relay: prevent integer overflow in relay_open()

commit f6302f1bcd upstream.

"subbuf_size" and "n_subbufs" come from the user and they need to be
capped to prevent an integer overflow.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
This commit is contained in:
Dan Carpenter 2012-02-10 09:03:58 +01:00 committed by Willy Tarreau
parent 15edbd9f8b
commit aa6333a71f

View File

@ -171,10 +171,14 @@ static void *relay_alloc_buf(struct rchan_buf *buf, size_t *size)
*/
static struct rchan_buf *relay_create_buf(struct rchan *chan)
{
struct rchan_buf *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan_buf), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
struct rchan_buf *buf;
if (chan->n_subbufs > UINT_MAX / sizeof(size_t *))
return NULL;
buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan_buf), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return NULL;
buf->padding = kmalloc(chan->n_subbufs * sizeof(size_t *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf->padding)
goto free_buf;
@ -581,6 +585,8 @@ struct rchan *relay_open(const char *base_filename,
if (!(subbuf_size && n_subbufs))
return NULL;
if (subbuf_size > UINT_MAX / n_subbufs)
return NULL;
chan = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!chan)