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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
synced 2025-01-04 04:06:26 +00:00
ed1cb76ebd
When kernel IBT is enabled, objtool detects all text references in order to determine which functions can be indirectly branched to. In text, such references look like one of the following: mov $0x0,%rax R_X86_64_32S .init.text+0x7e0a0 lea 0x0(%rip),%rax R_X86_64_PC32 autoremove_wake_function-0x4 Either way the function pointer is denoted by a relocation, so objtool just reads that. However there are some "lea xxx(%rip)" cases which don't use relocations because they're referencing code in the same translation unit. Objtool doesn't have visibility to those. The only currently known instances of that are a few hand-coded asm text references which don't actually need ENDBR. So it's not actually a problem at the moment. However if we enable -fpie, the compiler would start generating them and there would definitely be bugs in the IBT sealing. Detect non-relocated text references and handle them appropriately. [ Note: I removed the manual static_call_tramp check -- that should already be handled by the noendbr check. ] Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
712 lines
19 KiB
ArmAsm
712 lines
19 KiB
ArmAsm
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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/*
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* linux/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S -- start in 32bit and switch to 64bit
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2000 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@suse.de> SuSE
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* Copyright (C) 2000 Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
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* Copyright (C) 2000 Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
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* Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
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* Copyright (C) 2005 Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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*/
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/linkage.h>
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#include <linux/threads.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/pgtable.h>
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#include <asm/segment.h>
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#include <asm/page.h>
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#include <asm/msr.h>
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#include <asm/cache.h>
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#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
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#include <asm/percpu.h>
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#include <asm/nops.h>
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#include "../entry/calling.h"
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#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
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#include <asm/apicdef.h>
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#include <asm/fixmap.h>
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#include <asm/smp.h>
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#include <asm/thread_info.h>
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/*
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* We are not able to switch in one step to the final KERNEL ADDRESS SPACE
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* because we need identity-mapped pages.
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*/
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__HEAD
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.code64
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SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
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UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
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/*
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* At this point the CPU runs in 64bit mode CS.L = 1 CS.D = 0,
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* and someone has loaded an identity mapped page table
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* for us. These identity mapped page tables map all of the
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* kernel pages and possibly all of memory.
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*
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* %RSI holds the physical address of the boot_params structure
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* provided by the bootloader. Preserve it in %R15 so C function calls
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* will not clobber it.
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*
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* We come here either directly from a 64bit bootloader, or from
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* arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S.
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*
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* We only come here initially at boot nothing else comes here.
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*
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* Since we may be loaded at an address different from what we were
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* compiled to run at we first fixup the physical addresses in our page
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* tables and then reload them.
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*/
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mov %rsi, %r15
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/* Set up the stack for verify_cpu() */
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leaq __top_init_kernel_stack(%rip), %rsp
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/* Setup GSBASE to allow stack canary access for C code */
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movl $MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx
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leaq INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data)(%rip), %rdx
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movl %edx, %eax
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shrq $32, %rdx
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wrmsr
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call startup_64_setup_gdt_idt
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/* Now switch to __KERNEL_CS so IRET works reliably */
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pushq $__KERNEL_CS
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leaq .Lon_kernel_cs(%rip), %rax
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pushq %rax
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lretq
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.Lon_kernel_cs:
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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/*
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* Activate SEV/SME memory encryption if supported/enabled. This needs to
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* be done now, since this also includes setup of the SEV-SNP CPUID table,
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* which needs to be done before any CPUID instructions are executed in
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* subsequent code. Pass the boot_params pointer as the first argument.
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*/
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movq %r15, %rdi
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call sme_enable
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#endif
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/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
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call verify_cpu
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/*
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* Perform pagetable fixups. Additionally, if SME is active, encrypt
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* the kernel and retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME
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* is active) to be added to the initial pgdir entry that will be
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* programmed into CR3.
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*/
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leaq _text(%rip), %rdi
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movq %r15, %rsi
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call __startup_64
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/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
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leaq early_top_pgt(%rip), %rcx
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addq %rcx, %rax
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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mov %rax, %rdi
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/*
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* For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
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* hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP
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* attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for
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* the next RET instruction.
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*/
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call sev_verify_cbit
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#endif
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/*
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* Switch to early_top_pgt which still has the identity mappings
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* present.
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*/
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movq %rax, %cr3
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/* Branch to the common startup code at its kernel virtual address */
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ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
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jmp *0f(%rip)
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SYM_CODE_END(startup_64)
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__INITRODATA
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0: .quad common_startup_64
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.text
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SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
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UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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/*
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* At this point the CPU runs in 64bit mode CS.L = 1 CS.D = 0,
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* and someone has loaded a mapped page table.
