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perf/x86/hw_breakpoints: Improve range breakpoint validation
Range breakpoints will do the wrong thing if the address isn't aligned. While we're there, add comments about why it's safe for instruction breakpoints. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ae25d14d61f2f43b78e0a247e469f3072df7e201.1438312874.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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@ -291,8 +291,18 @@ static int arch_build_bp_info(struct perf_event *bp)
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break;
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break;
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#endif
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#endif
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default:
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default:
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/* AMD range breakpoint */
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if (!is_power_of_2(bp->attr.bp_len))
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if (!is_power_of_2(bp->attr.bp_len))
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return -EINVAL;
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return -EINVAL;
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if (bp->attr.bp_addr & (bp->attr.bp_len - 1))
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return -EINVAL;
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/*
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* It's impossible to use a range breakpoint to fake out
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* user vs kernel detection because bp_len - 1 can't
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* have the high bit set. If we ever allow range instruction
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* breakpoints, then we'll have to check for kprobe-blacklisted
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* addresses anywhere in the range.
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*/
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if (!cpu_has_bpext)
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if (!cpu_has_bpext)
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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info->mask = bp->attr.bp_len - 1;
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info->mask = bp->attr.bp_len - 1;
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