linux-stable/security/apparmor/capability.c
Ryan Lee 74a96bbe12 apparmor: audit_cap dedup based on subj_cred instead of profile
The previous audit_cap cache deduping was based on the profile that was
being audited. This could cause confusion due to the deduplication then
occurring across multiple processes, which could happen if multiple
instances of binaries matched the same profile attachment (and thus ran
under the same profile) or a profile was attached to a container and its
processes.

Instead, perform audit_cap deduping over ad->subj_cred, which ensures the
deduping only occurs across a single process, instead of across all
processes that match the current one's profile.

Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2024-11-26 19:21:06 -08:00

171 lines
4.7 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* AppArmor security module
*
* This file contains AppArmor capability mediation functions
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
* Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
*/
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/timekeeping.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/capability.h"
#include "include/cred.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/audit.h"
/*
* Table of capability names: we generate it from capabilities.h.
*/
#include "capability_names.h"
struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[] = {
AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_SFS_CAPS_MASK),
{ }
};
struct audit_cache {
const struct cred *ad_subj_cred;
/* Capabilities go from 0 to CAP_LAST_CAP */
u64 ktime_ns_expiration[CAP_LAST_CAP+1];
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct audit_cache, audit_cache);
/**
* audit_cb - call back for capability components of audit struct
* @ab: audit buffer (NOT NULL)
* @va: audit struct to audit data from (NOT NULL)
*/
static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
audit_log_format(ab, " capname=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, capability_names[sa->u.cap]);
}
/**
* audit_caps - audit a capability
* @ad: audit data
* @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL)
* @cap: capability tested
* @error: error code returned by test
*
* Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching
* and duplicate message elimination.
*
* Returns: 0 or ad->error on success, error code on failure
*/
static int audit_caps(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, struct aa_profile *profile,
int cap, int error)
{
const u64 AUDIT_CACHE_TIMEOUT_NS = 1000*1000*1000; /* 1 second */
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
struct audit_cache *ent;
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
ad->error = error;
if (likely(!error)) {
/* test if auditing is being forced */
if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
!cap_raised(rules->caps.audit, cap)))
return 0;
type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
} else if (KILL_MODE(profile) ||
cap_raised(rules->caps.kill, cap)) {
type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
} else if (cap_raised(rules->caps.quiet, cap) &&
AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) {
/* quiet auditing */
return error;
}
/* Do simple duplicate message elimination */
ent = &get_cpu_var(audit_cache);
/* If the capability was never raised the timestamp check would also catch that */
if (ad->subj_cred == ent->ad_subj_cred && ktime_get_ns() <= ent->ktime_ns_expiration[cap]) {
put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
return complain_error(error);
return error;
} else {
put_cred(ent->ad_subj_cred);
ent->ad_subj_cred = get_cred(ad->subj_cred);
ent->ktime_ns_expiration[cap] = ktime_get_ns() + AUDIT_CACHE_TIMEOUT_NS;
}
put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
return aa_audit(type, profile, ad, audit_cb);
}
/**
* profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap
* @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined)
* @cap: capability to test if allowed
* @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
* @ad: audit data (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM
*/
static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
unsigned int opts, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
int error;
if (cap_raised(rules->caps.allow, cap) &&
!cap_raised(rules->caps.denied, cap))
error = 0;
else
error = -EPERM;
if (opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) {
if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
return error;
/* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it
* should be optional.
*/
ad->info = "optional: no audit";
}
return audit_caps(ad, profile, cap, error);
}
/**
* aa_capable - test permission to use capability
* @subj_cred: cred we are testing capability against
* @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL)
* @cap: capability to be tested
* @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
*
* Look up capability in profile capability set.
*
* Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code.
*/
int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
int cap, unsigned int opts)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
ad.common.u.cap = cap;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &ad));
return error;
}