linux-next/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov ae193dd793 kasan: move checks to do_strncpy_from_user
Patch series "kasan: migrate the last module test to kunit", v4.

copy_user_test() is the last KUnit-incompatible test with
CONFIG_KASAN_MODULE_TEST requirement, which we are going to migrate to
KUnit framework and delete the former test and Kconfig as well.

In this patch series:

	- [1/3] move kasan_check_write() and check_object_size() to
		do_strncpy_from_user() to cover with KASAN checks with
		multiple conditions	in strncpy_from_user().

	- [2/3] migrated copy_user_test() to KUnit, where we can also test
		strncpy_from_user() due to [1/4].

		KUnits have been tested on:
		- x86_64 with CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC. Passed
		- arm64 with CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS. 1 fail. See [1]
		- arm64 with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS. 1 fail. See [1]
		[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CACzwLxj21h7nCcS2-KA_q7ybe+5pxH0uCDwu64q_9pPsydneWQ@mail.gmail.com/

	- [3/3] delete CONFIG_KASAN_MODULE_TEST and documentation occurrences.


This patch (of 3):

Since in the commit 2865baf54077("x86: support user address masking
instead of non-speculative conditional") do_strncpy_from_user() is called
from multiple places, we should sanitize the kernel *dst memory and size
which were done in strncpy_from_user() previously.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241016131802.3115788-1-snovitoll@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241016131802.3115788-2-snovitoll@gmail.com
Fixes: 2865baf540 ("x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional")
Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Hu Haowen <2023002089@link.tyut.edu.cn>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-11-11 00:26:43 -08:00

157 lines
4.1 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
#define IS_UNALIGNED(src, dst) 0
#else
#define IS_UNALIGNED(src, dst) \
(((long) dst | (long) src) & (sizeof(long) - 1))
#endif
/*
* Do a strncpy, return length of string without final '\0'.
* 'count' is the user-supplied count (return 'count' if we
* hit it), 'max' is the address space maximum (and we return
* -EFAULT if we hit it).
*/
static __always_inline long do_strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src,
unsigned long count, unsigned long max)
{
const struct word_at_a_time constants = WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS;
unsigned long res = 0;
if (IS_UNALIGNED(src, dst))
goto byte_at_a_time;
while (max >= sizeof(unsigned long)) {
unsigned long c, data, mask;
/* Fall back to byte-at-a-time if we get a page fault */
unsafe_get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)(src+res), byte_at_a_time);
/*
* Note that we mask out the bytes following the NUL. This is
* important to do because string oblivious code may read past
* the NUL. For those routines, we don't want to give them
* potentially random bytes after the NUL in `src`.
*
* One example of such code is BPF map keys. BPF treats map keys
* as an opaque set of bytes. Without the post-NUL mask, any BPF
* maps keyed by strings returned from strncpy_from_user() may
* have multiple entries for semantically identical strings.
*/
if (has_zero(c, &data, &constants)) {
data = prep_zero_mask(c, data, &constants);
data = create_zero_mask(data);
mask = zero_bytemask(data);
*(unsigned long *)(dst+res) = c & mask;
return res + find_zero(data);
}
*(unsigned long *)(dst+res) = c;
res += sizeof(unsigned long);
max -= sizeof(unsigned long);
}
byte_at_a_time:
while (max) {
char c;
unsafe_get_user(c,src+res, efault);
dst[res] = c;
if (!c)
return res;
res++;
max--;
}
/*
* Uhhuh. We hit 'max'. But was that the user-specified maximum
* too? If so, that's ok - we got as much as the user asked for.
*/
if (res >= count)
return res;
/*
* Nope: we hit the address space limit, and we still had more
* characters the caller would have wanted. That's an EFAULT.
*/
efault:
return -EFAULT;
}
/**
* strncpy_from_user: - Copy a NUL terminated string from userspace.
* @dst: Destination address, in kernel space. This buffer must be at
* least @count bytes long.
* @src: Source address, in user space.
* @count: Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
*
* Copies a NUL-terminated string from userspace to kernel space.
*
* On success, returns the length of the string (not including the trailing
* NUL).
*
* If access to userspace fails, returns -EFAULT (some data may have been
* copied).
*
* If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count bytes
* and returns @count.
*/
long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
{
unsigned long max_addr, src_addr;
might_fault();
if (should_fail_usercopy())
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(count <= 0))
return 0;
kasan_check_write(dst, count);
check_object_size(dst, count, false);
if (can_do_masked_user_access()) {
long retval;
src = masked_user_access_begin(src);
retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, count);
user_read_access_end();
return retval;
}
max_addr = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
src_addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(src);
if (likely(src_addr < max_addr)) {
unsigned long max = max_addr - src_addr;
long retval;
/*
* Truncate 'max' to the user-specified limit, so that
* we only have one limit we need to check in the loop
*/
if (max > count)
max = count;
if (user_read_access_begin(src, max)) {
retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, max);
user_read_access_end();
return retval;
}
}
return -EFAULT;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(strncpy_from_user);