bpf: Allow helpers access trusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID.

The verifier rejects the code:
  bpf_strncmp(task->comm, 16, "my_task");
with the message:
  16: (85) call bpf_strncmp#182
  R1 type=trusted_ptr_ expected=fp, pkt, pkt_meta, map_key, map_value, mem, ringbuf_mem, buf

Teach the verifier that such access pattern is safe.
Do not allow untrusted and legacy ptr_to_btf_id to be passed into helpers.

Reported-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230313235845.61029-3-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Alexei Starovoitov 2023-03-13 16:58:44 -07:00 committed by Martin KaFai Lau
parent c9267aa8b7
commit 3e30be4288

View File

@ -6303,6 +6303,9 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
env,
regno, reg->off, access_size,
zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta);
case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
return check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, reg->off,
access_size, BPF_READ, -1);
case PTR_TO_CTX:
/* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context,
* (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we
@ -7014,6 +7017,7 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = {
PTR_TO_MEM,
PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF,
PTR_TO_BUF,
PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED,
},
};
@ -7145,6 +7149,17 @@ found:
if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
return 0;
if (compatible == &mem_types) {
if (!(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) {
verbose(env,
"%s() may write into memory pointed by R%d type=%s\n",
func_id_name(meta->func_id),
regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
switch ((int)reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: