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lsm/stable-6.10 PR 20240617

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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240617' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm

Pull lsm fix from Paul Moore:
 "A single LSM/IMA patch to fix a problem caused by sleeping while in a
  RCU critical section"

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240617' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2024-06-17 18:35:12 -07:00
commit 3d54351c64
11 changed files with 34 additions and 22 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
View File

@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_post_create_or_update, struct key *keyring,
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule)
void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule)

5
include/linux/security.h
View File

@ -2048,7 +2048,8 @@ static inline void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
gfp_t gfp);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
@ -2056,7 +2057,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
#else
static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule)
void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp)
{
return 0;
}

5
kernel/auditfilter.c
View File

@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
f->lsm_str = str;
err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
(void **)&f->lsm_rule);
(void **)&f->lsm_rule,
GFP_KERNEL);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
@ -799,7 +800,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
/* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
(void **)&df->lsm_rule);
(void **)&df->lsm_rule, GFP_KERNEL);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {

6
security/apparmor/audit.c
View File

@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
}
}
int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct aa_audit_rule *rule;
@ -230,14 +230,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
return -EINVAL;
}
rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp);
if (!rule)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */
rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr,
GFP_KERNEL, true, false);
gfp, true, false);
if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) {
int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label);
aa_audit_rule_free(rule);

2
security/apparmor/include/audit.h
View File

@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
}
void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule);
int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp);
int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);

2
security/integrity/ima/ima.h
View File

@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
#else
static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule)
void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp)
{
return -EINVAL;
}

15
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
View File

@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
kfree(entry);
}
static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
int i;
@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
* Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only
* lsm rules can change
*/
nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL);
nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp);
if (!nentry)
return NULL;
@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
&nentry->lsm[i].rule);
&nentry->lsm[i].rule,
gfp);
if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
int i;
struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry);
nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nentry)
return -ENOMEM;
@ -664,7 +666,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
}
if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) {
lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule);
lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (lsm_rule) {
rule_reinitialized = true;
goto retry;
@ -1140,7 +1142,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);

6
security/security.c
View File

@ -5332,15 +5332,17 @@ void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
* @op: rule operator
* @rulestr: rule context
* @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct
* @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc
*
* Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
*
* Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of
* an invalid rule.
*/
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
gfp_t gfp)
{
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp);
}
/**

4
security/selinux/include/audit.h
View File

@ -21,12 +21,14 @@
* @op: the operator the rule uses
* @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
* @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
* @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc
*
* Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure
* will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with
* selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
*/
int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule);
int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule,
gfp_t gfp);
/**
* selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.

5
security/selinux/ss/services.c
View File

@ -3507,7 +3507,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
}
}
int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
struct selinux_policy *policy;
@ -3548,7 +3549,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
return -EINVAL;
}
tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), gfp);
if (!tmprule)
return -ENOMEM;
context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);

4
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
View File

@ -4693,11 +4693,13 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
* @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
* @rulestr: smack label to be audited
* @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
* @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
*
* Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
* The label to be audited is created if necessay.
*/
static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
char **rule = (char **)vrule;