipc:57: ../net/tipc/msg.c:584: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:63: ../net/tipc/name_table.c:536: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:63: ../net/tipc/name_table.c:537: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:78: ../net/tipc/socket.c:3809: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:78: ../net/tipc/socket.c:3807: WARNING: Inline strong start-string without end-string. Documentation/networking/tipc:72: ../net/tipc/node.c:904: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:97: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:98: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:141: WARNING: Inline strong start-string without end-string. ../net/tipc/discover.c:82: warning: Function parameter or member 'skb' not described in 'tipc_disc_init_msg' ../net/tipc/msg.c:69: warning: Function parameter or member 'gfp' not described in 'tipc_buf_acquire' ../net/tipc/msg.c:382: warning: Function parameter or member 'offset' not described in 'tipc_msg_build' ../net/tipc/msg.c:708: warning: Function parameter or member 'net' not described in 'tipc_msg_lookup_dest' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'seq' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'found_lower' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'found_upper' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'proto' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'port' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'ipv4' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'ipv6' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:98: warning: Function parameter or member 'rcast' not described in 'udp_bearer' Also fixed a typo of "duest" to "dest". Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-29 18:32:50 +00:00
* Returns position of next msg.
tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception TIPC handles message cardinality and sequencing at the link layer, before passing messages upwards to the destination sockets. During the upcall from link to socket no locks are held. It is therefore possible, and we see it happen occasionally, that messages arriving in different threads and delivered in sequence still bypass each other before they reach the destination socket. This must not happen, since it violates the sequentiality guarantee. We solve this by adding a new input buffer queue to the link structure. Arriving messages are added safely to the tail of that queue by the link, while the head of the queue is consumed, also safely, by the receiving socket. Sequentiality is secured per socket by only allowing buffers to be dequeued inside the socket lock. Since there may be multiple simultaneous readers of the queue, we use a 'filter' parameter to reduce the risk that they peek the same buffer from the queue, hence also reducing the risk of contention on the receiving socket locks. This solves the sequentiality problem, and seems to cause no measurable performance degradation. A nice side effect of this change is that lock handling in the functions tipc_rcv() and tipc_bcast_rcv() now becomes uniform, something that will enable future simplifications of those functions. Reviewed-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-02-05 13:36:41 +00:00
* Consumes outer buffer when last packet extracted
* Return: true when there is an extracted buffer, otherwise false
tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception TIPC handles message cardinality and sequencing at the link layer, before passing messages upwards to the destination sockets. During the upcall from link to socket no locks are held. It is therefore possible, and we see it happen occasionally, that messages arriving in different threads and delivered in sequence still bypass each other before they reach the destination socket. This must not happen, since it violates the sequentiality guarantee. We solve this by adding a new input buffer queue to the link structure. Arriving messages are added safely to the tail of that queue by the link, while the head of the queue is consumed, also safely, by the receiving socket. Sequentiality is secured per socket by only allowing buffers to be dequeued inside the socket lock. Since there may be multiple simultaneous readers of the queue, we use a 'filter' parameter to reduce the risk that they peek the same buffer from the queue, hence also reducing the risk of contention on the receiving socket locks. This solves the sequentiality problem, and seems to cause no measurable performance degradation. A nice side effect of this change is that lock handling in the functions tipc_rcv() and tipc_bcast_rcv() now becomes uniform, something that will enable future simplifications of those functions. Reviewed-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-02-05 13:36:41 +00:00
*/
bool tipc_msg_extract(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff **iskb, int *pos)
