linux-next/lib/list_debug.c
Marco Elver aebc7b0d8d list: Introduce CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED
Numerous production kernel configs (see [1, 2]) are choosing to enable
CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST, which is also being recommended by KSPP for hardened
configs [3]. The motivation behind this is that the option can be used
as a security hardening feature (e.g. CVE-2019-2215 and CVE-2019-2025
are mitigated by the option [4]).

The feature has never been designed with performance in mind, yet common
list manipulation is happening across hot paths all over the kernel.

Introduce CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED, which performs list pointer checking
inline, and only upon list corruption calls the reporting slow path.

To generate optimal machine code with CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED:

  1. Elide checking for pointer values which upon dereference would
     result in an immediate access fault (i.e. minimal hardening
     checks).  The trade-off is lower-quality error reports.

  2. Use the __preserve_most function attribute (available with Clang,
     but not yet with GCC) to minimize the code footprint for calling
     the reporting slow path. As a result, function size of callers is
     reduced by avoiding saving registers before calling the rarely
     called reporting slow path.

     Note that all TUs in lib/Makefile already disable function tracing,
     including list_debug.c, and __preserve_most's implied notrace has
     no effect in this case.

  3. Because the inline checks are a subset of the full set of checks in
     __list_*_valid_or_report(), always return false if the inline
     checks failed.  This avoids redundant compare and conditional
     branch right after return from the slow path.

As a side-effect of the checks being inline, if the compiler can prove
some condition to always be true, it can completely elide some checks.

Since DEBUG_LIST is functionally a superset of LIST_HARDENED, the
Kconfig variables are changed to reflect that: DEBUG_LIST selects
LIST_HARDENED, whereas LIST_HARDENED itself has no dependency on
DEBUG_LIST.

Running netperf with CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED (using a Clang compiler with
"preserve_most") shows throughput improvements, in my case of ~7% on
average (up to 20-30% on some test cases).

Link: https://r.android.com/1266735 [1]
Link: https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/linux/-/blob/main/config [2]
Link: https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings [3]
Link: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/11/bad-binder-android-in-wild-exploit.html [4]
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230811151847.1594958-3-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2023-08-15 14:57:25 -07:00

73 lines
2.3 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 2006, Red Hat, Inc., Dave Jones
* Released under the General Public License (GPL).
*
* This file contains the linked list validation and error reporting for
* LIST_HARDENED and DEBUG_LIST.
*/
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
/*
* Check that the data structures for the list manipulations are reasonably
* valid. Failures here indicate memory corruption (and possibly an exploit
* attempt).
*/
__list_valid_slowpath
bool __list_add_valid_or_report(struct list_head *new, struct list_head *prev,
struct list_head *next)
{
if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == NULL,
"list_add corruption. prev is NULL.\n") ||
CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == NULL,
"list_add corruption. next is NULL.\n") ||
CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next->prev != prev,
"list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (%px), but was %px. (next=%px).\n",
prev, next->prev, next) ||
CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev->next != next,
"list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (%px), but was %px. (prev=%px).\n",
next, prev->next, prev) ||
CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(new == prev || new == next,
"list_add double add: new=%px, prev=%px, next=%px.\n",
new, prev, next))
return false;
return true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__list_add_valid_or_report);
__list_valid_slowpath
bool __list_del_entry_valid_or_report(struct list_head *entry)
{
struct list_head *prev, *next;
prev = entry->prev;
next = entry->next;
if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == NULL,
"list_del corruption, %px->next is NULL\n", entry) ||
CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == NULL,
"list_del corruption, %px->prev is NULL\n", entry) ||
CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next == LIST_POISON1,
"list_del corruption, %px->next is LIST_POISON1 (%px)\n",
entry, LIST_POISON1) ||
CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev == LIST_POISON2,
"list_del corruption, %px->prev is LIST_POISON2 (%px)\n",
entry, LIST_POISON2) ||
CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(prev->next != entry,
"list_del corruption. prev->next should be %px, but was %px. (prev=%px)\n",
entry, prev->next, prev) ||
CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(next->prev != entry,
"list_del corruption. next->prev should be %px, but was %px. (next=%px)\n",
entry, next->prev, next))
return false;
return true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__list_del_entry_valid_or_report);