linux-stable/fs/fhandle.c
Christian Brauner 620c266f39 fhandle: relax open_by_handle_at() permission checks
A current limitation of open_by_handle_at() is that it's currently not possible
to use it from within containers at all because we require CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
in the initial namespace. That's unfortunate because there are scenarios where
using open_by_handle_at() from within containers.

Two examples:

(1) cgroupfs allows to encode cgroups to file handles and reopen them with
    open_by_handle_at().
(2) Fanotify allows placing filesystem watches they currently aren't usable in
    containers because the returned file handles cannot be used.

Here's a proposal for relaxing the permission check for open_by_handle_at().

(1) Opening file handles when the caller has privileges over the filesystem
    (1.1) The caller has an unobstructed view of the filesystem.
    (1.2) The caller has permissions to follow a path to the file handle.

This doesn't address the problem of opening a file handle when only a portion
of a filesystem is exposed as is common in containers by e.g., bind-mounting a
subtree. The proposal to solve this use-case is:

(2) Opening file handles when the caller has privileges over a subtree
    (2.1) The caller is able to reach the file from the provided mount fd.
    (2.2) The caller has permissions to construct an unobstructed path to the
          file handle.
    (2.3) The caller has permissions to follow a path to the file handle.

The relaxed permission checks are currently restricted to directory file
handles which are what both cgroupfs and fanotify need. Handling disconnected
non-directory file handles would lead to a potentially non-deterministic api.
If a disconnected non-directory file handle is provided we may fail to decode
a valid path that we could use for permission checking. That in itself isn't a
problem as we would just return EACCES in that case. However, confusion may
arise if a non-disconnected dentry ends up in the cache later and those opening
the file handle would suddenly succeed.

* It's potentially possible to use timing information (side-channel) to infer
  whether a given inode exists. I don't think that's particularly
  problematic. Thanks to Jann for bringing this to my attention.

* An unrelated note (IOW, these are thoughts that apply to
  open_by_handle_at() generically and are unrelated to the changes here):
  Jann pointed out that we should verify whether deleted files could
  potentially be reopened through open_by_handle_at(). I don't think that's
  possible though.

  Another potential thing to check is whether open_by_handle_at() could be
  abused to open internal stuff like memfds or gpu stuff. I don't think so
  but I haven't had the time to completely verify this.

This dates back to discussions Amir and I had quite some time ago and thanks to
him for providing a lot of details around the export code and related patches!

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240524-vfs-open_by_handle_at-v1-1-3d4b7d22736b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-05-28 15:57:23 +02:00