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*
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* We come here either from startup_64 (using physical addresses)
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* or from trampoline.S (using virtual addresses).
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*
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* Using virtual addresses from trampoline.S removes the need
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* to have any identity mapped pages in the kernel page table
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* after the boot processor executes this code.
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*/
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/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
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call verify_cpu
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/*
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* The secondary_startup_64_no_verify entry point is only used by
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* SEV-ES guests. In those guests the call to verify_cpu() would cause
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* #VC exceptions which can not be handled at this stage of secondary
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* CPU bringup.
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*
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* All non SEV-ES systems, especially Intel systems, need to execute
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* verify_cpu() above to make sure NX is enabled.
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*/
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SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
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UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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/* Clear %R15 which holds the boot_params pointer on the boot CPU */
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xorl %r15d, %r15d
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/* Derive the runtime physical address of init_top_pgt[] */
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movq phys_base(%rip), %rax
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addq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
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/*
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* Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be
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* added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3.
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*/
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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addq sme_me_mask(%rip), %rax
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#endif
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/*
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* Switch to the init_top_pgt here, away from the trampoline_pgd and
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* unmap the identity mapped ranges.
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*/
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movq %rax, %cr3
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SYM_INNER_LABEL(common_startup_64, SYM_L_LOCAL)
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UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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/*
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* Create a mask of CR4 bits to preserve. Omit PGE in order to flush
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* global 1:1 translations from the TLBs.
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*
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* From the SDM:
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* "If CR4.PGE is changing from 0 to 1, there were no global TLB
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* entries before the execution; if CR4.PGE is changing from 1 to 0,
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* there will be no global TLB entries after the execution."
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*/
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movl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %edx
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
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/*
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* Preserve CR4.MCE if the kernel will enable #MC support.
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* Clearing MCE may fault in some environments (that also force #MC
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* support). Any machine check that occurs before #MC support is fully
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* configured will crash the system regardless of the CR4.MCE value set
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* here.
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*/
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orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %edx
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#endif
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movq %cr4, %rcx
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andl %edx, %ecx
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/* Even if ignored in long mode, set PSE uniformly on all logical CPUs. */
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btsl $X86_CR4_PSE_BIT, %ecx
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movq %rcx, %cr4
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/*
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* Set CR4.PGE to re-enable global translations.
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*/
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btsl $X86_CR4_PGE_BIT, %ecx
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movq %rcx, %cr4
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#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
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/*
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* For parallel boot, the APIC ID is read from the APIC, and then
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* used to look up the CPU number. For booting a single CPU, the
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* CPU number is encoded in smpboot_control.
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*
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* Bit 31 STARTUP_READ_APICID (Read APICID from APIC)
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* Bit 0-23 CPU# if STARTUP_xx flags are not set
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*/
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movl smpboot_control(%rip), %ecx
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testl $STARTUP_READ_APICID, %ecx
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jnz .Lread_apicid
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/*
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* No control bit set, single CPU bringup. CPU number is provided
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* in bit 0-23. This is also the boot CPU case (CPU number 0).
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*/
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andl $(~STARTUP_PARALLEL_MASK), %ecx
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jmp .Lsetup_cpu
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.Lread_apicid:
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/* Check whether X2APIC mode is already enabled */
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mov $MSR_IA32_APICBASE, %ecx
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rdmsr
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testl $X2APIC_ENABLE, %eax
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jnz .Lread_apicid_msr
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X2APIC
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/*
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* If system is in X2APIC mode then MMIO base might not be
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* mapped causing the MMIO read below to fault. Faults can't
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* be handled at that point.
