This is a straight conversion from the old asm/unistd32.h into the
format used by 32-bit arm and most other architectures, calling scripts
to generate the asm/unistd32.h header and a new asm/syscalls32.h headers.
I used a semi-automated text replacement method to do the conversion,
and then used 'vimdiff' to synchronize the whitespace and the (unused)
names of the non-compat syscalls with the arm version.
There are two differences between the generated syscalls names and the
old version:
- the old asm/unistd32.h contained only a __NR_sync_file_range2
entry, while the arm32 version also defines
__NR_arm_sync_file_range with the same number. I added this
duplicate back in asm/unistd32.h.
- __NR__sysctl was removed from the arm64 file a while ago, but
all the tables still contain it. This should probably get removed
everywhere but I added it here for consistency.
On top of that, the arm64 version does not contain any references to
the 32-bit OABI syscalls that are not supported by arm64. If we ever
want to share the file between arm32 and arm64, it would not be
hard to add support for both in one file.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
An unintended consequence of commit 9c573cd313 ("randomize_kstack:
Improve entropy diffusion") was that the per-architecture entropy size
filtering reduced how many bits were being added to the mix, rather than
how many bits were being used during the offsetting. All architectures
fell back to the existing default of 0x3FF (10 bits), which will consume
at most 1KiB of stack space. It seems that this is working just fine,
so let's avoid the confusion and update everything to use the default.
The prior intent of the per-architecture limits were:
arm64: capped at 0x1FF (9 bits), 5 bits effective
powerpc: uncapped (10 bits), 6 or 7 bits effective
riscv: uncapped (10 bits), 6 bits effective
x86: capped at 0xFF (8 bits), 5 (x86_64) or 6 (ia32) bits effective
s390: capped at 0xFF (8 bits), undocumented effective entropy
Current discussion has led to just dropping the original per-architecture
filters. The additional entropy appears to be safe for arm64, x86,
and s390. Quoting Arnd, "There is no point pretending that 15.75KB is
somehow safe to use while 15.00KB is not."
Co-developed-by: Yuntao Liu <liuyuntao12@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuntao Liu <liuyuntao12@huawei.com>
Fixes: 9c573cd313 ("randomize_kstack: Improve entropy diffusion")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240617133721.377540-1-liuyuntao12@huawei.com
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> # s390
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240619214711.work.953-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Currently some parts of the codebase will test for CONFIG_COMPAT before
testing is_compat_task().
is_compat_task() is a inlined function only present on CONFIG_COMPAT.
On the other hand, for !CONFIG_COMPAT, we have in linux/compat.h:
#define is_compat_task() (0)
Since we have this define available in every usage of is_compat_task() for
!CONFIG_COMPAT, it's unnecessary to keep the ifdefs, since the compiler is
smart enough to optimize-out those snippets on CONFIG_COMPAT=n
This requires some regset code as well as a few other defines to be made
available on !CONFIG_COMPAT, so some symbols can get resolved before
getting optimized-out.
Signed-off-by: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240109034651.478462-2-leobras@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
For a number of historical reasons, when handling SVCs we don't unmask
DAIF in el0_svc() or el0_svc_compat(), and instead do so later in
el0_svc_common(). This is unfortunate and makes it harder to make
changes to the DAIF management in entry-common.c as we'd like to do as
cleanup and preparation for FEAT_NMI support. We can move the DAIF
unmasking to entry-common.c as long as we also hoist the
fp_user_discard() logic, as reasoned below.
We converted the syscall trace logic from assembly to C in commit:
f37099b699 ("arm64: convert syscall trace logic to C")
... which was intended to have no functional change, and mirrored the
existing assembly logic to avoid the risk of any functional regression.
With the logic in C, it's clear that there is currently no reason to
unmask DAIF so late within el0_svc_common():
* The thread flags are read prior to unmasking DAIF, but are not
consumed until after DAIF is unmasked, and we don't perform a
read-modify-write sequence of the thread flags for which we might need
to serialize against an IPI modifying the flags. Similarly, for any
thread flags set by other threads, whether DAIF is masked or not has
no impact.
The read_thread_flags() helpers performs a single-copy-atomic read of
the flags, and so this can safely be moved after unmasking DAIF.
* The pt_regs::orig_x0 and pt_regs::syscallno fields are neither
consumed nor modified by the handler for any DAIF exception (e.g.
these do not exist in the `perf_event_arm_regs` enum and are not
sampled by perf in its IRQ handler).
