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netfilter: nf_tables: switch trans_elem to real flex array
When queueing a set element add or removal operation to the transaction log, check if the previous operation already asks for a the identical operation on the same set. If so, store the element reference in the preceding operation. This significantlty reduces memory consumption when many set add/delete operations appear in a single transaction. Example: 10k elements require 937kb of memory (10k allocations from kmalloc-96 slab). Assuming we can compact 4 elements in the same set, 468 kbytes are needed (64 bytes for base struct, nft_trans_elemn, 32 bytes for nft_trans_one_elem structure, so 2500 allocations from kmalloc-192 slab). For large batch updates we can compact up to 62 elements into one single nft_trans_elem structure (~65% mem reduction): (64 bytes for base struct, nft_trans_elem, 32 byte for nft_trans_one_elem struct). We can halve size of nft_trans_one_elem struct by moving timeout/expire/update_flags into a dynamically allocated structure, this allows to store 124 elements in a 2k slab nft_trans_elem struct. This is done in a followup patch. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
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#define NFT_MODULE_AUTOLOAD_LIMIT (MODULE_NAME_LEN - sizeof("nft-expr-255-"))
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#define NFT_SET_MAX_ANONLEN 16
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/* limit compaction to avoid huge kmalloc/krealloc sizes. */
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#define NFT_MAX_SET_NELEMS ((2048 - sizeof(struct nft_trans_elem)) / sizeof(struct nft_trans_one_elem))
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unsigned int nf_tables_net_id __read_mostly;
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static LIST_HEAD(nf_tables_expressions);
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@ -391,6 +394,86 @@ static void nf_tables_unregister_hook(struct net *net,
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return __nf_tables_unregister_hook(net, table, chain, false);
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}
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static bool nft_trans_collapse_set_elem_allowed(const struct nft_trans_elem *a, const struct nft_trans_elem *b)
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{
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/* NB: the ->bound equality check is defensive, at this time we only merge
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* a new nft_trans_elem transaction request with the transaction tail
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* element, but a->bound != b->bound would imply a NEWRULE transaction
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* is queued in-between.
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*
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* The set check is mandatory, the NFT_MAX_SET_NELEMS check prevents
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* huge krealloc() requests.
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*/
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return a->set == b->set && a->bound == b->bound && a->nelems < NFT_MAX_SET_NELEMS;
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}
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static bool nft_trans_collapse_set_elem(struct nftables_pernet *nft_net,
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struct nft_trans_elem *tail,
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struct nft_trans_elem *trans,
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gfp_t gfp)
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{
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unsigned int nelems, old_nelems = tail->nelems;
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struct nft_trans_elem *new_trans;
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if (!nft_trans_collapse_set_elem_allowed(tail, trans))
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return false;
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/* "cannot happen", at this time userspace element add
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* requests always allocate a new transaction element.
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*
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* This serves as a reminder to adjust the list_add_tail
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* logic below in case this ever changes.
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*/
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(trans->nelems != 1))
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return false;
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if (check_add_overflow(old_nelems, trans->nelems, &nelems))
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return false;
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/* krealloc might free tail which invalidates list pointers */
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list_del_init(&tail->nft_trans.list);
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new_trans = krealloc(tail, struct_size(tail, elems, nelems), gfp);
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if (!new_trans) {
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list_add_tail(&tail->nft_trans.list, &nft_net->commit_list);
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return false;
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}
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/*
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* new_trans->nft_trans.list contains garbage, but
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* list_add_tail() doesn't care.
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*/
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new_trans->nelems = nelems;
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new_trans->elems[old_nelems] = trans->elems[0];
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list_add_tail(&new_trans->nft_trans.list, &nft_net->commit_list);
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return true;
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}
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static bool nft_trans_try_collapse(struct nftables_pernet *nft_net,
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struct nft_trans *trans, gfp_t gfp)
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{
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struct nft_trans *tail;
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if (list_empty(&nft_net->commit_list))
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return false;
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tail = list_last_entry(&nft_net->commit_list, struct nft_trans, list);
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if (tail->msg_type != trans->msg_type)
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return false;
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switch (trans->msg_type) {
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case NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM:
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case NFT_MSG_DELSETELEM:
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return nft_trans_collapse_set_elem(nft_net,
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nft_trans_container_elem(tail),
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nft_trans_container_elem(trans), gfp);
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}
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return false;
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}
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static void nft_trans_commit_list_add_tail(struct net *net, struct nft_trans *trans)
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{
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struct nftables_pernet *nft_net = nft_pernet(net);
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@ -424,11 +507,18 @@ static void nft_trans_commit_list_add_tail(struct net *net, struct nft_trans *tr
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static void nft_trans_commit_list_add_elem(struct net *net, struct nft_trans *trans,
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gfp_t gfp)
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{
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struct nftables_pernet *nft_net = nft_pernet(net);
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WARN_ON_ONCE(trans->msg_type != NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM &&
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trans->msg_type != NFT_MSG_DELSETELEM);
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might_alloc(gfp);
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if (nft_trans_try_collapse(nft_net, trans, gfp)) {
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kfree(trans);
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return;
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}
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nft_trans_commit_list_add_tail(net, trans);
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}
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