384 lines
10 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/exportfs.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "mount.h"
static long do_sys_name_to_handle(const struct path *path,
struct file_handle __user *ufh,
int __user *mnt_id, int fh_flags)
{
long retval;
struct file_handle f_handle;
int handle_dwords, handle_bytes;
struct file_handle *handle = NULL;
/*
* We need to make sure whether the file system support decoding of
* the file handle if decodeable file handle was requested.
*/
if (!exportfs_can_encode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb->s_export_op, fh_flags))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (copy_from_user(&f_handle, ufh, sizeof(struct file_handle)))
return -EFAULT;
if (f_handle.handle_bytes > MAX_HANDLE_SZ)
return -EINVAL;
handle = kzalloc(struct_size(handle, f_handle, f_handle.handle_bytes),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!handle)
return -ENOMEM;
/* convert handle size to multiple of sizeof(u32) */
handle_dwords = f_handle.handle_bytes >> 2;
/* we ask for a non connectable maybe decodeable file handle */
retval = exportfs_encode_fh(path->dentry,
(struct fid *)handle->f_handle,
&handle_dwords, fh_flags);
handle->handle_type = retval;
/* convert handle size to bytes */
handle_bytes = handle_dwords * sizeof(u32);
handle->handle_bytes = handle_bytes;
if ((handle->handle_bytes > f_handle.handle_bytes) ||
(retval == FILEID_INVALID) || (retval < 0)) {
/* As per old exportfs_encode_fh documentation
* we could return ENOSPC to indicate overflow
* But file system returned 255 always. So handle
* both the values
*/
if (retval == FILEID_INVALID || retval == -ENOSPC)
retval = -EOVERFLOW;
/*
* set the handle size to zero so we copy only
* non variable part of the file_handle
*/
handle_bytes = 0;
} else
retval = 0;
/* copy the mount id */
if (put_user(real_mount(path->mnt)->mnt_id, mnt_id) ||
copy_to_user(ufh, handle,
struct_size(handle, f_handle, handle_bytes)))
retval = -EFAULT;
kfree(handle);
return retval;
}
/**
* sys_name_to_handle_at: convert name to handle
* @dfd: directory relative to which name is interpreted if not absolute
* @name: name that should be converted to handle.
* @handle: resulting file handle
* @mnt_id: mount id of the file system containing the file
* @flag: flag value to indicate whether to follow symlink or not
* and whether a decodable file handle is required.
*
* @handle->handle_size indicate the space available to store the
* variable part of the file handle in bytes. If there is not
* enough space, the field is updated to return the minimum
* value required.
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(name_to_handle_at, int, dfd, const char __user *, name,
struct file_handle __user *, handle, int __user *, mnt_id,
int, flag)
{
struct path path;
int lookup_flags;
int fh_flags;
int err;
if (flag & ~(AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_HANDLE_FID))
return -EINVAL;
lookup_flags = (flag & AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW) ? LOOKUP_FOLLOW : 0;
fh_flags = (flag & AT_HANDLE_FID) ? EXPORT_FH_FID : 0;
if (flag & AT_EMPTY_PATH)
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_EMPTY;
err = user_path_at(dfd, name, lookup_flags, &path);
if (!err) {
err = do_sys_name_to_handle(&path, handle, mnt_id, fh_flags);
path_put(&path);
}
return err;
}
static int get_path_from_fd(int fd, struct path *root)
{
if (fd == AT_FDCWD) {
struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
spin_lock(&fs->lock);
*root = fs->pwd;
path_get(root);
spin_unlock(&fs->lock);
} else {
struct fd f = fdget(fd);
if (!f.file)
return -EBADF;
*root = f.file->f_path;
path_get(root);
fdput(f);
}
return 0;
}
enum handle_to_path_flags {
HANDLE_CHECK_PERMS = (1 << 0),
HANDLE_CHECK_SUBTREE = (1 << 1),
};
struct handle_to_path_ctx {
struct path root;
enum handle_to_path_flags flags;
unsigned int fh_flags;
};
static int vfs_dentry_acceptable(void *context, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx = context;
struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
struct dentry *d, *root = ctx->root.dentry;
struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(ctx->root.mnt);
int retval = 0;
if (!root)
return 1;
/* Old permission model with global CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH. */
if (!ctx->flags)
return 1;
/*
* It's racy as we're not taking rename_lock but we're able to ignore
* permissions and we just need an approximation whether we were able
* to follow a path to the file.
*
* It's also potentially expensive on some filesystems especially if
* there is a deep path.
*/
d = dget(dentry);
while (d != root && !IS_ROOT(d)) {
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(d);
/*
* We know that we have the ability to override DAC permissions
* as we've verified this earlier via CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH. But
* we also need to make sure that there aren't any unmapped
* inodes in the path that would prevent us from reaching the
* file.
*/
if (!privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, idmap,
d_inode(parent))) {
dput(d);
dput(parent);
return retval;
}