Thus, the manipulation of pt_regs::orig_x0 and pt_regs::syscallno can
safely be moved after unmasking DAIF.
Given the above, we can safely hoist unmasking of DAIF out of
el0_svc_common(), and into its immediate callers: do_el0_svc() and
do_el0_svc_compat(). Further:
* In do_el0_svc(), we sample the syscall number from
pt_regs::regs[8]. This is not modified by the handler for any DAIF
exception, and thus can safely be moved after unmasking DAIF.
As fp_user_discard() operates on the live FP/SVE/SME register state,
this needs to occur before we clear DAIF.IF, as interrupts could
result in preemption which would cause this state to become foreign.
As fp_user_discard() is the first function called within do_el0_svc(),
it has no dependency on other parts of do_el0_svc() and can be moved
earlier so long as it is called prior to unmasking DAIF.IF.
* In do_el0_svc_compat(), we sample the syscall number from
pt_regs::regs[7]. This is not modified by the handler for any DAIF
exception, and thus can safely be moved after unmasking DAIF.
Compat threads cannot use SVE or SME, so there's no need for
el0_svc_compat() to call fp_user_discard().
Given the above, we can safely hoist the unmasking of DAIF out of
do_el0_svc() and do_el0_svc_compat(), and into their immediate callers:
el0_svc() and el0_svc_compat(), so long a we also hoist
fp_user_discard() into el0_svc().
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230808101148.1064172-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
These are all tracing W=1 warnings in arm64 allmodconfig about missing
prototypes:
kernel/trace/trace_kprobe_selftest.c:7:5: error: no previous prototype for 'kprobe_trace_selftest_target' [-Werror=missing-pro
totypes]
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:329:5: error: no previous prototype for '__register_ftrace_function' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:372:5: error: no previous prototype for '__unregister_ftrace_function' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:4130:15: error: no previous prototype for 'arch_ftrace_match_adjust' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
kernel/trace/fgraph.c:243:15: error: no previous prototype for 'ftrace_return_to_handler' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
kernel/trace/fgraph.c:358:6: error: no previous prototype for 'ftrace_graph_sleep_time_control' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c:460:6: error: no previous prototype for 'prepare_ftrace_return' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c:2172:5: error: no previous prototype for 'syscall_trace_enter' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c:2195:6: error: no previous prototype for 'syscall_trace_exit' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
Move the declarations to an appropriate header where they can be seen
by the caller and callee, and make sure the headers are included where
needed.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230517125215.930689-1-arnd@kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
[ Fixed ftrace_return_to_handler() to handle CONFIG_HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_RETVAL case ]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
The following code:
static void el0_svc_common(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno, int sc_nr,
const syscall_fn_t syscall_table[])
{
...
if (!has_syscall_work(flags) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_RSEQ)) {
local_daif_mask();
flags = read_thread_flags(); -------------------------------- A
if (!has_syscall_work(flags) && !(flags & _TIF_SINGLESTEP))
return;
local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
}
trace_exit:
syscall_trace_exit(regs); ------- B
}
1. The flags in the if conditional statement should be used
in the same way as the flags in the function syscall_trace_exit,
because DAIF is not shielded in the function syscall_trace_exit,
so when the flags are obtained in line A of the code,
there is no need to shield DAIF.
Don't care about the modification of flags after line A.
2. Masking DAIF caused syscall performance to deteriorate by about 10%.
The Unixbench single core syscall performance data is as follows:
Machine: Kunpeng 920
Mask DAIF:
System Call Overhead 1172314.1 lps (10.0 s, 7 samples)
System Benchmarks Partial Index BASELINE RESULT INDEX
System Call Overhead 15000.0 1172314.1 781.5
========
System Benchmarks Index Score (Partial Only) 781.5
Unmask DAIF:
System Call Overhead 1287944.6 lps (10.0 s, 7 samples)
System Benchmarks Partial Index BASELINE RESULT INDEX
System Call Overhead 15000.0 1287944.6 858.6
========
System Benchmarks Index Score (Partial Only) 858.6
Rationale from Mark Rutland as for why this is safe:
This masking is an artifact of the old "ret_fast_syscall" assembly that
was converted to C in commit:
f37099b699 ("arm64: convert syscall trace logic to C")
The assembly would mask DAIF, check the thread flags, and fall through
to kernel_exit without unmasking if no tracing was needed. The
conversion copied this masking into the C version, though this wasn't
strictly necessary.
