mirror of
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git
synced 2025-01-10 07:50:04 +00:00
Merge branch 'random-5.17-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random
Pull random number generator fixes from Jason Donenfeld: - Some Kconfig changes resulted in BIG_KEYS being unselectable, which Justin sent a patch to fix. - Geert pointed out that moving to BLAKE2s bloated vmlinux on little machines, like m68k, so we now compensate for this. - Numerous style and house cleaning fixes, meant to have a cleaner base for future changes. * 'random-5.17-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account() random: selectively clang-format where it makes sense random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_ random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument random: remove incomplete last_data logic random: cleanup integer types random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction random: fix typo in comments lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard lib/crypto: add prompts back to crypto libraries
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
commit
0ed9059756
@ -1928,5 +1928,3 @@ source "crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig"
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source "certs/Kconfig"
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endif # if CRYPTO
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source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
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File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -302,6 +302,41 @@ void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key(
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static_identity->static_public, private_key);
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}
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static void hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen, const size_t keylen)
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{
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struct blake2s_state state;
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u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 };
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u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
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int i;
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if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
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blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
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blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen);
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blake2s_final(&state, x_key);
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} else
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memcpy(x_key, key, keylen);
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for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
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x_key[i] ^= 0x36;
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blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
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blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
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blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
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blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
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for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
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x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
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blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
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blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
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blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
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blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
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memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
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memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
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memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
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}
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/* This is Hugo Krawczyk's HKDF:
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* - https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf
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* - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
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@ -322,14 +357,14 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
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((third_len || third_dst) && (!second_len || !second_dst))));
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/* Extract entropy from data into secret */
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blake2s256_hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
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hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
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if (!first_dst || !first_len)
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goto out;
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/* Expand first key: key = secret, data = 0x1 */
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output[0] = 1;
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blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
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hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
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memcpy(first_dst, output, first_len);
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if (!second_dst || !second_len)
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@ -337,8 +372,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
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/* Expand second key: key = secret, data = first-key || 0x2 */
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output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 2;
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blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
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BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
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hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
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memcpy(second_dst, output, second_len);
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if (!third_dst || !third_len)
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@ -346,8 +380,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
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/* Expand third key: key = secret, data = second-key || 0x3 */
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output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 3;
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blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
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BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
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hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
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memcpy(third_dst, output, third_len);
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out:
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@ -101,7 +101,4 @@ static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key,
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blake2s_final(&state, out);
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}
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void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen,
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const size_t keylen);
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#endif /* _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H */
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@ -28,80 +28,71 @@ TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
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);
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DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
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TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
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TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
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TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP),
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TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
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TP_STRUCT__entry(
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__field( const char *, pool_name )
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__field( int, bytes )
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__field(unsigned long, IP )
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),
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TP_fast_assign(
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__entry->pool_name = pool_name;
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__entry->bytes = bytes;
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__entry->IP = IP;
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),
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TP_printk("%s pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
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__entry->pool_name, __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
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TP_printk("input pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
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__entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
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);
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DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes,
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TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
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TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
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TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
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TP_ARGS(bytes, IP)
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);
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DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock,
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TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
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TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
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TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
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TP_ARGS(bytes, IP)
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);
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TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
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TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bits, int entropy_count,
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unsigned long IP),
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TP_PROTO(int bits, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP),
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TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, IP),
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TP_ARGS(bits, entropy_count, IP),
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TP_STRUCT__entry(
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__field( const char *, pool_name )
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__field( int, bits )
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__field( int, entropy_count )
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__field(unsigned long, IP )
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),
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TP_fast_assign(
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__entry->pool_name = pool_name;
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__entry->bits = bits;
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__entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
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__entry->IP = IP;
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),
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TP_printk("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
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__entry->pool_name, __entry->bits,
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__entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
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TP_printk("input pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
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__entry->bits, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
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);
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TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy,
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TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int debit_bits),
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TP_PROTO(int debit_bits),
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TP_ARGS(pool_name, debit_bits),
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TP_ARGS( debit_bits),
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TP_STRUCT__entry(
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__field( const char *, pool_name )
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__field( int, debit_bits )
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),
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TP_fast_assign(
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__entry->pool_name = pool_name;
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__entry->debit_bits = debit_bits;
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),
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TP_printk("%s: debit_bits %d", __entry->pool_name,
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__entry->debit_bits)
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TP_printk("input pool: debit_bits %d", __entry->debit_bits)
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);
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TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness,
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@ -170,36 +161,31 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch,
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);
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DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
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TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
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unsigned long IP),
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TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP),
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TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
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TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
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TP_STRUCT__entry(
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__field( const char *, pool_name )
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__field( int, nbytes )
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__field( int, entropy_count )
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__field(unsigned long, IP )
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),
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TP_fast_assign(
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__entry->pool_name = pool_name;
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__entry->nbytes = nbytes;
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__entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
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__entry->IP = IP;
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),
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TP_printk("%s pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
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__entry->pool_name, __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count,
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(void *)__entry->IP)
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TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
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__entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
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);
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DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
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TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
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unsigned long IP),
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TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP),
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TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
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TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
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);
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TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,
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@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ config INDIRECT_IOMEM_FALLBACK
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mmio accesses when the IO memory address is not a registered
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emulated region.
