mirror of
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git
synced 2025-01-13 17:28:56 +00:00
crypto: aesni - Convert rfc4106 to new AEAD interface
This patch converts the low-level __gcm-aes-aesni algorithm to the new AEAD interface. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This commit is contained in:
Herbert Xu
parent
3e648cbeb3
commit
b7c89d9e2f
@ -44,13 +44,18 @@
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#endif
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#define AESNI_ALIGN 16
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#define AES_BLOCK_MASK (~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1))
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#define RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE 16
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/* This data is stored at the end of the crypto_tfm struct.
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* It's a type of per "session" data storage location.
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* This needs to be 16 byte aligned.
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*/
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struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx {
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u8 hash_subkey[16];
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struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key_expanded;
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u8 hash_subkey[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
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struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key_expanded
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__attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
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u8 nonce[4];
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};
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@ -65,10 +70,6 @@ struct aesni_hash_subkey_req_data {
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struct scatterlist sg;
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};
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#define AESNI_ALIGN (16)
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#define AES_BLOCK_MASK (~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1))
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#define RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE 16
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struct aesni_lrw_ctx {
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struct lrw_table_ctx lrw_table;
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u8 raw_aes_ctx[sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx) + AESNI_ALIGN - 1];
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@ -282,10 +283,11 @@ static void (*aesni_gcm_dec_tfm)(void *ctx, u8 *out,
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static inline struct
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aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
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{
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return
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(struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *)
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PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)
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crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)), AESNI_ALIGN);
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unsigned long align = AESNI_ALIGN;
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if (align <= crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment())
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align = 1;
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return PTR_ALIGN(crypto_aead_ctx(tfm), align);
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}
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#endif
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@ -838,8 +840,6 @@ rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *key, unsigned int key_len)
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if (IS_ERR(ctr_tfm))
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return PTR_ERR(ctr_tfm);
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crypto_ablkcipher_clear_flags(ctr_tfm, ~0);
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ret = crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(ctr_tfm, key, key_len);
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if (ret)
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goto out_free_ablkcipher;
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@ -888,56 +888,20 @@ out_free_ablkcipher:
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static int common_rfc4106_set_key(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
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unsigned int key_len)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(aead);
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struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(aead);
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u8 *new_key_align, *new_key_mem = NULL;
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if (key_len < 4) {
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crypto_tfm_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
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crypto_aead_set_flags(aead, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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/*Account for 4 byte nonce at the end.*/
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key_len -= 4;
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if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
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key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256) {
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crypto_tfm_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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memcpy(ctx->nonce, key + key_len, sizeof(ctx->nonce));
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/*This must be on a 16 byte boundary!*/
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if ((unsigned long)(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_enc[0])) % AESNI_ALIGN)
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return -EINVAL;
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if ((unsigned long)key % AESNI_ALIGN) {
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/*key is not aligned: use an auxuliar aligned pointer*/
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new_key_mem = kmalloc(key_len+AESNI_ALIGN, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!new_key_mem)
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return -ENOMEM;
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new_key_align = PTR_ALIGN(new_key_mem, AESNI_ALIGN);
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memcpy(new_key_align, key, key_len);
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key = new_key_align;
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}
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if (!irq_fpu_usable())
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ret = crypto_aes_expand_key(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded),
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key, key_len);
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else {
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kernel_fpu_begin();
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ret = aesni_set_key(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded), key, key_len);
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kernel_fpu_end();
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}
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/*This must be on a 16 byte boundary!*/
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if ((unsigned long)(&(ctx->hash_subkey[0])) % AESNI_ALIGN) {
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ret = -EINVAL;
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goto exit;
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}
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ret = rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(ctx->hash_subkey, key, key_len);
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exit:
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kfree(new_key_mem);
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return ret;
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return aes_set_key_common(crypto_aead_tfm(aead),
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&ctx->aes_key_expanded, key, key_len) ?:
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rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(ctx->hash_subkey, key, key_len);
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}
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static int rfc4106_set_key(struct crypto_aead *parent, const u8 *key,
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@ -960,7 +924,7 @@ static int common_rfc4106_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *aead,
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default:
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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crypto_aead_crt(aead)->authsize = authsize;
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return 0;
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}
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@ -975,20 +939,17 @@ static int rfc4106_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *parent,
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return crypto_aead_setauthsize(&cryptd_tfm->base, authsize);
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}
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static int __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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{
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u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
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u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
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__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
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struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
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struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
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u32 key_len = ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_length;
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void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
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unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
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u8 iv_tab[16+AESNI_ALIGN];
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u8* iv = (u8 *) PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)iv_tab, AESNI_ALIGN);
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u8 iv[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
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struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
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struct scatter_walk assoc_sg_walk;
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struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk;
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unsigned int i;
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@ -997,12 +958,6 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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/* to 8 or 12 bytes */
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if (unlikely(req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (unlikely(auth_tag_len != 8 && auth_tag_len != 12 && auth_tag_len != 16))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (unlikely(key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
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key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
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key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256))
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return -EINVAL;
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/* IV below built */
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for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
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@ -1011,55 +966,57 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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*(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i];
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*((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter;
