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98cf5bbff4
The existence test is not being properly logged as the signal mapping
maps it to the last entry in the named signal table. This is done
to help catch bugs by making the 0 mapped signal value invalid so
that we can catch the signal value not being filled in.
When fixing the off-by-one comparision logic the reporting of the
existence test was broken, because the logic behind the mapped named
table was hidden. Fix this by adding a define for the name lookup
and using it.
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: f7dc4c9a85
("apparmor: fix off-by-one comparison on MAXMAPPED_SIG")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
234 lines
6.5 KiB
C
234 lines
6.5 KiB
C
/*
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* AppArmor security module
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*
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* This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
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* Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
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* License.
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*/
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#include <linux/gfp.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include "include/audit.h"
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#include "include/capability.h"
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#include "include/context.h"
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#include "include/policy.h"
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#include "include/ipc.h"
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#include "include/sig_names.h"
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/**
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* audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
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* @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
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* @mask: permission mask to convert
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*/
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static void audit_ptrace_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
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{
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switch (mask) {
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case MAY_READ:
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audit_log_string(ab, "read");
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break;
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case MAY_WRITE:
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audit_log_string(ab, "trace");
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break;
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case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
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audit_log_string(ab, "readby");
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break;
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case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
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audit_log_string(ab, "tracedby");
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break;
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}
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}
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/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
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static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
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{
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struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
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if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
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audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
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audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request);
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if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
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audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
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audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);
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}
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}
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audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
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aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
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FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
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}
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/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
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/* TODO: conditionals */
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static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
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struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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{
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struct aa_perms perms = { };
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aad(sa)->peer = peer;
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aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
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&perms);
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aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
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return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
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}
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static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
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struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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{
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if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
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!PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
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return 0;
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return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
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}
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static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
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struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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{
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if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
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return 0;
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if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
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return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
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/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
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if (&tracer->label == tracee)
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return 0;
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aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
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aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
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aad(sa)->request = 0;
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aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
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return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
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}
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/**
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* aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
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* @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
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* @tracee: task label to be traced
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* @request: permission request
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*
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* Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
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*/
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int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
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u32 request)
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{
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struct aa_profile *profile;
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u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
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DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
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return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
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profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
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profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
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}
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static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
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{
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if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
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return SIGUNKNOWN;
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else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
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return sig - SIGRTMIN + 128; /* rt sigs mapped to 128 */
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else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
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return sig_map[sig];
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return SIGUNKNOWN;
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}
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/**
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* audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string
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* @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
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* @mask: permission mask to convert
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*/
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static void audit_signal_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
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{
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if (mask & MAY_READ)
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audit_log_string(ab, "receive");
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if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
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audit_log_string(ab, "send");
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}
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/**
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* audit_cb - call back for signal specific audit fields
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* @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
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* @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
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*/
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static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
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{
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struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
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if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
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audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
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audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request);
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if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
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audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
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audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);
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}
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}
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if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
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audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
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else
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audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
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aad(sa)->signal - 128);
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audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
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aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
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FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
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}
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/* TODO: update to handle compound name&name2, conditionals */
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static void profile_match_signal(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *label,
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int signal, struct aa_perms *perms)
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{
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unsigned int state;
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/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
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state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
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profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
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signal);
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state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, label);
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aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, perms);
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}
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static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
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struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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{
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struct aa_perms perms;
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if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
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!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
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return 0;
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aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;
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profile_match_signal(profile, peer->base.hname, aad(sa)->signal,
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&perms);
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aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
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return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
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}
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static int aa_signal_cross_perm(struct aa_profile *sender,
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struct aa_profile *target,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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{
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return xcheck(profile_signal_perm(sender, target, MAY_WRITE, sa),
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profile_signal_perm(target, sender, MAY_READ, sa));
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}
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int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
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{
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DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL);
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aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
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return xcheck_labels_profiles(sender, target, aa_signal_cross_perm,
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&sa);
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}
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