firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data()

Now that security_post_load_data() is wired up, use it instead
of the NULL file argument style of security_post_read_file(),
and update the security_kernel_load_data() call to indicate that a
security_kernel_post_load_data() call is expected.

Wire up the IMA check to match earlier logic. Perhaps a generalized
change to ima_post_load_data() might look something like this:

    return process_buffer_measurement(buf, size,
                                      kernel_load_data_id_str(load_id),
                                      read_idmap[load_id] ?: FILE_CHECK,
                                      0, NULL);

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-10-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Kees Cook 2020-10-02 10:38:21 -07:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent b64fcae74b
commit 4f2d99b06b
3 changed files with 21 additions and 15 deletions

View File

@ -272,9 +272,9 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
dev_err(dev, "%s: map pages failed\n",
__func__);
else
rc = security_kernel_post_read_file(NULL,
fw_priv->data, fw_priv->size,
READING_FIRMWARE);
rc = security_kernel_post_load_data(fw_priv->data,
fw_priv->size,
LOADING_FIRMWARE, "blob");
/*
* Same logic as fw_load_abort, only the DONE bit
@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static bool fw_run_sysfs_fallback(u32 opt_flags)
return false;
/* Also permit LSMs and IMA to fail firmware sysfs fallback */
ret = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, false);
ret = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, true);
if (ret < 0)
return false;

View File

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ int firmware_fallback_platform(struct fw_priv *fw_priv, u32 opt_flags)
if (!(opt_flags & FW_OPT_FALLBACK_PLATFORM))
return -ENOENT;
rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, false);
rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, true);
if (rc)
return rc;
@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ int firmware_fallback_platform(struct fw_priv *fw_priv, u32 opt_flags)
if (fw_priv->data && size > fw_priv->allocated_size)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = security_kernel_post_load_data((u8 *)data, size, LOADING_FIRMWARE,
"platform");
if (rc)
return rc;
if (!fw_priv->data)
fw_priv->data = vmalloc(size);
if (!fw_priv->data)

View File

@ -648,15 +648,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
}
return 0;
}
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
return 0;
@ -706,7 +697,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
}
break;
case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE)) {
if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && !contents) {
pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
}
@ -742,6 +733,15 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
char *description)
{
if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
}
return 0;
}
return 0;
}