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*/
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cmpl $0, x2apic_mode(%rip)
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jz .Lread_apicid_mmio
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/* Force the AP into X2APIC mode. */
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orl $X2APIC_ENABLE, %eax
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wrmsr
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jmp .Lread_apicid_msr
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#endif
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.Lread_apicid_mmio:
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/* Read the APIC ID from the fix-mapped MMIO space. */
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movq apic_mmio_base(%rip), %rcx
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addq $APIC_ID, %rcx
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movl (%rcx), %eax
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shr $24, %eax
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jmp .Llookup_AP
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.Lread_apicid_msr:
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mov $APIC_X2APIC_ID_MSR, %ecx
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rdmsr
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.Llookup_AP:
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/* EAX contains the APIC ID of the current CPU */
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xorl %ecx, %ecx
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leaq cpuid_to_apicid(%rip), %rbx
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.Lfind_cpunr:
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cmpl (%rbx,%rcx,4), %eax
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jz .Lsetup_cpu
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inc %ecx
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#ifdef CONFIG_FORCE_NR_CPUS
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cmpl $NR_CPUS, %ecx
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#else
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cmpl nr_cpu_ids(%rip), %ecx
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#endif
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jb .Lfind_cpunr
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/* APIC ID not found in the table. Drop the trampoline lock and bail. */
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movq trampoline_lock(%rip), %rax
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movl $0, (%rax)
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1: cli
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hlt
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jmp 1b
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.Lsetup_cpu:
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/* Get the per cpu offset for the given CPU# which is in ECX */
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movq __per_cpu_offset(,%rcx,8), %rdx
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#else
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xorl %edx, %edx /* zero-extended to clear all of RDX */
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#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
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/*
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* Setup a boot time stack - Any secondary CPU will have lost its stack
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* by now because the cr3-switch above unmaps the real-mode stack.
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*
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* RDX contains the per-cpu offset
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*/
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movq pcpu_hot + X86_current_task(%rdx), %rax
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movq TASK_threadsp(%rax), %rsp
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/*
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* Now that this CPU is running on its own stack, drop the realmode
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* protection. For the boot CPU the pointer is NULL!
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*/
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movq trampoline_lock(%rip), %rax
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testq %rax, %rax
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jz .Lsetup_gdt
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movl $0, (%rax)
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.Lsetup_gdt:
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/*
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* We must switch to a new descriptor in kernel space for the GDT
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* because soon the kernel won't have access anymore to the userspace
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* addresses where we're currently running on. We have to do that here
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* because in 32bit we couldn't load a 64bit linear address.
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*/
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subq $16, %rsp
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movw $(GDT_SIZE-1), (%rsp)
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leaq gdt_page(%rdx), %rax
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movq %rax, 2(%rsp)
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lgdt (%rsp)
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addq $16, %rsp
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/* set up data segments */
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xorl %eax,%eax
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movl %eax,%ds
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movl %eax,%ss
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movl %eax,%es
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/*
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* We don't really need to load %fs or %gs, but load them anyway
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* to kill any stale realmode selectors. This allows execution
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* under VT hardware.
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*/
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movl %eax,%fs
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movl %eax,%gs
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/* Set up %gs.
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*
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* The base of %gs always points to fixed_percpu_data. If the
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* stack protector canary is enabled, it is located at %gs:40.
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* Note that, on SMP, the boot cpu uses init data section until
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* the per cpu areas are set up.
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*/
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movl $MSR_GS_BASE,%ecx
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#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
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leaq INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data)(%rip), %rdx
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#endif
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movl %edx, %eax
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shrq $32, %rdx
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wrmsr
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/* Setup and Load IDT */
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call early_setup_idt
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/* Check if nx is implemented */
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movl $0x80000001, %eax
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cpuid
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movl %edx,%edi
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/* Setup EFER (Extended Feature Enable Register) */
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movl $MSR_EFER, %ecx
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rdmsr
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/*
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* Preserve current value of EFER for comparison and to skip
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* EFER writes if no change was made (for TDX guest)
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*/
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movl %eax, %edx
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btsl $_EFER_SCE, %eax /* Enable System Call */
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btl $20,%edi /* No Execute supported? */
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jnc 1f
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btsl $_EFER_NX, %eax
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btsq $_PAGE_BIT_NX,early_pmd_flags(%rip)
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/* Avoid writing EFER if no change was made (for TDX guest) */
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1: cmpl %edx, %eax
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je 1f
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xor %edx, %edx
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wrmsr /* Make changes effective */
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1:
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/* Setup cr0 */
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movl $CR0_STATE, %eax
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/* Make changes effective */
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movq %rax, %cr0
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/* zero EFLAGS after setting rsp */
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pushq $0
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popfq
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/* Pass the boot_params pointer as first argument */
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movq %r15, %rdi
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.Ljump_to_C_code:
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xorl %ebp, %ebp # clear frame pointer
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ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
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callq *initial_code(%rip)
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ud2
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SYM_CODE_END(secondary_startup_64)
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#include "verify_cpu.S"
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#include "sev_verify_cbit.S"
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#if defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU) && defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)
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/*
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* Entry point for soft restart of a CPU. Invoked from xxx_play_dead() for
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* restarting the boot CPU or for restarting SEV guest CPUs after CPU hot
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* unplug. Everything is set up already except the stack.
