linux-next/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
Matthieu Buffet 53b9d789df
samples/landlock: Clarify option parsing behaviour
Clarify the distinction between filesystem variables (mandatory)
and all others (optional).

For optional variables, explain the difference between unset variables
(no access check performed) and empty variables (nothing allowed for
lists of allowed paths/ports, or no effect for lists of scopes).

List the known LL_SCOPED values and their effect.

Signed-off-by: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241019151534.1400605-4-matthieu@buffet.re
[mic: Add a missing colon]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2024-10-22 20:43:43 +02:00

499 lines
14 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
/*
* Simple Landlock sandbox manager able to execute a process restricted by
* user-defined file system and network access control policies.
*
* Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
* Copyright © 2020 ANSSI
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#define __SANE_USERSPACE_TYPES__
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/landlock.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#ifndef landlock_create_ruleset
static inline int
landlock_create_ruleset(const struct landlock_ruleset_attr *const attr,
const size_t size, const __u32 flags)
{
return syscall(__NR_landlock_create_ruleset, attr, size, flags);
}
#endif
#ifndef landlock_add_rule
static inline int landlock_add_rule(const int ruleset_fd,
const enum landlock_rule_type rule_type,
const void *const rule_attr,
const __u32 flags)
{
return syscall(__NR_landlock_add_rule, ruleset_fd, rule_type, rule_attr,
flags);
}
#endif
#ifndef landlock_restrict_self
static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd,
const __u32 flags)
{
return syscall(__NR_landlock_restrict_self, ruleset_fd, flags);
}
#endif
#define ENV_FS_RO_NAME "LL_FS_RO"
#define ENV_FS_RW_NAME "LL_FS_RW"
#define ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND"
#define ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT"
#define ENV_SCOPED_NAME "LL_SCOPED"
#define ENV_DELIMITER ":"
static int str2num(const char *numstr, __u64 *num_dst)
{
char *endptr = NULL;
int err = 0;
__u64 num;
errno = 0;
num = strtoull(numstr, &endptr, 10);
if (errno != 0)
err = errno;
/* Was the string empty, or not entirely parsed successfully? */
else if ((*numstr == '\0') || (*endptr != '\0'))
err = EINVAL;
else
*num_dst = num;
return err;
}
static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
{
int i, num_paths = 0;
if (env_path) {
num_paths++;
for (i = 0; env_path[i]; i++) {
if (env_path[i] == ENV_DELIMITER[0])
num_paths++;
}
}
*path_list = malloc(num_paths * sizeof(**path_list));
for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++)
(*path_list)[i] = strsep(&env_path, ENV_DELIMITER);
return num_paths;
}
/* clang-format off */
#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
/* clang-format on */
static int populate_ruleset_fs(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
const __u64 allowed_access)
{
int num_paths, i, ret = 1;
char *env_path_name;
const char **path_list = NULL;
struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath = {
.parent_fd = -1,
};
env_path_name = getenv(env_var);
if (!env_path_name) {
/* Prevents users to forget a setting. */
fprintf(stderr, "Missing environment variable %s\n", env_var);
return 1;
}
env_path_name = strdup(env_path_name);
unsetenv(env_var);
num_paths = parse_path(env_path_name, &path_list);
if (num_paths == 1 && path_list[0][0] == '\0') {
/*
* Allows to not use all possible restrictions (e.g. use
* LL_FS_RO without LL_FS_RW).
