Jason A. Donenfeld 329d823098 Bluetooth: use constant time memory comparison for secret values
This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of
MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing
attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the
complexity, some other type of attack.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2017-06-10 15:45:40 +02:00
..
2017-01-14 11:37:18 +01:00
2015-07-30 13:31:59 +02:00
2015-07-30 13:31:59 +02:00