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*/
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SYM_CODE_START(soft_restart_cpu)
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
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/* Find the idle task stack */
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movq PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_current_task), %rcx
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movq TASK_threadsp(%rcx), %rsp
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jmp .Ljump_to_C_code
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SYM_CODE_END(soft_restart_cpu)
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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/*
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* VC Exception handler used during early boot when running on kernel
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* addresses, but before the switch to the idt_table can be made.
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* The early_idt_handler_array can't be used here because it calls into a lot
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* of __init code and this handler is also used during CPU offlining/onlining.
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* Therefore this handler ends up in the .text section so that it stays around
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* when .init.text is freed.
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*/
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SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_boot_ghcb)
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UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
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ENDBR
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/* Build pt_regs */
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PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
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/* Call C handler */
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movq %rsp, %rdi
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movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi
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movq initial_vc_handler(%rip), %rax
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ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
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call *%rax
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/* Unwind pt_regs */
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POP_REGS
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/* Remove Error Code */
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addq $8, %rsp
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iretq
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SYM_CODE_END(vc_boot_ghcb)
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#endif
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/* Both SMP bootup and ACPI suspend change these variables */
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__REFDATA
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.balign 8
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SYM_DATA(initial_code, .quad x86_64_start_kernel)
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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SYM_DATA(initial_vc_handler, .quad handle_vc_boot_ghcb)
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#endif
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SYM_DATA(trampoline_lock, .quad 0);
|
|
__FINITDATA
|
|
|
|
__INIT
|
|
SYM_CODE_START(early_idt_handler_array)
|
|
i = 0
|
|
.rept NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS
|
|
.if ((EXCEPTION_ERRCODE_MASK >> i) & 1) == 0
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
|
|
ENDBR
|
|
pushq $0 # Dummy error code, to make stack frame uniform
|
|
.else
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
|
|
ENDBR
|
|
.endif
|
|
pushq $i # 72(%rsp) Vector number
|
|
jmp early_idt_handler_common
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
|
|
i = i + 1
|
|
.fill early_idt_handler_array + i*EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE - ., 1, 0xcc
|
|
.endr
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(early_idt_handler_array)
|
|
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR // early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS]
|
|
|
|
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(early_idt_handler_common)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=16
|
|
/*
|
|
* The stack is the hardware frame, an error code or zero, and the
|
|
* vector number.
|
|
*/
|
|
cld
|
|
|
|
incl early_recursion_flag(%rip)
|
|
|
|
/* The vector number is currently in the pt_regs->di slot. */
|
|
pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */
|
|
movq 8(%rsp), %rsi /* RSI = vector number */
|
|
movq %rdi, 8(%rsp) /* pt_regs->di = RDI */
|
|
pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
|
|
pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->cx */
|
|
pushq %rax /* pt_regs->ax */
|
|
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r8 */
|
|
pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */
|
|
pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */
|
|
pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */
|
|
pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->bx */
|
|
pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->bp */
|
|
pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */
|
|
pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */
|
|
pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */
|
|
pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
|
|
|
|
movq %rsp,%rdi /* RDI = pt_regs; RSI is already trapnr */
|
|
call do_early_exception
|
|
|
|
decl early_recursion_flag(%rip)
|
|
jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(early_idt_handler_common)
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
|
|
/*
|
|
* VC Exception handler used during very early boot. The
|
|
* early_idt_handler_array can't be used because it returns via the
|
|
* paravirtualized INTERRUPT_RETURN and pv-ops don't work that early.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX it does, fix this.
|
|
*
|
|
* This handler will end up in the .init.text section and not be
|
|
* available to boot secondary CPUs.
|
|
*/
|
|
SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_no_ghcb)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
|
|
ENDBR
|
|
|
|
/* Build pt_regs */
|
|
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
|
|
|
|
/* Call C handler */
|
|
movq %rsp, %rdi
|
|
movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi
|
|
call do_vc_no_ghcb
|
|
|
|
/* Unwind pt_regs */
|
|
POP_REGS
|
|
|
|
/* Remove Error Code */
|
|
addq $8, %rsp
|
|
|
|
/* Pure iret required here - don't use INTERRUPT_RETURN */
|
|
iretq
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(vc_no_ghcb)
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
|
|
/*
|
|
* Each PGD needs to be 8k long and 8k aligned. We do not
|
|
* ever go out to userspace with these, so we do not
|
|
* strictly *need* the second page, but this allows us to
|
|
* have a single set_pgd() implementation that does not
|
|
* need to worry about whether it has 4k or 8k to work
|
|
* with.