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source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
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config CRC_CCITT
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tristate "CRC-CCITT functions"
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help
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@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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menu "Crypto library routines"
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config CRYPTO_LIB_AES
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tristate
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@ -31,7 +33,7 @@ config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
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config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
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tristate
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select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
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select XOR_BLOCKS
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help
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This symbol can be depended upon by arch implementations of the
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ChaCha library interface that require the generic code as a
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@ -40,7 +42,8 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
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of CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA.
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config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
|
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tristate
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tristate "ChaCha library interface"
|
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depends on CRYPTO
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depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
|
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select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=n
|
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help
|
||||
@ -65,7 +68,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC
|
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of CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519.
|
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|
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config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519
|
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tristate
|
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tristate "Curve25519 scalar multiplication library"
|
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depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519
|
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select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=n
|
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help
|
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@ -100,7 +103,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
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of CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305.
|
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|
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config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
|
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tristate
|
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tristate "Poly1305 library interface"
|
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depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
|
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select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=n
|
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help
|
||||
@ -109,14 +112,18 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
|
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is available and enabled.
|
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|
||||
config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
|
||||
tristate
|
||||
tristate "ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD support (8-byte nonce library version)"
|
||||
depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
|
||||
depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
|
||||
depends on CRYPTO
|
||||
select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
|
||||
select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
|
||||
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
||||
|
||||
config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
|
||||
tristate
|
||||
|
||||
config CRYPTO_LIB_SM4
|
||||
tristate
|
||||
|
||||
endmenu
|
||||
|
||||
@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
|
||||
* #include <stdio.h>
|
||||
*
|
||||
* #include <openssl/evp.h>
|
||||
* #include <openssl/hmac.h>
|
||||
*
|
||||
* #define BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT 256
|
||||
*
|
||||
@ -58,16 +57,6 @@
|
||||
* }
|
||||
* printf("};\n\n");
|
||||
*
|
||||
* printf("static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {\n");
|
||||
*
|
||||
* HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), key, sizeof(key), buf, sizeof(buf), hash, NULL);
|
||||
* print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
|
||||
*
|
||||
* HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), buf, sizeof(buf), key, sizeof(key), hash, NULL);
|
||||
* print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
|
||||
*
|
||||
* printf("};\n");
|
||||
*
|
||||
* return 0;
|
||||
*}
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -554,15 +543,6 @@ static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
|
||||
0xd6, 0x98, 0x6b, 0x07, 0x10, 0x65, 0x52, 0x65, },
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
|
||||
{ 0xce, 0xe1, 0x57, 0x69, 0x82, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x43, 0xad, 0x56, 0x4c, 0x70,
|
||||
0xed, 0x68, 0x16, 0x96, 0xcf, 0xa4, 0x73, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x79,
|
||||
0x08, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x82, 0xda, 0x3f, 0x05, 0x11, },
|
||||
{ 0x77, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x41, 0xf4, 0x4b, 0x2b, 0xb3, 0xc6, 0xb6, 0xf9,
|
||||
0x60, 0xde, 0xe4, 0x52, 0x38, 0x66, 0xe8, 0xbf, 0x9b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x9f,
|
||||
0x60, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x37, 0x99, 0xd6, 0xec, 0x31, },
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE];
|
||||
@ -607,16 +587,5 @@ bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (success) {
|
||||
blake2s256_hmac(hash, buf, key, sizeof(buf), sizeof(key));
|
||||
success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[0], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
blake2s256_hmac(hash, key, buf, sizeof(key), sizeof(buf));
|
||||
success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[1], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!success)
|
||||
pr_err("blake2s256_hmac self-test: FAIL\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return success;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -30,43 +30,6 @@ void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out)
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final);
|
||||
|
||||
void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen,
|
||||
const size_t keylen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct blake2s_state state;
|
||||
u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 };
|
||||
u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