{
struct tipc_msg *hdr, *ihdr;
int imsz;
tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception TIPC handles message cardinality and sequencing at the link layer, before passing messages upwards to the destination sockets. During the upcall from link to socket no locks are held. It is therefore possible, and we see it happen occasionally, that messages arriving in different threads and delivered in sequence still bypass each other before they reach the destination socket. This must not happen, since it violates the sequentiality guarantee. We solve this by adding a new input buffer queue to the link structure. Arriving messages are added safely to the tail of that queue by the link, while the head of the queue is consumed, also safely, by the receiving socket. Sequentiality is secured per socket by only allowing buffers to be dequeued inside the socket lock. Since there may be multiple simultaneous readers of the queue, we use a 'filter' parameter to reduce the risk that they peek the same buffer from the queue, hence also reducing the risk of contention on the receiving socket locks. This solves the sequentiality problem, and seems to cause no measurable performance degradation. A nice side effect of this change is that lock handling in the functions tipc_rcv() and tipc_bcast_rcv() now becomes uniform, something that will enable future simplifications of those functions. Reviewed-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-02-05 13:36:41 +00:00
*iskb = NULL;
if (unlikely(skb_linearize(skb)))
goto none;
hdr = buf_msg(skb);
if (unlikely(*pos > (msg_data_sz(hdr) - MIN_H_SIZE)))
tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception TIPC handles message cardinality and sequencing at the link layer, before passing messages upwards to the destination sockets. During the upcall from link to socket no locks are held. It is therefore possible, and we see it happen occasionally, that messages arriving in different threads and delivered in sequence still bypass each other before they reach the destination socket. This must not happen, since it violates the sequentiality guarantee. We solve this by adding a new input buffer queue to the link structure. Arriving messages are added safely to the tail of that queue by the link, while the head of the queue is consumed, also safely, by the receiving socket. Sequentiality is secured per socket by only allowing buffers to be dequeued inside the socket lock. Since there may be multiple simultaneous readers of the queue, we use a 'filter' parameter to reduce the risk that they peek the same buffer from the queue, hence also reducing the risk of contention on the receiving socket locks. This solves the sequentiality problem, and seems to cause no measurable performance degradation. A nice side effect of this change is that lock handling in the functions tipc_rcv() and tipc_bcast_rcv() now becomes uniform, something that will enable future simplifications of those functions. Reviewed-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-02-05 13:36:41 +00:00
goto none;
ihdr = (struct tipc_msg *)(msg_data(hdr) + *pos);
imsz = msg_size(ihdr);
if ((*pos + imsz) > msg_data_sz(hdr))
tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception TIPC handles message cardinality and sequencing at the link layer, before passing messages upwards to the destination sockets. During the upcall from link to socket no locks are held. It is therefore possible, and we see it happen occasionally, that messages arriving in different threads and delivered in sequence still bypass each other before they reach the destination socket. This must not happen, since it violates the sequentiality guarantee. We solve this by adding a new input buffer queue to the link structure. Arriving messages are added safely to the tail of that queue by the link, while the head of the queue is consumed, also safely, by the receiving socket. Sequentiality is secured per socket by only allowing buffers to be dequeued inside the socket lock. Since there may be multiple simultaneous readers of the queue, we use a 'filter' parameter to reduce the risk that they peek the same buffer from the queue, hence also reducing the risk of contention on the receiving socket locks. This solves the sequentiality problem, and seems to cause no measurable performance degradation. A nice side effect of this change is that lock handling in the functions tipc_rcv() and tipc_bcast_rcv() now becomes uniform, something that will enable future simplifications of those functions. Reviewed-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-02-05 13:36:41 +00:00
goto none;
*iskb = tipc_buf_acquire(imsz, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!*iskb)
goto none;
skb_copy_to_linear_data(*iskb, ihdr, imsz);
if (unlikely(!tipc_msg_validate(iskb)))
tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception TIPC handles message cardinality and sequencing at the link layer, before passing messages upwards to the destination sockets. During the upcall from link to socket no locks are held. It is therefore possible, and we see it happen occasionally, that messages arriving in different threads and delivered in sequence still bypass each other before they reach the destination socket. This must not happen, since it violates the sequentiality guarantee. We solve this by adding a new input buffer queue to the link structure. Arriving messages are added safely to the tail of that queue by the link, while the head of the queue is consumed, also safely, by the receiving socket. Sequentiality is secured per socket by only allowing buffers to be dequeued inside the socket lock. Since there may be multiple simultaneous readers of the queue, we use a 'filter' parameter to reduce the risk that they peek the same buffer from the queue, hence also reducing the risk of contention on the receiving socket locks. This solves the sequentiality problem, and seems to cause no measurable performance degradation. A nice side effect of this change is that lock handling in the functions tipc_rcv() and tipc_bcast_rcv() now becomes uniform, something that will enable future simplifications of those functions. Reviewed-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-02-05 13:36:41 +00:00
goto none;
*pos += BUF_ALIGN(imsz);
tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception TIPC handles message cardinality and sequencing at the link layer, before passing messages upwards to the destination sockets. During the upcall from link to socket no locks are held. It is therefore possible, and we see it happen occasionally, that messages arriving in different threads and delivered in sequence still bypass each other before they reach the destination socket. This must not happen, since it violates the sequentiality guarantee. We solve this by adding a new input buffer queue to the link structure. Arriving messages are added safely to the tail of that queue by the link, while the head of the queue is consumed, also safely, by the receiving socket. Sequentiality is secured per socket by only allowing buffers to be dequeued inside the socket lock. Since there may be multiple simultaneous readers of the queue, we use a 'filter' parameter to reduce the risk that they peek the same buffer from the queue, hence also reducing the risk of contention on the receiving socket locks. This solves the sequentiality problem, and seems to cause no measurable performance degradation. A nice side effect of this change is that lock handling in the functions tipc_rcv() and tipc_bcast_rcv() now becomes uniform, something that will enable future simplifications of those functions. Reviewed-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-02-05 13:36:41 +00:00
return true;
none:
kfree_skb(skb);
kfree_skb(*iskb);
tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception TIPC handles message cardinality and sequencing at the link layer, before passing messages upwards to the destination sockets. During the upcall from link to socket no locks are held. It is therefore possible, and we see it happen occasionally, that messages arriving in different threads and delivered in sequence still bypass each other before they reach the destination socket. This must not happen, since it violates the sequentiality guarantee. We solve this by adding a new input buffer queue to the link structure. Arriving messages are added safely to the tail of that queue by the link, while the head of the queue is consumed, also safely, by the receiving socket. Sequentiality is secured per socket by only allowing buffers to be dequeued inside the socket lock. Since there may be multiple simultaneous readers of the queue, we use a 'filter' parameter to reduce the risk that they peek the same buffer from the queue, hence also reducing the risk of contention on the receiving socket locks. This solves the sequentiality problem, and seems to cause no measurable performance degradation. A nice side effect of this change is that lock handling in the functions tipc_rcv() and tipc_bcast_rcv() now becomes uniform, something that will enable future simplifications of those functions. Reviewed-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-02-05 13:36:41 +00:00
*iskb = NULL;
return false;
}
/**
* tipc_msg_reverse(): swap source and destination addresses and add error code
* @own_node: originating node id for reversed message
* @skb: buffer containing message to be reversed; will be consumed
* @err: error code to be set in message, if any
* Replaces consumed buffer with new one when successful
* Return: true if success, otherwise false
*/
bool tipc_msg_reverse(u32 own_node, struct sk_buff **skb, int err)
{
struct sk_buff *_skb = *skb;
struct tipc_msg *_hdr, *hdr;
int hlen, dlen;
if (skb_linearize(_skb))
goto exit;
_hdr = buf_msg(_skb);
dlen = min_t(uint, msg_data_sz(_hdr), MAX_FORWARD_SIZE);
hlen = msg_hdr_sz(_hdr);
if (msg_dest_droppable(_hdr))
goto exit;
if (msg_errcode(_hdr))
goto exit;
/* Never return SHORT header */
if (hlen == SHORT_H_SIZE)
hlen = BASIC_H_SIZE;
/* Don't return data along with SYN+, - sender has a clone */
if (msg_is_syn(_hdr) && err == TIPC_ERR_OVERLOAD)
dlen = 0;
/* Allocate new buffer to return */
*skb = tipc_buf_acquire(hlen + dlen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!*skb)
goto exit;
memcpy((*skb)->data, _skb->data, msg_hdr_sz(_hdr));
memcpy((*skb)->data + hlen, msg_data(_hdr), dlen);
/* Build reverse header in new buffer */
hdr = buf_msg(*skb);
msg_set_hdr_sz(hdr, hlen);
msg_set_errcode(hdr, err);
msg_set_non_seq(hdr, 0);
msg_set_origport(hdr, msg_destport(_hdr));
msg_set_destport(hdr, msg_origport(_hdr));
msg_set_destnode(hdr, msg_prevnode(_hdr));
msg_set_prevnode(hdr, own_node);
msg_set_orignode(hdr, own_node);
msg_set_size(hdr, hlen + dlen);
skb_orphan(_skb);
kfree_skb(_skb);
return true;
exit:
kfree_skb(_skb);
*skb = NULL;
return false;
}
bool tipc_msg_skb_clone(struct sk_buff_head *msg, struct sk_buff_head *cpy)
{
struct sk_buff *skb, *_skb;
skb_queue_walk(msg, skb) {
_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!_skb) {
__skb_queue_purge(cpy);
pr_err_ratelimited("Failed to clone buffer chain\n");
return false;
}
__skb_queue_tail(cpy, _skb);
}
return true;
}
/**
* tipc_msg_lookup_dest(): try to find new destination for named message
net/tipc: fix various kernel-doc warnings kernel-doc and Sphinx fixes to eliminate lots of warnings in preparation for adding to the networking docbook. ../net/tipc/crypto.c:57: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'enum ' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:69: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'enum ' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:130: warning: Function parameter or member 'tfm' not described in 'tipc_tfm' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:130: warning: Function parameter or member 'list' not described in 'tipc_tfm' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:172: warning: Function parameter or member 'stat' not described in 'tipc_crypto_stats' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:232: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'tipc_crypto' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:329: warning: Function parameter or member 'ukey' not described in 'tipc_aead_key_validate' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:329: warning: Function parameter or member 'info' not described in 'tipc_aead_key_validate' ../net/tipc/crypto.c:482: warning: Function parameter or member 'aead' not described in 'tipc_aead_tfm_next' ../net/tipc/trace.c:43: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned long sysctl_tipc_sk_filter[5] __read_mostly = ' Documentation/networking/tipc:57: ../net/tipc/msg.c:584: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:63: ../net/tipc/name_table.c:536: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:63: ../net/tipc/name_table.c:537: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:78: ../net/tipc/socket.c:3809: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:78: ../net/tipc/socket.c:3807: WARNING: Inline strong start-string without end-string. Documentation/networking/tipc:72: ../net/tipc/node.c:904: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:97: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:98: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/networking/tipc:39: ../net/tipc/crypto.c:141: WARNING: Inline strong start-string without end-string. ../net/tipc/discover.c:82: warning: Function parameter or member 'skb' not described in 'tipc_disc_init_msg' ../net/tipc/msg.c:69: warning: Function parameter or member 'gfp' not described in 'tipc_buf_acquire' ../net/tipc/msg.c:382: warning: Function parameter or member 'offset' not described in 'tipc_msg_build' ../net/tipc/msg.c:708: warning: Function parameter or member 'net' not described in 'tipc_msg_lookup_dest' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'seq' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'found_lower' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/subscr.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'found_upper' not described in 'tipc_sub_check_overlap' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'proto' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'port' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'ipv4' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'ipv6' not described in 'udp_media_addr' ../net/tipc/udp_media.c:98: warning: Function parameter or member 'rcast' not described in 'udp_bearer' Also fixed a typo of "duest" to "dest". Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-29 18:32:50 +00:00
* @net: pointer to associated network namespace
* @skb: the buffer containing the message.