As (in general) thread flags can be manipulated by other threads, it's
not safe to manipulate the thread flags with plain reads and writes, and
since commit:
342b380878 ("arm64: Snapshot thread flags")
... we use read_thread_flags() to read the flags atomically.
With this, there is no need to mask DAIF transiently around reading the
flags, as we only decide whether to trace while DAIF is masked, and the
actual tracing occurs with DAIF unmasked. When el0_svc_common() returns
its caller will unconditionally mask DAIF via exit_to_user_mode(), so
the masking is redundant.
Signed-off-by: Guo Hui <guohui@uniontech.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526024715.8773-1-guohui@uniontech.com
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: updated comment with Mark's rationale]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Our ABI says that we exit streaming mode on syscall entry. Currently we
check if we are in streaming mode before doing this but since we have a
SMSTOP SM instruction which will clear SVCR.SM in a single atomic operation
we can save ourselves the read of the system register and check of the flag
and just unconditionally do the SMSTOP SM. If we are not in streaming mode
it results in a noop change to SVCR, if we are in streaming mode we will
exit as desired.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230110-arm64-sme-syscall-smstop-v1-1-ac94235fd810@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
The syscall ABI says that the SVE register state not shared with FPSIMD
may not be preserved on syscall, and this is the only mechanism we have
in the ABI to stop tracking the extra SVE state for a process. Currently
we do this unconditionally by means of disabling SVE for the process on
syscall, causing userspace to take a trap to EL1 if it uses SVE again.
These extra traps result in a noticeable overhead for using SVE instead
of FPSIMD in some workloads, especially for simple syscalls where we can
return directly to userspace and would not otherwise need to update the
floating point registers. Tests with fp-pidbench show an approximately
70% overhead on a range of implementations when SVE is in use - while
this is an extreme and entirely artificial benchmark it is clear that
there is some useful room for improvement here.
Now that we have the ability to track the decision about what to save
seprately to TIF_SVE we can improve things by leaving TIF_SVE enabled on
syscall but only saving the FPSIMD registers if we are in a syscall.
This means that if we need to restore the register state from memory
(eg, after a context switch or kernel mode NEON) we will drop TIF_SVE
and reenable traps for userspace but if we can just return to userspace
then traps will remain disabled.
Since our current implementation and hence ABI has the effect of zeroing
all the SVE register state not shared with FPSIMD on syscall we replace
the disabling of TIF_SVE with a flush of the non-shared register state,
this means that there is still some overhead for syscalls when SVE is in
use but it is very much reduced.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221115094640.112848-8-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
The defines for SVCR call it SVCR_EL0 however the architecture calls the
register SVCR with no _EL0 suffix. In preparation for generating the sysreg
definitions rename to match the architecture, no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220510161208.631259-6-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
By default all SME operations in userspace will trap. When this happens
we allocate storage space for the SME register state, set up the SVE
registers and disable traps. We do not need to initialize ZA since the
architecture guarantees that it will be zeroed when enabled and when we
trap ZA is disabled.
On syscall we exit streaming mode if we were previously in it and ensure
that all but the lower 128 bits of the registers are zeroed while
preserving the state of ZA. This follows the aarch64 PCS for SME, ZA
state is preserved over a function call and streaming mode is exited.
Since the traps for SME do not distinguish between streaming mode SVE
and ZA usage if ZA is in use rather than reenabling traps we instead
zero the parts of the SVE registers not shared with FPSIMD and leave SME
enabled, this simplifies handling SME traps. If ZA is not in use then we
reenable SME traps and fall through to normal handling of SVE.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220419112247.711548-17-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Some thread flags can be set remotely, and so even when IRQs are disabled,
the flags can change under our feet. Generally this is unlikely to cause a
problem in practice, but it is somewhat unsound, and KCSAN will
legitimately warn that there is a data race.
To avoid such issues, a snapshot of the flags has to be taken prior to
using them. Some places already use READ_ONCE() for that, others do not.
Convert them all to the new flag accessor helpers.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211129130653.2037928-7-mark.rutland@arm.com
Due to inconsistencies in the way we manipulate compat GPRs, we have a
few issues today:
* For audit and tracing, where error codes are handled as a (native)
long, negative error codes are expected to be sign-extended to the
native 64-bits, or they may fail to be matched correctly. Thus a
syscall which fails with an error may erroneously be identified as
failing.