|
|
*
|
|
* This ensures PGDs are 8k long:
|
|
*/
|
|
#define PTI_USER_PGD_FILL 512
|
|
/* This ensures they are 8k-aligned: */
|
|
#define SYM_DATA_START_PTI_ALIGNED(name) \
|
|
SYM_START(name, SYM_L_GLOBAL, .balign 2 * PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
#else
|
|
#define SYM_DATA_START_PTI_ALIGNED(name) \
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(name)
|
|
#define PTI_USER_PGD_FILL 0
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
__INITDATA
|
|
.balign 4
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PTI_ALIGNED(early_top_pgt)
|
|
.fill 511,8,0
|
|
.quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
.fill PTI_USER_PGD_FILL,8,0
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(early_top_pgt)
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(early_dynamic_pgts)
|
|
.fill 512*EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES,8,0
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(early_dynamic_pgts)
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA(early_recursion_flag, .long 0)
|
|
|
|
.data
|
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_PV) || defined(CONFIG_PVH)
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PTI_ALIGNED(init_top_pgt)
|
|
.quad level3_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
.org init_top_pgt + L4_PAGE_OFFSET*8, 0
|
|
.quad level3_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
.org init_top_pgt + L4_START_KERNEL*8, 0
|
|
/* (2^48-(2*1024*1024*1024))/(2^39) = 511 */
|
|
.quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
.fill PTI_USER_PGD_FILL,8,0
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(init_top_pgt)
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level3_ident_pgt)
|
|
.quad level2_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
.fill 511, 8, 0
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level3_ident_pgt)
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level2_ident_pgt)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since I easily can, map the first 1G.
|
|
* Don't set NX because code runs from these pages.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: This sets _PAGE_GLOBAL despite whether
|
|
* the CPU supports it or it is enabled. But,
|
|
* the CPU should ignore the bit.
|
|
*/
|
|
PMDS(0, __PAGE_KERNEL_IDENT_LARGE_EXEC, PTRS_PER_PMD)
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level2_ident_pgt)
|
|
#else
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PTI_ALIGNED(init_top_pgt)
|
|
.fill 512,8,0
|
|
.fill PTI_USER_PGD_FILL,8,0
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(init_top_pgt)
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level4_kernel_pgt)
|
|
.fill 511,8,0
|
|
.quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level4_kernel_pgt)
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level3_kernel_pgt)
|
|
.fill L3_START_KERNEL,8,0
|
|
/* (2^48-(2*1024*1024*1024)-((2^39)*511))/(2^30) = 510 */
|
|
.quad level2_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
.quad level2_fixmap_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level3_kernel_pgt)
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level2_kernel_pgt)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Kernel high mapping.
|
|
*
|
|
* The kernel code+data+bss must be located below KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE in
|
|
* virtual address space, which is 1 GiB if RANDOMIZE_BASE is enabled,
|
|
* 512 MiB otherwise.
|
|
*
|
|
* (NOTE: after that starts the module area, see MODULES_VADDR.)
|
|
*
|
|
* This table is eventually used by the kernel during normal runtime.
|
|
* Care must be taken to clear out undesired bits later, like _PAGE_RW
|
|
* or _PAGE_GLOBAL in some cases.
|
|
*/
|
|
PMDS(0, __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC, KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE/PMD_SIZE)
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level2_kernel_pgt)
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level2_fixmap_pgt)
|
|
.fill (512 - 4 - FIXMAP_PMD_NUM),8,0
|
|
pgtno = 0
|
|
.rept (FIXMAP_PMD_NUM)
|
|
.quad level1_fixmap_pgt + (pgtno << PAGE_SHIFT) - __START_KERNEL_map \
|
|
+ _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC;
|
|
pgtno = pgtno + 1
|
|
.endr
|
|
/* 6 MB reserved space + a 2MB hole */
|
|
.fill 4,8,0
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level2_fixmap_pgt)
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level1_fixmap_pgt)
|
|
.rept (FIXMAP_PMD_NUM)
|
|
.fill 512,8,0
|
|
.endr
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level1_fixmap_pgt)
|
|
|
|
.data
|
|
.align 16
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA(smpboot_control, .long 0)
|
|
|
|
.align 16
|
|
/* This must match the first entry in level2_kernel_pgt */
|
|
SYM_DATA(phys_base, .quad 0x0)
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(phys_base)
|
|
|
|
#include "../xen/xen-head.S"
|
|
|
|
__PAGE_ALIGNED_BSS
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(empty_zero_page)
|
|
.skip PAGE_SIZE
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(empty_zero_page)
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(empty_zero_page)
|
|
|