* @err: error code to be used by caller if lookup fails
* Does not consume buffer
* Return: true if a destination is found, false otherwise
*/
bool tipc_msg_lookup_dest(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, int *err)
{
struct tipc_msg *msg = buf_msg(skb);
u32 scope = msg_lookup_scope(msg);
u32 self = tipc_own_addr(net);
u32 inst = msg_nameinst(msg);
struct tipc_socket_addr sk;
struct tipc_uaddr ua;
if (!msg_isdata(msg))
return false;
if (!msg_named(msg))
return false;
if (msg_errcode(msg))
return false;
*err = TIPC_ERR_NO_NAME;
if (skb_linearize(skb))
return false;
msg = buf_msg(skb);
if (msg_reroute_cnt(msg))
return false;
tipc_uaddr(&ua, TIPC_SERVICE_RANGE, scope,
msg_nametype(msg), inst, inst);
sk.node = tipc_scope2node(net, scope);
if (!tipc_nametbl_lookup_anycast(net, &ua, &sk))
return false;
msg_incr_reroute_cnt(msg);
if (sk.node != self)
msg_set_prevnode(msg, self);
msg_set_destnode(msg, sk.node);
msg_set_destport(msg, sk.ref);
*err = TIPC_OK;
return true;
}
/* tipc_msg_assemble() - assemble chain of fragments into one message
*/
bool tipc_msg_assemble(struct sk_buff_head *list)
{
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp = NULL;
if (skb_queue_len(list) == 1)
return true;
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(list))) {
skb->next = NULL;
if (tipc_buf_append(&tmp, &skb)) {
__skb_queue_tail(list, skb);
return true;
}
if (!tmp)
break;
}
__skb_queue_purge(list);
__skb_queue_head_init(list);
pr_warn("Failed do assemble buffer\n");
return false;
}
/* tipc_msg_reassemble() - clone a buffer chain of fragments and
* reassemble the clones into one message
*/
bool tipc_msg_reassemble(struct sk_buff_head *list, struct sk_buff_head *rcvq)
{
struct sk_buff *skb, *_skb;
struct sk_buff *frag = NULL;
struct sk_buff *head = NULL;
int hdr_len;
/* Copy header if single buffer */
if (skb_queue_len(list) == 1) {
skb = skb_peek(list);
hdr_len = skb_headroom(skb) + msg_hdr_sz(buf_msg(skb));
_skb = __pskb_copy(skb, hdr_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!_skb)
return false;
__skb_queue_tail(rcvq, _skb);
return true;
}
/* Clone all fragments and reassemble */
skb_queue_walk(list, skb) {
frag = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!frag)
goto error;
frag->next = NULL;
if (tipc_buf_append(&head, &frag))
break;
if (!head)
goto error;
}
__skb_queue_tail(rcvq, frag);
return true;
error:
pr_warn("Failed do clone local mcast rcv buffer\n");
kfree_skb(head);
return false;
}
bool tipc_msg_pskb_copy(u32 dst, struct sk_buff_head *msg,
struct sk_buff_head *cpy)
{
struct sk_buff *skb, *_skb;
skb_queue_walk(msg, skb) {
_skb = pskb_copy(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!_skb) {
__skb_queue_purge(cpy);
return false;
}
msg_set_destnode(buf_msg(_skb), dst);
__skb_queue_tail(cpy, _skb);
}
return true;
}
/* tipc_skb_queue_sorted(); sort pkt into list according to sequence number
* @list: list to be appended to
* @seqno: sequence number of buffer to add
* @skb: buffer to add
*/
bool __tipc_skb_queue_sorted(struct sk_buff_head *list, u16 seqno,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sk_buff *_skb, *tmp;
if (skb_queue_empty(list) || less(seqno, buf_seqno(skb_peek(list)))) {
__skb_queue_head(list, skb);
return true;
}
if (more(seqno, buf_seqno(skb_peek_tail(list)))) {
__skb_queue_tail(list, skb);
return true;
}
skb_queue_walk_safe(list, _skb, tmp) {
if (more(seqno, buf_seqno(_skb)))
continue;
if (seqno == buf_seqno(_skb))
break;
__skb_queue_before(list, _skb, skb);
return true;
}
kfree_skb(skb);
return false;
}
void tipc_skb_reject(struct net *net, int err, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sk_buff_head *xmitq)
{
if (tipc_msg_reverse(tipc_own_addr(net), &skb, err))
__skb_queue_tail(xmitq, skb);
}