* For ptrace, *all* compat return values should be sign-extended for
consistency with 32-bit arm, but we currently only do this for
negative return codes.
* As we may transiently set the upper 32 bits of some compat GPRs while
in the kernel, these can be sampled by perf, which is somewhat
confusing. This means that where a syscall returns a pointer above 2G,
this will be sign-extended, but will not be mistaken for an error as
error codes are constrained to the inclusive range [-4096, -1] where
no user pointer can exist.
To fix all of these, we must consistently use helpers to get/set the
compat GPRs, ensuring that we never write the upper 32 bits of the
return code, and always sign-extend when reading the return code. This
patch does so, with the following changes:
* We re-organise syscall_get_return_value() to always sign-extend for
compat tasks, and reimplement syscall_get_error() atop. We update
syscall_trace_exit() to use syscall_get_return_value().
* We consistently use syscall_set_return_value() to set the return
value, ensureing the upper 32 bits are never set unexpectedly.
* As the core audit code currently uses regs_return_value() rather than
syscall_get_return_value(), we special-case this for
compat_user_mode(regs) such that this will do the right thing. Going
forward, we should try to move the core audit code over to
syscall_get_return_value().
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
Reported-by: weiyuchen <weiyuchen3@huawei.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210802104200.21390-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly
5 bits of entropy. (And include AAPCS rationale AAPCS thanks to Mark
Rutland.)
In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to
the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering
needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general
way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute[1],
this must be disabled at the compilation unit level. This isn't a problem
here, though, since stack protector was not triggered before: examining
the resulting syscall.o, there are no changes in canary coverage (none
before, none now).
[1] a working __attribute__((no_stack_protector)) has been added to GCC
and Clang but has not been released in any version yet:
https://gcc.gnu.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=gcc.git;h=346b302d09c1e6db56d9fe69048acb32fbb97845https://reviews.llvm.org/rG4fbf84c1732fca596ad1d6e96015e19760eb8a9b
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-6-keescook@chromium.org
The workaround for Cortex-A76 erratum 1463225 is split across the
syscall and debug handlers in separate files. This structure currently
forces us to do some redundant work for debug exceptions from EL0, is a
little difficult to follow, and gets in the way of some future rework of
the exception entry code as it requires exceptions to be unmasked late
in the syscall handling path.
To simplify things, and as a preparatory step for future rework of
exception entry, this patch moves all the workaround logic into
entry-common.c. As the debug handler only needs to run for EL1 debug
exceptions, we no longer call it for EL0 debug exceptions, and no longer
need to check user_mode(regs) as this is always false. For clarity
cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() is changed to return bool.
In the SVC path, the workaround is applied earlier, but this should have
no functional impact as exceptions are still masked. In the debug path
we run the fixup before explicitly disabling preemption, but we will not
attempt to preempt before returning from the exception.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210202120341.28858-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
The kbuild test robot reports that when building with W=1, GCC will warn
for a couple of missing prototypes in syscall.c:
| arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:157:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'do_el0_svc' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
| 157 | void do_el0_svc(struct pt_regs *regs)
| | ^~~~~~~~~~
| arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:164:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'do_el0_svc_compat' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
| 164 | void do_el0_svc_compat(struct pt_regs *regs)
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
While this isn't a functional problem, as a general policy we should
include the prototype for functions wherever possible to catch any
accidental divergence between the prototype and implementation. Here we
can easily include <asm/exception.h>, so let's do so.
While there are a number of warnings elsewhere and some warnings enabled
under W=1 are of questionable benefit, this change helps to make the
code more robust as it evolved and reduces the noise somewhat, so it
seems worthwhile.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202101141046.n8iPO3mw-lkp@intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210114124812.17754-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
All EL0 returns go via ret_to_user(), which masks IRQs and notifies
lockdep and tracing before calling into do_notify_resume(). Therefore,
there's no need for do_notify_resume() to call trace_hardirqs_off(), and
the comment is stale. The call is simply redundant.
In ret_to_user() we call exit_to_user_mode(), which notifies lockdep and
tracing the IRQs will be enabled in userspace, so there's no need for
el0_svc_common() to call trace_hardirqs_on() before returning. Further,
at the start of ret_to_user() we call trace_hardirqs_off(), so not only
is this redundant, but it is immediately undone.