*/
ret = 0;
goto out_free_name;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) {
struct stat statbuf;
path_beneath.parent_fd = open(path_list[i], O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
if (path_beneath.parent_fd < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open \"%s\": %s\n",
path_list[i], strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (fstat(path_beneath.parent_fd, &statbuf)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to stat \"%s\": %s\n",
path_list[i], strerror(errno));
close(path_beneath.parent_fd);
goto out_free_name;
}
path_beneath.allowed_access = allowed_access;
if (!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
path_beneath.allowed_access &= ACCESS_FILE;
if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
&path_beneath, 0)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Failed to update the ruleset with \"%s\": %s\n",
path_list[i], strerror(errno));
close(path_beneath.parent_fd);
goto out_free_name;
}
close(path_beneath.parent_fd);
}
ret = 0;
out_free_name:
free(path_list);
free(env_path_name);
return ret;
}
static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
const __u64 allowed_access)
{
int ret = 1;
char *env_port_name, *env_port_name_next, *strport;
struct landlock_net_port_attr net_port = {
.allowed_access = allowed_access,
};
env_port_name = getenv(env_var);
if (!env_port_name)
return 0;
env_port_name = strdup(env_port_name);
unsetenv(env_var);
env_port_name_next = env_port_name;
while ((strport = strsep(&env_port_name_next, ENV_DELIMITER))) {
__u64 port;
if (strcmp(strport, "") == 0)
continue;
if (str2num(strport, &port)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse port at \"%s\"\n",
strport);
goto out_free_name;
}
net_port.port = port;
if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
&net_port, 0)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Failed to update the ruleset with port \"%llu\": %s\n",
net_port.port, strerror(errno));
goto out_free_name;
}
}
ret = 0;
out_free_name:
free(env_port_name);
return ret;
}
/* Returns true on error, false otherwise. */
static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
struct landlock_ruleset_attr *ruleset_attr)
{
char *env_type_scope, *env_type_scope_next, *ipc_scoping_name;
bool error = false;
bool abstract_scoping = false;
bool signal_scoping = false;
/* Scoping is not supported by Landlock ABI */
if (!(ruleset_attr->scoped &
(LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET | LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL)))
goto out_unset;
env_type_scope = getenv(env_var);
/* Scoping is not supported by the user */
if (!env_type_scope || strcmp("", env_type_scope) == 0)
goto out_unset;
env_type_scope = strdup(env_type_scope);
env_type_scope_next = env_type_scope;
while ((ipc_scoping_name =
strsep(&env_type_scope_next, ENV_DELIMITER))) {
if (strcmp("a", ipc_scoping_name) == 0 && !abstract_scoping) {
abstract_scoping = true;
} else if (strcmp("s", ipc_scoping_name) == 0 &&
!signal_scoping) {
signal_scoping = true;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown or duplicate scope \"%s\"\n",
ipc_scoping_name);
error = true;
goto out_free_name;
}
}
out_free_name:
free(env_type_scope);
out_unset:
if (!abstract_scoping)
ruleset_attr->scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
if (!signal_scoping)
ruleset_attr->scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL;
unsetenv(env_var);
return error;
}
/* clang-format off */
#define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ ( \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR)
#define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE ( \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
/* clang-format on */
#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 6
#define XSTR(s) #s
#define STR(s) XSTR(s)
/* clang-format off */
static const char help[] =
"usage: " ENV_FS_RO_NAME "=\"...\" " ENV_FS_RW_NAME "=\"...\" "
"[other environment variables] %1$s <cmd> [args]...\n"
"\n"
"Execute the given command in a restricted environment.\n"
"Multi-valued settings (lists of ports, paths, scopes) are colon-delimited.\n"
"\n"
"Mandatory settings:\n"
"* " ENV_FS_RO_NAME ": paths allowed to be used in a read-only way\n"
"* " ENV_FS_RW_NAME ": paths allowed to be used in a read-write way\n"
"\n"
"Optional settings (when not set, their associated access check "
"is always allowed, which is different from an empty string which "
"means an empty list):\n"
"* " ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME ": ports allowed to bind (server)\n"
"* " ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME ": ports allowed to connect (client)\n"
"* " ENV_SCOPED_NAME ": actions denied on the outside of the landlock domain\n"
" - \"a\" to restrict opening abstract unix sockets\n"
" - \"s\" to restrict sending signals\n"
"\n"
"Example:\n"
ENV_FS_RO_NAME "=\"${PATH}:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" "
ENV_FS_RW_NAME "=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" "
ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "=\"9418\" "
ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "=\"80:443\" "
ENV_SCOPED_NAME "=\"a:s\" "
"%1$s bash -i\n"
"\n"
"This sandboxer can use Landlock features up to ABI version "