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if ((sg_is_last(req->src)) && (sg_is_last(req->assoc))) {
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if (sg_is_last(req->src) &&
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req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE &&
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sg_is_last(req->dst) &&
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req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE) {
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one_entry_in_sg = 1;
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scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
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scatterwalk_start(&assoc_sg_walk, req->assoc);
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src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
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assoc = scatterwalk_map(&assoc_sg_walk);
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assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
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src = assoc + req->assoclen;
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dst = src;
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if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
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scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
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dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk);
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dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen;
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}
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} else {
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/* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
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src = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen,
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assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen,
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GFP_ATOMIC);
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if (unlikely(!src))
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if (unlikely(!assoc))
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return -ENOMEM;
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assoc = (src + req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len);
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scatterwalk_map_and_copy(src, req->src, 0, req->cryptlen, 0);
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scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->assoc, 0,
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req->assoclen, 0);
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scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0,
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req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
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src = assoc + req->assoclen;
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dst = src;
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}
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kernel_fpu_begin();
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aesni_gcm_enc_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, (unsigned long)req->cryptlen, iv,
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ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, (unsigned long)req->assoclen, dst
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+ ((unsigned long)req->cryptlen), auth_tag_len);
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kernel_fpu_end();
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/* The authTag (aka the Integrity Check Value) needs to be written
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* back to the packet. */
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if (one_entry_in_sg) {
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if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
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scatterwalk_unmap(dst);
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scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 0, 0);
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scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen);
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scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst->length);
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scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0);
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}
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scatterwalk_unmap(src);
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scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
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scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, 0);
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scatterwalk_done(&assoc_sg_walk, 0, 0);
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scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, req->src->length);
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scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0);
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} else {
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scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, 0,
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req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len, 1);
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kfree(src);
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scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen,
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req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len, 1);
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kfree(assoc);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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{
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u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
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u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
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@ -1068,26 +1025,16 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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int retval = 0;
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struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
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struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
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u32 key_len = ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_length;
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void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
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unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
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u8 iv_and_authTag[32+AESNI_ALIGN];
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u8 *iv = (u8 *) PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)iv_and_authTag, AESNI_ALIGN);
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u8 *authTag = iv + 16;
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u8 iv[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
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u8 authTag[16];
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struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
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struct scatter_walk assoc_sg_walk;
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struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk;
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unsigned int i;
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if (unlikely((req->cryptlen < auth_tag_len) ||
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(req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12)))
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if (unlikely(req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (unlikely(auth_tag_len != 8 && auth_tag_len != 12 && auth_tag_len != 16))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (unlikely(key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
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key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
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key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256))
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Assuming we are supporting rfc4106 64-bit extended */
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/* sequence numbers We need to have the AAD length */
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@ -1101,33 +1048,36 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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*(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i];
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*((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter;
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if ((sg_is_last(req->src)) && (sg_is_last(req->assoc))) {
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if (sg_is_last(req->src) &&
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req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE &&
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sg_is_last(req->dst) &&
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req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE) {
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one_entry_in_sg = 1;
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scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
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scatterwalk_start(&assoc_sg_walk, req->assoc);
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src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
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assoc = scatterwalk_map(&assoc_sg_walk);
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assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
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src = assoc + req->assoclen;
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dst = src;
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if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
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scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
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dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk);
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dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen;
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}
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} else {
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/* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
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src = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
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if (!src)
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assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
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if (!assoc)
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return -ENOMEM;
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assoc = (src + req->cryptlen);
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scatterwalk_map_and_copy(src, req->src, 0, req->cryptlen, 0);
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scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->assoc, 0,
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req->assoclen, 0);
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scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0,
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req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
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src = assoc + req->assoclen;
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dst = src;
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}
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kernel_fpu_begin();
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aesni_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, tempCipherLen, iv,
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ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, (unsigned long)req->assoclen,
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authTag, auth_tag_len);
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kernel_fpu_end();
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/* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */
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retval = crypto_memneq(src + tempCipherLen, authTag, auth_tag_len) ?