In addition to being redundant, the trace_hardirqs_on() in
el0_svc_common() leaves lockdep inconsistent with the hardware state,
and is liable to cause issues for any C code or instrumentation
between this and the call to trace_hardirqs_off() which undoes it in
ret_to_user().
This patch removes the redundant tracing calls and associated stale
comments.
Fixes: 23529049c6 ("arm64: entry: fix non-NMI user<->kernel transitions")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210107145310.44616-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
When built with PROVE_LOCKING, NO_HZ_FULL, and CONTEXT_TRACKING_FORCE
will WARN() at boot time that interrupts are enabled when we call
context_tracking_user_enter(), despite the DAIF flags indicating that
IRQs are masked.
The problem is that we're not tracking IRQ flag changes accurately, and
so lockdep believes interrupts are enabled when they are not (and
vice-versa). We can shuffle things so to make this more accurate. For
kernel->user transitions there are a number of constraints we need to
consider:
1) When we call __context_tracking_user_enter() HW IRQs must be disabled
and lockdep must be up-to-date with this.
2) Userspace should be treated as having IRQs enabled from the PoV of
both lockdep and tracing.
3) As context_tracking_user_enter() stops RCU from watching, we cannot
use RCU after calling it.
4) IRQ flag tracing and lockdep have state that must be manipulated
before RCU is disabled.
... with similar constraints applying for user->kernel transitions, with
the ordering reversed.
The generic entry code has enter_from_user_mode() and
exit_to_user_mode() helpers to handle this. We can't use those directly,
so we add arm64 copies for now (without the instrumentation markers
which aren't used on arm64). These replace the existing user_exit() and
user_exit_irqoff() calls spread throughout handlers, and the exception
unmasking is left as-is.
Note that:
* The accounting for debug exceptions from userspace now happens in
el0_dbg() and ret_to_user(), so this is removed from
debug_exception_enter() and debug_exception_exit(). As
user_exit_irqoff() wakes RCU, the userspace-specific check is removed.
* The accounting for syscalls now happens in el0_svc(),
el0_svc_compat(), and ret_to_user(), so this is removed from
el0_svc_common(). This does not adversely affect the workaround for
erratum 1463225, as this does not depend on any of the state tracking.
* In ret_to_user() we mask interrupts with local_daif_mask(), and so we
need to inform lockdep and tracing. Here a trace_hardirqs_off() is
sufficient and safe as we have not yet exited kernel context and RCU
is usable.
* As PROVE_LOCKING selects TRACE_IRQFLAGS, the ifdeferry in entry.S only
needs to check for the latter.
* EL0 SError handling will be dealt with in a subsequent patch, as this
needs to be treated as an NMI.
Prior to this patch, booting an appropriately-configured kernel would
result in spats as below:
| DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lockdep_hardirqs_enabled())
| WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5280 check_flags.part.54+0x1dc/0x1f0
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 5.10.0-rc3 #3
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 804003c5 (Nzcv DAIF +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
| pc : check_flags.part.54+0x1dc/0x1f0
| lr : check_flags.part.54+0x1dc/0x1f0
| sp : ffff80001003bd80
| x29: ffff80001003bd80 x28: ffff66ce801e0000
| x27: 00000000ffffffff x26: 00000000000003c0
| x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffc31842527258
| x23: ffffc31842491368 x22: ffffc3184282d000
| x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000001
| x19: ffffc318432ce000 x18: 0080000000000000
| x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffc31840f18a78
| x15: 0000000000000001 x14: ffffc3184285c810
| x13: 0000000000000001 x12: 0000000000000000
| x11: ffffc318415857a0 x10: ffffc318406614c0
| x9 : ffffc318415857a0 x8 : ffffc31841f1d000
| x7 : 647261685f706564 x6 : ffffc3183ff7c66c
| x5 : ffff66ce801e0000 x4 : 0000000000000000
| x3 : ffffc3183fe00000 x2 : ffffc31841500000
| x1 : e956dc24146b3500 x0 : 0000000000000000
| Call trace:
| check_flags.part.54+0x1dc/0x1f0
| lock_is_held_type+0x10c/0x188
| rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x70/0x98
| __context_tracking_enter+0x310/0x350
| context_tracking_enter.part.3+0x5c/0xc8
| context_tracking_user_enter+0x6c/0x80
| finish_ret_to_user+0x2c/0x13cr
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201130115950.22492-8-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
In el0_svc_common() we unmask exceptions before we call user_exit(), and
so there's a window where an IRQ or debug exception can be taken while
RCU is not watching. In do_debug_exception() we account for this in via
debug_exception_{enter,exit}(), but in the el1_irq asm we do not and we
call trace functions which rely on RCU before we have a guarantee that
RCU is watching.