STR(LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST) ".\n";
/* clang-format on */
int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
{
const char *cmd_path;
char *const *cmd_argv;
int ruleset_fd, abi;
char *env_port_name;
__u64 access_fs_ro = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ,
access_fs_rw = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE;
struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
.handled_access_fs = access_fs_rw,
.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
};
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr, help, argv[0]);
return 1;
}
abi = landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION);
if (abi < 0) {
const int err = errno;
perror("Failed to check Landlock compatibility");
switch (err) {
case ENOSYS:
fprintf(stderr,
"Hint: Landlock is not supported by the current kernel. "
"To support it, build the kernel with "
"CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y and prepend "
"\"landlock,\" to the content of CONFIG_LSM.\n");
break;
case EOPNOTSUPP:
fprintf(stderr,
"Hint: Landlock is currently disabled. "
"It can be enabled in the kernel configuration by "
"prepending \"landlock,\" to the content of CONFIG_LSM, "
"or at boot time by setting the same content to the "
"\"lsm\" kernel parameter.\n");
break;
}
return 1;
}
/* Best-effort security. */
switch (abi) {
case 1:
/*
* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER for ABI < 2
*
* Note: The "refer" operations (file renaming and linking
* across different directories) are always forbidden when using
* Landlock with ABI 1.
*
* If only ABI 1 is available, this sandboxer knowingly forbids
* refer operations.
*
* If a program *needs* to do refer operations after enabling
* Landlock, it can not use Landlock at ABI level 1. To be
* compatible with different kernel versions, such programs
* should then fall back to not restrict themselves at all if
* the running kernel only supports ABI 1.
*/
ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER;
__attribute__((fallthrough));
case 2:
/* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */
ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
__attribute__((fallthrough));
case 3:
/* Removes network support for ABI < 4 */
ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
__attribute__((fallthrough));
case 4:
/* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV for ABI < 5 */
ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
__attribute__((fallthrough));
case 5:
/* Removes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_* for ABI < 6 */
ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~(LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL);
fprintf(stderr,
"Hint: You should update the running kernel "
"to leverage Landlock features "
"provided by ABI version %d (instead of %d).\n",
LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST, abi);
__attribute__((fallthrough));
case LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST:
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr,
"Hint: You should update this sandboxer "
"to leverage Landlock features "
"provided by ABI version %d (instead of %d).\n",
abi, LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST);
}
access_fs_ro &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs;
access_fs_rw &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs;
/* Removes bind access attribute if not supported by a user. */
env_port_name = getenv(ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME);
if (!env_port_name) {
ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP;
}
/* Removes connect access attribute if not supported by a user. */
env_port_name = getenv(ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME);
if (!env_port_name) {
ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP;
}
if (check_ruleset_scope(ENV_SCOPED_NAME, &ruleset_attr))
return 1;
ruleset_fd =
landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
if (ruleset_fd < 0) {
perror("Failed to create a ruleset");
return 1;
}
if (populate_ruleset_fs(ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_ro)) {
goto err_close_ruleset;
}
if (populate_ruleset_fs(ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_rw)) {
goto err_close_ruleset;
}
if (populate_ruleset_net(ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME, ruleset_fd,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP)) {
goto err_close_ruleset;
}
if (populate_ruleset_net(ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, ruleset_fd,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)) {
goto err_close_ruleset;
}
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
perror("Failed to restrict privileges");
goto err_close_ruleset;
}
if (landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)) {
perror("Failed to enforce ruleset");
goto err_close_ruleset;
}
close(ruleset_fd);
cmd_path = argv[1];
cmd_argv = argv + 1;
fprintf(stderr, "Executing the sandboxed command...\n");
execvpe(cmd_path, cmd_argv, envp);
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to execute \"%s\": %s\n", cmd_path,
strerror(errno));
fprintf(stderr, "Hint: access to the binary, the interpreter or "
"shared libraries may be denied.\n");
return 1;
err_close_ruleset:
close(ruleset_fd);
return 1;
}