||||
blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen);
|
||||
blake2s_final(&state, x_key);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
memcpy(x_key, key, keylen);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
|
||||
x_key[i] ^= 0x36;
|
||||
|
||||
blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||||
blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
|
||||
blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
|
||||
x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
|
||||
|
||||
blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||||
blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||||
memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s256_hmac);
|
||||
|
||||
static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) &&
|
||||
|
||||
95
lib/sha1.c
95
lib/sha1.c
@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
|
||||
#include <linux/kernel.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/export.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/bitops.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/string.h>
|
||||
#include <crypto/sha1.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -55,7 +56,8 @@
|
||||
#define SHA_ROUND(t, input, fn, constant, A, B, C, D, E) do { \
|
||||
__u32 TEMP = input(t); setW(t, TEMP); \
|
||||
E += TEMP + rol32(A,5) + (fn) + (constant); \
|
||||
B = ror32(B, 2); } while (0)
|
||||
B = ror32(B, 2); \
|
||||
TEMP = E; E = D; D = C; C = B; B = A; A = TEMP; } while (0)
|
||||
|
||||
#define T_0_15(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_SRC, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
|
||||
#define T_16_19(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_MIX, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
|
||||
@ -84,6 +86,7 @@
|
||||
void sha1_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
|
||||
{
|
||||
__u32 A, B, C, D, E;
|
||||
unsigned int i = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
A = digest[0];
|
||||
B = digest[1];
|
||||
@ -92,94 +95,24 @@ void sha1_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
|
||||
E = digest[4];
|
||||
|
||||
/* Round 1 - iterations 0-16 take their input from 'data' */
|
||||
T_0_15( 0, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_0_15( 1, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_0_15( 2, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_0_15( 3, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_0_15( 4, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
T_0_15( 5, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_0_15( 6, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_0_15( 7, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_0_15( 8, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_0_15( 9, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
T_0_15(10, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_0_15(11, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_0_15(12, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_0_15(13, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_0_15(14, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
T_0_15(15, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
for (; i < 16; ++i)
|
||||
T_0_15(i, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Round 1 - tail. Input from 512-bit mixing array */
|
||||
T_16_19(16, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_16_19(17, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_16_19(18, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_16_19(19, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
for (; i < 20; ++i)
|
||||
T_16_19(i, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Round 2 */
|
||||
T_20_39(20, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_20_39(21, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_20_39(22, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_20_39(23, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_20_39(24, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
T_20_39(25, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_20_39(26, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_20_39(27, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_20_39(28, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_20_39(29, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
T_20_39(30, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_20_39(31, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_20_39(32, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_20_39(33, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_20_39(34, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
T_20_39(35, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_20_39(36, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_20_39(37, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_20_39(38, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_20_39(39, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
for (; i < 40; ++i)
|
||||
T_20_39(i, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Round 3 */
|
||||
T_40_59(40, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_40_59(41, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_40_59(42, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_40_59(43, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_40_59(44, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
T_40_59(45, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_40_59(46, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_40_59(47, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_40_59(48, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_40_59(49, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
T_40_59(50, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_40_59(51, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_40_59(52, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_40_59(53, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_40_59(54, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
T_40_59(55, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_40_59(56, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_40_59(57, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_40_59(58, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_40_59(59, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
for (; i < 60; ++i)
|
||||
T_40_59(i, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Round 4 */
|
||||
T_60_79(60, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_60_79(61, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_60_79(62, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_60_79(63, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_60_79(64, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
T_60_79(65, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_60_79(66, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_60_79(67, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_60_79(68, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_60_79(69, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
T_60_79(70, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_60_79(71, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_60_79(72, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_60_79(73, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_60_79(74, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
T_60_79(75, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
T_60_79(76, E, A, B, C, D);
|
||||
T_60_79(77, D, E, A, B, C);
|
||||
T_60_79(78, C, D, E, A, B);
|
||||
T_60_79(79, B, C, D, E, A);
|
||||
for (; i < 80; ++i)
|
||||
T_60_79(i, A, B, C, D, E);
|
||||
|
||||
digest[0] += A;
|
||||
digest[1] += B;
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user