Let's avoid this by having el0_svc_common() exit userspace before
unmasking exceptions, matching what we do for all other EL0 entry paths.
We can use user_exit_irqoff() to avoid the pointless save/restore of IRQ
flags while we're sure exceptions are masked in DAIF.
The workaround for Cortex-A76 erratum 1463225 may trigger a debug
exception before this point, but the debug code invoked in this case is
safe even when RCU is not watching.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201130115950.22492-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
We don't need to check for MTE support before checking the flag
because it can only be set if the hardware supports MTE. As a result
we can unconditionally check the flag bit which is expected to be in
a register and therefore the check can be done in a single instruction
instead of first needing to load the hwcaps.
On a DragonBoard 845c with a kernel built with CONFIG_ARM64_MTE=y with
the powersave governor this reduces the cost of a kernel entry/exit
(invalid syscall) from 465.1ns to 463.8ns.
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If4dc3501fd4e4f287322f17805509613cfe47d24
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118032051.1405907-1-pcc@google.com
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: remove IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_MTE)]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
The Memory Tagging Extension has two modes of notifying a tag check
fault at EL0, configurable through the SCTLR_EL1.TCF0 field:
1. Synchronous raising of a Data Abort exception with DFSC 17.
2. Asynchronous setting of a cumulative bit in TFSRE0_EL1.
Add the exception handler for the synchronous exception and handling of
the asynchronous TFSRE0_EL1.TF0 bit setting via a new TIF flag in
do_notify_resume().
On a tag check failure in user-space, whether synchronous or
asynchronous, a SIGSEGV will be raised on the faulting thread.
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
If a task executes syscall(-1), we intercept this early and force x0 to
be -ENOSYS so that we don't need to distinguish this scenario from one
where the scno is -1 because a tracer wants to skip the system call
using ptrace. With the return value set, the return path is the same as
the skip case.
Although there is a one-line comment noting this in el0_svc_common(), it
misses out most of the detail. Expand the comment to describe a bit more
about what is going on.
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Keno Fischer <keno@juliacomputing.com>
Cc: Luis Machado <luis.machado@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Although we zero the upper bits of x0 on entry to the kernel from an
AArch32 task, we do not clear them on the exception return path and can
therefore expose 64-bit sign extended syscall return values to userspace
via interfaces such as the 'perf_regs' ABI, which deal exclusively with
64-bit registers.
Explicitly clear the upper 32 bits of x0 on return from a compat system
call.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Keno Fischer <keno@juliacomputing.com>
Cc: Luis Machado <luis.machado@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Although the arm64 single-step state machine can be fast-forwarded in
cases where we wish to generate a SIGTRAP without actually executing an
instruction, this has two major limitations outside of simply skipping
an instruction due to emulation.
1. Stepping out of a ptrace signal stop into a signal handler where
SIGTRAP is blocked. Fast-forwarding the stepping state machine in
this case will result in a forced SIGTRAP, with the handler reset to
SIG_DFL.
2. The hardware implicitly fast-forwards the state machine when executing
an SVC instruction for issuing a system call. This can interact badly
with subsequent ptrace stops signalled during the execution of the
system call (e.g. SYSCALL_EXIT or seccomp traps), as they may corrupt
the stepping state by updating the PSTATE for the tracee.
Resolve both of these issues by injecting a pseudo-singlestep exception
on entry to a signal handler and also on return to userspace following a
system call.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Luis Machado <luis.machado@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Keno Fischer <keno@juliacomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
This patch adds the bare minimum required to expose the ARMv8.5
Branch Target Identification feature to userspace.
By itself, this does _not_ automatically enable BTI for any initial
executable pages mapped by execve(). This will come later, but for
now it should be possible to enable BTI manually on those pages by
using mprotect() from within the target process.
Other arches already using the generic mman.h are already using
0x10 for arch-specific prot flags, so we use that for PROT_BTI
here.
For consistency, signal handler entry points in BTI guarded pages
are required to be annotated as such, just like any other function.
This blocks a relatively minor attack vector, but comforming
userspace will have the annotations anyway, so we may as well
enforce them.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
For most of the exception entry code, <foo>_handler() is the first C
function called from the entry assembly in entry-common.c, and external
functions handling the bulk of the logic are called do_<foo>().
