Documentation/security-bugs: Clarify treatment of embargoed information

The Linux kernel security team has been accused of rejecting the idea of
security embargoes. This is incorrect, and could dissuade people from
reporting security issues to us under the false assumption that the
issue would leak prematurely.

Clarify the handling of embargoed information in our process
documentation.

Co-developed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst

@@ -26,23 +26,34 @@ information is helpful.  Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
 be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
 made public.
 
-Disclosure
+Disclosure and embargoed information
-----------
+------------------------------------
 
-The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the bug
+The security list is not a disclosure channel.  For that, see Coordination
-submitter to understand and fix the bug.  We prefer to publish the fix as
+below.
-soon as possible, but try to avoid public discussion of the bug itself
-and leave that to others.
 
-Publishing the fix may be delayed when the bug or the fix is not yet
+Once a robust fix has been developed, our preference is to release the
-fully understood, the solution is not well-tested or for vendor
+fix in a timely fashion, treating it no differently than any of the other
-coordination.  However, we expect these delays to be short, measurable in
+thousands of changes and fixes the Linux kernel project releases every
-days, not weeks or months.  A release date is negotiated by the security
+month.
-team working with the bug submitter as well as vendors.  However, the
+
-kernel security team holds the final say when setting a timeframe.  The
+However, at the request of the reporter, we will postpone releasing the
-timeframe varies from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known bug)
+fix for up to 5 business days after the date of the report or after the
-to a few weeks.  As a basic default policy, we expect report date to
+embargo has lifted; whichever comes first.  The only exception to that
-release date to be on the order of 7 days.
+rule is if the bug is publicly known, in which case the preference is to
+release the fix as soon as it's available.
+
+Whilst embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
+order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
+the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
+reporter.  This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
+and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
+identity of the reporter.
+
+In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed.  All other
+information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
+of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
+lifted, in perpetuity.
 
 Coordination
 ------------
@@ -68,7 +79,7 @@ may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
 assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private
 linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known
 before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit
-message, though.
+message if the reporter agrees.
 
 Non-disclosure agreements
 -------------------------