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@ -1135,16 +1085,17 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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if (one_entry_in_sg) {
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if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
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scatterwalk_unmap(dst);
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scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 0, 0);
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scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen);
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scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst->length);
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scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0);
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}
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scatterwalk_unmap(src);
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scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
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scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, 0);
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scatterwalk_done(&assoc_sg_walk, 0, 0);
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scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, req->src->length);
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scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0);
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} else {
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scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, 0, tempCipherLen, 1);
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kfree(src);
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scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen,
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tempCipherLen, 1);
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kfree(assoc);
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}
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return retval;
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}
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@ -1188,36 +1139,6 @@ static int rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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return crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
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}
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static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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{
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int ret;
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if (unlikely(!irq_fpu_usable())) {
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WARN_ONCE(1, "__gcm-aes-aesni alg used in invalid context");
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ret = -EINVAL;
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} else {
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kernel_fpu_begin();
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ret = __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(req);
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kernel_fpu_end();
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}
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return ret;
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}
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static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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{
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int ret;
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if (unlikely(!irq_fpu_usable())) {
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WARN_ONCE(1, "__gcm-aes-aesni alg used in invalid context");
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ret = -EINVAL;
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} else {
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kernel_fpu_begin();
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ret = __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(req);
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kernel_fpu_end();
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}
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return ret;
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}
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#endif
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static struct crypto_alg aesni_algs[] = { {
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@ -1389,27 +1310,6 @@ static struct crypto_alg aesni_algs[] = { {
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.geniv = "chainiv",
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},
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},
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}, {
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.cra_name = "__gcm-aes-aesni",
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.cra_driver_name = "__driver-gcm-aes-aesni",
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.cra_priority = 0,
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.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
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.cra_blocksize = 1,
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.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx) +
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AESNI_ALIGN,
|
||||
.cra_alignmask = 0,
|
||||
.cra_type = &crypto_aead_type,
|
||||
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
||||
.cra_u = {
|
||||
.aead = {
|
||||
.setkey = common_rfc4106_set_key,
|
||||
.setauthsize = common_rfc4106_set_authsize,
|
||||
.encrypt = helper_rfc4106_encrypt,
|
||||
.decrypt = helper_rfc4106_decrypt,
|
||||
.ivsize = 8,
|
||||
.maxauthsize = 16,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC)
|
||||
}, {
|
||||
@ -1526,6 +1426,22 @@ static struct crypto_alg aesni_algs[] = { {
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
|
||||
static struct aead_alg aesni_aead_algs[] = { {
|
||||
.setkey = common_rfc4106_set_key,
|
||||
.setauthsize = common_rfc4106_set_authsize,
|
||||
.encrypt = helper_rfc4106_encrypt,
|
||||
.decrypt = helper_rfc4106_decrypt,
|
||||
.ivsize = 8,
|
||||
.maxauthsize = 16,
|
||||
.base = {
|
||||
.cra_name = "__gcm-aes-aesni",
|
||||
.cra_driver_name = "__driver-gcm-aes-aesni",
|
||||
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
|
||||
.cra_blocksize = 1,
|
||||
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx),
|
||||
.cra_alignmask = AESNI_ALIGN - 1,
|
||||
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}, {
|
||||
.init = rfc4106_init,
|
||||
.exit = rfc4106_exit,
|
||||
.setkey = rfc4106_set_key,
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user