For consistency, apply this scheme to el0_svc_handler and
el0_svc_compat_handler, renaming them to do_el0_svc and
do_el0_svc_compat respectively.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Now that the callers of these functions have moved into C, they no longer
need the asmlinkage annotation. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Revisions of the Cortex-A76 CPU prior to r4p0 are affected by an erratum
that can prevent interrupts from being taken when single-stepping.
This patch implements a software workaround to prevent userspace from
effectively being able to disable interrupts.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
The syscall number may have been changed by a tracer, so we should pass
the actual number in from the caller instead of pulling it from the
saved r7 value directly.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Pi-Hsun Shih <pihsun@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
We always run userspace with interrupts enabled, but with the recent
conversion of the syscall entry/exit code to C, we don't inform the
hardirq tracing code that interrupts are about to become enabled by
virtue of restoring the EL0 SPSR.
This patch ensures that trace_hardirqs_on() is called on the syscall
return path when we return to the assembly code with interrupts still
disabled.
Fixes: f37099b699 ("arm64: convert syscall trace logic to C")
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
To minimize the risk of userspace-controlled values being used under
speculation, this patch adds pt_regs based syscall wrappers for arm64,
which pass the minimum set of required userspace values to syscall
implementations. For each syscall, a wrapper which takes a pt_regs
argument is automatically generated, and this extracts the arguments
before calling the "real" syscall implementation.
Each syscall has three functions generated:
* __do_<compat_>sys_<name> is the "real" syscall implementation, with
the expected prototype.
* __se_<compat_>sys_<name> is the sign-extension/narrowing wrapper,
inherited from common code. This takes a series of long parameters,
casting each to the requisite types required by the "real" syscall
implementation in __do_<compat_>sys_<name>.
This wrapper *may* not be necessary on arm64 given the AAPCS rules on
unused register bits, but it seemed safer to keep the wrapper for now.
* __arm64_<compat_>_sys_<name> takes a struct pt_regs pointer, and
extracts *only* the relevant register values, passing these on to the
__se_<compat_>sys_<name> wrapper.
The syscall invocation code is updated to handle the calling convention
required by __arm64_<compat_>_sys_<name>, and passes a single struct
pt_regs pointer.
The compiler can fold the syscall implementation and its wrappers, such
that the overhead of this approach is minimized.
Note that we play games with sys_ni_syscall(). It can't be defined with
SYSCALL_DEFINE0() because we must avoid the possibility of error
injection. Additionally, there are a couple of locations where we need
to call it from C code, and we don't (currently) have a
ksys_ni_syscall(). While it has no wrapper, passing in a redundant
pt_regs pointer is benign per the AAPCS.
When ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER is selected, no prototype is defines for
sys_ni_syscall(). Since we need to treat it differently for in-kernel
calls and the syscall tables, the prototype is defined as-required.
The wrappers are largely the same as their x86 counterparts, but
simplified as we don't have a variety of compat calling conventions that
require separate stubs. Unlike x86, we have some zero-argument compat
syscalls, and must define COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE0() to ensure that these
are also given an __arm64_compat_sys_ prefix.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Now that the syscall invocation logic is in C, we can migrate the rest
of the syscall entry logic over, so that the entry assembly needn't look
at the register values at all.
The SVE reset across syscall logic now unconditionally clears TIF_SVE,
but sve_user_disable() will only write back to CPACR_EL1 when SVE is
actually enabled.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Currently syscall tracing is a tricky assembly state machine, which can
be rather difficult to follow, and even harder to modify. Before we
start fiddling with it for pt_regs syscalls, let's convert it to C.
This is not intended to have any functional change.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
As a first step towards invoking syscalls with a pt_regs argument,
convert the raw syscall invocation logic to C. We end up with a bit more
register shuffling, but the unified invocation logic means we can unify
the tracing paths, too.
Previously, assembly had to open-code calls to ni_sys() when the system
call number was out-of-bounds for the relevant syscall table. This case
is now handled by invoke_syscall(), and the assembly no longer need to
handle this case explicitly. This allows the tracing paths to be
simplified and unified, as we no longer need the __ni_sys_trace path and
the __sys_trace_return label.
This only converts the invocation of the syscall. The rest of the
syscall triage and tracing is left in assembly for now, and will be
converted in subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