dput(d);
d = parent;
}
if (!(ctx->flags & HANDLE_CHECK_SUBTREE) || d == root)
retval = 1;
WARN_ON_ONCE(d != root && d != root->d_sb->s_root);
dput(d);
return retval;
}
static int do_handle_to_path(struct file_handle *handle, struct path *path,
struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx)
{
int handle_dwords;
struct vfsmount *mnt = ctx->root.mnt;
/* change the handle size to multiple of sizeof(u32) */
handle_dwords = handle->handle_bytes >> 2;
path->dentry = exportfs_decode_fh_raw(mnt,
(struct fid *)handle->f_handle,
handle_dwords, handle->handle_type,
ctx->fh_flags,
vfs_dentry_acceptable, ctx);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(path->dentry)) {
if (path->dentry == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM))
return -ENOMEM;
return -ESTALE;
}
path->mnt = mntget(mnt);
return 0;
}
/*
* Allow relaxed permissions of file handles if the caller has the
* ability to mount the filesystem or create a bind-mount of the
* provided @mountdirfd.
*
* In both cases the caller may be able to get an unobstructed way to
* the encoded file handle. If the caller is only able to create a
* bind-mount we need to verify that there are no locked mounts on top
* of it that could prevent us from getting to the encoded file.
*
* In principle, locked mounts can prevent the caller from mounting the
* filesystem but that only applies to procfs and sysfs neither of which
* support decoding file handles.
*/
static inline bool may_decode_fh(struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx,
unsigned int o_flags)
{
struct path *root = &ctx->root;
/*
* Restrict to O_DIRECTORY to provide a deterministic API that avoids a
* confusing api in the face of disconnected non-dir dentries.
*
* There's only one dentry for each directory inode (VFS rule)...
*/
if (!(o_flags & O_DIRECTORY))
return false;
if (ns_capable(root->mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
ctx->flags = HANDLE_CHECK_PERMS;
else if (is_mounted(root->mnt) &&
ns_capable(real_mount(root->mnt)->mnt_ns->user_ns,
CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
!has_locked_children(real_mount(root->mnt), root->dentry))
ctx->flags = HANDLE_CHECK_PERMS | HANDLE_CHECK_SUBTREE;
else
return false;
/* Are we able to override DAC permissions? */
if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return false;
ctx->fh_flags = EXPORT_FH_DIR_ONLY;
return true;
}
static int handle_to_path(int mountdirfd, struct file_handle __user *ufh,
struct path *path, unsigned int o_flags)
{
int retval = 0;
struct file_handle f_handle;
struct file_handle *handle = NULL;
struct handle_to_path_ctx ctx = {};
retval = get_path_from_fd(mountdirfd, &ctx.root);
if (retval)
goto out_err;
if (!capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) && !may_decode_fh(&ctx, o_flags)) {
retval = -EPERM;
goto out_path;
}
if (copy_from_user(&f_handle, ufh, sizeof(struct file_handle))) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out_path;
}
if ((f_handle.handle_bytes > MAX_HANDLE_SZ) ||
(f_handle.handle_bytes == 0)) {
retval = -EINVAL;
goto out_path;
}
handle = kmalloc(struct_size(handle, f_handle, f_handle.handle_bytes),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!handle) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto out_path;
}
/* copy the full handle */
*handle = f_handle;
if (copy_from_user(&handle->f_handle,
&ufh->f_handle,
f_handle.handle_bytes)) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out_handle;
}
retval = do_handle_to_path(handle, path, &ctx);
out_handle:
kfree(handle);
out_path:
path_put(&ctx.root);
out_err:
return retval;
}
static long do_handle_open(int mountdirfd, struct file_handle __user *ufh,
int open_flag)
{
long retval = 0;
struct path path;
struct file *file;
int fd;
retval = handle_to_path(mountdirfd, ufh, &path, open_flag);
if (retval)
return retval;
fd = get_unused_fd_flags(open_flag);
if (fd < 0) {
path_put(&path);
return fd;
}
file = file_open_root(&path, "", open_flag, 0);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
put_unused_fd(fd);
retval = PTR_ERR(file);
} else {
retval = fd;
fd_install(fd, file);
}
path_put(&path);
return retval;
}
/**
* sys_open_by_handle_at: Open the file handle
* @mountdirfd: directory file descriptor
* @handle: file handle to be opened
* @flags: open flags.
*
* @mountdirfd indicate the directory file descriptor
* of the mount point. file handle is decoded relative
* to the vfsmount pointed by the @mountdirfd. @flags
* value is same as the open(2) flags.
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(open_by_handle_at, int, mountdirfd,
struct file_handle __user *, handle,
int, flags)
{
long ret;
if (force_o_largefile())
flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
ret = do_handle_open(mountdirfd, handle, flags);
return ret;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
/*
* Exactly like fs/open.c:sys_open_by_handle_at(), except that it
* doesn't set the O_LARGEFILE flag.
*/
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(open_by_handle_at, int, mountdirfd,
struct file_handle __user *, handle, int, flags)
{
return do_handle_open(mountdirfd, handle, flags);
}
#endif